CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/10/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02008416
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: October 18, 1958

proved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
ED
3.5(c)
18 October 1958
Copy No. C 59
CENTRAL
3.3(h)(2)
I\TELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMFHT N) _
L',,:')G,E IN CLASS.
, DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IL' S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _ _
AU DATE.
REVIEWER:
Awm7ZZ/Z/Z/ZZApproveZI To r-R-e Release: CO2008416'
//,
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
Nur, No,
TO ECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
TOP sFrprT
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
18 OCTOBER 1958
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait - Cease-fire continues;
bloc propaganda pointing to "political"
means to regain offshore islands and
Taiwan.
Moscow "displeased" by Nash.' q PffOrt
to supply arms to Iraq.
l
USSR to deliver more ships to UAR.
Poland - Gomulka moves closer to the
Kremlin's ideological line.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Thailand - Sarit returning to Bangkok
to deal with discord among followers. 0
Lebanon - Current mood of political
reconciliation unlikely to continue long. 0
Nasir's land reform program encounter-
ing resistance in Syria.
III. THE WEST
France - Early cease-fire expected in
Algeria.
0 De Gaulle to postpone recognition of
Guinea for several months.
0 Military coup may be attempted in Ven-
ezuela on 19 October.
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
%WOiur I.ru,i
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
18 October 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait situation: As the cease-fire is maintained,
both Chinese Communist and Soviet propaganda commentaries
are pointing to "political work" and "peaceful liberation" to
regain the offshore islands and Taiwan.
(Page 1)
USSR-Iraq: Soviet officials 1have expressed their "displeas-
ure" to the UAR Emb MosoQver Cairo's efforts to
supply arms to Iraq,
Negotiations presumably are now under way or irec pu
of Soviet arms by the four-man Iraqi military mission which
arrived in Moscow earlier this month. Training and supply of
the Iraqi military is likely to be a key issue in the competition
for influence in Baghdad now taking place between Moscow and
Cairo. (Page 3)
USSR-UAR!, During the past three years, the Soviet Union
has supplied two destroyers, six submarines, six mine sweep-
ers, and at least forty motor torpedo boats to the UAR. An
additional three submarines and three destroyers will reportedly
be delivered by January, and some 25 other ships, including
mine sweepers andtransports,during'1959. The new deliveries
presumably will include the two submarines and two mine sweep-
ers known to have been ready in late August for delivery to
Syria. (Page 4)
TOP SECRET
/. /Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
/ 'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
-I-C71-01c7crtm-r
Poland: In an unusually confident speech to the Polish
party central committee's 12th plenum on 15 October, Gomulka
appears to have adopted a position closer to the Kremlin's on
certain questions. He declared both the "revisionist" and
"dogmatic" (Natolin) wings of the party have been brought un-
der control and that the party has emerged from 1957's "con-
fusion of internal differences" and now is fully capable of car-
rying on the "building of socialism." In publicly scheduling
the oft-postponed third party congress for next March--after
that of the CPSU in January--Gomulka has apparently acted
In part out of deference to the USSR and in part out of a de-
sire to be able to tailor policies and actions of his own con-
gress to those of the USSR's congress.
(Page 5)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Thailand: Marshal Sarit, leader of the ruling Thai mil-
itary group, is flying to Bangkok from London, to deal with
discord among his followers. Premier Thanom doubted his
ability to handle the situation, and is said to have urgently re-
quested Sarit's return. General Prapat, the ambitious interior
minister, is believed to be the principal troublemaker.
(Page 6)
Lebanon: While civil life in Lebanon will probably return
to normal with the vote of confidence given the Karami govern-
ment, basic problems remain unresolved. It is doubtful that
the modoLiitaLronciliationwill
uzutA�thorities are disturbed over passive resi
ance to Nasir's recently announced land reform law in Syria.
Many landlords are refusing to pay their debts to banks and to
work their holdings. Further social and political disruption
can be expected as Nasir presses his land reform program.
(Page 7)
18 Oct 58
DAILY BRIEF ii
TOP SECRET
r
,ApprovedforRelezgrlfr/01/23 CO2008416
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
101 MW1L1
,==
timoo
III. THE WEST
France-Algeria: Negotiations between Paris and the Algerian
rebel National Liberation Front (FLN) are progressing and point
to an early announcement of a cease-fire agreeinent. For five
weeks, representatives of De Gaulle and the top FLN leadership
have been in contact through several separate channels with a
view to a cease-fire and subsequent FLN participation in the
French National Assembly elections scheduled for 30 Novem-
ber in Algeria. (Page 8)
France-Guinea: De Gaulle has decided to postpone recog-
nition of Guinea for at least two or three months, during which
time priority will be given to building up the new French Com-
munity. Although the French premier is said to be neutral on
recognition of Guinea by other powers, some of his advisers who
favor a tough line can be expected to continue trying to influence
him to eonsidr .siih reonitlon .n et unfrinr11y to Prnce
Venezuela: The Venezuelan mintalhy may attempt a coup
on 10 October, although any attempt is likely to be defeated.
