CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/12/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02066863
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: December 26, 1957

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
PCICUMEt/r MO.
NO CHANGE IN CLA S.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS,.ISA )
NEXT REVIEW DATE: i 6�1 61
T L' I 7"
i
_REVIEWE
26 December 1957
7
138
Copy No . 3.3(h)(2)
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Apimok,
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CONTENTS
0A1. THE BERLIN ACCESS PROBLEM
0 2. SITUATION IN INDONESIA
(page 3).
(page 4).
u, A 3. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF INDONESIAN COMMUNISTS
aage 5).
fp 4. SOVIET OFFICIAL PROBES US REACTION TO PROPOSALS
v FOR BILATERAL TALKS (page 6).
gO 5. USSR CLAIMS r RECM DISTANCE FLIGHT FOR JET
HEAVY BOMBER (page 7). O_
0 6, MENSHIKOV TO REPLACE ZAROUBIN AS SOVIET AMBAS-
SADOR IN WASHINGTON age 8).
0/1 7. ARMY GENERAL NAMED THAI PREMIEF
(page 9)0
AM 8. EARLY BRITISH ACTION ON CYPRUS PROBLEM FORE-
SHADOWED (page 10).
9. ALGERIANS REPORTED DISCUSSING ACCEPTANCE OF BLOC
ARMS (page 11).
Wo 10. SAUD WARY OF NASIR AS CROWN PRINCE VISITS CAIRO
(page 12).
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I. THE BERLIN ACCESS PROBLEM
Comment on:
assactor Bruce in Bonn reports that
both he and West German officials have
become increasingly concerned over Allied
vulnerability and unpreparedness in the
event the Russians take steps aimed at forcing the Allies to
accept East German authority over Berlin traffic or refuse to
guarantee flight safety in the Berlin air corridors for Western
commercial aircraft.
r Several Bonn officials favor some form of
resistance if the Soviet Union transfers to the East German
regime the control over rail traffic to and from Berlin. All-
German Affairs Minister Lemmer, Federal Properties Min-
ister Lindrath, and State Secretary for All-German Affairs
Thedieck agree that yielding immediately, thus implicitly
recognizing the East German government, would have far
greater repercussions on public opinion than turning back
Allied military trains, even if the Western powers eventually
acceded to Soviet demands. Thedieck favors forcing military
trains through, and another official suggested a temporary air-
lift while negotiations are opened with Moscow.
The views of these officials reflect Bonn's
growing apprehension that East German control over Allied
military trains would be the forerunner of a general harass-
ment of West German traffic to Berlin. Bonn would probably
not consider using its major retaliatory weapon�curtailment
of interzonal trade--unless West German supply of essential
goods to Berlin were seriously threatened or impeded.
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2. SITUATION IN INDONESIA
Comment on:
Funds for Indonesian arms purchases
in the Communist bloc will be derived
from hard currency credit extended by
Communist China, according to a re-
port which has reached the American
embassy in Djakarta from usually re-
liable sources. In return Indonesia
purportedly is to ship rubber to China
over the next several years. The source
believes, however, that China will never
actually claim the rubber as long as Indo-
nesian policy is not contrary to the inter-
ests of the Communist bloc. According to the American em-
bassy, the extension of credit would explain Indonesia's sudden
ability, in the midst of serious economic difficulties, to "pur-
chase" the arms now under negotiation with Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia..
If the credit should be granted in cash, the
arrangement would require Sino-Soviet collabpration, since China
is faced with a severe shortage of foreign exchange. Peiping,
however, could supply directly considerable quantities of con-
ventional military equipment.
Sjahrir, leader of the Socialist party, be-
lieves the cabinet may resign within the next few days and will
certainly do so after Sukarno leaves the country. He claims
Prime Minister Djuanda has attempted to resign but was dissuaded
by President Sukarno. Djuanda has repeatedly stated that he would
gladly resign if he could be assured he would be succeeded by a
non-Communist cabinet. All non-Communist political elements
are exDloring the possibility of cabinet and governmental changes.
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3. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF INDONESIAN COMMUNISTS
Reference:
Local Indonesian Communists do not
have sufficient military strength or arms
to gain control at this time, according to
the American naval attach�n Djakarta.
He further believes that if they should try, anti-Communist
forces would crush them. Communist strength in the Indo-
nesian army is concentrated largely in the Djakarta command
area, the attach�eported. The city commander is suspected
of being a Communist, and his chief of staff works actively
with the Communists. Actual Communist strength among the
troops is not known, but it is estimated that their orientation
is more anti- than pro-Communist.
