CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/05/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02985834
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: May 24, 1958

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24 May 1958
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. I
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REVIEWER: =L. J.
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10,
24 MAY 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC �
Soviet air exercises in Arctic lasting
longer than nrevious activity of this
nature. 0
Bloc reactions to Soviet-Yugoslav
dispute reveal marked differences
I n tone.
Tito may seek to promote ties with
Nehru and NasLr to counter bloc
pressure against him.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon - Military stalemate and
political impasse continues; UAR �
support for opposition may be:
stepped up.
Sudanese officials fear Egyptian
subversion against government.
UAR may be plotting to incite Kurdish
tribal disturbances in Middle East;
Iraq, Iran, and Turkey planning pro-
test to UN Security CounciL 0
TOP SECRET
Indonesia - Central government
official indicates willingness to
discuss "settlement" with dissidents.
0 Japan - Kishi victory will strengthen
his hand in foreign policy; pressure
for more trade with Communist China
will continue.
French commander in Tunisia urges
early withdrawal of troops, except
from Bizerte, as only way to avoid
bloodshed.
Algerian military and civilian ex-
tremists prepared to accept prolonged
stalemate with Paris.
III. THE WEST
France - Pflimlin's majority in danger
amid signs of more political support
for De Gaulle.
0 West German foreign minister believes
De Gaulle's accession to power in Paris
would be "catastrophe" for Germany.
@ Panama - Although national guard con-
trols situation, further trouble still
Possible.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
24 May 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Arctic air activity: Sizable numbers of jet
medium bombers, principally from Long Range Air Force
bases located in the Soviet Far East, have been conducting
exercises involving bases in the eastern and central Arctic.
This series of exercises began in mid-April, and has con-
tinued beyond the usual termination date of comparable ac-
tivities in past years. The bulk of these flights apparently
are familiarization flights with most aircraft remaining on
Arctic bases for not more than a day or so.
(Page 1) (Map)
Bloc-Yugoslav dispute: Bloc reactions to the Soviet-
Yugoslav dispute reveals differences of views among the
satellites regarding a future course toward Belgrade. The
public position taken by Poland contrasts markedly in tone
with those of Moscow, Peiping and the "hard-line" satel-
lites, although Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Rumania
have shown an inclination to adopt a more conciliatory at-
titude than Moscow toward Belgrade.
(Page 2)
Yugoslavia: Tito may again attempt to promote his
concept of a Yugoslav-Egyptian-Indian grouping of uncom-
mitted nations as a counter to adverse Soviet bloc foreign
policy initiatives toward him in the wake of the Moscow-
Belgrade ideological rupture. Tito has reportedly sent
letters to Nehru and Nasir regarding his dispute with the
USSR. Belgrade was greatly encouraged by Nehru's de-
fense of its stand against the Soviet Union, and Nasir on
--Tep-SEGRETT--
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his return from Moscow told Ambassador Hare that he
intends to visit Tito "unofficially" in July.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon: The Egyptian Embassy in Beirut on 22 May
forwarded to Cairo a plan of action which proposed that the
principal dissident armed groups in northern, eastern and
southern Lebanon converge on Beirut and demand that Pres:-
ident Chamoun resign within 24 hours.
Syrian agents are reported to have made a large de-
livery of arms to Lebanese dissidents on 22 May. The
military situation has been generally quiet, with the gov-
ernment forces apparently inactive against the dissidents
who hold Balabakk and part s of Tripoli.
(Page 3)
UAR-Sudan: Sudanese officials are concerned that
lithe UAR is successful in its opposition to Chamoun in
Lebanon, Nasir may next move against Prime Minister
Khalil's government. Egyptian bribery of members of Par-
liament taken together with southern Sudanese resentment
of Khartoum could weaken the pro-Western coalition in the
parliamentary session just begun. (Page 5)
UAR-Kurdish tribes: The UAR may be planning to
incite Kurdish tribal disturbances on the frontiers of Iran,
Iraq, and Turkey. According to information reaching the
Iranian government' UAR officials have been in contact
with Kurdish tribal leaders, and the subject of an independ-
ent Kurdistan was discussed by President Nasir during his
trip to the USSR. King Husayn of
Jordan states that Turkey, Iran, and Iraq are planning to
protest to the UN Security Council against U4Ra1temnts
to create an independent Kurdish republic.
