CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/08/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03189019
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: August 24, 1957

Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189019
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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
3.3(h)(2)
24 August 1957 3.5(c) /
4
Copy No. 136
Volv;-vo,
c.r
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
TOP SECRET
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CONTENTS
14,0 1. THE SYRIAN SITUATION
(page 3).
t9--k- 2. PHAO PLANS TO RELINQUISH THAI INTERIOR MIN-
ISTRY (page 4).
)-1-0 3. 0 ECURITY FORCES ALERTED
(page 5).
�x-0 4. POSSIBLE SAUDI INTENTION TO RENEW SUPPORT TO
OMANI REBELS (page 6).
�Lo 5. SOVIET-SYRIAN ECONOMIC AGREEMENT REPORTEDLY
TO BE SIGNED (page 7).
04e-- 6. SOVIET OFFER OF ECONOMIC AID FAVORABLY RECEIVED
BY SUDAN (page 8).
6L-t-- 7. USSR PROPOSES JET TRANSPORT FLIGHT TO NEW YORK
(page 9).
8. CEYLON REBUFFS HUNGARIAN PLEA FOR SUPPORT IN
UN DEBATE (page 10).
9. SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT ARRESTS PRO-COMMUNIST
LEADERS (page 11).
24 Aug 57
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LA-JCL I
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1. THE SYRIAN SITUATION
Comment on:
Syrian President Quwatli is still in
Alexandria, but reportedly plans to
return to Damascus within a few days.
The campaign against the United States
continues with both Quwatli and Defense
Minister Azm declaiming against Amer-
ican "intervention" in Syrian affairs.
Azm has accused the United States of
forcing Syria to the brink of "positive
neutrality" and warned against "push-
ing us beyond." He is Quwatli's most
likely successor should the President
resign,
all
effective pro-Western Syrian officers have been rounded up.
Ex-Iraqi Prime Minister Nun i Said has declared that pro-Western
political elements are too weak to stem the pro-Soviet trend and
that the tribes of the Jazira region in northeastern Syria are "all
that remain to the WestP The arrest of one of the largest land-
owners of the Jazira, a brother of former chief of staff Nizam
ad-Din, and two tribal sheiks suggests that the leftists are alert
to a possible weakness in this area.
24 Aug 57
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2. PHAO PLANS TO RELINQUISH THAI
INTERIOR MINISTRY
General Phao
plans to re-
sign as interior minister, but that his resig-
nation will not be announced until after 24
September� he would also resign as secretary gen-
oral of the government Seri-Manangkhasila party but would re-
main indefinitely as director general of the police.
� Comment Phao's withdrawal from the cabinet would
leave both of the leading rivals in the ruling
clique without ministerial portfolios. Marshal Sarit, army com-
mander in chief, recently resigned as defense minister. This
arrangement will presumably be satisfactory to Sarit, who has
long been seeking to remove Phao from the cabinet and reportedly
took the defense portfolio last march only to match Phao's posi-
tion.
24 Aug 57
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101' SLCKL1
3. JORDANIAN SECURITY FORCES ALERTED
Comment on:
Jordanian security forces were alerted
with a warning that Jor-
danian Communists planned to increase
activities during the following two weeks
by distributing subversive literature and "undertaking action
detrimental to security!' The period cited in the alert coin-
cides with King Hussain's absence from Jordan, when his re-
gime will probably be under increased attack from reorgani-
ized and emboldened opposition groups. Despite cabinet ad-
vice against leaving the country, Hussain departed for Istanbul
on 22 August. After a week's vacation in Turkey, Hussain re-
portedly plans to visit Switzerland and Spain, returning to
Jordan about the end of the first week in September.
24 Aug 57
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4. POSSIBLE SAUDI INTENTION TO RENEW SUPPORT
TO OMANI REBELS
Comment on:
'Possible Saudi intention to renew sup-
port to Omani dissidents is suggested
Saudi support could entail asylum and possibly new material as-
sistance for the unsuccessful Omani rebels, although it could also
refer to measures to raise the Omani issue before the UN General
Assembly,
Sheik Salah has been the rebellious Imam of
Oman's special representative, operating mostly in the eastern
province of Saudi Arabia,where 500-600 refugee Omanis received
military training during 1956 and the first half of 1957 and where
several hundred other Omanis were temporarily employed as un-
skilled labor.
Although Sheik Salah ad-
mitted at the end of July that he had not seen the Imam of Oman
since 1955, he insists that he is the Imam's fully empowered rep-
resentative.
24 Aug 57
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5. SOVIET-SYRIAN ECONOMIC AGREEMENT REPORTEDLY
TO BE SIGNED
Comment on:
A Syrian delegation is to leave shortly
for the USSR to sign an economic agree-
ment negotiated in Moscow in late July,
according to a British press report quot-
ing a member of the Syrian Foreign Min-
istry. This official said that the agree-
ment covers Soviet aid in the amount of
50 million pounds sterling ($140,000,000
at the official exchange rate) for the exten-
sion of Latakia harbor, a Euphrates River dam for power and
irrigation, roads and railways, and a build-up of Syrian indus-
tries. Repayment for this aid is to be made over a 12-year
period at two and one-half percent interest.
the USSR also offered to
purchase 200,000 tons of wheat (worth about $15,000,000) or
other commodities. This may be part of a long-term offer de-
signed to convince Syria it can earn sufficient credits to meet
its payment obligations to the USSR.