In West Java, the Siliwangi Division of
40,000 men is considered loyal to its commander and would
probably move into the Djakarta area against the Communists
should civil war develop. Both Central and East Java com-
mands are headed by capable anti-Communist commanders
and, in the event of a major Communist insurrection on the
island, would side with West Java forces, according to an
agreed plan for coordinated action by the three area com-
manders.
All army commanders on Sumatra are con-
sidered anti-Communist, although there may be some Commu-
nist sympathizers among troops of Javanese origin stationed
there.
In Celebes, the northern part of the island
is under firm anti-Communist control, with all party leaders
in jail. Some �army units in southern Celebes are suspected of
being in collusion with the rebel leader Muzakkar, who is con-
sidered to be under Communist control.
all Soviet ships entering Indonesian waters supply the
Indonesian Communist party with small quantities of arms.
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44.1". '4411d
4. SOVIET OFFICIAL PROBES US REACTION TO PROPOSALS
FOR BILATERAL TALKS
Comment on:
In an effort to sound out American reac-
tion to recent Soviet bids for high-level
bilateral negotiations, Yuri Zhukov, head
of the USSR's Committee for Cultural
Relations with Foreigners, told Ambassador Thompson on 22
December that in the final analysis East-WeSt problems could
only be resolved by Soviet-American discussions. He claimed
that America's allies had prevented such talks in the past but
that the British seem to have changed their position and now
would favor Soviet-US talks.
Zhukov expressed the view that negotia-
tions would become more difficult after NATO plans for arm-
ing Western Europe, particularly West Germany, were carried
out. He also stated that it was important to reach agreement
while President Eisenhower and Khrushchev were in office.
Zhukov's probing suggests that the Soviet
leaders may be planning to follow the cautious and equivocal
bid for bilateral heads-of-government talks in Premier Bul-
ga.nin's letter of 10 December to President Eisenhower with a
formal and definite call for such a meeting. In his speech to
the Supreme Soviet on 21 December, Khrushchev stated that a
bilateral meeting of the "representatives" of the United States
and the USSR could precede a conference of the "heads of gov-
ernment of socialist and capitalist countries."
The Soviet leaders probably expect to
benefit from either acceptance or rejection by the United States.
Acceptance, in their view, would undercut American efforts to
strengthen NATO, while rejection would facilitate Soviet efforts
to demonstrate that only the United States stands in the way of a
substantial improvement in East-West relations.
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50 USSR CLAIMS RECORD DISTANCE FLIGHT FOR
JET HEAVY BOMBER
Comment on:
Red Star, the Soviet army newspaper,
reported on 24 December that a Soviet
jet heavy bomber had made a record
flight over a "colossal" distance with-
out aerial refueling. The paper stated that the aircraft
carried 10 tons of fuel and flew at 39,000 feet.
Although the distance flown is not speci-
fied, the relatively small fuel load--if accurately reported--
is not consistent with a maximum range attempt by the BISON,
the only known Soviet jet heavy bomber. According to the lat-
est estimates, the BISON would carry approximately 227,000
pounds of jet fuel--more than 100 metric tons--on a standard
mission, and more on an optimum mission.
Unconfirmed reports of a very large delta-
wing aircraft sighted over the Barents Sea in mid-October
suggest that the USSR may have developed a new jet heavy
bomber not yet identified by Western intelligence. However,
the fuel consumption of such an aircraft would be expected to
approximate that of the BISON if its engines used standard jet
fuel. A heavy bomber using an "exotic" fuel such as a boron
compound would use approximately one half as much fuel over
the same distance, but there is no evidence that the USSR has
developed such an aircraft.
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6. MENSHIKOV TO REPLACE ZAROUBIN AS SOVIET
AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON
Comment on:
The slated replacement of Soviet Am-
bassador to the United States Georgy
Zaroubin by former. Soviet Ambassador
to India Mikhail Menshikov appears to
be a routine shift within the Soviet diplomatic corps. Zar-
oubin, who according to unconfirmed reports is to be pro-
moted to deputy foreign minister, has been ambassador in
Washington for over five and half years and is due for re-
assignment. Menshikov was relieved of the New Delhi post
on 22 October 1957 and since then has been in Moscow.