Military unrest apparently is a reaction to a recent "deal" be-
tween the leftist but non-Communist Democratic Action party
and Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, junta chief and leading pres-
idential candidate. (Page 9)
18 Oct 58
DAILY BRIEF iii
TOP SECRET
A kp-p7o-v�e-Cirgzkele�a-s-e7a12"67M 3 CO20084167
CrIND.10-7_
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
Imre' '4�10
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait Situation
The Chinese Communists appear to be adding a new
feature to their propaganda which will, for the first time
during the current situation, stress the "peaceful liberation"
of the offshore islands. A Peoples' Daily commentator on
17 October called for "political work" among "compatriots"
on Taiwan, the Penghus, Chinmen, and Matsu to help them
"unite" with 6509000,000 Chinese on the maihland to recover
Chinmen and Matsu as well as Taiwan. In commenting on
Peiping's extension of the "cease-fire in the Far East," a So-
viet domestic broadcast of 16 October declared that public
opinion regarded the extension as another manifestation of
Communist China's desire "to achieve the liberation of the
Chinese islands by peaceful means."
Peiping delivered its "34th serious warning" on 17
October, alleging intrusio,n by two US warships into the
territorial waters of the Pingtan and Matsu area.
A Chinese Nationalist spokesman has asserted that
the Nationalist blockade of Amoy was abandoned in mid-
July prior to commencement of the Communist bombard-
ment of Chinmen. This appears to represent a modifica-
tion of the stated Nationalist "port closure" policy of all
China mainland ports, which has not been enforced against
non-Communist shipping, however, for at least a year.
The purpose of the announcement appears to be to demom-
strate that the offshore islands are not a threat to the econ-
omy of Communist China and that Nationalist withdrawal
from the islands would be of no economic advantage to the
Communists.
Since 8 August, 14 radar tracks of apparent Commu-
nist high-altitude flights over the mainland have been recorded
in the Taiwan Strait area--13 'reported by the Chinese
Nationalists and one by a US destroyer. One track reflected
SECRET
18 Oct 58 r=kITD Al IKITCI I inctor= RI II I PTI
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416N Page 1
rwrrn Fyn"
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
�4004 %goo
an altitude of 58,000 feet, six between 60,000 and 65,000
feet, and seven between 70,000 and 75,000 feet. The number
of aircraft reportedly involved in each instance varied from
one to eight. Plotted ground speeds ranged from 300 to 600
knots, with an average of 400 knots. These radar plots have
coincided with low-grade unconfirmed reports that FARMER
(MI0-19) fighters and other more advanced Soviet jet fighters
have been brought into East China. The movement of more
advanced fighter types into East China would be a logical de-
velopment in an effort to reduce the lopsided aerial combat
score achieved by the Nationalists, but insufficient evidence
is available to make any positive identification.
SECRET
18 Oct 58
����1,. urn A I IkITCI I irtmor= RI III PTIN
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
Page 2
Prt 011-,e�Drrr
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
*me Nore
Soviet- UAR Friction Over Iraq
Soviet of-
ficials had expressed their "displeasure" to Cairo's principal
arms negotiator in Moscow over Egyptian offers of arms
to Iraq, is the clearest indication to date of Soviet-UAR rivalry
to supply equipment and training assistance to Iraq. This
is likely to be a key issue in the competition now under way
between Moscow and Cairo for political influence in that
country.
Moscow, whose virtually unqualified support for Nasir's
leadership of Arab nationalism facilitated the rapid rise of
Soviet influence in the Middle East, has identified itself in
Iraq with pro-Qasim forces opposed to Cairo's domination
and to early union with the UAR. The Iraqi Communist
party, strengthened by the release from jail and the return
from-exile of many of its most able members, has taken a
leading role in opposing Iraqi-UAR union and has been in-
volved in a number, of street clashes recently with pro-Nasir
elements. The USSR'S, willingness to pursue a policy in Iraq
which apparently runs counter to Nasir's interests suggests
that Moscow will take advantage of every opportunity to
extend its influence over the entire Arab national liberation
movement.
