CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/06/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03163339
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: June 4, 1959

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4 June 1959
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
6
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4 JUNE 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Guided Missile and Astronautics In-
telligence Committee statement on
30 May Tyura Tam test firing -- see
page 1.
Gromyko insists UK and USSR as co-
chairmen of 1954 Indochina settlement
must discuss Laotian crisis.
USSR may call Balkan "summit" meet-
ing to discuss denuclearized Balkan-
Adriatic zone.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
New Rhee Line fishing boat incident
will heighten Japanese - South Korean
tension.
'Djakarta alarmed over plans by dis-
sident leaders to visit Tokyo while
Sukarno is there.
Nehru, concerned over Nepal's grow-
ing diplomatic ties, to visit Katmandu
next week.
Turkish Government leaders split on
degree of repression to be applied to
opposition and press.
IIL THE WEST
CI Nicaraguan capital remains quiet
under martial law but general strike
continues.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 June 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR Missile Testing: Conclusions of the Guided Mis-
sile andAstronautics Intelligence Committee on
test firing at rvura Tam Missile Test Range.
Page 1)
*USSR_ Laos: Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 1
June insisted that The USSR and UK, as cochairmen of the
1954 Geneva agreements for Indochina, discuss the Laotian
crisis. This is Moscow's strongest move to date in support
of North Vietnam's campaign to reconvene the International
Control Commission for Laos. The Foreign Office has ad-
vised Lloyd to resist efforts to reconvene the ICC-.)
Watch Committee conclusion�Berlin:(So significant in-
dications bearing on the possibility of hostilities)
USSR: Moscow and its Balkan satellites may be planning
to follow up Khrushchev's threats to establish missile bases in
Albania with a call for a regional conference, including Yugo-
slavia, Greece, Turkey, and Italy, to discuss the creation of
a denuclearized zone in the Balkan and Adriatic area. Khrushchev's
speech of 30 May in Tirana and the Soviet-Albanian joint statement
recalled Rumanian Premier Stoicays proposal in November 1957 for
such a conference. According to TASS, the USSR and Albania pro-
pose to call a Balkan-Adriatic "summit" meeting to "discuss ur-
gent questions and turn the Balkans into a denuclearized zone."
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
South Korea - Japan: Existing tension between Japan and
South Korea over Tokyo's negotiations with Pyongyang regard-
ing the repatriation of Koreans in Japan will be heightened
by. a new fisheries incident. According to a Japanese report,
a South Korean patrol boat reportedly has fired on a Japanese
patrol ship attempting to obtain the release of a Japanese fish-
ing boat taken in custody by the South Korean Coast Guard.
This is the first time a South Korean ship has fired on Japanese
patrol craft since March 1958.
II *Indonesia:
several Indonesian dissident leaders, including ex-Colonel
Kawilarang, former military attache in Washington, plan to leave
Manila soon for Taipei and Tokyo. President Sukarno is to visit
Japan from 6 to 19 June. While Djakarta, out of concern for
Sukarno's safety, has asked that the Japanese security service
be alerted, the nature of the dissident group suggests that this
step is largely. routine. The group may plan some approach to
Sukarno to suggest a negotiated settlement of the rebellion
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Nepal: Communist China's ambassador to New Delhi, who
is also accredited to Nepal, was in Katmandu on 1 June, possibly
to urge the establishment of a resident diplomatic mission. Nepal
agreed in April to the opening of a Soviet embassy in Katmandu.
Indian Prime Minister Nehru, who plans to go to Katmandu on 11
June, will probably attempt to discourage Nepal from increasing
its ties with the outside world too rapidly.
(Page 4)
Turkey: A serious split has apparently developed within
the ruling Democratic party and between President Bayar and
Prime Minister Menderes over the degree of repression to be
exerted against the press and the political opposition. Menderes
has made it clear to press leaders that Bayar is the leading ex-
ponent of the tough line. Menderes, who may feel that he can
strengthen his political position by a more moderate government ap-
proach, appears to be in a strong position to ease repression and
also to maintain his control. (Page 5)
4 June 59
DAILY BRIEF
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Watch Committee conclusion�Asia-Africa: (Situations
susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action
which would jeopardize US interests exist in Laos and in the
Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Iran. The situation in
the Middle East remains precarious, but a deliberate initia-
tion of ,large-scale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate
future.)
