CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/02/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169392
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: February 10, 1958

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10 February 1958
Copy No.
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN-
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE.
1240 0
REVIEWER:
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10 FEBRUARY 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Repressive policies to follow East
German party purge.
Communist Chinese military build-up
to continue at same rate as last year.
USSR - New information on probable
ICBM launching of 30 Jan 58. (See
page i.)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Egyptian-Syrian union - Iraq
considering moves in support of
Jordanian Government.
Lebanon - Foreign Minister Malik
may resign if Lebanon recognizes
United Arab Republic.
USSR and Egypfmay exploit French
bombing of Tunisian village to
complicate Bourguiba's relations
with the West.
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Indonesia - Sumatran dissidents
continue pressure on Djakarta
government.
Peiping's opening of Amoy to
Japanese shipping may lead to
tension between Japan and
Nationalist China.
III. THE WEST
Bonn may protest to Moscow over
East German detention of three
scientists returning from USSR.
Argentina - Peronista and Communist
support of Frondizi for president may
lead to unrest.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
10 February 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
East German party purge: The purge of three leading
East-GeTrnan CrOm.cnantep makes it clear that Moscow con-
tinues to back Stalinist party boss Walter Ulbricht and re-
pressive policies associated with him. Ulbricht% victory
over the moderate opposition group will probably heighten
popular unrest and increase the possibility of overt resiSt-
ance. A further purge of persons suspected of anti-Ulbricht
leanings will probably be carried out at all levels of the So-
cialist Unity (Communist)party.
(Page 1)
Communist China's defense budget: Build-up of Com-
munist China's military forces will apparently continue at
the same rate as last year. A deputy director of the armed
forces political department, speaking before the National
People's Congress, said that the defense budget for 1958
is equivalent to about $2,000,000,000--only $10,000,000
less than last year's defense expenditure.
� Additional information on receRt ICBM launching: The
Guided Missile Intelligence Committee issued the following
statement on 7 February 1958:
1. There is additional information which permits a
more definitive statement regarding the event of 30 January
1958 at the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range.
2. The evidence supports to a considerable degree that
on 30 January 1958 at 2014:51Z the USSR launched a test ICBM
from Tyura Tam, scheduled to impact in the vicinity of the
� Kamchatka Peninsula, some 3,500)NM downrange.
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3.
the missile reached
the vicinity of the Kamchatka Peninsula.
II, ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq-Jordan: Iraq may move troops into Jordan to try
to help protect King Hussayn's government from new pres-
sures resulting from the Egyptian-Syrian union. Exiled
leftist Jordanians, are reported to
be stepping up subversive activities against Hussay
economic pressure may also be used in this effort.
Page 2)
Lebanon: Foreign Minister Malik may resign soon,
since the Lebanese Government apparently has decided
to recognize the new United Arab Republic. Malik's de-
parture from the cabinet would signal the beginning of a
trend away from his outright but not generally popular
pro-Western policy toward one of accommodation to
Egyptian-Syrian pressure.
Tunisia: The bombing of a Tunisian border village
by French Air Force B-26's and Corsairs on 81 February
provides an opportunity for President.,Nasir and the SoViet
Union to complicate Tunisian: President Bourguiba's rela-
tions with the West by offering him arms and economic
assistance. On 6 February Bourguiba publicly appealed
for expanded economic aid from the West to relieve Tu-
nisia's serious economic problems. (Map)
10 Feb 58
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Chinese Communist port opening: Chinese Communist
opening of the port of Amoy to Japanese shipping may lead
to some tension between Nationalist China and Japan. The
Nationalists will probably confine their protests to the diplo-
matic field, but might take hostile action against Japanese
shipping if they become convinced this is necessary to pre-
vent a serious loss of prestige.
(Page 3)
Indonesia: Sumatran dissidents are maintaining a steady
barrage of broadcasts and mass rallies denouncing President
Sukarno and the Djuanda cabinet, apparently in the hope of
inducing Sukarno to capitulate and of developing popular sup-
"MAO port. They still plan to force the issue if Sukarno refuses.