(Page 6) (Map)
24 May 58 DAILY BRIEF
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Indonesia: Deputy army chief Col. Jani expects the
dissident capital of Menado to fall within two weeks. He
also states that army headquarters is willing to discuss
a settlement with the dissidents but would insist on dictat-
ing the terms. (Page 7)
Japanese general elections: Despite Sino-Soviet ef-
forts to undermine his position, Prime Minister Kishi's con-
servative Liberal-Democ4tic party won a large majority
in the general election of 22 May. He will be encouraged
to continue his policy of cooperation with the United States.
While Kishi will be subjected to pressures to improve trade
relations with Peiping, the election results should enable
him to ao slow in making political concessions,
(Page 8)
Tunisia: The French commander in Tunisia urges
that the evacuation of all French forces in Tunisia, ex-
cept those at Bizerte, begin immediately "as the only
means to avoid future incident's which could lead to blood-
shed." He believes that the majority could be withdrawn
within two weeks, About 13,000 of the 22,000 French
forces in Tunisia are based at Biz,erte.
Algeria: There are signs of splits within the ranks
of the civilian and military extremists. All elements
seem prepared to face the prospect of a prolonged stale-
mate between Algiers and Paris, and there is talk of
eventual secession. The army's primary political in-
terest in the dispute continues to be to bring about a
change in the regime in Paris. General Salan com-
mitted 1irnf&f even Mnr xplicitly to this view on 23
May. (Page 9)
24 May 58
DAILY BRIEF iii
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III. THE WEST
1�
6
France: Pflimlin's proposals for strengthening the
executive have run into major opposition in the National
Assembly, and discussion of the issue has been postponed.
This action suggests stronger opposition from the Inde-
pendents, more of whom now tend to support General de
Gaulle. Should the Independents withdraw their support,
Pflimlin would have to depend on the Communists to main-
tain a majority. In this connection, French press reports
suggest that the Communists may be under pressure from
Moscow to withdraw their support from Pflimlin.
(Page 10)
West Germany: Foreign Minister Brentano believes
that the consequences of De Gaulle's coming to power in
France could be "catastrophic" for Germany and would be
interpreted by the German public as marking the complete
failure of Bonn's foreign policy. He feels that De Gaulle
would try to replace'Diropean integration arrangements
with new bilateral economic and political agrmnfs with
er which Bonn would have to refuse.
(Page 11)
Panama: Although the national guard controls Panama
City under virtual martial law --following the violence which
took several lives on 22 May--there may be further serious
trouble. Opposition groups hoping to oust President de la
Guardia will probably continue their efforts. Although the
disturbances have still had no anti-American overtones,
they coilld be channeled in that direction at any time.
(Page 12)
24 May 58
DAILY BRIEF iv
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AREA INVOLVED IN RECENT SOVIET
LRAF EXERCISES IN ARCTIC
(MID.APPIL 195$ TO DATE)
� EASTERN/CENTRAL ARCTIC BASES USED
FLIGHT ROUTES (SCHEMATIC)
FLIGHT ROUTE (SCHEMATIC)
STATUT
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Long Range Air Force Arctic Activities
Approximately 60 Soviet Long Range Air Force
BADGER (TU-16) jet medium bombers and one BEAR
(TU-95) heavy bomber have conducted a series of exer-
cises involving the Eastern and Central Arctic bases of
Tiksi, Mys Shmidta, and Anadyr/Leninka since mid-April.
Of this total, as many as 50 BADGERS deployed from bases
located in the Far East, the remainder from bases located
in the western USSR.
