CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/11/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 2018 Sanitization
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06232638
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: November 13, 1958

Approved or Release:'��I��t�Cg
I-OP-SKR-ET CI)
13 November 1958 3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Copy No.
CENTRAL
60
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANCE IN CLASS.
I
CLASS. CHANCED TO: Iv
NEXT REVIEW DATE�
AUT 7
DAT
-TOP-SECRET-
/ZApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232638/
REVIEWER:
0
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638
. .... ..,...........
C
T I P SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638
_
� Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638
-
13 NOVEMBER 1958.
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Gromyko says Berlin. change Will not
be long delayed; Bonn official states
change "must" affect Bonn's relations
with USSR.
Yt.igoslovia threatens to break rela-
tions with East Germany.
Comment on Soviet tactics at Geneva.�
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UN officials fear new trouble between
Israel and Jordan over Mount Scopus
area. 0
Haniniarskjold suggests Jordan not
press charges against UAR on plane
incident.
Syrian students strike against VAR
'education policy.
a
0 Soviet arms to arrive in Iraq 15-16
November.
0 Iraq- Pro-UAR party plans more
vigorous tactics.
III. THE WEST
0 Argentina- Petroleum workers continue
defiant; pressing for nationwide strike.
LATE ITEM
Soviet central committee now meeting.
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638
r4/7 Approved rZ'ag/ 2020/01/23 006232638
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
13 November 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Berlin: Gromyko has told the Swiss ambas-
sador to Moscow that while action to implement changes
in the four-power administration of Berlin would not be
taken immediately, it would not be long delayed. Follow-
ing a special cabinet meeting, Bonn's press chief said that
Soviet-German relations "must" be affected if Moscow pro-
ceeds with its plan to transfer its responsibilities in Berlin
to the East German Government, and pointed to diplomatic
and economic relations as "ties which might suffer."
(Page 1)
Watch Committee conclusion�Berlin: Recent Soviet
and East German declarations regarding the status of Ber-
lin probably represent the beginning of a concerted effort
to make Western access to the city conditional on de facto
recognition of the East German regime.
Yugoslavia - East Germany: Yugoslavia has threatened
to break diplomatic relations with East Germany. Belgrade
on 11 November protested remarks made by Premier Grote-
wohl on the occasion of the 41st Soviet anniversary celebra-
tions. Until recently, the East German regime has appeared
hesitant to take a strong line in the bloc campaign against
Yugoslavia because of the importance it has attached to main-
taining diplomatic relations with Vucinslayia�thp only nonhloc
country recognizing it.
11
74
�
TOP SECRET
V.
for Release:
r re7/17./ c''17/effZ:ZZZZZZZZZZ/7/ZilMf
iJ
,b\(
*USSR-Geneva talks: The deadlock on an agenda for the
talks on nuclear tests continues, despite some adjustments
by both sides on procedural points. While the Soviet delegate
has refused to discuss a control system until agreement has
been reached on a permanent cessation of tests, he has given
no indication of a desire to break off the negotiations. At
the opening sessions of the talks on prevention of surprise
attack, the Soviet delegation took a firm line insisting that
unless this subject is "organically linked" with broaderdis-
armament issues--such as a ban on nuclear weapons, liqui-
dation of foreign military bases, and reduction of conven-
tional armaments and forces--any discussion of controls is
useless and inspection could only be regarded as an intelli-
gence-collecting device. (Page 2)
Watch Committee conclusion--Taiwan Strait situation: The
Chinese Communists are likely to continue military action
against the offshore islands to the degree they deem necessary
to demonstrate their capability to retain the military initiative;
and to support their political objectives in the strait area. The
Chinese Communists retain the capabilities to launch major
attacks with little or no warning against the offshore islands
and, by air, against Taiwan and the Penghus (Pescadores).
