CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/12/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03184088
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: December 22, 1957

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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3.5(c) 22 December 1957
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
SOVIET COUNTERMOVES TO THE NATO CONFERENCE
(page 3).
14 2. SITUATION IN INDONESIA
(page. 4).
06 3. _NASIR-TO_MA.KE MAJOR POLICY SPEECH AT PORT SAID
(page 6).
/40 4. YEMEN ASKS CZECH COOPERATION IN ARMING OMANI
REBELS (page 7).
5. IMRE NAGY UNDER BITTER ATTACK IN HUNGARY
(page 8).
6. FRENCH POLICY TOWARD TUNISIA TAKES CONCILIATORY
TURN (page 9).
7. LEFTISTS MAKE STRONG SHOWING IN SINGAPORE CITY
ELECTION (page 10).
8. MALAYAN COMMUNISTS REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE SURREN-
DER TERMS (page 11).
9, STRATEGIC RAIL LINK BETWEEN CHINA AND NORTH
VIETNAM RESTORED (page 12).
22 Dec 57
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1. SOVIET COUNTERMOVES TO THE NATO CONFERENCE
Comment on:
The speeches of Soviet party chief Khru-
shchev and Foreign Minister Gromyko
before the Supreme Soviet emphasize the
USSR's position that the West, to bring
about any lessening of international ten-
sions, must acknowledge the new "balance of forces" caused
by Soviet technological advances. The Supreme Soviet "in-
structed" the government to "consider the question of a fur-
ther reduction of the armed forces of the USSR," while main-
taining the "remaining strength" of the Soviet armed forces
at a "proper level" pending an international disarmament
agreement. The United States, Britain, and France were
called on to undertake similar reductions.
Khrushchev called on the United States to
cast its "positions-of-strength" policy on "history's dust
heap," and instead "recognize the existing situation." The
Kremlin apparently believes that a general world settlement
on the basis of the status quo would appeal to Western states-
men, who are faced with the economic demands necessary
for Western defense efforts.
While Gromyko did not categorically re-
ject the proposal made in the NATO communique for a for-
eign ministers' conference to discuss disarmament, he stated
that the USSR would not agree to such a meeting if the, basis of
discussion were the resolution recently passed by the UN Gen-
eral Assembly endorsing the Western disarmament position.
The Soviet foreign minister proposed that a special session of
the UN General Assembly or a broadly representative conference
be called. Both Gromyko and Khrushchev called for a "summit con-
ference" of capitalist and Communist states; however, Khru-
shchev urged that bilateral negotiations be held first between
the United States and the Soviet Union.
The USSR's countermoves to the NATO II13,J-
ing are probably based on the calculation that their proposals
will gain time for Soviet diplomacy to exploit the political im-
pact of their technological gains and thus increase world pressure
on the West to negotiate on Soviet terms of "equality."
22 Dec 57
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2. SITUATION IN INDONESIA
Comment on:
Indonesian anti-Communist military ele-
ments on Java are ready to take armed
action if necessary to prevent a Commu-
nist takeover there and would be supported
in this by provincial commanders outside
Java.
How-
ever, they are reluctant to take action at
this time owing to the strong psychological
position of the Indonesian Communist party,
and the difficulty of getting material aid
from the outer islands because of shipping
dislocations. The anti-Communist leaders
furthermore believe that the Communists
engineered the recent destruction of the
Bandung arsenal. A leader of the minor
Indonesian Socialist party claims Chief of
Staff Nasution is plotting to seize the government after Sukarno
leaves the country in January.
Reports from both Sumatra and Java em-
phasize the stagnation of the economy. The disruption of ef-
fective management and lack of shipping have resulted in
mounting stockpiles of unmoved goods, unemployment, and
lack of money to meet payrolls,
In South Sumatra, where local elections were
held on 1 December, about 50 percent of the returns show a sig-
nificant increase in Communist party voting strength. Although
the 1Vlasjumi party leads, as in the 1955 elections, the Commu-
nists appear to be replacing the National party in second place.
