CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/11/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06232651
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: November 28, 1958

3.5(c) /
3.3(h)(2)
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLfr
; DECLASS
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT FIEVIE DATE:
28 November 1958
Copy No. C OU
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28 NOVEMBER 1958
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC; -
USSR-Berlin - Soviet Union proposes
making West Berlin a "free city"; ex-
pects answer from West within six
months or will go ahead on own.
USSR seeking to fix blame on West
for any failure as Geneva talks enter
final stage.
Additional Soviet arms arriving in
Egypt.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR reduces armed forces alert.
Syrian dissatisfaction deemed within
UAR control.
Ghana may turn to bloc for economic
aid. .
Indonesia - Rumors circulate of pos-
sible coup against Nasution.
III. THE WEST
0 Uruguay - Governing party likely to
suffer losses in general elections.
0 Mexico - Possible demonstrations
against Dulles during visit for
Mateos! inauguration on 1 December.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
28 November 1958
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR-Berlin: The new Soviet proposal on Berlin use's
Moscow's standard gambit of presenting an appearance of
reasonableness and conciliation while requiring the West
to abandon its basic- positions. Unless the Western powers
accept the Kremlin's concept of making a demilitarized
"free city" of West Berlin, with access controlled by East
Germany, Moscow will turn over all control to the East
Germans without any agreement. East Berlin could pre-
sumably be formally absorbed by East Glarmany, perhaps
immediately, under the Soviet proposal, 'and the East
German regime would gain de facto recognition if the West
accepted the proposal. The Kremlin probably believes
that rejection of its ostensibly reasonable proposals for-a
six-months grace period and some form of UN supervision
will place the three Western powers in the position of ap-
pearing to insist on continuing the military occupation of
Berlin.
USSR-Geneva talks: Moscow apparently believes that
both Geneva conferences are entering the final stage and
is maneuvering for the strongest possible position; in the
event of an early breakoff. Bloc delegates are seeking to
establish a record which they hope will place the onus for
any failure to reach agreement on the West. There have
been no hints of any major changes in bloc proposals at
either conference. (Page 2)
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USSR-UAR: Negotiations begun this summer for the sup- �
ply of additional bloc arms to Egypt are still in progress in
Moscow. In addition to jet fighter aircraft, Cairo is seeking
naval equipment and probably a wide range of land armaments.
Deliveries contracted for earlier in these negotiations are
now under way, with at least three Soviet merchant ships sched-
uled to transport arms to Alexandria shortly.
(Page 3)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR alert reduced: Cairo on 25 November called off
the precautionary alert of UAR forces instituted in late Oc-
tober in anticipation of a crisis in Jordan. Units were in-
structed to revert to their previous state of readiness, with
the exception of Egyptian forces in Sinai. which will remain
on alert.
/
Syria-Jordan: Reports of Syrian dissatisfaction with
the UAR and of possible new difficulties for Cairo in the
UARis northern region are increasing. The disgruntled ele-
ments, however, appear to be primarily members of con-
servative groups. Current reforms are largely directed
against their vested interests, and neither Nasir nor the
Syrian Baathists have ever counted on their political sup-
port. Even if unrest develops to the point of open violence,
UAR security measures appear adequate to maintain con-
trol in Syria.
Ghana: Prime Minister Nkrumah has indicated that if
he does not receive the assistance he desires from the West
to implement the $850,000,000 Volta River hydroelectric=
aluminum project, upon which his regime is counting heav-
ily, he will do "all possible" to get such assistance from
"any source anywhere." A spokesman for Nkrumah said
offers of technical assistance and machinery from Poland
and qechoslovakia are already being considered and that
Nkrumah would be "reluctantly" receptive to major help
from Moscow if it is not forthcoming from the West.
(Page 6)
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*Indonesia:
a report is circulating in Djakarta that Army
Vice Chief ot Staff General Subroto and Deputy Prime Minister
Hardi are going to carry out a coup against Army Chief of
Staff General Nasution. This report is unconfirmed. Subroto
and Hardi are primarily loyal to President Sukarno, who may
have stimulated their plotting as a means of countering at
some future date Nasution's growing influence.
1
III. THE WEST
Uruguay: The Colorado party, which has dominated the
government for almost a century, is likely to suffer severe
losses in the 30 November general elections because of wide-
spread discontent over economic conditions. The party's fear
of losing control of the nine-man executive council as well as
of Congress has led to talk of a preventive coup, but the party
is probably willing to rely on its organizational ability and the
advantages it expects to gain at the polls from its recent tiro-
labor measures. (Page 7)
*Mexico: Communist party leaders are
planning demonstrations, which might
involve violence, against Secretary Dulles during his visit to
attend the Iqauguration of President Lopez Mateos on 1 Decem-
ber. Outgoing President Luis Cortines is said to be angered
by reports of the nlan and to have ordered strong nreventive
measures
IV.) SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Special National Intelligence Estimate No.
