CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/04/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03150415
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: April 2, 1957

rre./J3/07,,,,,,e4,3r;woved foir3ej_emE0i1,9/1/04 CO3150415,
////1171,1 #9741�
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
2 April 1957
Copy No.
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUT HR 7041
DA EVIEWER:
134
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
'1,601
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Tar SECRET
P,vtiff,ediciez/A
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
_oo�01�k ossaisrA,
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
CONTENTS
iJ ZHUKOV GIVES VIEWS ON SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY
(page 3).
ri to THE SITUATION IN JORDAN
(page 5).
A13. SYRIAN ARMY WARNS UN OF ISRAELI BORDER ACTIVITIES
(page 6).
0
5. BRITAIN
FROM UN
(page 7).
ORTED STILL CONSIDERING WITHDRAWAL
(page 8).
TITO TO PROTEST BULGANIN'S CHARGES
(page 9).
0 ('V. SITUATION IN INDONESIA
page 10).
0(1;1. ELEC7I7LAY BRINGS POLITICAL CRISIS IN ARGEN-
TINA (page 11).
109. NEW GENERAL STRIKE THREATENS HAITIAN GOVERNMENT
(page 12).
2 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
---TOP�SEelitErT
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
I May 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Bino-Soviet Bloc Area
'ROM � chief, Ground Forces Branch
SUBJECT � � Zhukov's Speech to GBFG
have learned a little more with regard to
Zhukov's statement on aircraft and missile capa-
bility contained in his speech to top level
officers in the GSFG in March.
Zhukov's remarks on the altitude of aircraft
was within the context of an off-the-cuff boast--
that he had no set altitude in his prepared speech.
Zhukov's
reference to a missile with only 200 meter devia-
tion cannot be taken too seriously�that he was
i?robably referring to a "book" specification and
wt actual, demonstrated capability. The
view has been passed informally to the services
and to Stoertz.
As you may know, the confusion over Zhukov's
statement that the GBFG must hold out for 46 hours
while the second echelon moves up has now been
-formally corrected to 4-6 hours. This, of course,
is even more absurd and defies analysis. Zhukov's
speech, in part, was directed toward improving
GBFG morale which might provide some excuse for
such a statement. But it is difficult to believe
that he would feel such a remark would be taken
literally. I can conclude only that there is
still a mistake somewhere.
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
nip rts.r.
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
r
NIMPO10,
We have received another version of the Zhukov
speech, whab generally confirms the earlier TD,
but which does not include much of the specific
information. The new version is an Fl report
seems to be an obvious attempt to
plant information in the West that could serve
Soviet interests. It fits into the recent Soviet
propaganda framework aimed at intimidation. It
stresses Soviet mechanized and atomic capabilities
and deprecates American fighting capability.
Zhukov's speech
stressed the need for cooperation between the
East German and Soviet army, while the earlier TD
version has Zhukov warning that strict security
measures be maintained with respect to the East
German army. Significant points of Zhukov's
speech not reported include: (1)
specific information on aircraft and missile
capability, (2) GSFG hooliganism, (3) Western
alertness, (4) beating the West to the punch,
and (5) the Hungarian rebellion.
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
1,W C.7771�
y 195?
FROM
CT
Chief -Soviet Bloc Area
Chief Oround forces Branch
Shukov's Speech to GSM
I have learned a little sore with regard to
ov s statement on aircraft and missile capa-
biUty contained in his speech to top level
iff4cvii 1,, 44sis iftlInfirt 4 alert
km on the
t of an
itudo in his nrimar
a
rezeronco
tion cannot be
probably reforri
not actual, demons
view has boon pass
and to Stoortz.
le with only 200 meter devia-
*Do seriously--that he was
"book" specification and
capability. The
rosily to the services
As you may know, the confusion over Zbukov s
statement that the G6PG must hold out for 46 hours
while the second echolon moves up has now been
formally corrected to 4-6 hours. This f course,
is even nor* absurd and defiss analysis. Zhukov's
speech, in part, was directed toward improving
OSPO morale which might provide some *sous* for
such a statement. But it is difficult to bolieve
that he would feel such a remark would be takon
literally. I can conclude only that there is
still a mistake somewhere.
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 003150415
Aft M /ft vas .m
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
..airxx",j1 II
We have r.c�iv.d another ve
speech, whitfh generally confirms
but which dbes not inclado much e
information. The new version is an
seems to be an obvious
plant information in the West that could serve
Soviet interests. It fits into the recant Soviet
propaganda framework aimed at intimidation. It
stresses Soviet mechanised and atomic capabilities
and deprecates American fighting capability.