While the Chinese Communists may expand the scope of their
military activities against the offshore islands, available evi-
dence does not indicate that they will do so to the extent of
deliberately risking hostilities with the US.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Arab-Israeli tension: Tel Aviv is following up the Syrian
border incident of last week with pressure on local UN offi-
cials for a further extension of Israeli control over the demil-
itarized zone in the Lake Hula area. UN officials, moreover,
fear new trouble may soon occur with Jordan over the dis-
puted Mount Scopus area of Jerusalem.
(Page 3)
II
13 Nov 58 DAILY BRIEF
TOP SECRET EIDER
dafygZ,IZZM/g/fril,ZZAApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232638WZIWZA
ii
TOP SECRET
Wateh Committee conclusion�Middle East: The sit-
uation remains unstable throughout the Middle East and
incidents and coups could occur at any time. A deliberate
initiation of open hostilities in the area is unlikely in the
immediate future. The attempted Syrian interception of
King Husayn's aircraft on 10 November has had the short-
term effect of considerably strengthening the personal po-
sition of the King and, to that extent, has improved Jordan-
ian stability. It has also caused a sharp deterioration of
Jordanian-UAR relations, and Husayn's regime remains
basically vulnerable.
Jordan-UAR: UN Secretary General Hammarskjold
has counseled the Jordanian Government against pressing
charges against the UAR on the plane incident on 10 Novem-
ber involving the King. He has also advised Nasir that the
UAR should apologize even though it may technically be in
the right. Additional information on the circumstances of
the King's flight indicates that a request for blanket clear-
ances of several flights over Syria was never answered by
the UAR. (Page 5)
UAR student strike: Syrian University students in Damas-
cus have been out since a November on a strike in protest
against new regulations integrating the Syrian'and Egyptian
higher educational systems. This is the first demonstration
of organized opposition to government policy since the crea-
tion of the UAR. ) (Page 7)
Iraq-USSR: The first consignment of Soviet arms is ex-
pected to arrive at Basra about 15-16 November. A Soviet
military delegation, numbering from three to five men has
arrived in Baghdad
0
ii
Iraq: me pro- UAlt 13aath party now believes that its
tactic of avoiding criticism of the government and clashes
with Communist elements has been unwise. It intends to
58 DAILY BRIE F
ZZZZcZ=AcrZrCr="ESMAHZTEreW,ZjWZZ,,YZ,Z,IZ,/,A
TOP SECRET iii
rril/ZZZZAZK,J,Z,JZJ,141,7,ff/U','/',9J,M=,=3ZLZZZ/g,,ZZZMZ
a
/41
AT
A2flffl11'11VCI
�aaquaanoN 01 JO St A100SOIAT ..10j sisoa ljaT yeti �zuT
-purls OOPTUIT1100 It.11.1103 aseti wow& JO TIE (UTETTJH leaao pue
(eplunoisotpazo (eTiveiso2nA 'weal O saopessequir laTnaS
aql Tem 40EJ eq q pauatiVuaals sT tunuaid jo poolmaNTT
ata, �slaacbca oTumuoaa jo 2unaaul aleardas q pamoTioj aq
o4 sT uoTssas slT aouTs `aapTunuoo Trawao oi jo ssauTsnq
uretu o Anuareddr ST 'map TIT panssT aq oi uoos
aeas.-uaAas M.81.1 OM JO uoTssnosia
'aaqulaAoN gi uo moosoTAT uT zuneaul Stit. ArEct STU
-nuncuoD 1aTA0Satil JO pollTultuoo reaw-ao 0141, :IISSfl*
U.d!Schl. U.I pou..tol cm Aelll 01.01
a.v.-0 mulAIOAUT 100 0 ANJOCIE tie paqsenb
STluaaudde '2uppeq ,saoaoj patuat gum �TzTpuoakaTpvit
I saNTals AtiledtuAs uTtlawaai
eat S.1031.10/A LunaToilad itreTjap `aaquianoN TT uo paaET3
-op a2aTs jo awls or n aapun sisTunufluop pue s4s a Tuoad
paapunq TEJOAOS JO 450IJE alp alTdsaa trunua0av*
ISam Hifi, 'III
-ueaTAT � 2n ax e s JOVOM atn
aNTa4s apTmuoneu a4eTpaultui TIE� a slaojja uTnuTluoo
ao
� Ire l 2
I -tuoad Tujinj ol aanifej s,aulT2aa ulTse0 am 01 uoTluane
-xaup smogs InevET ato ssaTun ��uo-praq� slsTununuop
am loam oi. pue uonnToAaa ain jo awn am ix �pew sasT
TIED
(g aged) �saapeaT 1sTIMEsa 2uT
-lsaaat ,uT snoao2Ta aaotu aq al ,asnoxa ur qi.pm. ulTseto app.