Situation in Cuba. 24 November 1958.
85-58. The
National Intelligence Estimate No. 76-58.
for the Horn of Africa. 12 November 1958,
The
Outlook
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LA.J11/1 1UILiVI UHL 0
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Proposal on Berlin
The Soviet proposal to convert West Berlin into a de-
militarized "free city" guaranteed by the USSR, the UK,
the United States, France, and the two German states is
designed to place the USSR in a stronger position to proceed
at the end of six months with its plans to transfer to East
Germany its control over Allied access to West Berlin.
Moscow probably believes that rejection of its proposaL
for a six-month grace period for negotiating a free-city
status and for some form of UN supervision would place
the Western powers in the position of appearing to insist
on continuing the military occupation of Berlin.
By confining the proposal to West Berlin, the Kremlin
has shown that it already considers East Berlin as East
German territory. The Soviet proposal further states that
both Germanies shall participate in "respecting" West Ber-
lin as a free city, indicating that recognition of East Germany
is an immediate Communist goal. The proposal assigns to
East Germany the right to control access to the "free city"
in return for West Berlin's guarantee that no "hostile, sub-
versive activity" against East Germany will be tolerated in
its territory.
By unilaterally nullifying the various agreements that
form the basis for the Berlin occupation and by stating as
an ultimatum to the West that the Soviet proposal must be
accepted or "there will be nothing left to discuss on the
Berlin question," the Kremlin is demonstrating its determi-
nation to bring about a change in the city's status. The pro-
posal adds that if the Western powers do not accept within
the six-month period, the East Germans will be empowered
to control Allied access to Berlin, and the Soviet Union will
refuse further contact with the Allies there.
CONFIDENTIAL
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..CONF1DEN.TIAL 0
Soviet Bloc Delegates Prepare for Climax in Geneva Talks
The tactics of the Soviet bloc delegates at the Geneva
conferences on nuclear tests and surprise attack suggest that
Moscow, believing the talks are entering the final stage, is
moving to place the onus for any failure to reach agreements
on the West. There have been no hints of any major changes
in bloc proposals at either conference.
In the conference on discontinuing nuclear tests, Soviet
delegate Tsarapkin is directing his attack on what Moscow re-
gards as the most vulnerable points in the Western position--
year-by-year extension of any test suspension and condition-
ing test cessation on progress on other disarmament measures.
He has sought an early showdown on the firmness of the West-
ern position by insisting that the conference begin the actual
drafting of a permanent cessation agreement. At the same time,
he continues to reject Western requests for Soviet views on a
control system, arguing that the USSR will not discuss controls
until the West agrees to a permanent cessation of tests.
These tactics reflect Moscow's confidence that its demand
for a permanent and unconditional test cessation will contrast
favorably with the Western position, which would make the
year-by-year extension of a test ban conditional not only on
satisfactory progress in installing a control system but also
on progress on other disarmament measures.
Bloc tactics in the surprise-attack talks have been concen-
trated on sharpening the contrast between the West's nonpolit-
ical, technical approach and the bloc's thesis that surprise at-
tack can best be eliminated by political agreements removing
the causes. The bloc delegates charge that Western insistence
on a technical approach is merely a device for evading agree-
ment on "realistic" measures.
Soviet delegate Kuznetsov has specifically linked measures
to prevent surprise attack with an agreement to ban nuclear
weapons. This conforms to the standard Soviet position that
any recommendations on surprise attack must be related to
"definite steps in the sphere of disarmament." The chief Amer-
ican delegate feels that if the talks make no progress, Kuznetsov
may soon move abruptly for a breakoff.
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Us I
Bloc Arms Shipments to the UAR
Moscow, resuming major arms shipments to Egypt,has
scheduled at least three ships to transport military cargoes
to Alexandria. These shipments constitute the first major
delivery of bloc arms to the UAR since the large-scale sup-
ply of materiel to the Syrian region this past summer. Nego-
tiations which Cairo began in Moscow early this summer are
still going on, but the resumption of shipments indicates that
final agreement must already have been reached on many items. ,
The Soviet Union apparently still is denying the UAR's re-
quest for late-model military aircraft--TU-16 medium jet
bombers and MIG-19 jet fighters.--but Cairo continues to press
Moscow for additional jet aircraft and may have been able to
effect some sort of a compromise, possibly involving YAK-25
twin-jet all-weather fighters. In addition to the jet aircraft,
Cairo apparently is seeking more naval equipment, possibly
including additional submarines and minesweepers. The bloc
is expected to provide Egypt with a wide range of land armaments
as well, including 50 T-54 medium tanks, field artillery, and
radar-controlled antiaircraft artillery.
