CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/12/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03192687
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: December 3, 1957

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/// CURRENT
/ INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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3.5(c)
3 December 1957
Copy No. ,
1.1S
REVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TO7CRET
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CONTENTS
1. 1. AMBASSADOR THOMPSON'S VIEWS ON RECENT COMMU-
NIST BLOC PRONOUNCEMENTS (page 3),
co42_ 2. YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS COOL
A/0
ht7'
(page 4).
3. RUSSIANS REFUSE VISAS FOR TRANSIT OF EAST GERMANY
(page 5).
4. BONN REFUSES TO CONTINUE PAYMENTS FOR BRITISH
TROOPS (page 6).
5. FRANCE MANEUVERS FOR GREATER BRITISH SUPPORT
IN NATO (page 7).
6. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-SAUDI RELATIONS
(page 8).
7. IMAM CONFUSED ON SCOPE OF SOVIET BLOC ACTIVITIES
IN YEMEN (page 9).
8. SHAH OF IRAN BECOMING DISILLUSIONED WITH BAGHDAD
PACT (page 10).
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1. AMBASSADOR THOMPSON'S VIEWS ON RECENT
COMMUNIST BLOC PRONOUNCEMENTS
Reference:
Ambassador Thompson in Moscow be-
lieves party presidium member Furtseva's
address on 26 November before a Moscow
party meeting shows that a primary Soviet
objective during the recent high-level Communist meetings in
Moscow was to obtain clear reacknowledgment of Soviet lead-
ership of the international Communist movement by all Sino-
Soviet bloc parties. Furtseva emphasized this theme at least
five times, and declared that such recognition is important,
"because revisionists in certain foreign Communist parties ap-
plied much effort to discredit the successes of the Soviet Union
and to undermine the authority of our party."
Ambassador Thompson notes that one of
the major aims of the Soviet leaders over the past year has
been to restore the momentum given the international Commu-
nist movement by the February 1956 CPSU 20th party congress,
but disrupted by the de-Stalinization campaign and the Hungar-
ian revolt. Moscow has since been seeking means to prevent
a repetition of situations in which foreign Communists were un-
certain about the party line and even went so far in some in-
stances as to criticize the USSR.
Ambassador Thompson believes that Moscow
has clearly outmaneuvered Belgrade. Among Tito's potential
allies, Mao was loud in his affirmation of Soviet leadership;
Gomulka was apparently pleased with concessions on "national
peculiarities"; while Togliatti was presumably reassured by
affirmation of the doctrine of peaceful transition to Socialism
and by the failure to revive any international Communist organ-
ization. In the ambassador's view, it is an open question whether
Moscow will be able to keep the entire Communist movement in
line, although the situation now tends to favor the Kremlin.
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2. YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS COOL
Comment on:
Yugoslav-Soviet relations appear to
have cooled distinctly since Zhukov's
ouster. Belgrade has become increas-
ingly disillusioned with the Soviet lead-
ership, and Moscow has been treating
Yugoslavia with reserve.
The French Foreign Ministry reported
on 30 November that during a courtesy
call, the new Yugoslav ambassador to Paris was quite def-
inite in expressing President Tito's disenchantment with
Khrushchev. He said that Yugoslav Vice President Kardelj
had returned from Moscow with a "most unfavorable impres-
sion of Khrushchev and the general atmosphere." In what ap-
pears in part as an effort to redress Yugoslavia's balance be-
tween East and West, the ambassador added that Kardelj
deeply resented Soviet attempts to push the Yugoslays into
following the Soviet line in a way "all too reminiscent of
Cominform practices:'
Major Moscow dailies carried noncommital
articles about Yugoslavia's national day on 29 November in con-
trast to the more general attention given to Albania's national
holiday on the same date. Although the Yugoslav embassy's cele-
bration in Moscow on this occasion was attended by Khrushchev
and other top Soviet leaders, Soviet propaganda only noted the
Yugoslav holiday in a polite but reserved fashion. The Amer-
ican embassy in Moscow views the "rather perfunctory" tele-
gram Soviet President Voroshilov sent Tito in conjunction with
the event as one "superficially correct" and as a reflection of
present Yugoslav-Soviet relations in which "no great enthusiasm
is apparent on either side."
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3. RUSSIANS REFUSE VISAS FOR TRANSIT OF EAST GERMANY
Comment on:
The Soviet embassy in Warsaw, in another
move probably designed to force the West-
ern allies to deal directly with the East
German regime, has refused to act on re-
cent applications from American embassy personnel in Warsaw
for Soviet transit visas for travel in East Germany. In explan-
ation of their refusal, Soviet officials stated they have no auth-
orization from the East German government to issue transit
visas. Although formerly most requests were granted within a
week or 10 days, recent requests have been in for as long as
two weeks without action.