Iecuraty
he East
v's
(X)
to
T
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
ZHUKOV GIVES VIEWS ON SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY
Comment on:
In a recent speech to commanders
of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
(GSFG), Marshal Zhukov reportedly dis-
cussed some aspects of current Soviet mil-
itary strategy. The statements attributed to Zhukov appear
generally plausible in the light of estimated Soviet capabilities.
Zhukov's assertion that the Soviet Union
would definitely be the one to "unleash the war," as soon as
it became apparent that the West was preparing to attack the
USSR, is in line with the increased emphasis since 1954 in
Soviet military literature on the importance of surprise at-
tack. in April 1956 that Soviet troops
were being acquainted with the idea of preventive war.
Zhukov reportedly said that the GSFG must
hold out for a 46-hour period during which the second echelon
moves up with all types of modern weapons. He added, how-
ever, that operations must now be planned so that Soviet for-
ces--presumably airborne troops�will reach the English
Channel on the second day of war. His remarks suggest that,
of the various courses of action open to the USSR, it would
choose to place considerable weight on the factor of surprise
and therefore would select a course midway between maximum
prior reinforcement and initiating an attack with forces already
in East Germany.
The marshal's statement that Soviet forces
possess everything essential to modern warfare is a standard
Soviet position and probably reflects the actual USSR's assess-
ment of its strength vis-a-vis the West. The reference to mod-
ern Soviet aircraft with speeds of 1,800 to 2,000 kilometers an
2 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
TOP SECRET
_Jur appears accurate, but operational ceilings of 25 to
30 kilometers (82,500-99,000 ft) are well beyond the es-
timated capabilities of approximately 60,000 to 61,000 ft.
for known existing aircraft. Zhukov stated that the T-10
heavy tank is to be replaced by a new heavy tank. His
frank reference to obsolete equipment in the GSFG is sur-
prising in view of the modernization program which has
entailed almost complete re-equipping of those forces
since 1954.
The warning that the Soviet army must
maintain strict security measures in its dealings with the
East German: army indicates the Soviet estimate of the low
reliability of that army and probably all Satellite armies,
and suggests that security considerations will severely re-
strict Satellite capability. It indicates, further, that Soviet
statements on strengthening the Warsaw pact probably refer
primarily to the political aspects.
Commenting on the Hungarian uprising,
Zhukov stated that 12 Soviet divisions were sent from the
USSR to reinforce the two divisions already in Hungary.
2 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
.11- L5 �...4 A.111.4-4
2. THE SITUATION IN JORDAN
Comment� on:
Jordan's Prime Minister Nabulsi and
his cabinet--in a maneuver probably
designed to thwart the king's reported
plans to implement sweeping changes in
the government�reportedly planned to
submit their resignations to King Hussain
on 1 April. The resignations could array
a majority of ultranationalist political
groups against the king, making formation
of a new cabinet extremely difficult.
To strengthen his position, Hussain last
week sought to recall from abroad certain supporters, includ-
ing Major General Hiyari--a possible successor to Chief of
Staff Nuwar. Meanwhile, Syrian intrigue against Hussain is
reported to have induced him to request that Syria's 3,000 troops
be withdrawn from Jordan.
Army chief of staff Nuwar, meanwhile, ap-
pears to believe that either the king must co-operate with the
present anti-Western cabinet, or that he, Nuwar, must be called
on to form a military dictatorship with the king's approval. Nu-
war continues to work with both sides but is increasingly dis-
trusted by both. Nuwar desires that the king place the police
and gendarmerie under army control, which would place the
army in virtual control of the country.
2 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
jrL .3GL/in /
3. SYRIAN ARMY WARNS UN OF ISRAELI BORDER ACTIVITIES
Reference:
The chairman of the Israeli-Syrian
mixed armistice commission reports
that he was summoned abruptly to Syrian
army headquarters on 30 March and told
by Lieutenant Colonels Sarraj and Nufuri
to deliver an ultimatum to the Israeli chief
of staff to withdraw Israeli forces from a
section of the Israeli-Syrian demilitarized
zone east of Lake Hula. If the Israelis did
not promptly withdraw, the Syrian army
would 'expel them by force.
the Syrians are concerned over the construction by the Israelis
of a new bridge and a road which the Syrians assert violates the
armistice agreement. The area has also been the scene of
sporadic cross-border shooting during night hours.
2 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
errinr�r,
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
Approved f9r_Rele_a_s_t:_?2:12/12/04 C03150415
I A
4.
2 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
3C1�.11.ETh
5. BRITAIN REPORTED STILL CONSIDERING WITHDRAWAL
FROM UN
e orwegian un e Nations delegation
believes the British are continuing to give
serious consideration to possible with-
drawal from the UN, according to Ambas-
sador Lodge. Study of such a move was
begun in on on some weeks before the Bermuda conference,
and led to exploratory British approaches to several West--
ern European governments. The British decided, however,
not to take a position at Bermuda that Britain and others
should withdraw.
