CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/05/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03185638
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: May 15, 1958

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3.3(h)(2)
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15 May 1958
Copy No. 140
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
No CHAN G'3. lN C:711.
�
'DOCUMENT NO.
CLAS3. CriA',NGED
NEXT FiEV;EW DATE:
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15 MAY 1958
I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Latest Polish statement on bloc-
Yugoslav dispute leaves Gomulka in
equivocal position, still subject to
Soviet pressure.
iI. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon - Fighting and sabotage
continue. New attacks on govern-
ment security forces likely if out-
come of political maneuvering does
not suit Chamounis opponents.
Indonesia - Dissident commander
states his aim is to make military
gains in East Indonesia which will
bring about negotiations with Djakarta.
Israeli Government concerned over
revival of Arab terrorism on Gaza
strip frontier.
LATE ITEM
Tyura Tam range activity indicates
valid firing sequence with launch time
of about 0300 EDT, 15 May.
Burmese Premier U Nu enlists sup-
port of Communist-dominated political
party in factional power struggle.
Laotian Communists hope to keep
present government in power as tactic
to further non-Communist disunity.
Tunisian Government fears local
French troops may try to join French
forces in Algeria.
Algeria - General Massu remains
defiant of civilian authority. The
role of General Salan continues
unclear.
III. THE WEST
France - Governnient under rightist
pressure; Communists demonstrate
against Pflimlin; chances of a call
to De Gaulle increasing.
0 Bolivia - Rebel outbreak in Santa
Cruz province increases President
Siles' political troubles.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
15 May 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Poland: Warsaw's latest response to Soviet pressure
in the bloc dispute with Yugoslavia is a Trybuna Luda edi-
torial condemning some aspects of Tito's party program but
treating Yugoslavia as a "fraternal socialist state." Go-
mulka's position creates a dilemma for the Kremlin. Fur-
ther Soviet pressure on Poland could threaten the principles
of independence on which the continued tenure of Gomulka
depends. (Page 1)
IAC Current Intelligence Group for the Taiwan Strait
Prnh1Pm � Renort for the period 10 April - 14 May f958.
(Page 2) (Maps)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon: Sporadic street fighting and sabotage have
continued. The army has apparently maintained control of
most of Beirut, but has not tried to reassert authority in
rural areas. Opposition groups continue to receive money
and arms from UAR sources. Chamoun's .opponents
may well mount a new effort against the strained security
forces if the results of recent political maneuvering do not
satisfy them.
*Indonesia:
the ultimate objective of the dissidents in North
Celebes was to bring about negotiations with the central gov-
ernment, but that they must first build up their offensive in
1.
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East Indonesia until they are in a position of greater strength.
Kawilarang subsequently went to Menado to assume over-all
command of the dissident armed forces.
(Page 3)
Israel-Gaza: The Israeli Government is becoming con-
cerned over a revival of Arab terrorism resembling fedayeen
activity based in the Gaza strip. So far, this activity has
been restricted to mining roads in Israel. (Page 5)
Burma: Premier U Nu has gained the support of the
Communist-dominated National Unity Front in the struggle
between Burmese political factions. This will enhance U
Nu's prospects for retaining control of the government but
may make him dependent on the front's support.
(Page 6)
Laos: Communist strategy in Laos appears aimed at
keeping the present premier and his cabinet, which includes
two former Pathet Lao leaders, in power rather than demand-
ing a larger cabinet representation for leftist parties. The
Communists would thus hope to allay conservative fears and
prevent the development of conservative unity. This plan
may be succeeding since a number of conservative leaders
he French ambassador are already favoring it.
(Page 7)
Tunisia: The Tunisian foreign secretary has informed
the American charg�'affaites that the government feared
French troops might attempt to join forces with those in Al-
geria, in which case Tunisia would resist the move and hope
for American support.
Algeria: General Massu and his "committee of public
safety" are apparently in control of the city of Algiers and
have succeeded in inspiring the formation of similar commit-
tees in several other important Algerian cities such as Oran
and Constantine. The role of General Salan, which remains
15 May
DAILY BRIEF ii
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a major factor in determining the effectiveness of any gov-
ernment move, is still unclear. All action is still being
taken in the name of preserving Algeria for France, and the
movement's ultimate objective still seems to be to influence
political developments in Paris. (Page 8)
III. THE WEST
*France: (As of 2400 hours) The Pflimlin government,
whi.cE has been strengthened by the decision of the Socialists
to participate, appears to be tightening police control on all
political activity. Whether these measures will be effective
is still questionable, and there are doubts whether the gov-
ernment will be able to survive in the ace of _continuing pros-
Sure from extrerniSts on .the ,tight and: defiance by the
Communists. A new crisis would advance the. Pros-
pect of President Coty's calling on De Gau_le�ta_head_o_a_
complete disruption of authority in Paris.