-oad o4 /claim woos pp-tot �noel mau atn qn.21.taa4s paioad
inin o czti.otozoz : e S ealaNyzpazAzoJdzdvy/y//,/,,i/Azzz
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638
11%.1
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Further Comments on Status of Berlin
The Soviet Union probably will follow up Khrushchev's
statement on Berlin with some form of agreement providing
for at least the de jure transfer of its functions in Berlin to
the German Democratic Republic (GDR). An East German
Foreign Ministry official reportedly stated some action
would be taken in December or January following a meeting
of Soviet and East German representatives to work out the
details. Foreign Minister Gromyko told the Swiss ambas-
sador in Moscow that while the action would not be taken im-
mediately, it would not be long delayed.
West German press chief von Eckardt, in a prepared
statement on 12 November, hinted that Bonn might consider
severing relations with Moscow if the USSR should abrogate
the four-power agreement on Berlin.
The USSR probably will not permit East Germany to go so
far as to provoke Western military action, but there is likely
to be a new series of harassments by the Communists of allied
lines of communication to the Western,sectors of Berlin. Brit-
ish officials in Berlin point to the danger of a "self-imposed"
blockade if the Western powers refuse to accept East German
control over access to Berlin.
In a press conference on 12 November, East German Pre-
mier Otto Grotewohl made strong anti-Bonn statements stress-
ing Violations of the Potsdam Agreement by both the Western
powers and the Federal Republic. He,also discussed the possi-
bility of negotiating troop withdrawa c frr"" h"th "'"i'a "f
Germany on a, quid-pro:quo basis.
13 Nov 58 c=kITD A I IkITCI I irtnarc Dl iii
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638'
Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232638
LIE,1 V / I fri
0
Geneva Talks oly_T--..7t Cessation Still Deadlocked Over Agenda
The deadlock over the agenda for the Geneva talks on
nuclear tests has extended through the second week of the
conference without any apparent movement in Moscow's
basic position that the first order of business must be
an immediate permanent and unconditional test-cessation
agreement. The discussion of a second Soviet agenda
proposal--modified to appear as a concession to the West
by providing for discussion of a control system before
sign4tuTe of an .agredment4,clearly indicates that Mos-
cow wants only a general directive for the establishment
of a control organization. The details of such an organiza-
tion would be relegated to a subsequent separate agreement,
There is .no: indication, however, that the Soviet Union
desires to break off the negotiations.
Meanwhile, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister. V. V.
Kuznetsov, who is the chief Soviet delegate at the talks in
Geneva on prevention of surprise attack, has stated that
this subject must be "organically linked"mtith broader dis-
� armament issues such as a ban on nuclear weapons,
liquidation of foreign military bases, and reduction of
conventional armaments and forces. He insisted that an
inspection system not linked with definite disarmament
measures would promote rather than hinder the prospects
of a .surprise attack since the system would provide the
would-be aggressor with intelligence data of value in
launching such attack.