The reluctance of dissidents to take action has apparently
prevented the activthts from delivering a formal ultimatum
to the Djakarta government or proclaiming a rival Indonesian
government.
III. THE WEST
West Germany--the USSR: The Bonn government is
reasonably certain that three of a group of 21 West German
scientists who were being repatriated from the USSR are
forcibly detained in East Germany. Bonn plans to wait un-
til 14 February and then protest to the Soviet Union. Trade
and repatriation talks may be broken off.
Argentina. Recent moves by ,deposed Argentine dictator
Juan Peron and by the Communist party will probably place
substantial support behind the presidential candidacy of
Arturo Frondizi and may lead to a Frondizi victory in the
Argentine general elections of 23 February. The prospect
of Peronista influence in the incoming government is likely
to increase unrest among conservative military groups and
may lead to military plotting either to postpone the elections
or to nullify the results if Frondizi wins. (Page 4)
10 Feb 58
DAILY BRIEF
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. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
East German Party Purge
After the most serious intraparty struggle ha has yet
encountered, East Germany's Stalinist party. boss Walter
Ulbricht has emerged victorious over an opposition groUp
which sought a more moderate approach to the country's po-
litical and economic problems. The purge of three leading
Communists on charges of opportunism and revisionism and
the election of four loyal Ulbricht men to top party posts in-
dicate that Moscow continues to back Ulbricht and the poli-
cies of iron repression associated with him. A far-reaching
purge of persons suspected of anti-Ulbricht leanings is ex-
pected to be carried out at all levels of the Socialist Unity
(Communist) party (SED).
Those purged are the party's number-two man, Karl
Schclowan, party theoretician Fred Oelssner, and former
Minister of State Security Ernst Wollweber.
As a result of Ulbricht% victory, East German domestic
policies are likely to follow an even harder line, such as up-
ward revisions of work norms, continued emphasis on heavy
industry at the expense of consumer goods, pressures for
collectivization, stepped-up attacks on the church, and in-
tensified Soviet-East German efforts to erode the Western
position in Berlin. These policies will probably heighten
popular unrest and increase the possibility of overt resist-
ance to the regime.
-CONFIDENTIAL
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraqi-Jordanian Reaction to Syrian Egyptian Union
Iraq may move troops into Jordan to try to help pro-
tect King Hussayn's government from new pressures gen-
erated by the Syrian-Egyptian union, according to Iraqi
Crown Prince Abd al-Illaho The troops would Move into
northern Jordan on Hussaynis request. Abd al-Illah hag
recalled Iraqi strong man Nun i Said to Baghdad to discuss
a changeJof cabinet which would bring in a "strong" rand
broadly based government.
Hussayn and Iraq's King Faysal are to meet this week
in Amman to discuss joint moves, including a possible con-
federation of their two countries. If agreement is reached
on a plan, no announcement will be made until Hussayn has
met with King Saud, possibly also this week.
Exiled leftist Jordanians,
are reported to be stepping up subversive activities
against Hussayn for the purpose of ultimately bringing about
the merger of Jordan with the Egyptian-Syrian union. Other
measures to achieve this might include economic pressure,
such as closing the roads from Syria into Jordan, and an an-
nouncement that a 'Palestine government, "located in the
Egyptian-occupied Gaza strip, would join the United Arab
Republic/
It is doubtful that Nasir desires to push these measures
hard enough at this time to try to overthrow Hussayn. His
aim at the moment seems to be to try to reassure elements,
such as King Saud and the Lebanese, who have been frightened
by the formation of the union. An Iraqi move to "unite" with
Jordan, nevertheless. might lead Nasir to take vigorous counL
termeasures.
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Opening of Amoy to Japanese Shipping May Cause Tension
Between Japan and Nationalist China
Communist China's opening of the port of Amoy to Japa-
nese shipping may cause tension between Nationalist China
and Japan.
the National-
ists on 3 February issued a statement reiterating their "port
closure" of China mainland ports and warned that foreign
shipping entering the Taiwan Strait area should inform Na-
tionalist officials in advance.