(Page 9)
*Bolivia: The rebel outbreak on 14 May in the Santa
"714) Cruz province in eastern Bolivia and the government's sub-
sequent declaration of modified martial law throughout the
country will increase the political difficulties of the Siles re-
gime. The government party, which is preparing for a conven-
tion on 20 May and for congressional elections in late June,
is badly -divided. Former President Paz Estenssorots re-
turn from abroad on 14 May is also likely to increase unrest
since Paz is friendly with leftist labor leader Juan Lechin.
Lechin, a leading critic of the US-backed economic stabiliza-
tion program, has led the o position to President Siles in
recent months.
15 May 58
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LATE ITEM
*Soviet missile activity: (As of 0001 hours) After a
protracted period of operational and administrative traffic
on the Tyura Tam range network, the activity entered the
X-8 hours countdown stage at about 2300Z (1900 EDT)
14 May. What appears to be a valid firing sequence
reached the X-6 hours stage at about 0100Z, 15 May.
Barring unforeseen delays, launch time should be
reached about 0700Z (0300 EDT), 15 May. Present
evidence precludes a firm determination as to whether
the activity involves an ICBM or a space vehicle. On
balance, the evidence slightly favors a space vehicle,
probably the third Sputnik.
15 May 58
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111 1I.' 11-4L I A-I
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Gomulka Enters Bloc Polemics on Yugoslavia
In response to continued bloc pressure to depart from
his middle-of-the-road policy on Yugoslavia, Polish leader
Gomulka on 14 May condemned certain aspects of Tito's party
program, but in a significantly milder tone than used in other
bloc criticisms. The Polish statement, published in the party
daily Trybuna Ludu, implies that while there are ideological
errors in the Yugoslav program, they do not constitute suffi-
cient cause for reading Yugoslavia out of the socialist camp.
The Poles express hope that an ideological and political rec-
onciliation can be reached between the Yugoslays and the
other Communist parties, and state that there must be no re-
turn to "the errors and methods of 1948."
Omitting reference to denunciations issued by Moscow
and Peiping, which were reprinted without comment by
Trybuna Ludu on 10 May, the Poles take particular exception
to Tito's analysis that contemporary capitalism is progressing
toward socialism by evolutionary means. The Yo,�Ylslays are
also condemned for failing to take into account "the funda-
mental principle of international solidarity of all socialist
forces," a criticism which may be directed as much against
a continuation of strong polemics by both Moscow and Bel-
grade as against the program itself.
In taking the Yugoslays to task for causing ideological
confusion in Communist ranks, Gomulka reveals his fear that
any split in the socialist camp could point up differences be-
tween his program and that of Moscow. The statement avoids
comment on those aspects of the Yugoslav program which could
have a bearing on Polish internal independence, such as the
principles of sovereignty and noninterference in internal af-
fairs which have been major planks in Gomulka's program.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Nee �104
Report No. 116 of the IAG Current Intelligence Group for
The Taiwan Strait Problem Covering the Period From 10
April to 14 May 1958
1. There were no significant combat operations in
the area during the period.
2. Chinese Communist naval exercises of an unde-
termined nature, involving various types of ships including
landing craft, commenced on 12 April and continued at a
Very high level as of 12 May. Abnormal naval communica-
tions activity also continued in the East China area. The
general exercise area is in the Hangchow Bay/Choushan Is-
lands region, with increased patrol activity noted at Wenchow
sand San Tu Tao. Since 8 May the activity has been extremely
high, with as many as 48 units active between Shanghai and
San Tu Tao on 9 May. The significance of this activity re-
mains undetermined. In the absence-of other possible indi-
cators of hostilities, an assessment of hostile intent at this
time is not warranted. However, the Chinese Communist
capability for hostile action with little or no warning is great-
ly enhanced by the immediate availability of such a large
number of naval units.
3, work is under
way on a short extension of the Yingtan-Amoy railroad lead-
ing to the dock area of Amoy. The exact amount of work
remaining to be done is not known, but completion within a
month or so is feasible. The Chinese Communists may then
try to make fuller use of Amoy, the best harbor on the China
coast between Shanghai and Hong Kong. If there is an in-
crease in the number of ships calling at Amoy, the Chinese
Nationalists might take more active steps to effect their port
closure, steps which could lead the Chinese Communists to
take retaliatory action against the Quemoys.
15 May 58
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TAIWAN STIMIT SITUATION Ns,
STATUS OF AIR FACILITIES
OPERATIONAL � Air facilities printed in red are known or evaluated to be consistently
used by military or civilian aircraft.
