CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/09/17

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03153717
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: September 17, 1957

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/ CURRENT
/j INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
17 September 1957
Copy No. 136
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DATE _REVIEWER:
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CONTENTS
6*. 1. SARIT OVERTHROWS PHIBUN GOVERNMENTJKLPHAILAID
(page 3).
(Information as of 2400 hours EDT 16 Sept 57)
64___ 2. TITO-GOMULKA COMMUNIQUE
a-12-
(page 4).
3. KHRUSWC11EIT7 POLITICAL POSITION REPORTEDLY SHAKY
(page 5).
4. USSR WARNS IS7ART, Th AVOID "PROVOCATIVE MOVES"
AGAINST SYRIA (page 7).
4-6 5. IRAQIS REPORT KING SAUD READY TO SUPPORT SYRIAN
REVOLT (page 8).
4� 6, SYRIAN_ARMI_CHIRF_PLANS PALESTINIAN COMMANDO
CORPS (page 9).
64, 7. JAPANESE PROTEST ON 1958 US NUCLEAR TESTS SERIES
(page 10).
bk-k- 8. POLITICAL DISSENSION IN FRANC INCREASES OVER
ALGERIAN STATUTE
(5--t� 9. THE WEST GERMAN ELECTION
17 Sept 57
(page 11).
(page 12).
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SAR1T OVERTHROWS PHIBUN GOVERNMENYIN THAILAND
(Information as of 0030 hours EDT, 17 Sept 57)
Comment on:
Latest reports from Bangkok indicate that
Thai army troops commanded by Marshal
Sarit are firmly in control of the city follow-
ing their bloodless coup against the Phibun
government on the night of 16 September.
Premier Phibun has fled and his whereabouts is unknown. Sarit
has declared martial law throughout the country to guard against
the possibility of a countercoup by the followers of Phibun and
Police Director Phao who reportedly has given himself up.
The coup was precipitated by Phibun's ada-
mant rejection of repeated demands by Sarit for the removal of
Phao and his supporters from all official positions. Sarit ap-
parently decided to take direct action when Phibun, on the morn-
ing of the 16th, sought to stall off an ultimatum calling for the
cabinet's resignation and replacement by one formed "in accord-
ance with the people's wishes,"
The only clue to Sarit's future intentions is
his establishment, prior to the coup, of a committee of 13 army
officers and himself, as chairman, for the purpose of maintain-
ing "peace and security." This group will almost certainly form
the nucleus of a new ruling clique. Under this setup, Sarit would
be in line to assume the premiership, although he may prefer to
rule behind a front man.
Sarit's assumption of control of the Thai gov-
ernment promises to be followed by an extensive "house cleaning,"
particularly in the police force. Thailand's foreign policy, however,
is unlikely to be drastically altered in the immediate future.
There will undoubtedly be strong pressures for
the adoption of a more "independent" policy involving the loosening
of ties with the West. Available information suggests, however,
that Sarit has acknowledged the importance of American economic
and military aid, although he may seek a greater degree of Thai
supervision of its administration. He has also publicly endorsed
Thailand's membership in SEATO. Another factor militating against
his moving toward an accommodation with the Communists is that
much of his present popularity is based on his being identified as
the champion of the monarchy and of "traditional Thai values."
17 Sept 57
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2. TITO-GOMULKA COMMUNIQUE
Comment on:
In a joint party and government com-
munique signed on 16 September, Tito
and Gomulka agreed on the correctness
of their independent roads to socialism
and reaffirmed that relations between
Communist states and parties should be based on the prin-
ciple of equality and noninterference. The communique did
not once refer to the Soviet Union. It did not take issue vith
the USSR, however, on any international problem.
The two men again stressed their desire
for bilateral relations between Communist parties, but noted
that multilateral relations "can also be very useful." The
declaration embodies Tito's theory that progressive forces,
even in capitalist states, are moving toward socialism and
states that the very fate of socialism and peace depends on
strengthening relations, cooperation, and unity among these
forces.
With respect to international issues, Tito
reiterated his previous stand on German unification and en-
dorsed the Oder-Neisse as the final Polish-German frontier.
Both countries invited other nations to adhere to this view. In
addition, they called for the admission of Communist China to
the UN and an immediate ban on nuclear tests as a first step
toward disarmament.
Both powers pledged themselves to develop
the broadest possible economic and cultural relations with all
countries regardless of the political system. In order to pro-
mote cultural and economic cooperation, the two governments
agreed to establish a Yugoslav-Polish economic commission
and cultural information centers in their two capitals.
17 Sept 57
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`VI
3. KHRUSHCHEV'S POLITICAL POSITION
REPORTEDLY SHAKY
Comment on:
Khrushchev
may be facing stiff political opposition
within the party presidium and that he
has suffered a decline in public esteem
as a result of the June purges.
le would like to get rid
of Bulganin, Voroshilov, and Suslov but
has been unable to secure the TIPVPSRPT�V
majority in the presidium.
Khrushchev is not popular in
party circles wh-,re it is dolibted that he will he nhlp fn kpr,
power for long.
"Khrushchev isn't feared nor loved. In the party apparatus
he is still regarded with some contempt."
the working
people of that city reacted unfavorably to the purge of Malen-
kov and Molotov. The news announcement caused feelings of
anger and open talk of demonstrations.