Iraq:( Despite some indications of cooling relations between
Qasim an the Iraqi. Communists, Qasim has not taken effective
measures to reduce Communist influence.)
III. THE WEST
*Nicaragua: Opposition elements in Managua remain out-
wardly quiescent under martial law, although the general strike,
called by united opposition elements to obtain political as well
as economic concessions from the regime, has curtailed most
business activity. The small invasion from Costa Rica has not
attract
ed much support, but its failure would not end the threat
to government Stability, since opposition businessmen participat-
ing in the strike seem determined to hold out. The Organization
of American States has postponed until 4 June action on the Nic-
araguan Government's request for intervention by the OAS
Council to prevent further attacks on Nicara
aries based in other American countri
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4 June 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC
GMAIC Statement on 30 May Test Firing at Tyura Tam
The Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Commit-
tee on 3 June submitted to the United States Intelligence Board
the following conclusions on the 30 May Soviet missile test at
Tyura Tam:
1. At about 1742 EDT, Saturday, 30 May, the USSR
launched another vehicle from the Tyura Tam Missile Test
Range. There are several features of this activity that make
it difficult to state with conviction what type of vehicle it was and
its purpose. However, based primarily on subtleties in the
firing sequence and the observed trajectory, �we believe this
was a successful test ICBM.
2. ELINT indicates that the time of flight was consider-
ably greater than usual. Preliminary analysis of RADINT with
other data indicates that the vehicle went considerably farther
than the Kamchatka Peninsula, to a total range of perhaps
4000-5500 nautical miles. This is the first time a vehicle
has been launched to a range greater than approximately 3500
n. m. A firing to such a range would be expected in the Soviet
ICBM test program.
3. In connection with this firing, other data must be con-
sidered,
in the direction of the test vehicle at the
time, a luminous glow starting nine minutes after launch
This could not have been an explosion
is compatible with an ioniza-
tion type experiment, such as the USSR has conducted in vertical
firings at Kapustin Yar, and had, probably for observation pur-
poses, in the lunar probe of 2 January 1959.
On two previous test firings from Tyura Tam, 17 Febru-
ary and 30 March 1959, similar luminous balls were seen at
the time the test vehicles were in generally similar locations.
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It is believed that these three sightings of luminescent
balls were probably of ionization experiments associated with
the launchings from Tyura Tam.
should assist in determining more fully the purpose of these
experiments.
4. We therefore conclude that the Soviets probably fired
a test ICBM to about 4000-55006..1n. on 30 May, with an added
ionization experiment.
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USSR and Satellites May Propose a Balkan Summit Meeting
Moscow may attempt to bring greater pressure on the
Italian and Greek governments on the subject of missile bases.
The USSR is likely to join its Balkan satellites--Albania, Bul-
garia, and Rumania--in formally calling for a summit confer-
ence of Balkan states and Italy, to discuss the creation of a zone
free of nuclear weapons and missiles in the Balkan and Adriatic
area. The Soviet leaders probably anticipate that rejection by
Turkey, Greece, and Italy of such a proposal would provide a
pretext for carrying out Khrushchev's recent threats to establish
missile bases in Albania "aimed at Italy and Greece."
Renewed bloc interest in pressing for a Balkan conference
and denuclearized zone was reflected in Khrushchev's speeches
in Albania and in the Soviet-Albaniab joint statement. The So-
viet premier recalled Rumanian Premier Stoica's 1957 proposal
which called for a Balkan summit conference and reaffirmed an-
other proposal, first made by Bulgarian Premier Yugov in Janu-
ary 1958, for a Balkan zone in which nuclear weapons and mis-
siles would be prohibited. He called on the Balkan peoples to
"start a struggle to prevent the establishment of rocket bases
and the stockpiling of atomic weapons on Balkan soil and in the
Mediterranean basin."