SERVICEABLE � Air facilities printed in green are known or evaluated to be capable
of use by aircraft.
OTHER � Air facilities printed in black are those under construction, unserviceable,
or on which the availability of information is such that the current status
cannot be determined.
*Delineated runways are explained as a defined or marked area on an airfield
prepared or selected for landing and takeoff of aircraft.
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14 MAY 1958
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Situation in Indonesia
Prior to his recent departure for Menado, Col. Alex
Kawilarang is to have stated in Manila
that the dissidents' ultimate objective was to force the
central government into meaningful negotiations. In the
meantime, the dissidents would have to continue their of-
fensive in East Indonesia so as to strengthen their bar-
gaining position. Kawilarang, who is the commander in
chief of the dissident armed forces, estimated that it
would take from three months to a year to bring about
negotiations. He admitted having been contacted while
in Manila by an emissary of Army Chief of Staff Nasution
but stated that the central government representative
brought no "positive offer" from Nasution.
ships "involved in opera-
tions" which were proceeding to Ambon is a further indi-
cation thatAmbon will be used as a staging area for gov-
ernment operations against Morotai, Halmahera, and the
east coast of North Celebes. Ambon is vulnerable to dis-
sident air attacks, as is Balikpapan On Borneo, which is
another staging area for operations in East Indonesia.
Military authorities in Djakarta apparently have banned
a Communist-sponsored mass rally to protest "foreign inter-
vention" which had been scheduled for 16 May.
An undisclosed number of 2,000- to 4,000-ton Soviet
tankers are en route to Indonesia to carry petroleum prod-
ucts from South Sumatra to East Indonesian ports.
these tankers have been provided outside the frame-
work of he $100,000,000 credit the USSR has extended to In-
donesia.
In answer to a request for arms in late April
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vl
Japan could not officially
approve such shipments without consulting the United States,
the United States controls sales of American-type arms
but would not oppose "disguised"
shipments of arms. Japan has officially supported the cen-
tral government in Djakarta since the revolution began.
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i.-11 4...1Laii...1%.Li 1
Aar' Near'
Israeli Concern Over Increased Fedayeen-Type Terrorist
Activity on Egyptian Frontier
The Israeli Government suspects that a "recrudescence"
of fedayeen-type terrorist activity, principally road mining,
along Israel's Sinai and Gaza strip frontiers is Cairo-directed
rather than mere local harassment by Gaza's Arab refugees.
citing a mine explosion on 7 May
and evidences of other mining preparations, these
incidents have been too numerous and their implications for
Israel too serious to be overlooked. Israel Defense Force
Chief of Staff Laskov is expected to discuss the situation with
General Burns, commander of the UN Emergency Forces de-
ployed on the Arab side of the border. The Israelis have ex-
pressed little confidence in UNErs effectiveness, and Laskov
probably will seek more freedom of action for Israeli securi-
ty operations, which are handicapped by the presence of UNEF.
The Israelis consider themselves particularly vulnerable to
terrorist harassment.
increased f ed-
ayeen training in Gaza, and in March fedayeen there were es-
timated to number 400. In addition, Egyptian regular forces
in the eastern Sinai area have been augmented during recent
months and further increases are likely. The present Egyp-
tian strength in this area is about 10,000, roughly one third the
force E gypt had hi the area before the 1956 Sinai campaign,:
Egyptian in-
telligence parties were authorized to enter Israel, probably
to assess the Israeli reaction to increasing Egyptian military
activity near Israel.
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Burmese Political Crisis Deepens
Premier Nu has been promised the 46 to 49 parliamentary
votes controlled by the Communist-dominated National Unity
Ffont (NUF) in the dispute which has split Burma's govern-
ing party, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League. Nu
claims to have made no concessions for this support, but,
if he is forced to rely on the NUF votes, he may have to
modify his opposition to direct negotiations with the Commu-
nist insurgents and to become more accommodating to Othcr
leftist demands. Already the Rangoon press has denounced
Nuts acceptance as "expediency" aric a windfall for the Bur-
mese Communist party, and przAicts it will result in the
"birth of real Communist power in Burma."
The closeness of the coming parliamentary vote is il-
lustrated by the fact that both the Nu and the Ba Swe - Kyaw
Nyein factions are offering the Ministry of Finance to an
ethnic minority leader in return for the six votes he can de-
liver. This leader, however, has announced he will cast
his votes "for the winning side."
Both factions have disavowed any intention of resorting
to violence, but such a development cannot be discounted
in the light of Burma's turbulent history. In the present
situation, the feuding leaders command personal followings
in the armed forces, regular and irregular, as well as
among the police, labor unions, and peasant organizations.
