CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/09/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03156631
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: September 12, 1958

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3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
12 September 1958
Copy No, C 59
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
T3OCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. )(r.
I 1 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C -
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2 0/ �
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Nesse
12 SEPTEMBER 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait - Chinese Communist
naval activity increasing.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai says
Hammarskjold's mission has failed.
Jordan - More friction reported between
0
King Husayn and Rifai.
Indonesia cites receipt of arms from
both US and USSR as proof of success
of its independent foreign policy.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
12 September 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait situation: Chinese Communist military
activity is increasing; five North China Fleet vessels in-
cluding two submarines, are moving south from Tsingtao
to Shanghai and some naval jet fighters from Hainan Island
have moved north to Nanchang.
Heavy Communist artillery fire prevented an attempt
to resupply Kinmen on 11 September.
(Page 1) (Map)
Watch Committee conclusion -- Tttiwan Strait:
The Chinese Communists will continue heavy artillery
barrages, interdict supply lines to the offshore islands by
using artillery and naval elements as necessary, and main-
tain a high state of readiness for air operations.
The Chinese Communists now possess a capability to
launch major attacks against the Kinmens, the Matsus, and
smaller offshore islands with little or no warning. Seizure
of one or more of the offshore islands is possible, but am-
phibious lift necessary for an invasion of Kinmen and Leih
Hsu (Little Quemoy) and Matsu has not yet been observed.
The Chinese Communists probably do not intend to initiate
major offensive military action against Taiwan and the
Penghus (Pescadores), but possess a capability for major
air attacks against them.
The Chinese Nationalists, fearing US concessions in
talks with the Chinese Communists, might undertake
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independent provocative action calculated to embroil the US
in hostilities.
NOTE: The Director for Intelligence, Joint ,
Staff, agrees that this is possible, but con-
siders it unlikely in the immediate future.
In view of the reported confidence of the Chinese Commu-
nist leadership and the increasing belligerence of Chinese
Communist propaganda, the Chinese Communists may take
military action against US naval or ,cair units operating in the
offshore islands area within the recently proclaimed 12-mile
territorial limits, although it is difficult to assess the de-
gree of likelihoodnof this occurring. Such Chinese Communist
military action in turn may lead to further US - Chinese Com-
munist armed clashes. Strong Soviet statements of support
for the Chinese Communists probably represent a real So-
viet commitment to the defense of Communist China. This
commitment, however, would probably be honored only in
the event that US - Chinese Communist hostilities extend be-
yond the offshore islands and immediately adjacent mainland
areas, and only after a failure of Soviet diplomatic efforts
to terminate those hostilities on terms acceptable to the
USSR and Communist China,
IL ASIA-AFRICA
*Hammarskjold mission: Jordan's Prime Minister Rifai
considers that UN Secretary General Hammarskjold's mission
to implement the 21 August UNGA resolution on the Middle
East has failed, since Nasir has mot given acceptable as-
surance of noninterference in Jordan. Unless Nasir changes
his attitude, Hammarskj old, according to Rifai, plans to
make no recommendation to the impending General Assembly
session regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops. Nasir is
unwilling to accept Jordan's demand that a UN representative
12 Sept 58
DAILY BRIEF ii
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be stationed in Cairo. On 11 September, commenting on Ham-
marsk)old's failure to expedite withdrawal, the UAR-controlled
clandestine radio in effect called for renewal of anti-Western
terrorism. Cairo had earlier warned that unless foreign
troops were speedily withdrawn, severe tension would re-
appear in the Middle East.
Jordan: Increased friction has been reported between
King Husayn and Prime Minister Rifai, leading to new re-
ports that the King may be induced to appoint a less au-
thoritatian premier. Although agitation has been mounting
for relaxation of martial law and other restrictions, Husayn
would risk even greater instability in dismissing Rifai un-
less he decided at the same time to seek some sort of ac-
commodation with Nash'. (Page 4)
Indonesia:
recent deliveries of arms from the United
States following those from the USSR as proof of the con-
tinuing success of the government's independent foreign
policy. (TOP SECRET EIDER NOFORN) (Page 5)
III. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Special National Intelligence Estimate No. 34-58
bility of Present Regime in Iran. 26 August 1958.
National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-5-58. The Eco-
nomic and Political Conseauences of .11dia's Financial Prob-
lems. 19 August 1958.
12 Sept 58
DAILY BRIEF iii
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1�110
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait Situation
Five North China �Fleet vessels--two submarines, two
subchasers and an auxiliary �moved from Tsingtao to
Shanghai on 10 September in a relatively major deployment
of Communist naval strength.
the Communists are pre-
paring for significant naval operations in the East China
Fleet area.
Thirteen motor torpedo boats were seen near the mouth
of the Min River, opposite the Matsus, by Chinese Nation-
alist pilots on 9 September. Previous reports have indi-
cated that motor torpedo boats are operating in the Santu
Bay area, but this is the first report that such boats are
based even closer to the Matsus.
Another possible indication of increased activity by high-
level commands was a flight of three IL-14 transport air-
craft to Hankow from Peiping on the morning of 10 Septem-
ber. Two of these aircraft are usually reserved for top-
level personnel and at times have carried Mao Tse-tung.