CONFIDENT
13 Nov 58
CENTRAL INTFI I inFtsirF RI III FTIN
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232638'
Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638
%La a
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Arab-Israeli Tension
King Husayn's decision to remain in Jordan following
the incident involving his aircraft over Syria apparently has
temporarily relieved Israeli apprehension over the future of
Jordan. During the past week, the Israeli Army had alerted
its mobilization cadre, a precautionary measure which
would enable it to move and mobilize with a minimum of de-
lay in the event of trouble. Reserve transport units with
civilian vehicles are reported to have been alerted since
7 November.
Localized Israeli-Jordanian trouble, however, may oc-
cur, again in Jerusalem to exacerbate the broader tension.
The chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization
fears a new crisis may develop involving the Israeli enclave
on Mt. Scopus. The Israelis insist on including new-type
rifles and ammunition--to be exchanged for older weapons
currently in use on Scopus--in the manifest of supplies for
the next convoy to the enclave. The Jordanian � are expected
to reject the request. Israeli patrols, moreover, have con-
tinued to enter a disputed area of the Mt. Scopus demilita-
rized zone where a conflict with Jordanian forces earlier this
year, resulted in the death of a Canadian UN official.
The Israeli Foreign Ministry is following up the incident
of 6 November on Israel's Syrian border by protesting to UN
officials regarding the UAR "attack." The Israelis also have
requested a survey of the area in the demilitarized zone where
an Israeli tractor was fired on. Israeli accounts of the inci-
dent do not conform with the facts as available to the UN teams,
and UN observers reportedly were prevented from fulfilling
their function. Some UN officers were detained at Israeli
check points, the view from one of the UN observation posts
was obscured by Israeli smoke bombs, and observer radio
communications were jammed by the Israelis. Israel ap-
parently will oppose any investigation by the Mixed Armistice
13 Nov 58
rrk171% Al ikrrei nil. 'rviki
'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638'
Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638
4.1 L.A Nos A
Commission on the ground that the commission's compe-
tence does not extend to the demilitarized zone. Israel's
alleged conduct during the incident and its position regard-
ing the commission is a continuation of persistent Israeli
efforts to exercise sovereignty over the demilitarized zone
in contravention of the General Armistice Agreement.
13 Nov 58
reklITTI Al I \MEI it.krar,e ni la t
'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638`
Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638
4.041.41,6s, I %LI S
Developments in Jordan
UN Secretary General Hammarskjold has advised the
Jordanian Government against attempting to press charges
in the UN against the UAR over the incident involving the
royal aircraft on .10 November. According to UN Ambas-
sador Spinelli in Amman, the Jordanian Government had
failed to obtain clearance for overflight of the King's air-
craft; a request for blanket clearance of three overflights,
one of them to be the King's, was never answered. Despite
the absence of an official clearance from UAR authorities,
the completion of a test flight without incident led the Jor-
danians to assume that all three flights were approved.
Hammarskjold reportedly advised Nasir to apologize
even though the UAR might technically be in the right.
Nasir is most unlikely to do so, however, whatever the cir-
cumstances, particularly in view of the propaganda play be-
ing given the incident by Amman.
King Husayn has confirmed that some Jordanian Army
units were preparing for an attack on Syria by the time he
returned to Amman, and that it became necessary for him
to make a personal appeal to Bedouin troops to return to
their camps. While residents of Amman and the Bedouin,
with official encouragement, rejoiced over the survival of
the King, the reaction in West Jordan has been largely one
of indifference. The American charg�n Amman points out
that the aircraft incident demonstrated the extent to which
King Husayn alone provides the cohesion necessary to hold
Jordan together. The charg�elieves that without the King's
physical presence the army might have fragmented along
Bedouin-Palestinian lines, accompanied by popular demands
for overthrow of the pro-Western Rifai government.
