CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/02/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03179857
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: February 28, 1958

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7
28 February 1958
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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28 FEBRUARY 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR - Two major nuclear tests at
Novaya Zemlya.
USSR - Central committee approves
Khrushchev's machine tractor policy.
Tito plans "dramatic" diplomatic
initiative regarding summit talks to
bolster Yugoslav prestige.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Moroccan King feels US prestige in
Morocco has declined to point where
continued pro-American stand may
endanger his own position.
Spanish West Africa - Madrid reports
claim successes against guerrillas,
but any respite may be temporary.
N 0 Egypt - Nasir criticizes Iraq-Jordan
--, federation, Baghdad Pact as "imperi-
alist."
, \
,
0 Cyprus - Greek foreign minister
expects next British proposals may
be acceptable, to Greece; Turks,
Makarios, and EOICA will probably
balk.
III. THE WEST
Argentine president-elect asks dis-
cussions with United States, probably
seeking loan.
Cuban rebels adopt tactics of scattered
terrorist and sabotage exploits to
attract attention.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
28 February 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*Soviet naclear tests: Two high-yield nuclear tests
were conducted by the USSR at its Novaya Zemlya prov-
ing ground within a three-hour period on 27 February--
the first time that any nation has staged two such tests
In a single day. Preliminary estimates of the Joint
Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
One to three TU-16's were in the proving
ground area at the time of the first test. Two more
TU-16's, and possibly a TU-95, were involved in the
second. (Page 1) (Map)
*USSR: �Sign of disagreement noted earlier in
the Soviet leadership over IChrushchev's agricultural
proposal were not reflected in the 27 February an-
nouncement of the party central committee's approval
of the plan. Implementation now appears certain.
High-level opposition is no longer possible without
provoking a political showdown.
(Page 2)
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Yugoslavia: The regime appears to be preparing
to undertake a dramatic new diplomatic initiative for the
purpose of fostering East-West summit talks, in an effort
to bolster Yugoslavia's international prestige. Frustrated
as a result of Belgrade's increasingly isolated position be-
tween East and West, Tito probably feels compelled to
create the impression that he is once again playing an im-
portant role in international affairs before the national
elections on 23 March and the Yugoslav party congress
scheduled for April. (Page 3)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Morocco: American prestige is apparently declining
sharply in North Africa and particularly in Morocco. The
King fears the loss of his own popularity and influence
within the Moroccan Government should he continue to
hold a pro-American position. He is under constantly in-
creasing pressure to adopt a more neutralist attitude.
Page 4)
Spanish West Africa: The second phase of Spanish-
French operations in Spanish Sahara has ended with Army
of Liberation irregulars absorbing a "hard beating,"
Many
of the guerrillas have probably taken temporary refuge on
Moroccan territory, giving the French and Spanish only a
respite. (Page 5) (Map)
Nasir's 26 February speech: Nasir's public attack on
the Baghdad Pact and the Iraqi-Jordanian federation as
unions formed by "imperialists" opposing his program for
Arab unity probably foreshadows another Egyptian-Syrian
campaign to drive a wedge between King Saud and the Iraqi-
Jordanian federation and to undermine the government of
Jordan. In developing psychological support for such a
campaign, Nasir may use a rejuvenated government of
"Arab Palestine" to appeal to the Arab refugees in Jordan.
(Page 6)
28 Feb 58
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Ulf aLL.AN.a... A
*tie NOIS
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee as of
27 February 1958, the Intelligence Advisory Committee con=
cludes that tensions in the Middle East continue to create
possibilities for serious incidents. Although Arab states
have recently appeared concerned over immediate Israeli
intentions, a deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Mid-
dle East is considered unlikely.
Cyprus: New British proposals are anticipated which
will probably include an interim period of self-government
followed by a plebiscite on the island's future status, and
the granting of a military base on Cyprus to Turkey. Al-
though the Greek foreign minister seems receptive to these
ideas, the immediate reaction of Archbishop Makarios,
EOKA, and Turkey will probably be unfavorable.
(Page 7)
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee as of
27 February 1958, the Intelligence Advisory Committee
concludes that there is no evidence of Sino-Soviet intention
to become militarily involved in the Indonesian situation.
The Djakarta government is apparently determined to take
measures to subdue the dissidents by economic blockaue
�and military action. An early resolution of the issue is un-
likely. Sukarno's uncompromising attitude, his charge of
� Western interference, and the continuing economic and ad-
ministrative deterioration favor the Communist position on
Java and exploitation by the Sino-Soviet bloc.
III. THE WEST
Argentina: President-elect Frondizi,
has told the American Embassy in Buenos
Aires that he desires "frank and informal discussions"
with the United States. This approach is probably a build-
up to a request for a large loan.