The joint statement asserted that a Balkan conference could
contribute to the cause of "turning the Balkans into a zone of peace
and quiet" by renouncing missile bases and nuclear weapons. A
TASS summary of a Soviet New Times article stated on 3 June
that the USSR and Albania propose to call a Balkan "summit"
meeting to "discuss urgent questions and turn the Balkans into a
denuclearized zone."
Belgrade has long opposed the introduction of nuclear weapons
into the Balkans and favors a Balkan summit meeting to ease ten-
sions in the area. Yugoslavia qualified its acceptance of Stoica's
1957 invitation by insisting that all Balkan states be represented;
Turkey and Greece refused.
Rome, Athens,, and Ankara would probably reject any bid for
such a summit meeting on the grounds that attendance would con-
flict with NATO obligations and that the proposal is clearly ,an ef-
fort to split NATO solidarity.
4 June 59
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Nepal's Expanding Diplomatic Relations
Nepalese Prime Minister Koirala's new government,
which took office on 27 May, may soon be subjected to in-
creasing international pressures as a result of moves made
by the predecessor government to increase Nepal's foreign
relations. Last April, apparently under the urging of sev-
eral members of the outgoing government, King Mahendra
agreed to the opening of a Soviet embassy in Katmandu in
the near future. Britain and India have long had the only
diplomatic missions resident in Katmandu and there had
been an informal agreement with Nepal that the USSR and
China would not be encouraged to open missions there.
Nepalese officials may have reasoned that by playing
off the USSR and the United States in matters of aid, Nepal
might benefit materially. In fact, a new Soviet economic
assistance agreement was announced simultaneously with
the announcement of the new embassy. The United States
has given economic aid to Nepal for some years.
Communist China may now be seeking a mission of its
own in Katmandu, complicating the position of the new
Koirala government because of India's, strained relations
with China over Tibet. The Chinese Communist ambassador
to Nepal, who resides in New Delhi, reportedly had an
audience with King Mahendra in Katmandu on 1 June. In
addition to giving assurances that China has no expansionist
intentions, he may well have raised the issue of a resident
diplomatic mission. China has the right under its 1956
treaty with Nepal to open a consulate general, but in view
of the fact that the USSR will open an embassy, the Chinese
ambassador may suggest raising the level of Sino-Nepalese
missions.
Nehru, who is scheduled to arrive in Katmandu on
11 June for a four-day visit, will probably caution Koirala
against increasing his ties with the outside world too rapidly.
3 June 59
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Turkish President and Premier Disagree on Restrictive
Measures
Turkey's President Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan
Menderes are apparently in basic disagreement over the
degree to which the government should restrict the press
and the political opposition, and are thereby causing a
strain within the ruling Democratic party (DP). Menderes
privately told a group of Turkish press representatives
recently that Bayar, rather than he, is the leading exponent
of the government's, continuing repressive measures. Der
spite the apparent bid for more party and administrative
control by 74-year-old President Bayar and other advocates
of a sterner repressive policy, Menderes, as in the past,
is expected to maintain his pre-eminent position within
both the party and the government.
The possibility of a split in the party is also suggested
in the failure of Menderes to name ministers for six
cabinet posts which nay lack permanent incumbents and
the unusual absence of an official party communiqu�ince
14 May. Bayar is believed to champion the severe penalties
against the press which have recently left Ankara without
any opposition daily newspaper and have put Turkey's most
distinguished journalist in jail.
Menderes, now appears anxious to dissociate himself
from severe repressive :measures against the press and
the opposition. These appear to be unpopular with many
citizens, and half of the DP legislators are reported to
oppose them. Menderes met with representatives of the
Istanbul press recently and agreed to work toward a press
amnesty if they would tone down their criticisms of the gov-
ernment.
While in the past Menderes has threatened further re-
strictions, he may now consider this a liability which has
increased popular sympathy for the opposition, and may
adopt a more moderate policy in order to reduce political
tensions,.
CONFIDENTIAL
4 June 59
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THE PRESIMNT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFITWNTI AI,
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