Tension resulting from the aircraft incident probably
caused the exchange of fire between a Jordanian outpost
and a Syrian gendarmerie patrol on 11 November, in which
the Syrians accused the Jordanians of stealing 69 cows and
wounding a gendarmerie sergeant. The American military
attach�n Amman reported on 11 November that although
SECRET
13 Nov 58 CCAITD A I IlkITC1 I Ir'Lklie"L DI II I Link!
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C06232638'
Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638
troarmea %LI
the Jordanian Army had increased the strength of its border
patrols, there were no indications of preparations to attack
Syria. The Rifai government, apparently reluctant to con-
cede its share of responsibility for the aircraft incident, has
continued to exploit the upsurge of anti-UAR feeling. It is
possible that Rifai's enemies will attempt to discredit his
government by charging that inadequate arrangements for the
flight endangered the life of the King.
The first two of twelve British-made Hawker Hunter jet
fighters being supplied to Jordan under the American mil-
itary aid program arrived in Amman via Egypt without inci-
dent on 11 November.
13 Nov 58
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638. _
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638
�6.0 V A A-AA A AA AA-A
Anti-UAR Syrian Student Strike
Syrian University law and medical students went on
strike on 8 November in protest against the unification of
Syrian and Egyptian higher educational systems. After
their protests had been rebuffed by the university president,
a delegation of students and faculty protested to Minister
of Interior Sarraj and the minister of education. The
strikers have threatened a university-wide strike unless
student demands for rescinding the directives are met.
Two faculty members are said to have resigned from the
university in sympathy with the strikers.
Antigovernment 'politicians have often used the stu-
dents as tools to serve their political objectives. In the
past, several Syrian governments have been pulled down
by student strikes and demonstrations. While the strike
may have been sparked by what the students believe to be
genuine grievances, anti-UAR elements, possibly the Com-
munists or Baathists, may have seized upon it as a means
to embarrass the regime.
There is no indication that this protest will serve as
_
a catalyst for widespread unrest, but it is the first demon-
strationo of organized oppOsition'sSinte the fc rmatiorr of the
UAFt in February 1958.
CONFIDENTIAL
13 Nov 58
r�CkITEt Al IkITEI I le�Ekll'E DI III CTINJ
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638
Page 7
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638
Iraqi Political Situation
The pro-UAR Iraqi Baath party now believes that a con-
tinuation of its tactic of avoiding clashes with the Communists
would result in Communist control of the "street" mob and the
government. The party has therefore decided to meet the
Communists "head-on" and to provoke elashes whenever possible
in the hope that this will stimulate the government into moving
against the Communists. At the same time, the Baath will
undertake a campaign to undermine Prime Minister Qasim by
.encouraging criticism of the government's failure to live up to
its earlier promises.
Fighting between anti-Communist Iraqi nationalists and
Communists, possibly Baathist-inspired� occurred in Baghdad
on 10 November near the home of relatives of arrested former
Deputy Premier Arif. Troops had to be used to disperse the
crowd.
l"the Communists and nationalists are
planning identical demonstrations" 'for either 13 or 14 Novem-
ber and that Iraqi officials fear "Urge-scale incidents:"
Senior military officers and General Rubai, head of the
Council of State, again urged Prime
Minister Qasim to establish a military Revolutionary Com-
mand Council, release Arif, remain neutral between right-
and left-wing civilian groups, and depend on the army in-
stead of the Communists for sunnort
senior military officers had urged
Qasim to issue a decree suppressing all political activities.
SECRET
13 Nov 58
CF MTD A I IMTCI I irIckirc DliiicTik4
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638
Page 8
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638
1 IL/ I-4 di 1 I I I I .C11. ICJ
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 006232638
rVa II (0 1/1 71 7.7/4/1 #1////nA rp< role cAl/for Release: r20 �Z12'3# 'CA 0 6 W/////////////W
/ a
/
/
/
/
/ 0
/
/
//z
7z
r/
voe
7,4
v/t
// r#
rf
r%
//:////://4/7/1./././/1,06;01;c1701'.449"2.6c'_6'42:6738307,407,41.14000771:40007/7 40/,