The British press report also quoted the
Syrian Foreign Ministry official as stating that Damascus be-
lieves the USSR's motive is to make Syria a showplace to con-
vince pro-Western Arab states that "there is much more to be
gained by dealing with Russia:'
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6. SOVIET OFFER OF ECONOMIC AID FAVORABLY
RECEIVED BY SUDAN
The Sudanese prime minister has de-
scribed as a "step forward" a Soviet
offer to provide the Sudan with large-
scale economic assistance and to pur-
chase surplus Sudanese cotton. The
Soviet offer is well timed to take advantage of the Sudan's
exceptionally slow cotton sales. Additionally, the pro-Western
government faces elections in February 1958 and cannot afford
to dismiss any offer promising to reduce its economic problems.
The USSR proposes to aid in the construc-
tion of industrial enterprises, provide the Sudan with neces-
sary equipment, train Sudanese experts, and undertake a geo-
logical survey. The broad scope of economic assistance
proposed, together with an offer to relieve the Sudan of some
of its growing cotton surplus, follows the pattern of the Soviet
economic offensive in other underdeveloped countries.
The Soviet bloc hitherto has been unsuc-
cessful in promoting economic ties with the Sudan. The only
bloc technical assistance mission�an East German water sur-
vey group--produced no results and was requested to terminate
its activities.
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7. USSR PROPOSES JET TRANSPORT FLIGHT TO NEW YORK
The USSR requested on 21 August that
necessary arrangements be made for
flights by two TU-104 twin-engine jet
aircraft to New York in September to
transport the Soviet delegation to the United Nations General
Assembly.
Comment
A Soviet Foreign Ministry official in
Moscow implied on two occasions this
summer that flights to support the American mission in Mos-
cow would be cut off if a Soviet request for similar privileges
were denied.
These flights may be intended as a test
operation prior to a request for negotiating an exchange of air
rights. The USSR may also be looking toward the propaganda
value of using the CAMEL (TU-104) in these flights.
Previous Soviet statements had indicated
that trans-Atlantic flights would not be attempted until four-
engine transports were available.
24 Aug 57
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8, CEYLON REBUFFS HUNGARIAN PLEA FOR SUPPORT
IN UN DEBATE
Ceylonese Premier Bandaranaike on 20
August told a Hungarian mission seeking
Ceylon's support against discussion of
Hungary at the forthcoming UN session
that Budapest should "welcome" discussion of the report.
He also remarked that Hungarian opposition to a discussion
would prejudice world public opinion against Hungary. He
rejected the delegation's criticism of R. S. S. Gunewardene,
Ceylon's member of the special committee which prepared
the report on Hungary, and asserted that Gunewardene had
acted as a restraining influence on the committee.
A Ceylonese Foreign Ministry official
also told the American charg�hat Ceylon would not in any
way repudiate Gunewardene's part in the report. He made
it clear, however, that Ceylon would not support "extreme
measures" which might lead to a withdrawal of the USSR from
the UN.
Comment The special mission sent to South Asia
as part of the Kadar regime's attempt to
gain support in barring or softening UN action on Hungary
has had little success to date. On 18 August, while the mis-
sion was in India, a Budapest communiqu�ttributed to Nehru
a declaration disapproving the inclusion of the Hungarian ques-
tion on the General Assembly agenda. On 21 August, however,
Indian Defense Minisler V. K. Krishna Menon declared publicly
that India "will not and cannot object" to discussion of the re-
port by the General Assembly.
The Hungarian mission reportedly plans to
visit Indonesia and possibly other Asian countries.
24 Aug 57
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9. SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT ARRESTS PRO-
COMMUNIST LEADERS
Comment on:
The recent emergence of the pro-
Communists as the dominant faction
in Singapore's influential People's
Action Party (PAP) apparently trig-
gered the 22 August arrest for sub-
versive activities of 35 leftist politicians and labor leaders,
including five newly elected officers of the party. The move
is designed primarily to destroy the influence of those left-
ist leaders who were not arrested during Chief Minister Lim's
antisubversive campaign of last October.
A corollary motive for the government's
action may be to facilitate the return to positions of leadership
of the recently deposed PAP "moderates," headed by former
secretary general Lee Kuan Yew. If Lee, who has been co-
operating with Lim for the past several months, is successful
in regaining control of the party, the probable result would be
close Labor Front-PAP cooperation in the forthcoming city
council and legislative assembly elections.
The Communists may react with strikes,
demonstrations, and riots. They are, however, more likely
to instigate an intensive propaganda campaign to gain public
sympathy and support against the "undemocratic" actions of the
government.
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