Most deployments have been of short duration with
little or no local flying from forward bases, suggesting
that these operations were related primarily to unit mobili-
ty, route navigation, and base familiarization training. On
several occasions, the aircraft remained at the Arctic bases
less than 24 hours.
Numerous delays in scheduling, however, were noted
during these operations. These appeared to be caused, in
most instances, by unfavorable weather.
Compared with Arctic training activity in 1956, 1957,
and an earlier phase during 1958, these recent operations
engaged more aircraft, involved the LRAF units based in
the Far East to a greater extent, and have continued be-
yond the usual termination date for such exercises.
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I...WI NI 11.� 1-41 II 1 I .C7.L.
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Satellites Differ on Yugoslav Question
Hungarian, Rumanian and Polish comments on the Mos-
cow-Belgrade dispute have emphasized "comradely criti-
cism," They have avoided vituperation and, although
fully adheringtobasic bloc positions on "revisionism," have
called for further interparty talks and continuance of amic-
able government-to-government relations. This reaction--
which in the case of Hungary admittedly reflects "conster-
nation" of party members over Yugoslav developments�is
significantly different from the uncompromising stand taken
by Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.
Comment in the official Hungarian party newspaper of
21 May, while closer to the Kremlin's position than Warsaw's
guarded defiance, is nonetheless conciliatory. It calls for
further discussions with the Yugoslav party "as between
comrades" and warns Hungarian party members not to
"backslide" to the vituperative line of the 1949 Cominform
resolution against Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the
Hungarian article does condemn the Yugoslav party for its
"anti-Marxist views," admits the 1948 resolution expelling
Belgrade from the Cominform was "essentially" correct,
and alleges Yugoslavia approved of the Hungarian revolution.
Rumania, like Hungary, apparently still desires to
avoid direct involvement in the dispute. The official Ru-
manian comment on the Yugoslav question issued on 18
May avoided polemics while carefully siding with Moscow
on the ideological questions in dispute.
Polish comment goes much further, approaching open
disagreement with the Kremlin's line and even hinting that
Moscow does not fully support the Chinese Communist de-
nunciation of Tito. An 18 May article in Swiat i Polska, un-
official organ of the Foreign Ministry declared that the Poles
considered the isolation of Yugoslavia in 1948 "unjustified."
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanese Situation
in light of the imminent
arrival of American tanks and President Chamoun's con-
tinued resistance, opposition elements should be given arms
to "enter the capital by force, even if it led to a clash with
the army." equipping the
forces of Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt; Maruf Sad, a Shia
Moslem from Sidon; Sabri Hammadah, a Balabakk Shia;
and Sulayman Franjiya, a Tripoli Moslem.
a concerted
march on Beirut, which has failed to materialize.
renewed fighting in Tripoli pin
down army units there who might otherwise join in the de-
fense of Beirut.
Syrian intelligence is reported to be using Sirghaya, a
Syrian town on the Lebanese border near Balabakk, as a
center for arms shipments to dissident forces. The town is
also being used as a point where Syrian commandos in s-
ant parb assemble for incursions into Lebanon.
flientions Syrian
soldiers in mufti heading for Kamal Jumblatt's castle in
the Bayt ad-Din region.
The military situation in Lebanon remains in a state of
suspension. In the Balabakk area, the army appears to be
following a passive course, and no action has been taken to
recapture the town.
The arrival of Egyptian Brigadier-General Abd al-
GhaffitY�. a guerrilla warfare specialist, in Damascus on
24 May 58
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21 May supports a number of reports predicting an im-
mediate intensification of UAR interference in Lebanon.
The political situation is still deadlocked.
the opposition has rejected a compromise solution where-
by General Shihab would become prime minister and
� Chamoun serve out his term of office.
Prime Minister Sami Su111 has declared that his cabi-
net "cannot ask for the amendment of the constitution" so
that President Chamoun can serve another term. Like-
wise, Sulh declared that he cannot accede to demands that
Chamoun resign.