(Page 8)
28 Feb 58 DAILY BRIEF
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Cuba: Rebel leader Fidel Castro's campaign against
President Batista has apparently entered a new phase of
attracting attention by daring exploits in Havana in lieu of
Inconclusive military skirmishing in the mountains of
eastern Cuba. Scattered incidents of terrorism and sa-
botage continue throughout the island, and Castro continues
to call for a general strike as a means of ousting Batista
or forcing postponement of the elections scheduled for
1 June. There is as yet no indication that the government's
position is seriously threatened.
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week.)
Estimate of the World Situation. National Intelligence
Estimate Number 100-58, 26 Feb 58
Prospects and Consequences of Arab Unity Moves,
Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 30-58,
20 Feb 58.
Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in Underdeveloped
Areas, 1 July through 31 December 1957. Economic Intel-
ligence Committee. Economic Intelligence Report Number
EIC R 14 - S 4. 28 Feb 58.
28 Feb 58
DAILY BRIEF iv
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SITE OF NEW RUSSIAN
NUCLEAR TEST AREA
28 FEBRUARY 1958
AREA CLOSED
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR Conducts Two Nuclear Tests
on Same Day
The Soviet Union on 27 February conduaed two high-yield
nuclear tests within three hours at the new Novaya Zemlya prov-
ing ground for multimegaton weapons.
The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee issued the
following statement at 1000 hours: "An explosion has been de-
�tected by the Atomic Energy Detection System as having occurred
at 07 hours 59 minutes 17.4 seconds Zebra, 27 February 1958 in
the vicinity of Novaya Zemlya (74�N, 55�E).
Although the data re-
ported up to this time are too sparse to provide a reliable esti-
mate of yield, it is possilble to say that the explosion is about the
same size as that observed at Novaya Zemlya on 23 February
1958, . Nuclear confirmation cannot be ex-
pected prior to 2 March 1958."
A second JAEIC statement at 1700 hours said: "A second
explosion on 27 February 1958 has been reported by the Atomic
Energy Detection System as having occurred at about 1030 hours
Zebra, in the vicinity of Novaya Zemlya (74�N, 559E).
s,
Although
the data reported up to this time do not permit a reliable esti-
mate ofyield, it is possible to say that the explosion is some.
what smaller in size than that observed earlier on this same
date. The revised preliminary estimate of the yield of the
earlier explosion at 0759 Zebra is now about 3 MT with about
1 MT estimated for this second test. Nuclear confirmation
cannot be expected prior to 3 March 1958,
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Central Committee Approves Khrushchev's Agricultural
Proposal
The central committee of the USSR's Communist party
has endorsed Khrushchev's proposal for transferring So-
viet agricultural machinery from the machine tractor sta-
tions to the collective farms. Implementation of the re-
organization is practically assured and the approval gives
Khrushchev a club with 'which to beat down any rearguard
opposition such as the "anti-party group" which formed
against his industrial reorganization plan last year.
The central committee convened on 25-26 February,
heard a report by Khrushchev, and, "recognizing the cor-
rectness and timeliness of the proposal," apparently
adopted it in short order. Neither the speed with which
the plenum reached a decision nor the wording of the an-
nouncement reflect earlier suggestions of high-level dis-
agreement over the proposal.
The central committee put forth a five-point deci-
sion which followed closely the pattern laid clown by Khru-
shchev last month in Minsk. A nationwide discussion of
the plan is now to take place, after which it will be sub-
mitted to the next session of the Supreme Soviet for ap-
proval. Khrushchev himself has been appointed to pres-
ent the final proposal to the Supreme Soviet.
While specific details of the proposal have appar-
ently still not been formulated, control of the machinery
by the collective farms should result in real improve-
ment in agricultural efficiency, perhaps even during the
1958 growing season for those collective farms receiving
machinery immediately.
CONFIDENTIAL
28 Feb 58
CENTRAL INTELLIC;ENCF Sill I FT11�1 Page 2
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�etranYrrerVir
Nome
Tito Seeks to Restore Yugoslav International Prestige
President Tito apparently is about to attempt to re-
gain his influence in international affairs. His recent
efforts to assume a leading role among the "unattached"
states and in the preparations for a summit meeting have
failed, as apparently have his efforts to overcome his
isolation between East and West. The US Embassy re-
ports that the Tito regime considers the decline in its
international prestige "intolerable."
Ambassador Rankin ob-
served on 26 February that the "atmosphere in Belgrade;.
Is ripe for some type of Yugoslav effort to reassert the
pretension of playing a major role on the world scene."
The Yugoslav party congress in April and national
elections scheduled for March are immediate reasons
for Tito to attempt some dramatic gesture. In the past,
his ability to give the appearance of playing an interna-
tional role far beyond that which his country merited
has been a major element in stemming his internal op-
position and maintaining popular support for his regime.
