CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/12/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02998400
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: December 11, 1958

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11 December 1958
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*11 DECEMBER 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR introduces draft nuclear-test-
control system at Geneva talks; ma-
jor decisions to be subject to veto.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraqi Government permitting charges
of US plotting to go unchallenged.
India reluctant to accept Soviet offer
to train 500 steelworkers.
III. THE WEST
Venezuela - President-elect Betan-
court planning coalition government
of parties committed to seeking
larger revenue from US firms.
Guatemala - Rightist groups form
front with aim of forcing Ydigoras
out of office.
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11 December 1958
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR--Geneva talks: The Soviet delegate to the test-
cessation talks has introduced a text of "basic provisions"
for a control system in an effort to create the impression
of progress and to counter Western charges that the USSR
is refusing to negotiate. Under the Soviet plan, all major
decisions in the proposed control commission would be sub-
ject to a veto by any of the three "founder states" in the
commission; disagreements would be referred to the UN
Security Council. (Page I)
Watch Committee conclusion�Berlin: There is no
assurance that the USSR will wait for the full six months'
period mentioned in the Soviet note of 27 November before
transferring to the East Germans control over Allied traf-
fic to Berlin or undertaking harassment of some other sort.
Current Soviet efforts in the Berlin situation appear directed
primarily toward forcing counterproposals and negotiations
with the West.
Watch Committee conclusion�Taiwan: The Chinese
Communists retain the capability to initiate major military
action in the offshore islands area without prior warning.
However, the Communists do not appear to intend, in the
immediate future, to terminate the self-imposed restriction
against interference with resupply operations on alternate
days.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Watch Committee conclusion�Middle East: A deliberate
initiation of large-scale hostilities in the Middle East is un-
likely in the immediate future, although the situation remains
unstable throughout the area. The Iraqi and Jordanian internal
situations continue to be explosive, and there are reports of
plots to overthrow the regimes in both countries. The Israeli-
Syrian border situation is also explosive, and Israeli retaliatory
raids into Syria may occur if Israel is not satisfied with the UN
Security Counc re additional serious bor-
der incidents.
Iraq: The pneral atmosDhere in Baghdad appears to be
tense but quiet. a growing ap-
prehension by the UAR that the upshot of the coup attempt will
be new o � portunities for the Communists in Iraq.
Id
e Qasim regime is permitting the impression that the /,
United States rather than the UAR is the "foreign power" behind ,
recent plotting to go unchallenged. A Baghdad newspaper has /7:
repeated UAR and Soviet propaganda chres that the United / , / ; ,,
States was involved.
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India-USSR: The Soviet Union--in further exploitation of its
construction of the Bhilai steel mill--has offered to pay all costs
of training 500 skilled Indian steelworkers in the Soviet Union.
New Delhi is reluctant to accept the offer. An Indian official
states that 60 workers recently trained in the USSR have shown
susceptibility to Soviet propaganda. The training of Indian work-
ers in the Soviet Union would assist the Communist-controlled
All-India Trade Union Congress in its vigorous drive to gain con-
trol of the country's steelworkers. (Page 3)
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III. THE WEST
Venezuela: President-elect Romulo Betancourt--in
line with pre-election statements--apparently plans a coal-
ition government which will include the two other major
parties along with his own leftist Democratic Action party.
The Communists will probably be excluded. All three coal-
ition parties are committed to seek social reforms and a
larger share of profits from US-owned oil companies.
Betancourt may consider establishing diplomatic relations
with the Soviet bloc. Long-standing antagonism between
Betancourt and the military raises the possibility of a coup
attempt. However, plottine at this time is not believed to
hp in an arivanepel ai-acrp
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in a ''national anti-Communist front" to attempt to force Pres-
ident Ydigoras out of office through a series of planned public
demonstrations. While Ydigoras lacks an effective political
machine, he is believed to retain the backing of the army. An
armed clash between the police an4 demonstrators would fur-
ther weaken his position, however.
(Page 4)
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Union Introduces "Basic Provisions" for Test-
Control System
The long, detailed Soviet text of "basic provisions" for
a control system to supervise a nuclear-test cessation prob-
ably is designed to create the impression of substantial
progress toward agreement before the Christmas recess
and undercut Western charges that the USSR refuses to dis-
cuss details. The plan, introduced on 9 December at the
Geneva talks, is intended to appear comprehensive in scope,
but it fails to include the guarantees suggested previously by
the West.