A late press report from Cairo asserts that a "popu-
lar government" has been formed in south Lebanon and that
its forces will march on Beirut "within two days." While
this claim may be a form of psychological warfare against
the Lebanese Government, it may indicate that the UAR is
about to initiate such a movement. The existence of a "Free
Lebanese Government" with Nasir's covert support would
serve as an effective rallvin point for antigovernment ele-
ments.
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Egyptian Activity in the:Sudan
The UAR's subversive campaign against Sudanese
Prime Minister Khalil's pro-Western government may be
gaining strength, and events in Lebanon have apparently
shaken the confidence of high Sudanese officials in their
ability to resist a possible Egyptian effort to vverthrow
Khalil's coalition. The Saudi Arabian ambassador in
Khartoum stated on 20 May that he had "incontestable
proof" that the UAR Embassy was "Vuying" members of
the Sudanese Parliament and will make some move against
the government within two weeks. The speaker of the Su-
dan's house of representatives has informed the US Embassy
of the "gloomy" state of mind of many of his colleagues and
of his fear that the Sudan might be next if Nasir wins out in
Lebanon.
Egypt was apparently unchastened by the setback in
prestige it suffered in the Sudanese border dispute last Feb-
ruary and Khalil's subsequent parliamentary election victory
over the pro-Egyptian National Unionist party. Subversive
activities have not slackened, and bribery may well have
increased. Disaffection of a relatively small number of
members in the all-important house of representatives
would threaten the slim majority now held by Khalil's Urn-
ma party in coalition with the People's Democratic party
(PDP), which has its own small but troublesome pro-Egyp-
tian wing.
Egypt is also reported to have been active in the south-
ern Sudan, where resentment toward the central government
is of long standinv. Members of the Southern delegation in
Parliament, on whom the coalition also depends for support,
walked out of the 22 May session in protest against Litc form
of the new constitution now being written. Their dissatisfac-
tion with the government's stand against regional autonomy
may make them amenable to Egyptian advances.
24 May 58
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SAUDI ARABIA
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UAR May Attempt to Exploit Kurdish Nationalism
President Nasir of the UAR and Kamal Rifat, director
of Egyptian clandestine operations, met early this spring
with Kurdish leaders in Syria and may be planning disturbances
among the Kurdish tribes in frontier areas in Iraq, Iran, and
Turkey,
luring his recent trip
to the USSR, Nasir discussed with Soviet leaders an independ-
ent Kurdistan which would include some 20,000 Kurds in the
USSR.
While the UAR and the USSR may consider the Kurds
available for propaganda, intelligence, and diversionary
purposes, most of the Kurdish tribes are reported disil-
lusioned with past exploitation of their desire for a nation-
al state. An estimated total of 3,500,000 Kurds live in
Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, largely in the area be-
tween the Euphrates River and the Zagros Mountains.
Turkey, Iran, and Iraq are each preparing to protest
in the UN Security Council alleged attempts by the UAR to
encourage the creation of an independent Kurdish republic.
Iran in particular is sensitive to Kurdish nationalism be-
cause Mullah Mustafa Barzani, leader of the the Barzani
Kurdish tribe in Iraq, helped organize a Soviet-sponsored
Kurdish republic in Iran in 1945-46. When the incipient
republic was overthrown by Iranian troops, Barzani and
some of his followers fled to the USSR and are believed to
be located in the USSR near the western Iranian border.
There were unsubstantiated rumors during the Turkish-
Syrian crisis last fall that Barzani and armed Kurds were
in Syria.
information being received regularly in Iraq
indicated a iCurdish revolt was likely.
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Now'
Indonesian Situation
Indonesian army officials expect the dissident capital of
Menado in North Celebes to fall to government forces within
two weeks,
Government aircraft reportedly bombed Menado again on 23
May. The government has further strengthened its position
by relieving the commander in South Celebes, Lt. Col. Andi
Mattalatta, who had been sympathetic to the dissidents and
had failed to take action against revolutionary officers travel-
ing through his territory. He has been replaced by Lt. Col.