-CONFIDENTIAL
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%me
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Moroccan King Reported Concerned Over Growing An i-
American Sentiment
American prestige is reported to have recently declined
so sharply in Morocco that King Mohamed V, who has been
closely identified with a pro-American position, apparently
fears the loss a his own popularity and influence within his
government. the King is
under increasing pressure within his cabinet�where re-
cently only he took a position favorable to the United States
on an issue under consideration�to adopt a more neutralist
position. Strong internal security measures recently im-
posed in Morocco are apparently designed in part as an im-
mediate means of combating this growing anti-Western feel-
ing, but the King seems to be relying ultimately on American
economic aid and, presumably, also diplomatic support vis-
a-vis France and Spain.
Significant but ill-defined anti-American sentiment has
long existed in Morocco� fed by an underlying popular suspi,
cion that the United 'States is underwriting the efforts of
France and Spain to rnaltitain their positions in North Africa.
This sentiment was noticeably stimulated by France's use
of American-made aircraft in its 8 February attack on the
Tunisian border village of Saldet Sidi Youssef. It has now
apparently reached such proportions that the King is said
to fear repercussions damaging to United States interests
will occur throughout North Africa if this trend is not
halted "immediately." These repercussions would include
the replacement of the Bourguiba government, in Tunisia,
the domination of the Algerian National Liberation Front
by its most extreme and pro-Egyptian elements, and the
loss of the King's present ability to influence decisively
the dominant political forces within his own government.
SECRET
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* SPen sh defense perimeters
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in December.
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31._:�,..r�i1
ffiff
Situation in the Western Sahara
Army of Liberation guerrillas absorbed a "hard beat-
ing" as a result of the Spanish-French military o erations
in Spanish Sahara which ended on 25 February,
Official casua ty
statistics will apparently not be released, but Madrid offi-
cials are saying they expect the Sahara to be quiet "for
some time." This seems unlikely, however, as many of
the guerrillas have probably taken temporary refuge in
Moroccan territory. At best, the two powers may get a
short breathing spell during which Spain apparently intends
to reorganize its defenses in the area and to maintain daily
liaison by radio with French forces in Mauritania. The
Spanish are sending more supplies and equipment to the Ifni
enclave, where some fighting presumably continues.
A statement may soon be forthcoming from Rabat offi-
cially endorsing for the first time most of the extensive
western Saharan claims long advanced by extremists of the
dominant Istiqlal party. Such a statement would probably
include an assertion that Colomb-Bechar and Tindouf, now
administered by France as parts of Algeria, are Moroccan.
Already Moroccan King Mohamed V, in a 25 February speech
at a remote Moroccan village near the undefined frontier with
the Algerian Sahara, has specifically underscored Morocco's
"historic rights" and the determination of his government to
seek the return of "our Sahara." This week Rabat also, in
effect, formally protested consideration by the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development of a loan requested
by a French mining company which hopes to exploit iron ore
deposits in the Fort Gouraud area of Mauritania.
28 Feb 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page
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,ILA,1 kr. I
vale*
Nasir's Speech May Herald New Pressures on Jordan
Nasirt 26 February speech in Damascus attacked the
Baghdad Pact and the Iraqi-Jordanian union as "false fed-
erations" which would be overcome by the movement for
greater Arab unity, presumably led by his own United
Arab Republic (UAR). By suggesting that the federation
of the two monarchies is an "imperialist" device, Nasir
probably hopes to scuttle Iraqi and Jordanian efforts to
gain the adherence of King Saud and at the same time
further his own campaign to undermine the Jordanian Gov-
ernment. Before Nasir's speech, a Saudi Foreign Minis-
try official had said the King intended to favor the Iraqi-
Jordanian union although he would join neither group for-
mally.
Nasir is reported to be planning to bring Gaza into
the UAR, after restoration of an all-Palestine government.
A preliminary step in that direction seems to be indicated
by an Egyptian announcement on 25 February that new ex-
ecutive and legislative councils have been established in
Gaza. These councils would probably serve as the instru-
ments for approving union with the UAR.
Such a move would provide psychological support for
Palestinian Arab agitation against the Jordanian Govern,
merit, which in 1950 annexed a portion of Palestine along
the west bank of the Jordan River. Further pressure on
the Iraqi-Jordanian federation could result from an in-
crease of Egyptian-Syrian military strength in Syria.
American military attaches in Damascus report indica-
tions that such a build-up may be planned.