Hoihow airfield on Hainan Island also was the origin
of a movement of jet fighters, believed to be a naval unit,
to Canton on :9 September. The following day, at least
12 of these planes flew on to Nanchang. Two of the aircraft
later returned to Canton. These fighters may be deployed
to the Taiwan Strait coastal area.
The Nationalists made a third attempt to supply Kinmen
on 11 September with two convoys. The first, consisting of
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12 Sept 58
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five vessels, successfully completed its mission of evacuat-
ing Nationalist wounded personnel. The second convoy,
carrying supplies, was driven off by Communist shore
batteries before it unloaded, despite the use of smoke
screens. The Communist bombardment of the Kinmens
on 11 September was one of the most intensive delivered
during the current situation.
The Nationalist deputy commander on Kinmen told news-
men on 11 September that the Communist artillery must be
suppressed and called for air attacks on the gun positions.
A Nationalist general staff officer said that counterbattery
fire from Kinmen is ineffective and hampered by a short
supply of 155-mm. shells. He said that Nationalist China
could not afford to knock out Communist gun positions by
air action, and that American convoying so far was not
adequate since it did not protect the landing craft along
the beaches.
The Chinese Nationalist Government is attempting to
foster a calm and moderate attitude on Taiwan, but Ambas-
sador Drumright reports that the prospect of Sino-American
talks has "caused a tremendous upsurge in Nationalist con-
cern, apprehension and uneasiness" in all circles.
Peiping's Foreign Ministry issued Communist China's
"fourth warning" on 11 September, claiming intrusions into
territorial waters by US warships engaged in convoy opera-
tions. The statement charged that American convoy op-
erations clearly demonstrate to the world that the United
States has not yet given up provocations against Communist
China. There was no clear indication that Peiping intends
to take immediate counteraction.
the Chinese Communists will be
satisfied with nothing less in the Warsaw talks than a
guarantee that the offshore islands will be evacuated or that
the United States will leave them "to their fate." They also
expect the Communists to take this position if the issue
Is raised in the United Nations.
Soviet editorial comment broadcast by Moscow on 10 Sep-
tember stressed the line that action against China would start
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a "world conflagration," and began to develop the theme that
settlement of the issue depends upon total withdrawal of US
forces from the area. Moscow radio on 11 September re-
ported a series of popular "indignation" meetings in the USSR
to protest American activities and endorse Khrushchev's
warning Khrushchev, speaking in Stalingrad on 11 Septem-
ber, re-emphasized Soviet support for the Chinese Commu-
nist position, stating that "the friendship between the Soviet
Union and China is strong as never before."
Prime Minister Nehru and senior Indian Foreign Min-
istry officials are convinced that the present shelling of the
offshore islands is a propaganda maneuver intended to reas-
sert the existence of the Peiping government and its claim
to participation in any high-level international discussions.
The Communist action is regarded as deliberately timed
to coincide with the coming UNGA session. Indian officials
discount any Chinese intention to invade the offshore is-
lands or to precipitate armed conflict with American forces
in the area.
12 Sept 58
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I I. ASIA- AFRICA
Developments in Jordan
Increased friction has developed between King Husayn
and Prime Minister Rifai amid new reports that the King
may be induced to appoint a less authoritarian premier.
Part of Rifai's difficulties with the King appear to reflect
the prime minister's efforts to block attempts by his rivals
to infiltrate their supporters into key positions from which
they might undermine Rifai. Although agitation has been
mounting for relaxation of martial law and other restrictions,
the King would risk serious instability in dismissing Rifai
unless he decided at the same time to seek some sort of
accommodation with Nasir.
A decision by the King to relax internal controls and
attempt to cultivate more popular support for the govern-
ment would run considerable risk in view of the possibility
of renewed UAR-supported terrorism in Jordan as a result
of the failure of the Hammarskjold mission.
12 Sept 58
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Indonesian Foreign Ministry Explains Arms Purchase From US
the recent purchase of arms from
the United States, together with the granting of credit and other
aid by the Soviet bloc, as evidence that Indonesia's independent
foreign policy "has borne fruit" despite "severe tests."
an Indonesian request for US
arms had been "hanging fire" since 1956, and that the United
States had been sympathetic toward the Indonesian dissidents.
The Foreign Ministry believes that the recent volte-face in
American policy resulted from the respect and surprise en-
gendered by the Indonesian Army's performance in suppressing
the provincial rebellion and from Indonesia's resort to the So-
viet bloc, among other sources, for military purchases.
The Foreign Ministry states that the Indonesian Govern-
ment wants to continue friendly relations with the United
States without sacrificing its foreign policy, It points out
that "as outsiders look at our independent policy, it is pos-
sible that it sometimes seems to lean toward the right or the
left in a zigzag line," and it is not surprising that attacks
come from both left and right.
Present army leaders, who have assumed
an increasingly active role in Indonesian policy making, hope
to steer a middle-of-the-road course avoiding either a Com-
munist or a Moslem state. "
The Indonesian Army has consistently pressed for US
arms and, since the arrival of token amounts of American equip-
ment, has requested a continuing supply. Considerable quan-
tities of bloc arms were contracted for in early 1958, when
the acquisition of US arms seemed unlikely.
12 Sept 58
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CONFIDENTIAL
Nee
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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