Andi Jusuf. Colonel Jani told the American army attache
army headquarters is willing to negotiate with the dissidents
but that the army will dictate the terms.
Army Chief of Staff General Nasution is reported working
toward the reorganization of both the army and the country's
political system, with anti-Communism and the dissolution
of political parties as his basic policies. Nasution, however,
must obtain the support of President Sukarno if he expects to
implement his plans. Nasution is also said to be seeking the
cooperation of Colonel Kawilarang, former military attache
to Washington who joined the dissidents, in order to facilitate
the reintegration of dissident areas.
The second major shipment of bloc arms is en route
to Indonesia. A Soviet vessel loaded with 1,500 tons of mili-
tary equipment, apparently including at least five more jet
fighter aircraft, left the Black Sea on 21 May and is expected
to arrive in Indonesia by mid-June. A second small Soviet
tanker left the Black Sea on 19 May "to be delivered to the
Indonesians," suggesting that it, like the ten small Soviet
cargo vessels delivered in March and April may be sup-
plied under the $100,000,000 Soviet credit. The first tanker
is expected to arrive in early June and the second by mid-
June. They are to replace Western vessels on interisland
runs. A second group of IL-141s was scheduled to leave
Irkutsk for Peioinz on 21 May on the first le 2 of the flight
to Indonesia.
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Japanese Election Results
Japanese Prime Minister Kishi's Liberal-Democratic
party, according to unofficial returns on the 22 May elec-
tion, retained its large majority in the powerful lower house
of the Diet by winning 287 of 467 seats.
The Socialists, in winning 166 seats, gained eight seats
and continued the trend of increasing their Diet representation
and percentage of popular vote. The expected addition of in-
dependent conservatives to the ruling party, however, would
leave the distribution of seats relatively unchanged. The Com-
munists lost one of their two seats.
The Conservatives' election victory, in the face of Sino-
Soviet efforts to undermine Kishi and his policies, should
strengthen Kishi's control of the government and enable him
to continue his policy of cooperation with the United States.
The full extent of his strength, however, will be shown by
his success in gaining the support of all conservative fac-
tions in the new, cabinet to be formed after the Diet is con-
voked about mid-June. He appearsio have a good chance of
achieving wide cooperation.
The election results should enable Kishi to resist mak-
ing political concessions to Peiping in return for trade with
Communist China. The conservative mandate also should al-
low him to proceed with the hnild-un and mndprniz don of Ja-
pan's defense forces.
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Situation in'llgeria
There are increasing indications of friction and dis-
cord within the ranks of the dominant military and civilian
extremists in Algeria and also between these elements and
more moderate leaders who have been caught up in the re-
cent developments there.
General Massu, head of the original Algiers Commit-
tee of Public Safety and now also a cochairman of the all-Al-
geria committee formally launched on 23 May, was recently
quoted as saying he was "fed up with the civilian trash" now
in control of the central government building in Algiers, and
one of the paratroop colonels involved in the plotting which
preceded last week's takeover has spoken disParagingly of
his associates.
Early this week a sharp and extended disagreement
over the attempt by two Poujadist National Assembly deputies
to enter Algeria reportedly occurred between extremist sup-
porters of Iacques Soustelle, ostensible civilian leader of the
ruling junta, and military authorities acting under orders of
General Salan, the top French commander in Algeria.
moderate elements
and "hotheads" are also competing for control in many of the
cities and villages throughout eastern Algeria.
The American consul general in Algiers reports that as
the stalemate continues, extremist civilian elements among
the resident Europeans are beginning to envisage with equa-
nimity a prolonged split with metropolitan France and even
eventual secession. The army's only political objective, how-
ever, continues to be to bring about the desired change of re-
gime in Paris, a goal to which General Salan committed him-
self more explicitly than heretofore when on 23 May he issued
a statement saying the new all-Algeria committee had been
formed to facilitate the establishment in Paris of a "govern-
ment of public safety presided over by General de Gaulle."