28 Feb 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
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*mei
� Cyprus Situation
The Greek Government now appears ready to accept
British proposals, which it expects within 20 days, for a
Cyprus solution, and Foreign Minister Averoff is optimis-
tic that a settlement of the issue is possible. Averoff be-
lieves that the proposals will involve a period of self-gov-
ernment for Cyprus, to be followed by a plebiscite to deter-
mine the island's future status. The Cypriots probably
would vote for enosis--union with Greece. The Greeks
assume that, to placate the Turks, the British plan will
include provisions for establishing a Turkish military
base on Cyprus and international guarantees for the Turk-
ish minority on the island.
While Averoff's apparent willingness to accept a Turk-
iSh base on the island is a hopeful sign that progress on the
issue is possible, his optimism about a settlement is prob-
ably unwarranted. London probably has not yet decided on
a specific plan for a Cyprus settlement. While proposals
along this line were discussed during the recent Anglo-
Greek conversations, London is likely to consult further
with the Turks before making definite offers. The Turks
remain firmly opposed to enosis and continue to demand
partition of the island. There is also little likelihood
that Archbishop Makarios or EOKA would accept any plan
including the presence of Turkish troops on Cyprus. In
addition, �a cabinet crisis, which appears to be developing
rRpidly in Greece, could seriously weaken the Karamanlis
government and reduce chances for advance on the Cyprus
issue at this time.
SECRET
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Nuie' �le
III. THE WEST
New Argentine Government Probably Will Seek US Loan
President-elect Frondizi's request to the American
Embassy in Buenos Aires for "frank and informal" dis-
cussions is his first direct contact with any United States
official, and it probably foreshadows a request for a large
loan. Frondizi, who has been critical of the United States,
is essentially an opportunist, and
plans to conduct his dealings in a "businesslike way'
since he considers his position analogous to that of a "chair-
man of the board of a corporation with 20,000,000 stockhold-
ers."
When he takes office on 1 May, Frondizi will be con-
fronted with increasingly serious trade and payments deficits
and with the task of rehabilitating the state-owned power,
transport, steel, and oil-producing facilities. The provi-
sional Aramburu government has estimated the cost of
Argentina's immediate needs for transportation and basic
industry in the government sector as $1.3 billion in hard
currencies. The government has recently sent a trade mis-
sion to the Soviet bloc in search of industrial credits.
Frondizi plans to send a representative to the United
States immediately to solicit investments. He says he also
plans to encourage local private enterprise but that he must
first get financial help for existing government utilities.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
28 February 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*Soviet miclear tests: Two high-yield nuclear tests
were conducted by the USSR at its Novaya Zemlya prov-
ing ground within a three-hour period on 27 February--
the first time that any nation has staged two such tests
In a single day. Preliminary estimates of the Joint
Atomic Energy Intelligence Committe
One to three TU-16's were in the proving
grouns area at the time of the first test. Two more
TU-16's, and nossihlv a were involved in the
second. (Page 1) (Map)
*USSR:� Signs of disagreement noted earlier in
the Soviet leadership over Khrushchev's agricultural
proposal were not reflected in the 27 February an-
nouncement of the party central committee's approval
of the plan. Implementation now appears certain.
High-level opposition is no longer possible without
provoking a political showdown.
(Page 2)
Yugoslavia: The regime appears to be preparing
to undertake a dramatic new diplomatic initiative for the
purpose of fostering East-West summit talks, in an effort
to bolster Yugoslavia's international prestige. Frustrated
as a result of Belgrade's increasingly isolated position be-
tween East and West, Tito probably feels compelled to
create the impression that he is once again playing an im-
portant role in international affairs before the national
elections on 23 March and the__Yugoslav party congress
eSMK.APril� (Page 2)
�
_ n The basis of findings by-its Watch Cit Ommtee as of
27 February 1958, the Intelligence Advisory Committee con-
cludes ,that tensions in the Middle East continue to create
possibilities for serious incidents. Although Arab states
have recently appeared concerned over immediate Israeli
intentions, a deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Mid-
dle lik 1
lipsjlogs by its Watch Committee as of
7 February 1958, the Intelligence Advisory Committee
concludes that there is no evidence of Sino-Soviet intention
to become militarily involved in the Indonesian situation.
The Djakarta government is apparently determined to take
measures to subdue the dissidents by economic blocka,:te
and military action. An early resolution of the issue is un-
likely. Sukarno's uncompromising attitude, his charge of
Western interference, and the continuing economic and ad-
ministrative deterioration favor the Communist position on
Java and exploitation by the Sino-Soviet bloc.
Culzsa. 'Rebel leader Fidel Castro's campaign ago....not.
President 13atista has apparently entered a new phase of
attracting attention by daring exploits in Havana in lieu of
Inconclusive military skirmishing in the mountains of
eastern Cuba. Scattered incidents of terrorism and sa-
botage continue throughout the island, and Castro continues
to call for a general strike as a means of ousting Batista
or forcing postponement of the elections scheduled for
1 June. There is as yet no indication that the government's
nosition is sEApproved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03179857
PI