Under four power agreements, the Russians
are responsible for the documentation of official Allied person-
nel traveling in East Germany. The Soviet embassy in East
Berlin, however, has issued visas permitting American offi-
cials to travel in East Germany on only two occasions since
October 1956. The Russians, in refusing to issue visas, have
hinted that approval would probably be granted if American re-
quests were addressed directly to East German officials.
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4� BONN REFUSES TO CONTINUE PAYMENTS FOR
BRITISH TROOPS
Comment on:
Bonn's adamant refusal to negotiate on
continuing payments to defray local ex-
penses of British forces in Germany
after 31 March 1958 has caused London
to invoke special NATO and WEU provi-
sions concerning relief of financial dif-
ficulties arising from stationing forces
in other member countries. The dis-
pute will raise anew the divisive issue of future British troop
levels less than two weeks before the 16-18 December NATO
meetings.
Bonn's attitude is much firmer than in
previous years, when it accepted compromise arrangements
for contributing to the support of all foreign troops in West
Germany. Indicative of the new German concentration on
building up the Bundeswehr was the expression by a respon-
sible Foreign Ministry official of the greatest indifference
regarding the presence or absence of British troops. Adenauer
has recently shown alarm at the cost of the German build-up.
German intransigence, which may be ex-
pected to continue even if NATO studies point to the advisa-
bility of special aid to Britain, will probably lead London to
consider further reductions of the 50,000-man force it planned
to leave in Germany after March 1959. Presumably, London in
any event will no longer offer to station in Germany the 5,000-
man element of the British strategic reserve which it had linked
to German agreement to pay $140,000,000 in support costs for
all British troops.
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5. FRANCE MANEUVERS FOR GREATER BRITISH
SUPPORT IN NATO
Comment on:
Premier Gaillard, during his 25 No-
vember talks in Paris with Prime
Minister Macmillan, showed the grow-
ing French resentment of close British-
American ties by requesting Anglo-
French coordination in nuclear weapons development. This
tactic is probably aimed less at securing British assistance
in this field than at forcing London into positions closer to
those of France prior to the forthcoming NATO meeting.
French officials have already implied to
the American embassy that France needs less help on nu-
clear bombs than on other projects--such as an IRBM. Brit-
ish Foreign Secretary Lloyd has suggested that Paris may be
interested in the construction of missile-launching sites.
The French not only resent the idea of an
Anglo-American "atomic club" within NATO, but are bitter,
particularly against the British, over the Tunisian arms de-
livery issue. Paris probably is also pushing for minimal
compensation in the form of greater British backing for
French policy toward Algeria, both in the UN General Assem-
bly and in NATO.
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6. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-SAUDI RELATIONS
Comment on:
Britain is pursuing efforts to resume
diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia
in order to work toward a settlement of
outstanding area problems. London has
asked the Iraqis to explore Saud's views
on the requisite preconditions during King
Faysal's current visit to Riyadh.
King Saud has previously appeared inter-
ested, but his present attitude is unclear. Saud told the Amer-
ican ambassador on 24 November that "up to now Britain has
done nothing to meet problems pending between us" and that
he saw no point in resuming relations until it did so. British
officials think, however, that Saud, not wishing to be isolated,
will be more inclined to reach agreement if Anglo-Egyptian
relations are re-established--as now appears likely.
The Buraimi Oasis, which has been occu-
pied by British-led local forces since late 1955, remains the
outstanding dispute. In September, the Saudis proposed through
an intermediary four possible solutions, including the creation
of a neutral zone in the Buraimi area.
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7. IMAM CONFUSED ON SCOPE OF SOVIET BLOC
AG TIVITIES IN YEMEN
Comment on:
progress in absorbing Soviet
bloc military and economic aid is slow
and that the Imam has only the vaguest
notion of what the bloc representatives
are undertaking in his country.
Yemen's first military and economic deals with the bloc in
the summer of 1956.
because Badr had
monopolized all information, neither he nor the responsible
officials knew what to do with eight newly arrived Soviet
"harbor experts" and a group of Czech arms technicians
who desired to leave the country on vacation.
the Russians were traveling all over the country
at n�as completely unaware of the nature of their ac-
an
tivities.
The Yemeni charge in Cairo on 30 No-
vember indicated that Badr might again visit Eastern Euro-
pean countries before returning ,to Yemen.
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8. SHAH OF IRAN BECOMING DISILLUSIONED WITH
BAGHDAD PACT
Comment on:
The Shah,
has
voiced his disillusionment with the Bagh-
dad pact. He made thinly veiled threats
that his country may withdraw from the
pact's military committee unless it re-
ceives substantial military and financial
assistance. In this connection he again
pressed for American adherence to the
pact.
The Shah proposes to tell the Baghdad
pact council meeting in January that without additional aid,
Iran's forces cannot hold positions chosen by the pact's mil-
itary committee and must accordingly develop plans limited
to Iran's'own defense.
Soviet activity in the Middle East and
Soviet willingness to extend economic aid to Iran are fac-
tors inducing the Shah to intensify his pressure on the US
for help.
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