CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/10/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03190619
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: October 25, 1957

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
25 October 1957
Copy No. 13 s
3.3(h)(2)/
3.5(c)
NO CHANGE IN CLA.. S.
LIECLASSIFIED
LASS. CHANGED TO: IS to 0 REVIEW DATE
AUTH: H 0-2
DAts. FIEVIEWER:
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
vase
1. SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF TURKISH-SYRIAN SITUATION
(page 3).
2. USSR SUGGESTS THAT HAMMARSKJOLD ENTER SYRIAN
SITUATION (page 5).
3, TURKS REGARD DANGER IN SYRIAN CRISIS GREATER'
THAN EVER (page 6).
4. TURKISH-SAUDI DISCUSSIONS
(page 7).
5. TURKISH ELECTION CAMPAIGN ENDS ON AIR OF UNCER-
TAINTY (page 8).
6. FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS
(page 9).
7. MILITARY JUNTA TAKES CONTROL IN GUATEMALA
(page 10).
)1..0 8. SOVIET UNION REPORTEDLY RELUCTANT TO RESUME
DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE TALKS (page 11).
9. INDIAN CONGRESS PARTY AGAIN SUFFERS SERIOUS DEFEATS
IN LOCAL ELECTIONS (page 12).
A.0 10, UNREST IN SPAIN
(page 13).
� ANNEX--Conclusions of the Watch Report of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee
(page 15).
25 Oct 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 2
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1. SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF TURKISH-
SYRIAN SITUATION
The USSR's moves in the Middle East
over the past two months apparently have been based on
the Soviet leaders' belief that American and Turkish re-
sponses to the extremist take-over in Syria last August
can be exploited to advance major Soviet policy objectives.
In addition to the immediate aim of forestalling military
intervention and stiffening the Damascus regime against
outside pressure or internal action designed to bring about
its overthrow, these Soviet moves have been intended to:
(1) enhance the USSR's self-appointed position
as champion of Arab nationalism and the independence of
small states, and their right to pursue neutralist policies;
(2) expand Soviet influence and prestige through
the Asian-African world and thereby strengthen Soviet ef-
forts to counter the increased activity of American diplo-
macy in the Middle East since last January;
(3) advance the basic Soviet objective of weaken-
ing Western alliance systems by generating suspicion of US
intentions and mistrust of its leadership;
(4) manufacture "proof" of an aggressive policy of
the United States which could be used to facilitate the Soviet
leaders' task of reimposing unity and discipline in the Com-
munist world and defending the USSR's "leading role."
In pursuit of these aims, Moscow is ex-
ploiting the urgency of the Turkish-Syrian situation by claim-
ing to have "verified data" on American and Turkish plans for
an attack "immediately after the Turkish elections on 27 Octo-
ber." It has warned that hostilities will inevitably engulf other
countries, particularly America's NATO allies.
Moscow is also maneuvering to place itself
in a position to claim credit for any relaxation of Middle East
tension and to throw the United States and Turkey on the
25 Oct 57 , Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
TOP SECRET EIDER
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defensive. It has offered to join the United States and any
other country "to curb the aggressor" and has challenged
the US and Turkey to state before the United Nations that
they are against war and to withdraw Turkish troops from
the Syrian border.
Although some of Moscow's warnings
have contained deliberately ambiguous hints intended to im-
ply that the USSR might intervene with its own forces in the
event of a Turkish attack on Syria, available evidence indi-
cates that the USSR has not yet made military preparations
on a scale which would be anticipated for dealing with the
broader contingencies which might follow such intervention.
� The Soviet Union does not appear to be explicitly committed
to come to the military assistance of Syria in the event of an
attack. The Soviet leaders appear to believe there is a great-
er likelihood of an internal coup than of foreign military inter-
ime.
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2, USSR SUGGESTS THAT HAMMARSKJOLD ENTER
SYRIAN SITUATION
Comment on:
UN Under Secretary General Dobrynin,
a Soviet national, suggested to Secre-
tary General Hammarskj old on 23 Octo-
ber that as secretary general he might
take a hand in the Syrian situation.
Hammars jo � as concluded that his involvement would
not be unpalatable to the Russians, but he told Dobrynin
that to become involved too early would be unfortunate.
Al-Hawrani, speaker of the Syrian Assembly, had said
the day before that a visit by Hammarskj old to Syria would
be welcome on the condition that he visit Turkey and Israel
as well.
The USSR's primary purpose in the cur-
rent session of the United Nations appears to be to inhibit
any Turkish or Western action against the pro-Soviet Syrian
regime. Presentation of the Syrian complaint to the General
Assembly on 16 October resulted from Soviet prodding at the
UN and in Damascus. Gromyko on the same day backed the
Syrian complaint with a letter to UN General Assembly Pres-
ident Munro urging the UN to assist Syria immediately with
armed forces in the event Turkey breaks the peace. His state-
ment to Munro that the USSR "is prepared to take part with its
forces in suppressing aggression and punishing the violators
of peace" is the only public commitment the USSR has made in
the Syrian crisis.