The announcement from Djakarta that Indone-
sia's National Security Council, headedby Prime Minister Djuanda,
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will henceforth direct the campaign for possession of Western
New Guinea is further evidence of government attempts to re-
gain some of the initiative in the anti-Dutch drive from the
Communists. Although the council undoubtedly will continue
to harass Dutch interests, there may now be more opportunity
for moderate elements to influence the situation than was for-
rnerlv the case under the "West I rian Action Committee."
22 Dec 57
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3. NASIR TO MAKE MAJOR POLICY SPEECH AT PORT SAID
Comment on:
The address scheduled by President Nasir
for delivery at Port Said on 23 December,
billed as a "major policy speech," may con-
tain a demand that the United Nations Emer-
gency Force (UNEF) be withdrawn from E ptian territory.
Nasir planned to
ma e suc a eman uring December, and he may consider
the Port Said anniversary celebration of last year's withdrawal
of the French and British "aggressors" the appropriate occa-
sion. UN members generally agree that the UNEF can re-
main only with Egyptian approval.
A demand for withdrawal would risk cen-
sure from Western quarters, which would interpret the re-
moval of the UNEF as a threat to the stability of the area.
On the other hand it would probably evoke strong popular Arab
approval and provide the type of dramatic political action which
sustains the Nasir regime. Nasir's recent actions aimed at
bettering relations with the West suggest, however, he does
not wish to do anything to disturb this trend.
22 Dec 57
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4. YEMEN ASKS CZECH COOPERATION IN ARMING
OMANI REBELS
Comment on:
Czech military officials in Prague have
indicated they are prepared to send ex-
perts to train Yemeni troops in use of
their modern Soviet bloc weapons, and to
facilitate Yemeni arms aid to the Omani
rebels.
The Czechs were reported to have ex-
pressed interest in assisting the Omani rebellion against
Britain's ally, the Sultan of Muscat, by sending additional
arms to Yemen, which could then send its own British and
German arms to the rebels without revealing Czech involve-
ment. The Czechs proposed that Yemen submit a statement
of the quantities and types of weapons desired.
The Yemeni ambassador apparently con-
vinced the Czechs that the arms could be sent to the Omanis
by a secure route, in cooperation with the Omani representa-
tive in Cairo.
22 Dec 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
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5. IMRE NAGY UNDER BITTER ATTACK IN HUNGARY
Comment on.
Hungarian First Deputy Premier Ferenc
Muennich and Supreme Prosecutor Gaza
Szenasi bitterly attacked Imre Nagy as a
traiter, presumably as a prelude to his
trial, in speeches to the National Assem-
bly session just ended.
Muennich on 20 December accused Nagy of
trying to set Hungarians against "their best
friends, the Soviet Union," and charged that Nagy, by nego-
tiating for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest, where
they had come under the provisions of the Warsaw pact, per-
mitted "counterrevolutionary" elements to seize power.
Szenasi spelled out the probable court charge
that "the traitorous group led by Imre Nagy," in alliance with
Harthyites, clerical reactionaries, and right-wing leaders of
former coalition parties, "cleared the way" for and then led
the counterrevolutionary forces "in open treason." Szenasi
also asserted that the "liquidation of the counterrevolution" was
an internal Hungarian affair--apparently a rebuff to efforts by
the United Nations to obtain clemency for the leaders of the rev-
olution.
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6. FRENCH POLICY TOWARD TUNISIA TAKES
CONCILIATORY TURN
Comment on:
A more conciliatory French policy
toward Tunisia is evident in the new
proposals to settle outstanding mil-
itary, financial, and political prob-
lems. Paris presumably hopes that its offers of a liberal
settlement will not only lead to a removal of major disagree-
ments between the two countries but also pave the way for
a more conciliatory Tunisian attitude on Algeria. French
Ambassador Gorse, who left for Tunisia on 20 December,
was given broad negotiating powers, and the importance. at
tached to his mission is indicated by press reports that
Premier Gaillard left the NATO meetings on 10 and 11 De-
cember to confer with him.