After the 14 July coup, Moscow promptly wdended
diplomatic and propaganda support to the new Iraqi regime.
Moscow probably will make arms available to Iraq on the
favorable terms granted earlier to the UAR. A Soviet-
Iraqi trade agreement was signed recently in Baghdad, and
the bloc is developing economic political, and cultural ties
with Iraq.
TOP SECRET
18 Oct 58 r=k1TD A I lkiTrl I unrkieF RI II I FTIN
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
Page 3
TnP Crf,Dr-r
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
Nine
USSR to Supply AdditOral Naval Vessels to the UAR
The USSR reportedly plans to deliver to the UAR in
the next few months three submarines, three destroyers,
and about 25 other naval vessels, including mine sweepers
and transports. The submarines are to be delivered to
the Syrian port of Latakia by the end of 1958, and the UAR
is to take delivery of the destroyers, presumably at
Alexandria, by the end of January 1959. Although these
quantities have not been verified inter-
cepted Egyptian messages show that two submarines and
two mine sweepers, contracted for by the Syrian Region,
were ready for delivery in late August.
The arrival of these Soviet vessels would increase
UAR holdings of bloc naval craft to nine submarines, five
destroyers, and more than seventy auxiliary vessels, in-
cluding at least eight mine sweepers and forty motor
torpedo boats. The purchase of this additional naval
equipment, estimated to cost $100,000,000, would raise
total UAR arms purchases from the Soviet bloc since
1955 to more than $600,000,000.
Cairb is continuing to press the Soviet Union to approve
a UAR request for three IL-18 four-engine turboprop
transports, as well as some TU-104 jet transports.
Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the UAR for
passenger aircraft have been in progress since early 1958.
The UAR delegation which concluded a civil air agreement
in Moscow in early September also discussed procureraeht
of transport air/.aft for commercial uSe.
TOP SECRET
18 Oct 58
CFKITI2A1 IKITFI I inctorc ni cTlkl
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
Page 4
r' 'r
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
Nre .44sei
Gomulka Speech to the Polish Party Plenum
In his opening speech to the Polish party central committee's
12th plenum on 15 October, Party First Secretary Gomulka
adopted a position which will be more to the Kremlin's liking
than his attitude in the past on questions of ideology and inter-
nal party control. Gomulka reaffirmed Moscow's thesis that
revisionism is a greater danger than dogmatism in contrast
to his stand when he first came to power that dogmatism was
the greater problem. He probably hopes thereby to assure the
success of his forthcoming "friendship" visit to the USSR.
The fact that the oft-postponed third party congress, which
Gomulka admitted had been delayed because of internal party
conditions, now has been publicly scheduled for next March in-
dicates Gomulka's confidence that he has more than adequate
control over the party. He asserted that the party has already
emerged from the "confusion of internal differences" and now
is ideologically consolidated, stronger organizationally and po-
litically, and fully capable of carrying forward the task of
"building socialism." The date of the congress will permit
Gomulka to tailor the policies and actions of his congress to
those of the USSR's congress which will be held in January.
Gomulka made it clear that the party's main efforts now
would be directed toward the "complete liquidation" of the revi-
sionistic tendencies still to be found in universities, among
scientists, in the theater and the cinema, and among writers,
though this would not be accomplished by Stalinist-type meas-
ures.
Gomulkab speech indicates that he will soon attempt to put
more effective personnel in the party's grass-roots apparatus
and make it more responsive to control from Warsaw. In this
connection, he drew particular attention to the political activ-
ities of the clergy in rural areas as a special problem to be
overcome by local party organizations.
18 Oct 58 CENTRAL iisn-Fi inFKirF RI II I-FTIKI
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
Page 5
r LIP
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
Irg 64 II. ASIA-AFRICA :160
Continuing Discord in Ruling Thai Military Group
Marshal Sarit, the leader of the ruling Thai military
group, is flying to Bangkok from London .amid persistent reports
of serious discord among his principal followers.
It is reliably reported that the military group is now
split into two major factions, probably centering around
Premier Thanom and Interior Minister Prapat, contesting
certain key appointments in the cabinet and the military
command structure. Thanom is also allegedly being pressed
by his backers to force a showdown on the issue of corruption
in the military group. Any drive to limit corruption would be
aimed primarily at Prapat, since he and some of his followers
are among the worst offenders.
The two disputing factions seem about equal in terms of
military strength, with the Thanom group apparently controlling
the armored units and the Prapat group the bulk of the infantry
units in the Bangkok area. Their approximate parity in terms
of power minimizes the possibility of a surprise coup'. d'etat.
