CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/06/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 2018 Sanitization
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03153698
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: June 9, 1957

Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03153698,
T LLI
LL TI
9 June 1957
Copy No. 134
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: R 70-2
DATE
EVIEWER: .
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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CONTENTS
04, I. USSR SLIGHTLY MODIFIES DISA AMENT POSITION OF
30 APRIL page 3).
uk, 2. NEW FRENCH-TUNISIAN CLASHES
(page 5).
Ai 6 3. EGYPT 017RS SUSPENSION OF FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS
IN ISRAEL (page 6).
04 4. RESIGNATION OF IRAQI PRIME MINISTER NURI S
(page 7).
L-5. INDONESIA REPORTEDLY STEPPING UP EFFORTS TO
OBTAIN ORBIT ASSISTANCE (Page 8)-
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1. USSR SLIGHTLY MODIFIES DISARMAMENT POSITION
OF 30 APRIL
Comment on:
At a bilateral meeting on 7 June with the
American delegation to the London disarma-
ment talks, Soviet delegate Zorin read from
an "informal" document "just received"
from Moscow in response to recent American suggestions.
Elaborating on the USSR's disarmament position as stated on
30 April, Zorin made the following points:
(a) The USSR continues to insist that a
preliminary agreement must specify subsequent and more com-
prehensive reductions in force levels than the figure of 2,500,000
for the US and USSR as proposed by the US.
(b) The USSR has no objection to a method
of listing specific categories of hardware to be cut rather than
using a general percentage figure, but continues to feel that
defense expenditures could be cut by 15 percent under a prelim-
inary agreement.
(c) Only a "complete and unconditional re-
nunciation" of the use of nuclear weapons will be satisfactory.
Zorin characterized the American desire to stop the manufac-
ture of these weapons under adequate inspection as simply
"legalizing" their possession and use--"a bargain to which the
Soviet government cannot be a partner."
(d) While sticking to the idea of agreeing
separately and without delay to the cessation of nuclear tests,
Zorin showed some flexibility by accepting in principle the US
concept of a temporary suspension. However, he argued that
a ten-month suspension period might be used to cover prepara-
tions for another test series and that only a period of two to
three years would have meaning.
(e) He reaffirmed the Soviet position that
In an inspection system, ground control posts would not be
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permitted at airfields until the US and USSR force-levels
were reduced well below 2,500,000.
(f) He continued to push for troop reduc-
tions in the NATO and Warsaw Pact areas of Europe and
reductions by a third of American, British, and Soviet forces
in East and West Germany.
(g) Apparently seeking to exploit differ-
ences between the United States and other NATO members on
the question of a European aerial inspection zone, the Soviet
delegate maintained that such a zone should be expanded rather
than contracted.
In the course of the meeting, Zorin noted
that the American suggestion that the subcommittee talks
should be at the foreign ministers level after progress had
been made "had been the subject of discussion in Moscow." He
asked when such meetings should be held and what preparations
should be made, and indicated Moscow felt the need for consid-
eration of "political problems" by the great powers outside of
the subcommittee. He added that the USSR's position on German
reunification had not changed.
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.1IL 14.1 1, JR. A...Z 1.4
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2. NEW FRENCH-TUNISIAN CLASHES
Four clashes on 7 June between
French and Tunisian military units,
resulting in eight French and six
Tunisian dead, point up the serious-
ness of French-Tunisian tension. The French embassy
claims that these incidents were incited by Algerian refu-
gees aided by former members of the Tunisian fellagha,
and that some Tunisian officials have followed a provoca-
tive course.
French military commanders strongly
resent Tunisian premier Bourghiba's insistence that Tunisian
approval be obtained before French troops leave their barracks.
The American ambassador in Tunis believes that further seri-
ous incidents can be avoided only if France accepts Bourghiba's
proposal, reiterated on 6 June, for the withdrawal of French
troops to the Bizerte area where France would be permitted to
maintain a base.
Comment Unusual activity by Neo-Destour youth
groups since the 31 May clash in north-
eastern Tunisia may indicate that the Tunisians are preparing
for widespread guerrilla action against Freneh units.
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3. EGYPT ORDERS SUSPENSION OF FEDAYEEN
OPERATIONS IN ISRAEL
Comment
Nasr
wishes for the moment to avoid Arab mili-
tary involvement with Israel and to curtail some of the con-
spiratorial activities which have undermined Egypt's prestige
in other Arab countries. Egypt's caution probably reflects a
desire to protect its remaining clandestine resources from
being compromised by King Hussain's increasingly vigilant
security forces.
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CONFIDEN11,11,
4. RESIGNATION OF IRAQI PRIME MINISTER NURI SAID
Comment on:
The resignation of Iraqi prime minister
Nun i Said and his cabinet on 8 May pre.
sages a cabinet shake-up rather than a
change of government. Formation of a
new cabinet may be delayed until 13 June.
Nun, who took office in December 1955,
is probably attempting to lessen popular
discontent by reshuffling ministerial posts and dropping cer-
tain unpopular members such as the competent minister of
finance and education, Khalil Kanna. Nun i has. relied heavily
on Kanna.
American-educated, pro-Western Fadhil
Jamali may receive the post of foreign minister. Jamali is
prominent among those who are seeking the leadership of the
importOnt Shia Muslim community following the death on 6
June of Salih Jabr, Iraq's foremost Shia Muslim statesman.
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5. INDONESIA REPORTEDLY STEPPING UP EFFORTS TO
OBTAIN ORBIT ASSISTANCE
Comment on:
As a result of mounting economic diffi-
culties and perhaps pressure from
President Sukarno, the Indonesian gov-
ernment apparently feels compelled to
speed up efforts to obtain assistance from
the Sino-Soviet bloc. According to a
Chinese Communist press report from
Djakarta, the government is about to ask
parliament to ratify the $100,0002000 aid
aareement signed with the Soviet Union last September,
the cabinet in May not only decided to pusn
ahead with the Soviet agreement, but also to commence nego-
tiations for economic and technical aid from the Chinese Com-
munists.
Indonesia
is drafting projects calling for Soviet aid in harbot develop-
ment, a geological survey, and the exploitation of nickel de-
posits in Celebes. The implementation of these projects
will mean the introduction of a substantial number of Soviet
technicians and administrators--one of the main reasons
ratification of the Soviet aid agreement was delayed.
Indonesia asked that
part of the assistance promised by Moscow be advanced in cash
as a currency-support loan.
These actions are being taken
in accordance with the government's attempt to eliminate the
economic grievances which underly the current political
crisis between Djakarta and the disaffected provinces.
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