The Nationalists probably will confine their protests to
the diplomatic field. British ships since last August have
been entering Amoy without interference, and Nationalist of-
ficials have stated that earlier attempts to prevent them from
entering gained the Nationalist government nothing. Unless
the Nationalist now are convinced that a reversal of policy
is necessary to prevent a serious loss of prestige, military
action to close the port appears unlikely.
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III. THE WEST
Peronista Resurgence Feared In Argentina
A manifesto issued on 4 February by former Argentine
dictator Peron is believed to be a tacit endorsement of the
presidential 'candidacy of Arturo Frondizi in Argentina'sgen-
eral elections scheduled for 23 February. Frondizi, a
nationalist, heads the ticket of the intransigent R�
party, which ran second in the Constituent Assembly elections
last July. Despite Frondizit denials, there is a general be-
lief that Peron't manifesto resulted froM
agreement by which Frondizi would be obliged, if he took of-
fice on I May, to permit legalization of the Peronista party
and the reintegration of pro-Peronistas into the military
establishments. In the manifesto Peron urged his followers
to "vote in an appropriate manner against the continuation of
the tyranny" in contrast to his order last July for them to
cast blank ballots.
As a result of squabbling Among his lieutenants, .Peron
does not completely control his followers,, Only 25 percent
of the Peronista vote in some of the larger provinces, how-
ever, would be sufficient to put Frondizi ahead of his more
moderate rival, Ricardo Balbin of the Popular Radical party.
The Communiet party has already thrown its support to
Frondizi.
The prospect of Peronista influence in the incoming gov-
ernment is likely to increase unrest among conseiwative mili-
tary groups and may lead to military plotting either to post-
pone the elections or to nullify , the results,if. .Frondizi
wins.
SECIZEr
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DISTRIBUTION
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Operations Coordinating Board
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Seciretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
�Calkiri-MrAgr
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
10 February 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
East German party purge: The purge of three leading
Eastian CrOuunalnias makes it clear that Moscow con-
tinues to back Stalinist party boss Walter Ulbricht and re-
pressive policies associated with him. Ulbricht's victory
over the moderate opposition group will probably heighten
popular unrest and increase the possibility of overt resigt-
ance. A further purge of persons suspected of anti-Ulbricht
leanings will probably be carried out at all levels of the So-
cialist Unity. (Communist) party.
(Page 1)
Communist China's defense budget: Build-up of Com-
munistChina's military forces win apparently continue at
the same rate as last year. A deputy director of the armed
forces political department, speaking before the National
People's Congress, said that the defense budget for 1958
is equivalent to about $2,000,000,000--only $10.000.000
less than last year's defense expenditure.
Additional information on recent ICBM launching: The
Guided Missile Intelligence Committee issuea the following
statement on 7 February 1958:
1. There is additional information which permits a
more definitive statement regarding the event of 30 January
1958 at the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range.
2. The evidence supports to a considerable degree that
on 30 January 1958 at 2014:51Z the USSR launched a test ICBM
from Tyura Tam
the missile reached
the vicinity of the Kamchatka Peninsula.
ia: The bombin of a Tunisian Doraer vulage
by renc ir Force B--2 's and Corsairs on 8 February
provides an opportunity for President.Nasir and.the,SoViet
Union to complicate Tunisian President Bourguiba's rela-
tions with the West by offering him arms and economic
assistance. On 6 February Bourguiba publicly appealed
for expanded economic aid from the West to relieve Tu-
rious ee'ciilirC:probrems.
rviitirat''----reafiTifibves by deposed Argentine dictator
Juan term and by the Communist party will probably place
substantial support behind the presidential candidacy of
Arturo Frondizi and may lead to a Frondizi victory in the
Argentine general elections of 23 February. The prospect
of Peronista, influence in the incoming government is likely
to increase unrest among' conservative military groups and
may lead to military olotting either to postpone the elections
� " folk p pro y e d for Release: 2019/08/20 C03169392
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