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3. TURKS REGARD DANGER IN SYRIAN CRISIS GREATER
THAN EVER
Turkish leaders assured Ambassador
Warren on 22 October that Turkey will
make no move "without closest consul-
tation with Washington." The Turks are
looking to the US in particular for leadership in handling
Syrian and Soviet charges in the UN. Ankara considers the
danger in Syria greater than ever and continues to maintain
a state of military readiness in the vicinity of the Syrian
border,
Prime Minister Menderes is aware of
the dilemma which the situation poses for the other Arab
states and has indicated a willingness to visit King Saud af-
ter the 27 October Turkish elections if he is invited.
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4. TURKISH-SAUDI DISCUSSIONS
Comment on:
King Saud told Turkish Minister of
State Zorlu on 23 October that ag-
gression against Turkey "would be
bad," but that aggression against
Syria would find the Saudi govern-
ment beside its brother Arabs. Turk-
ish and Saudi delegations are discuss-
ing the Syrian crisis in Dhahran.
According to Saud, Zorlu indicated
that Turkey will move troops away from the Syrian bor-
der. It is unlikely, however, that the Turks, in view of
the tension in the area, would withdraw more than a token
force at this time.
Turkey, which has been trying to make
contact with Saud for some time, was quick to accept Saud's
Invitation to talk. Turkish officials believe that Syria's re-
fusal now can be ecploited to advantage in the UN by Turkey's
friends.
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5. TURKISH ELECTION CAMPAIGN ENDS ON AIR
OF UNCERTAINTY
on:
Top officials of the Turkish National
Police believe,,on the basis of reports
rom the provinces as well as from
Ankara, that the opposition Republican
eop e in the 27 October election. This is the
strongest suggestion thus far that the ruling Democratic
party might be upset. Various politicians and journalists
have recently labeled certain crucial provinces as "com-
pletely uncertain."
Top Democratic politicians, including
Prime Minister Menderes and President Bayar, have been
campaigning vigorously, but have indicated no concern to
American officials over the ultimate outcome of Sunday's
balloting. Menderes is a capable and tough politician, and
has no apparent intention of relinquishing his position of
political power. He would probably employ highhanded meth-
ods to .maintala.himsell if he thought the elections were going
against him.
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6, FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS
Comment on:
Premier-designate Guy Mollet's chances
of winning French National Assembly ap-
proval early next week appear to depend
largely on his ability to neutralize the op-
position of the Independent and Peasant
party's rank and file who might reject
Pinay's agreement with Mollet to accept
Robert Schuman's financial and economic
report as the basis for future government
action. The Popular Republicans, whose support is essential,
have already decided to participate in a government headed by
Monet,
If labor's response to the strikes scheduled
for 25 October is widespread and effective, it may induce most
conservative deputies to support Mallet in order to achieve at
least a temporary solution, although some of them may become
even more reluctant to accept a Socialist government. Mollet's
reported reiteration of willingness to negotiate a cease-fire
with the Algerian rebels may revive conservative fears of losing
Algeria. The assembly is also likely to be cool to Mollet's pro-
posed constitutional reforms which would limit its control over
the government.
Mollet's Algerian policy could provide an
opening for the Communists to offer their support as they did
at the start of his previous government, in hopes of furthering
their Popular Front campaign. Mollet is unlikely to accept an
�
investiture in which Communist votes would be the decisive fac-
tor.
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CONHESSATITME
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7. MILITARY JUNTA TAKES CONTROL IN GUATEMALA
Guatemala is likely to be ruled by
military government for some time,
following the coup of early 24 October
when a three-man military junta took
power. The coup, which followed two
days of rioting in the capital and in sev-
eral provincial towns over the disputed
20 October presidential election, re-
moves from power the followers of the late president Cas-
tillo Armas and has probably moved the country toward a
rightist dictatorship. The congress is likely to be dissolved,
and new elections, though promised, are probably distant.
The junta is composed of colonels who
have not been prominent in army or political affairs for sev-
eral years. Their selection is probably a compromise by
cliques of the faction-ridden army. The head of the junta is
the conservative-minded 40-year-old Colonel Oscar Mendoza,
former army chief of staff who lost the trust of Castillo Armas
and was demoted to under secretary of defense in early 1955.
�Mendoza received military training in the United States and is
considered capable and pro-American. Other junta members
are Colonel Roberto Lorenzana, commander of an outlying
military district, and Colonel Gonzalo Yurrita Nova of the air
force.