Army Commander in Chief Ne Win has ordered army
leaders to remain aloof from the political struggle, and it
is reported that a dusk-to-dawn curfew will be imposed in
the Rangoon area from 26 May until the end of the special
session of Parliament which begins on 5 June. Ne Win has
warned that the inclusion of Communists in any forthcoming
government would be a "matter of concern to the army."
-SEeRE-T--
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SECRET iudif
Sentiment for Coalition With Communists Growing in Laos
Sentiment for the retention of Premier Souvanna Phouma
and most of his present cabinet, including two former Pathet
Lao representatives, appears to be gaining strength in Laotian
political circles. The Communists are abetting this trend to
maintain the conservatives' false sense of security, thus
facilitating Communist plans for an eventual political take-
over. Conservative elements, meanwhile, are seizing on this
formula as a face-saving device in the wake of their recent
electoral defeat.
Crown Prince Savang has issued a call for national
harmony, and has indicated that the monarchy would acquiesce
in Souvanna's remaining as head of a coalition government.
Other conservative leaders, in turn, are rationalizing the
heavy vote for antiadministration candidates in the 4 May elec -
tion as a protest against government corruption or as a popular
mandate for national unity rather than a vote for Communism.
French Ambassador Gassouin, who also favors retention
of Souvanna at the head of a government of technicians drawn
from all political affiliations, has reiterated his conviction
that the Neo Lao Hak Zat is not Communist but a reform par-
ty with high motives. His views are encouraging accommoda-
tion with the Communists by government officials who, in any
event, are inclined to view them essentially as patriots
�SEC�RE-T---
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...WI NI 1L,Lal I 111L.d
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Situation in Algeria
Joint military-civilian committees of "public safety"
modeled upon and supporting the one established in Algiers
on 13 May under the leadership of French paratroop gen-
eral Massu and local civilian extremists have apparently
assumed power in numerous major and minor Algerian
cities�including Oran, Constantine, Bone and Philippeville.
These developments have been accompanied by strikes,
demonstrations, and new disorders which were most in-
tense in Oran. Rioting mobs there stormed the government
building and manhandled the top civilian official after the
radio station had been seized, apparently by reservists
in civilian dress. The newly established committees have
all re-echoed the call for a De Gaulle government issued
by Massu and his Algiers committee.
The position of General Salan, France's supreme com-
mander in Alget.ia, remains unclear. He has been recog-
nized as the ultimate authority in Algeria for the time be-,
ing by both Premier Pflimlin and General Massu�who
yesterday described Salan as an "emanation of the govern-
ment." Salan himself, who earlier announced he had as-
sumed power "in agreement" with the Algiers committee,
has so far studiously avoided a firm public commitment
of loyalty to Paris.
Both Salan and the Algiers committee under Massu con-
tinue to occupy the paratroop-guarded central government
building in Algiers ransacked by European rioters on 13 May.
The committee insists, however, that it has no intention of
forming an independent government, but intends to hand over
authority as soon as Paris installs a government "capable of
preserving Algeria as an integral part of France." Late
yesterday there were some indications that Massu jght now
be willing to settle for something considerably short k d the
terms he first laid down. Events in Algeria, however, indi-
cated that the civilian extreirnists, now thoroughly aroused,
may fomeat new disorders in an effort to bring down even
the Pflimlin government,, even if it is further modified.
CONFIDENTIAL
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1.71-01...,ZIL 1
Nate III. THE WEST
The French Political Situation (As of 2400 hours)
Premier Pflimlin is attempting to stabilize the situation
in France by tightening police controls, arresting rightist
extremists, and banning political demonstrations.
The Socialists have agreed to participate in his gov-
ernment, which may lead to the return of Robert Lacoste
to Algiers as minister for Algeria. This development
might appease the army leaders in Algeria and restore
their confidence in the Paris regime.
The other nonextremist French political parties
and groups, such as the non-Communist labor organizations,
now appear ready to back, at least for a limited time, "com-
mon action of all national parties against all seditious ac-
tivities." Under these circumstances, the Communists may
continue agitation similar to the 14 May street demonstra-
tions in an effort to keep alive the idea of a popular front
against what they call the new "fascist menace."
Pflimlin faces the prospect of continuing civil dis-
orders and pressures from the military.
the Paris prefect is
uncertain whether the entire police force will be reliable
in the face of rightist pressures. Should continuing ex-
tremist agitation force Pflimlin to give up his attempt to
maintain a governMent, President Coty will be under even
heavier pressure to turn to De Gaulle. The general, how-
ever, has not yet given any sign of his intentions, although
various spokesmen continue to make representations on
his behalf.
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