The USSR insists that all substantive decisions of the
control "commission" be subject to a veto by any of the three
"founder states" in the commission and that disputes be re-
ferred to the UN Security Council. The plan also fails to
meet Western requirements on other major issues. It does
not provide for a truly international organization, requiring
instead that all personnel at the control posts, except for one
or two senior officials, be nationals of the country in which
the post is located. Soviet delegate Tsarapkin contended that
his proposals were based on the report of the Geneva technical
talks last summer or, in some cases, on the views expressed
by the Soviet expert. Tsarapkin also alleged that these "basic
draft provisions" were sufficient and that all other details
should be covered in agreements drafted by the organization
itself.
Tsarapkin's insistence that the Soviet control plan is de-
rived from the Geneva technical report will probably be used
by Soviet propaganda as a basis for charges that a Western re-
jection is another retreat from previous positions and agree-
ments. While the USSR may be willing to compromise on such
points as the make-up, privileges, and immunities of control
post personnel, and on communication facilities for the control
organ, it is unlikely to drop its insistence on unanimity on all
important questions.
CONFIDEN T1A L
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In a press conference on 9 December, Tsarapkin firmly
rejected majority voting, stating that Moscow "cannot accept
an automatic two-to-one majority against it." However, he
did tell the Western delegates that it should be possible to find
a compromise defining which questions re .uire un ni
which ones need only a simple majority.
CONFIDENTIAL
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
USSR Offers to Train 500 Indian Steelworkers
The USSR apparently is attempting to exploit India's
need for skilled steelworkers to aid the Communist-controlled
All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) in its drive to gain
control of labor in this vital industry. Moscow officially has
offered to pay all the costs of training 500 skilled workers in
the Soviet Union for the government steel plants under construc-
tion in India.
Despite its acceptance of a $132,000,000 loan for the con-
struction of the Bhilai steel mill, New Delhi is reluctant to
accept the Soviet offer because it fears that the workers will
be influenced by Soviet propaganda, as was a group of 60 such
workers who recently returned from the USSR. Engineers
sent previously to the Soviet Union have proved less suscepti-
ble, to Soviet propaganda. India, however, may decide it must
accept the Soviet offer, since the first units of the 13hilai and
Rourkela steel mills have already begun operation and the re-
maining units�as well as the Durgapur mill--are to be in op-
eration by 1961.
Moscow probably believes Soviet training of the workers
would help the AITUC to displace the Indian National Trade
Union Congress (INTUC), which is controlled by the Congress
party, as the leading Indian labor federation. AITUC, already
the dominant union in the steel industry, has increased its
strength in recent years, and this trend appears likely to con-
tinue.
CONFIDENTIAL
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III. THE WEST
Political Tensions Rising Again in Guatemala
Uncertainty and tension are mounting in Guatemala in the
aftermath of the bitterly contested 7 December municipal elec-
tions in which the leftist but non-Communist Revolutionary party
(PR) won control of the Guatemala City government.
Rightist political groups blame their defeat on President
Ydigoras' refusal to outlaw the PR, and they have joined in a
"national anti-Communist front" dedicated to ousting him.
These groups, which include some disillusioned former sup-
porters of Ydigoras, have planned a series of public demon-
strations at which they intend to accuse the President of know-
ingly furthering Communist objectives. This charge, though
unwarranted, is given credence in rightist circles because of
Ydigoras' temporary alliance with pro-Communist groups dur-
ing his struggle for the presidency in October t9'57 and because
of his refusal, after becoming President last March, to crush
organized labor and take drastic action against the Communists.
The PR, probably Guatemala's strongest single party,
was a prime Communist target, but last June strongly anti-
Communist leaders consolidated their control and have since
been systematically purging Communists and pro-Communists
from the party. Extreme rightists, however, still regard the
PR as being Communist.
Ydigoras appears to be concerned over the prospect of
demonstrations against him on the Communist issue, but he is
believed to have decided for the present against suppressing
them. If demonstrators should get out of control and bloodshed
result, however, his regime could be seriously weakened.
Ydigoras has no effective political machine of his own, but he
is still believed to have the backing of the military, and this
remains his most important asset.
CONFIDENTIAL
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t....fiva� WEAN 1 IbiL,
%WI Name
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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