France is ready to complete its 1956
aid payments before the talks begin, but will be reluctant
to negotiate its 1957 payments till the military problem is
settled. It is prepared to withdraw ground forces in return
for the granting of residual rigts at about five airports. It
hopes to conclude a separate agreement on the Bizerte naval
base. To forestall possible obstruction of the resulting agree-
ment by French officials, Premier Gaillard has insisted
on a detailed draft of the French position on military questions,
approved in advance by the interested services.
There also appears to be a more favorable
attitude in Tunisia. President Bourghiba desires negotiations
with France provided the talks are on an "equal-to-equal" basis
and without prejudice to Tunisian freedom.
22 Dec 57
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7, LEFTISTS MAKE STRONG SHOWING IN SINGAPORE
CITY ELECTION
Comment on:
The ttrongly anti-Communist Labor
Front party of Singapore Chief Minis-
ter Lim Yew Hock suffered a serious
defeat in the 21 December city council
elections by winning only four of the 16
seats it contested.
In contrast, the Labor Front's more leftist-
inclined election partner, the People's Action party (PAP),
elected 13 of its 14 candidates. Most of PAPIs victories were
by substantial majorities, and several candidates with pro-
Communist reputations were seated. The leftist Workers'
party, recently organized by former Chief Minister David
Marshall, elected four of the five candidates it offered.
The conservative Liberal Socialists, who
had torpedoed Lim's plans for a dominant election coalition
by offering candidates for all 32 seats, won seven; the United
Malay National Organization won two; and independent candi-
dates two.
The success of the new Workers' party,
which must now be regarded as an important factor in Singa-
pore politics, illustrates the extent of leftist influence in
Singapore. Lim hopes to unite the non-Communist left in a
strong new coalition early in 1958 in order to win the much
more important legislative assembly elections tentatively
set for September. The city council election, however, casts
doubt on Lim's prospects for dominatin7 any such coalition
which may emerge before the election.
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8, MALAYAN COMMUNISTS REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE
SURRENDER TERMS
Comment on:
A letter from Malayan Communist
leader Chen Ping to Prime Minister
Abdul Rahman refusing to discuss
surrender terms has apparently ended
government hopes for an early settle-
ment of the Communist rebellion. The government had
been optimistic that a settlement might result from Chenis
earlier letter of 12 October requesting talks and stating that
he believed a mutually satisfactory agreement could be
reached.
The Communist attitude may have hard-
ened as a result of the defeats administered the ruling Alli-
ance party by left-wingers in the recent federal legislative
council by-election in Ipoh and in several municipal elections.
These elections, as well as the recent school riots, reflect
a growing dissatisfaction with government policies on the part
of Malaya's large Chinese minority.
The Communist terrorists in Malaya--
now down to a hard core of about 1,700 from a top strength of
nearly 7,000--may hope that, by continuing to avoid contact
with government security forces and conserving their resources,
they can eventually use the growing left-wing opposition to ob-
tain better terms in any future negotiations.
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9. STRATEGIC RAIL LINK BETWEEN CHINA AND
NORTH VIETNAM RESTORED
Comment on:
Peiping and Hanoi have announced com-
pletion of restoration work on the last
section--the 110-mile stretch between
Pisechai and Hokow--of the international
railroad between Kunming and Haiphong.
r. roug operations in 15 years are expected early
next year.
Reopening of this meter-gauge line will
provide a second rail connection between China and North
Vietnam. Together with a new international bridge on the
coastal highway, the new line will improve transportation
Kochiu �
Thai - Meo
Autonomous
Zone Hokow
4 Hanoi
CHINA- VIETNAM R.R.
Standard-Guage Railroad
I , , Narrow-Guage Railroad
14111.��
22 DECEMBER 1957
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between the two countries and thus improve the bloc's ability
to render military and economic support to the Hanoi regime.
The new rail line will give Yunnan, tradi-
tionally one of the most isolated of Chinese provinces, direct
line access through North Vietnam to the rest of China and will
make possible the export of products of Southwest China�in-
cluding tin from Kochiu, the most important tin-producing area
in the Sino-Soviet bloc--through the port of Haiphong. It will
also help the Communists to consolidate their control over the
Thai-Meo Autonomous Zone, an area where the Hanoi regime
has encountered difficulties with a restless minority population.
22 Dec 57
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