Khrushchev is not popular in Leningrad, became even
less so after the purges, and was booed in the streets during
his visit to Leningrad for its 250th anniversary celebration.
17 Sept 57
the people in Brest were
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speaking openly in criticism of Khrushchev and in favor of
Malenkov.
in August that the mood of
many Soviet citizens appeared to be one of general depression,
lack of faith about the future, cynicism toward the party line,
and distrust of present party leaders --a far cry from the bold
optimism which Khrushchev seeks to inculcate. (NOFORN)
17 Sept 57
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4. USSR WARNS ISRAEL TO AVOID "PROVOCATIVE MOVES"
AGAINST SYRIA
Comment on:
Comment The Abramov warning, which was appar-
ently delivered orally to Foreign Minister
Meir just before she left for New York, supplements the USSR's
warnings to Turkey in Gromyko's statement of 10 September and
Bulganint note to Prime Minister Menderes on 10 September.
Soviet broadcasts on 13 September repeated the Soviet line that
the actions by Israeli "ruling circles" backed by the West were
creating a "danger to the very existence of Israel as a state."
17 Sept 57
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5. IRAQIS REPORT KING SAUD READY TO SUPPORT
SYRIAN REVOLT
King Saud told Lebanese officials
that he was
prepared to finance from his private treas-
ury any revolt or action which would lead
to changing the situation in Syria
he preferred that military intervention be avoided,
but that Iraqi and Jordanian military support would be needed if
the revolt failed. The King apparently opposed Turkish inter-
vention.
Comment King Saud has indicated on other occasions
that he believes the trend of developments
in Syria should be reversed by internal means, not by open for-
eign intervention. It is unlikely, however, that the Saudis have
or could acquire political assets in Syria which would have a
significant effect on the situation.
17 Sept 57
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6. SYRIAN ARMY CHIEF PLANS PALESTINIAN
COMMANDO CORPS
Syrian Chief of Staff Major General
Bizri has stated that he intends to
organize into a special commando corps
20,000 Palestinian refugees now in var-
ous ra countries,
The ex-Grand Mufti of Jerusa-
lem, Hail Amin al-Hussavni,is said to be cooperating in the
plan.
Comment The Syrian army now totals 50,000 men.
A group organized by Bizri and loyal to
him rather than to the Syrian state would represent the most
violent anti-Western element, and could make leftist Bizri the
strongest man in Syria. Such a group would most likely be used
as an instrument to control Syria and to subvert other Arab gov-
ernments.
17 Sept 57
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7. JAPANESE PROTEST ON 1958 US NUCLEAR
TESTS SERIES
Comment on:
The Japanese government's decision to
protest the United States' plans for nu-
clear tests in the Pacific in 1958, an-
nounced on 15 September, is a swift move
to align itself with Japanese public opinion
on this issue. The popular reaction also may make it difficult
for the ICishi government to comply with the United States' de-
sire not to present to the UN General Assembly a resolution
calling for the suspension of all nuclear tests. The resolution,
already drafted, does not provide for immediate supervision of
the test ban or for the halting of weapons production, both con-
sidered vital by the West.
Japan has submitted similar protests to the
USSR in recent months in order to maintain its stand against
further nuclear tests.
17 Sept 57
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8, POLITICAL DISSENSION IN FRANCE INCREASES OVER
ALGERIAN STATUTE
The Bourges-Maunoury government's
hopes for wide National Assembly back-
ing on its proposed basic statute for
Algeria appear to have vanished
The left continues to press for a more liberal ver-
sion of the proposed plan, and unexpectedly strong opposition
to a federative solution is developing on the right.
Defense Minister Morice, a dissident Rad-
ical,has so far refused to join the rest of the cabinet in endors-
ing the government's program, and there is speculation that he
may resign. The embassy fears the right may seek to water
down the draft when it comes up for debate, or even to oppose
it
The government is expected to stress the
urgency of the Algerian issue in order to limit discussion of
the economic grievances which led Bourges-Maunoury to call
a special assembly session for 17 September. The embassy
expects the difficulty of finding a new premier and the immi-
nent UN debate on Algeria to prevent a crisis now. Neverthe-
less, it believes that the heavy opposition to the government's
economic program and back-bench restiveness will put Bourges-
Maunoury in serious trouble again in a month.
17 Sept 57
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9. THE WEST GERMAN ELECTION
Comment on:
Following its sweeping victory in the
15 September West German Bundestag
election the Christian Democratic
Union, with 21 seats more than a ma-
jority, will probably invite its present
coalition partner, the German .party,
into the new government, adding 17
seats to its majority. Chairman Maier
of the Free Democrats has indicated that he is opposed to
joining the government even if invited, but a party caucus is
necessary for any final decision. The new Bundestag is
scheduled to meet on 10 October in Berlin.
The election furthered the development
of a two-party system in West Germany--82 percent of the
ballots being cast for the two major parties in contrast to 74
percent in 1953. Only two other parties gained Bundestag
representation. The CDU became the first party in modern
German history to win an absolute majority--50.18 percent--
of the vote. The SPD gained 31.8 percent of the popular vote
as contrasted with 28.8 four years ago and, with over a third
of the Bundestag seats, now has the power to block constitu-
tional amendments.
17 Sept 57
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