Prapat, however, has shown a tendency to take ill-considered
actions.
Sarit is likely to side with the Thanom faction when he
returns and, while he is probably neither able nor willing to
remove Prapat completely from the scene, he may try to
reduce Prapat's substantial political and economic empire.
He may also attempt to limit the influence of the elected mem-
bers of the National Assembly. Sarit is known to have been
considering a plan to alter the Constitution to reduce the mili-
tary's dependence on the votes of the elected assemblymen, who
have become increasingly obsrperous and demanding in recent
months.
SECRET
18 Oct 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
Page 6
erring�r
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
4'01
Resistance to Land Reform Law Disturbs Syrian Officials
Passive resistance by Syrian landlords to the confiscatory
agricultural land reform law decreed by Nasir
is disturbing officials,
Under the decree, all landholdings in excess of 198 acres
of irrigated or 741 acres of unirrigated land will be taken over
by the state in exchange for nonnegotiable 40-year bonds at
1.5 percent interest.
Resident landlords in the Jazirah dry-farming region of
northeast Syria are said to be abandoning their property, and
many throughout the country have ceased cultivating the land.
A number of landlords are refusing to pay their bank debts,
apparently because they believe these debts will in any case be
deducted from compensation for their lost properties. The land-
lords' attitude is affecting the planting of next year's spring
wheat crop.
The regime ultimately plans to transform large private
properties'into collective farms. At this point, peasant re-
sistance will probably be added to the distress of the large
landholders. Anticipation of resistance may have stimulated
Nasir's promulgation of a new state-of-emergency law and the
extensive reshuffling of local government and CPcurit erson-
nel
SECRET
18 Oct 58 CFKITP Al IKITPI I irtckirc Dl iii CTiki
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
Page 7
rinF I", TT
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
INF
III. THE WEST
French-Algerian Negotiations Appear to Be Progressing
Satisfactorily
The French Government has been contacting top leaders
of the Algerian rebel National Liberation Front (FLN) since
early September in an attempt to arrange a cease-fire and
subsequent FLN participation in the 30 November elections.
Recent conciliatory statements on both sides and De Gaulle's
latest moves against the settler extremists in Algeria seem
to indicate that the negotiations have progressed satisfactorily.
Speculation is growing that a cease-fire agreement may be
publicly announced before the beginning of the electoral campaign.
the rebels
now are willing to settle for a French commitment to allow
the Algerians eventually to determine their own fate.
the rebels
were thinking of participating in the November elections by
supporting "neutral" Moslems with the idea of using them at
alater date.
De Gaulle, who has declared he wants a representative
cross section of Algerian opinion to emerge from the elections,
is using this pre-electoral period to encourage Moslem leaders
to cooperate with his plans. The leader of the FIN's rival
organization, the Algerian National Movement (MNA), has been
led to expect a call shortly from a representative of the French
Government.
Meanwhile, in a move possibly related to the future im-
plementation of a cease-fire agreement, the rebel provisional
government reorganized its "armed forces command" as of 1
October.
military activities inside Algeria now are under the
)urlscliction of two "general staffs" which, together with two
"border commands" and "training services," are "under the
complete control" of the rebels' de uty premier and armed
forces minister, Krim Belkacem.
4/942-SEGRET
18 Oct 58 fkITDAI IkITCI I inprorp rti II writs!
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
Page 8
nrrincrr
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
Nov
Venezuelan Military Reported Planning Coup
The Venezuelan military will attempt a coup on 19 October,
the leftist, non-Communist Demo-
cratic Action party (AD). The AD reportedly made a deal re-
cently which would give it significant representation in a post-
election government under Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, the
odds-on favorite in the Venezuelan presidential election which
is to be held between 23 November and 7 December. The mil-
itary has previously threatened to take over the government
rather than permit an administration dominated by the AD
party. I the mil-
itary would not insist on the total exclusion of AD from any
share in the new government.
The AD apparently is prepared to combat any new coup at-
tempt. The Communists and other political parties would be
likely to join AD, and a coup effort, although unsuccessful,
might thus provoke widespread and violent rioting.
18 Oct 58 r=k1TDAI INTFI I ICIENCE BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
Page 9
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23_CO2008416
Nue %le
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination-
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2008416
,0.1101* TOP SECRET
0, �
rtz
4
TOP SECRET
z,.....,,,,,,,,Z/ZZAPProved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO200841-6W/7/1,/ 7/4:40