Colonel Juan F. Oliva, former army strong
man and defense minieter, apparently lost out by resisting what
seems to have been virtually solid army desire for a military
junta, With Oliva's moderate and unifying influence in the army
considerably weakened if not destroyed, the army will be even
more vulnerable to internal factionalism. It is strongly anti-
Communist, however, and will probably be able to suppress
any further agitation by leftists and Communists, who joined
in the violent demonstrations of 21 and 22 October,
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8. SOVIET UNION REPORTEDLY RELUCTANT TO RESUME
DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE TALKS
Comment on:
A member of the Soviet UN delegation
recently told a Western delegate that the
USSR is reluctant to resume disarmament
negotiations until "at least a few months"
after the current General Assembly ses-
sion is over. He reportedly also implied that, if the disarma-
ment debates in the United Nations ended in a deadlock, the
Soviet government might favor "intervention" by UN Secretary
General Hammarskj old.
During the closing stages of the five-power
Disarmament Subcommittee talks in London last summer, the
Soviet representative appeared eager to transfer the discussions
to the General Assembly. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's
opening speech before the General Assembly on 20 September
also indicated a preference for an "atmosphere of wide publicity"
for further disarmament discussions, as opposed to the "seclud-
ed character" of the subcommittee.
Moscow obviously would like to keep the
disarmament question in open discussion before either the Gen-
eral Assembly or the Disarmament Commission, particularly
if the latter were expanded according to the Indian resolution,
for which the USSR has indicated support. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that the Soviet Union would refuse to resume negotiations
if the General Assembly again referred the problem to the
Disarmament Subcommittee.
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9, INDIAN CONGRESS PARTY AGAIN SUFFERS SERIOUS
DEFEATS IN LOCAL ELECTIONS
Comment on:
The provincial organizations of Nehru's
Congress party, on whose rejuvenation
the future political complexion of India
depends, apparently have as yet made no
progress in overcoming serious weak-
nesses uncovered in the national elections seven months ago.
In statewide municipal elections on 16 and 18 October in Uttar
Pradesh State in North India, the Congress party's most im-
portant stronghold, preliminary returns show the Congress
suffered crushing defeats exceeding the 25-percent losses it
experienced in the national elections last March. Socialists
and independents, many of them former Congress party mem-
bers, made the greatest gains. The Communists maintained
their former strength. Factionalism, lack of discipline, and
loss of morale, evident in the Congress party throughout India,
apparently were largely responsible for its losses.
The Congress party high command is deeply
worried over its loss of popular support and has drawn up de-
tailed plans for regaining contact with the people. Provincial
party leaders, however, seem still unaware that they may
eventually be ousted from office. Opposition groups, on the
other hand, are becoming increasingly conscious that the
once-monolithic Congress party is now susceptible to defeat.
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VINO, 441.14
M. UNREST IN SPAIN
Comment on:
Popular dissatisfaction in Spain is wide-
spread as the result of a cost-of-living
increase amounting to about 20 percent
since last November. Strikes and stu-
dent disturbances are possible this fall.
Industrialists in Barcelona now are dis-
posed to collaborate with anti-Franco elements who plan to
organize student disturbances at Barcelona University about
1 November. Barcelona textile manufacturers are apparently
disillusioned with the government's failure to check inflation,
and to make good its February promise to grant them a meas-
ure of regional autonomy in economic matters. Their finan-
cial support could provide the means for opposition elements
to develop some organized effort toward an effective policy.
Conservative groups are apprehensive
over the failure of Franco, now 64, to provide for a succes-
sor. Franco may decide to reshuffle the cabinet again to keep
his supporters unsure of their positions. The government can
at present_ suppress any challenge to its authority.
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CORRECTION
Current Intelligence Bulletin, 24 October 1957, Item
POLITICAL UNREST IN JORDAN
P. 5.
The last paragraph should read:"To di-
vert public attention from these difficulties, the Jordanians
are again complaining to the UN about Israeli activities in
the contested Jerusalem area.
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ANNEX
Watch Report 376, 24 October 1957
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the
Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:
A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostil-
ities against the continental US or its possessions in
the immediate future.
13. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral
to the orbit in the immediate future. Although Soviet
statements have strongly implied that the USSR might in-
tervene with its own forces in the event of a Turkish at-
tack on Syria, available evidence indicates that the USSR
had not yet made military preparations on the scale which
would be anticipated for dealing with the broader contin-
gencies resulting therefrom.*
C. Unstable conditions and tensions stemming from develop-
ments concerning Syria continue to create possibilities
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4ars,
for conflict in the Middle East. The continued deploy-
ment of major Turkish forces on the Syrian frontier, the
presence of Egyptian forces in Syria, and Soviet pres-
sure moves combine to make this situation particularly
tense. Although Turkish forces are in position to attack
Syria, we have no evidence that Turkey has reached a
decision to launch such an attack.
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