Comment The issue of British withdrawal from the
UN--on which the Macmillan government
has taken no public stand--probably has urgency largely be-
cause of pressure on the government from anti-UN elements
of the Conservative Party. These elements may have gained
an influential spokesman for their views in Lord Salisbury,
who resigned from the government on 29 March. The Amer-
ican embassy in London had reported earlier that British dis-
satisfaction with the UN is accompanied by considerable anti-
Ame rican sentiment.
Various European countries, including
France, Belgium and the Netherlands, have contrasted the
UN's actions on Suez unfavorably with those in Hungary. They
have long held reservations about the UN's encroachment on
sovereign rights, especially in administering colonies.
2 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
Approved for Release: 2019/72/04 C03150415
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
_itfli T.E.LIfi'lL141 V A 12-AiLi
6. TITO TO PROTEST BULGANINS CHARGES
The Yugos.Lav ambassador in Moscow is
to be instructed to protest the charges
against the Yugoslav leaders made on
27 March by Soviet premier Bulganin,
accor m o a ig Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official. The
official stated that, while it was clear Moscow wanted to
isolate the Yugoslays from contact with the Soviet camp, it
was somewhat "surprising that such a crude Stalinist way"
was being taken.
Comment Bulganin, in a speech at the Hungarian-
Soviet friendship meeting, containing
the .sharpest explicit accusation leveled at the Yugoslays
since Stalin's death, charged Yugoslavia with giving Nagy
practical as well as verbal support. He also said it is"ntot
permissible for Communists" to characterize the Hungarian
"counterrevolution"--as the Yugoslays had--as originally a
true revolution of the people.
In order to strike �a definitive blow at
"national Communism," Moscow may be hoping to goad the
Yugoslays into taking some action that would make the break
complete and open; so far, Belgrade, hoping to preserve what-
ever influence it can in Eastern Europe, has merely replied
in kind to the Soviet charges.
2 Apr �5'7
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
1rrri1ffWNrzFF-A47�
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
-SECRET' -
7. SITUATION IN INDONESIA
Comment on:
The formateur of the Indonesian cabinet,
Suwirjo, returned his mandate to President
Sukarno on 2 April following his failure to
form a cabinet in accordance with the pres-
ident's instructions. Sukarno announced
that he would take further action "in a day
or two."
By "further action" Sukarno may have in
mind simply the appointment of another formateur, or he may
acceed to the demands of Moslem and Christian parties that
he personally head a "presidential cabinet" which would include
former vice president Hatta.
7Sukarno threatened to arrest his leading opponents and
as
ruit a military dictator if Suwirjo failed. In this connec-
tion, the army, which has been assuming an increasingly im-
portant role in administrative measures, is already investi-
gating and interrogating at least 30 prominent politicians, most
of whom are opposed to Sukarno's "concept."
2 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
8. ELECTION DELAY BRINGS POLITICAL CRISIS
IN ARGENTINA
Comment on:
President Aramburu's announcement on
30 March that national elections in Argen-
tina, once promised by the end of 1957,
will be held on 23 February 1958 was fol-
lowed by an attempt by Air Minister Krause
to withdraw air force support from the re-
gime. Krause has been dismissed, and
high air force leaders, who support Krause,
are demanding a voice in the choice of his
successor.
With the possible exception of the naval
air corps, army and navy leaders reportedly are backing
Aramburu against Krause. High-level military meetings
are continuing, however, and security precautions, including
antiaircraft defense, have been strengthened.
Aramburu's "political calendar;' which
he said was "irrevocable," calls for the election of a con-
stituent assembly on 28 July, general elections on 23 Feb-
ruary, and installation of a new government on 1 May 1958.
The bulk of the armed forces appear to desire elections
without delay, but they would be reluctant to revolt unless
they become conyinced that this postponement is only the
first of several.
2 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 11
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415
t.4 Nr
9. NEW GENERAL STRIKE THREATENS
HAITIAN GOVERNMENT
Comment on:
Port-au-Prince was virtually paralyzed
on 1 April by a general strike protesting
against the government of Provisional
President Franck'Sylvain. The strike
was called by six presidential candidates to support their de-
mands that Sylvain reorganize his cabinet and end alleged
favoritism toward a seventh candidate, Francois Duvalier.
General strikes forced out of office the
two preceding presidents, Paul Magloire and Joseph Nemours
Pierre-Louis, and the present regime may also be forced to
resign. In that event, the most likely successor would be a
military junta.
2 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 12
rnivrinFNIT'T A T
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03150415