Menshikov, a Great Russian born in 1902,
has had many years of experience in the international field,
specializing in foreign economic relations. He has resided
in Great Britain (1930-36) and the United States (interruptedly
during 1943-46). In 1946 he became a USSR deputy foreign
trade minister under Anastas Mikoyan, currently the second
or third man in the Soviet hierarchy, succeeding Mikoyan as
minister in 1949. He was transferred in 1951 to ''other work,"
possibly to CEMA, the Soviet-satellite Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance. He entered the Soviet diplomatic corps
in 1953 when he was assigned to India.
Menshikov has a good command of English
and is said to be a good mixer, but very tenacious in argument.
Like Zaroubin, he is a candidate member of the Soviet party
central committee.
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7. ARMY GENERAL NAMED THAI PREMIER
Comment on:
General Thanom Kittikachorn, who has
been selected to be Thailand's new prime
minister by the ruling military group and
civilian elements associated with it in the
National Socialist party, is a 47-year-old career army officer
who has long been closely associated with Armed Forces Com-
mander Sarit. He is considered an able military administrator,
but is lacking in political experience and admits that he knows
little about foreign affairs. Thanom supports Thailand's pro-
Western policy and is one of the more conservative leaders
of the military group.
As prime minister, Thanom will be subject
to the policy guidance of Sarit, who despite recurrent periods
of illness is still the most powerful figure in Thailand.
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80 EARLY BRITISH ACTION ON CYPRUS
PROBLEM FORESHADOWED
Comment on:
December,
overnor Foot of Cyprus and the British
Colonial Office apparently believe the
wave of good feeling toward Foot that
has resulted from the new governor's relax-
ation of emergency measures may provide
an opportunity for steps toward long-term
settlement of the island's status. Foot will
return to London for consultations on 31
several weeks earlier than planned.
Foot's planned solution is evidently a, con-
siderable departure from the established British position,
and probably involves the early granting of wide powers of
self-government to the Cypriots. He hopes to enlist the co-
operation of Archbishop Makarios, perhaps even at the price
of allowing his unconditional return to Cyprus. Without such
a move, the favorable effect of Foot's good will gestures will
dissipate as the time approaches for a decision by the British
government.
The chances for London's adoption of Foot's
recommendations probably hinge on how sensitive the Foreign
Office remains to Turkey's adamant stand against any moves
that it sees as leading toward eventual union of Cyprus and
Greece. While Ankara still follows the policy of "watchful
waiting" pending a declaration of intentions by Foot, a Turk-
ish Cypriot leader has already expressed disagreement with
the governor, The American consul in Nicosia believes that
failure of Foot's mission could have "the gravest consequences."
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9. ALGERIANS REPORTED DISCUSSING ACCEPTANCE
OF BLOC ARMS
oi soviet and uzec
Two senior members oithe
rebel organization passed through Tripoli
on 10 December en route to Cairo to dis-
take-over and transport to Algeri
arms and ammunition available in Cairo,
agreement had already been reached in
principle and that only a few points remained to be cleared
up in discussions with the Egyptians and Soviets before the
shipments are started.
quantity of arms involved is considerably greater than the
usual consignments carried by road through Libya and that
for this reason it had not yet been decided whether to send
the arms overland or by sea as far as Libya or Tunisia.
Comment Dissatisfaction within the National Libera-
tion Front (FLN) over the results of this
year's UN deb4te on Algeria may have enabled rebel elements
already predisposed toward soliciting Soviet bloc assistance to
convince the FLN leadership that a new effort should be made
to obtain such aid. Any appreciable amount of arms the USSR
or Egypt would make available at this time probably would not
be readily identifiable as of bloc origin.
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10. SAUD WARY OF NASIR AS CROWN PRINCE
VISITS CAIRO
Comment on:
Nasir has invited Saudi Crown Prince
Faysal to visit Cairo on his way home
from the United States.
the visit could be beneficial if it contributed to an under-
standing with the Egyptians, or "at least to their refraining
from troubling us either by statement or insinuation."
Cairo radio continued to misrepresent Saudi policy,
Crown Prince Faysal is expected to arrive in Cairo on 1 Jan-
uary for a week following five months' visit in the United
States for medical treatment.
The Saudi envoy in Cairo, in reporting
Nasir's invitation early in November, said that Nasir had
expressed pessimism about the prospect for improving rela-
tions with Saudi Arabia as long as King Saud was "bound to
the policy" of Lebanese President Chamoun, King Hussayn
of Jordan, "and others who carry out imperialist policy!'
Nasir will attempt to undercut the king by trying to sway key
Saudis such as Faysal who may be somewhat inclined to con-
sider Egypt's viewpoint.
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