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act...an
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Developments in Syria
Reports of Syrian dissatisfaction with the UAR and of
possible new difficulties for Cairo in the UAR's northern
region are increasing. The most potent factors in the dis-
affection include implementation of Nasir's hastily promul-
gated land reform program, replacement of Syrian officials
and military personnel by Egyptians, and the prospect of
further economic dislocation. Discontent with the land re-
form law appears based in part on genuine inequities, such
as failure to adjust acreage ceilings to compensate for vary-
ing land values. Although authorities at first appeared to be
moving slowly in implementing the law, the regime has sud-
denly ordered immediate implementation of the law on prop-
erties of 25 prominent landowners. In all, about 3,100 land-
lords will be affected. Other Syrian groups affected by UAR
social legislation have been tribal chiefs, employers, and
businessmen.
The disgruntled elements, however, appear to be pri-
marily members of now impotent conservative groups never
counted on by Nasir or the Syrian Baathists for political sup-
port, and against whose vested interests current Arab reform
movements are largely directed. A serious challenge to the
regime in Syria appears possible only in the unlikely event
that dissident conservative elements could obtain the army's
support.
Reports of dissatisfaction in Syria have moved Jordan's
Premier Rifai to advocate an attempt to encourage Syria to
break away from the UAR, and to suggest that Syria could be
induced to unite with Jordan under King Husayn. UAR secu-
rity measures appear adequate to maintain control in Syria,
� however, even if disturbances should break out. Rifars
plans to promote unrest in Syria could react seriously against
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ont.nr. I
Jordan, and his proposal appears primarily a bid for addi-
tional Western financial assistance, since the prospect of
rallying Syrian public opinion behind King Husayn is un-
realistic.
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I WI a.) Lal...11,E. I
Nkrumah Pressing West for Volta Project Aid
Ghana's Prime Minister Nkrumah,
has indicated he will turn to the Soviet bloc
for assistance in launching his ambitious Volta River hydro-
electric and aluminum project if such assistance is not soon
forthcoming from the West. Nkrumah's spokesman said that
Nkrumah, while "most reluctant" to seek major aid in Moscow,
nevertheless was hopeful that the USSR would assist him as it
recently did Nasir if the West does not help, and added that
Ghana is already considering offers of technical assistance
and machinery, from Czechoslovakia and Poland. The presence
in Accra earlier this month of a Czech trade delegation tends
to substantiate Nkrumah's claim to have received bloc "offers"
along the lines indicated. At least at this stage, however, it
appears unlikely that any such "offers" were specifically related
to the Volta scheme, with which Moscow has so far avoided any
involvement.
The Nkrumah regime is deeply committed politically to
the Volta project--which has been estimated as an $850,000,000
investment--and appears to be becoming increasingly anxious
to demonstrate some tangible progress. Earlier this year the
United States indicated its willingness to help finance the scheme's
projected 600,000-kw. power installation provided private capital
could be found to build and operate a smelter. So far, however,
this condition has not been met, although one American aluminum
comnanv h.s evinced a serious interest in the project.
Nkrumah is
planning a visit to the USSR next spring. He may be planning
to raise the Volta question at that time if firm Western commit-
ments are still lacking.
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HI. THE WEST
Tension Over Uruguayan General Elections of 30 November
Widespread discontent over economic conditions could
cost Uruguay's ruling Colorado party its slim congressional
majority in the general elections scheduled for 30 November
and possibly its control of the nine-man executive,
In view of Uruguay's tradition of orderly elections, how-
ever, such action seems unlikely. Instead, the party may be
banking on the strength of its entrenched organization and on
new support at the polls deriving from recent prolabor moves.
Early this month, government action, which included financial
aid, finally made it possible for worker cooperatives to reopen
two formerly American-owned meat-packing plants which shut
down nearly a year ago.
Whatever the outcome of the contest for the executive,
prospects are that no one party will control the Congress.
All four opposition parties, including the Communists, are
expected to gain seats at the expense of the Colorados, with
the result that the new congress may be virtually paralyzed
until some interparty agreement permitting working control
can be reached.
Two constitutional referenda, both calling for a change
from the council form of government to the presidential sys-
tem, are expected to fail by a narrow margin.
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�...�%.,1 I ILLIN 1 11-1 1.4
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, _Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
NTIAL
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