The Algiers leaders are not known to be planning to initiate
in the near future any further action of a drastic nature to
achieve this objective, but pressure for such action--which
could conceivably take place in Tunisia, Algeria or France--
may mount if the stslemate is nf limp' chiral-inn I
24 May 58
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III. THE WEST
The French Crisis
Premier Pflimlings proposals for strengthening the execu-
tive power appear a,lfeadST' to be running into major parlia-
mentary opposition. The decision of the National Assembly's
steering committee to postpone discussion of the issue un-
til 27 May probably reflects the basic distrust on the part
of many deputies of any move curtailing their own power,
and may also indicate stronger opposition from the Independ-
ents than was anticipated. The Independents, including their
top leaders Pinay and Senator Duchet, appear to be sliding
more toward De Gaulle as the only alternative to a popular
Front.
According to some press reports, the French Commu-
nists are under pressure from Moscow to withdraw their
support from Pflimlin. Since Soviet and French Communist
propaganda has been proclaiming that Communist support
for Pflimlin in the assembly has saved the Republic, it
would be difficult for the Communists to reverse their posi-
tion. They might, however, find a pretext in the constitu-
tional issues arguing that they have always opposed strengthen-
ing the executive.
There is renewed speculation that Pflimlin will make
contact with De Gaulle this week end to discuss "the steps
by which the general could assume power" if President
Coty were to call him to form a National Union government.
Although Pflimlin still has a chance to retain office
himself, a split or even a relative strengthening of the left
in his broad parliamentary support would bolster the case
of those urging a De Gaulle solution.
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Bonn Foreign Minister Fears Consequences of a De
Gaulle Government
West German Foreign Minister Brentano told the Amer-
ican ambassador on 20 May he believes a De Gaulle govern-
ment in Paris would want to conclude bilateral arrangements
with West Germany, the USSR, and other states in place of
the multilateral agreements built around European integra-
tion and NATO. The consequences for West Germany, he
said, would be "catastrophic" and would be interpreted by
the German public as complete failure of Chancellor Ade-
nauer's foreign policy.
Brentano feels that Bonn's reliance on NATO and Euro-
pean integration would force it to reject any such bilateral
political arrangements with or financial aid to a De Gaulle
government. Such a refusal, he fears, would increase na-
tionalist propaganda and anti-German sentiment in France
1 to a point where it might 1 estrov all grains made in Franco-
German rapprochement.
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New, Nue
Panama Still Tense
The state of siege declared on 22 May in Panama has
not eliminated antigovernment activity in the capital. A
disruptive general strike called by students and joined by
several unions continues, and unidentified mob leaders have
threatened renewed violence. At least 500 rebellious students
are in control of the national university area--which is out-
side national guard jurisdiction--although many took refuge
in the Canal Zone when armed hoodlums turned student demon-
strations over school administration into rioting and terrorism.
The agitators who incited the crowds in Panama City and
Colon reportedly were armed and directed by various groups
anxious to oust President de la Guardia for business or politi-
cal reasons and further to discredit the unpopular guard by
goading it into repressive measures. These opposition forces
are disparate in motive and distrustful of one another and would
probably have difficulty working together. However, their ini-
tial success in arousing the public may encourage them to new
efforts. They have often resorted to attacks on the United States
position in the Canal Zone for political purposes in the past and
have used De la Guardia's moderate approach to US relations
against him.
National Guard Commandant Bolivar Vallarino, who evi-
dently made the decision to impose martial law and censorship,
has arrested some of the alleged agitators and appears to be
the strongest figure in Panama at present. He may insist that
De la Guardia make some cabinet changes to ensure loyalty
within the administration ranks.
24 May May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 12
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14., 1 ,I.L.R1-di V 41 StIL
DISTRIBUTION
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Operations Coordinating Board
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985834