CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/10/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03178394
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: October 27, 1957

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CURRENT
/4 INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
AUTH HR 7 -2
DATE. fr4
27 October 1957
Copy No.
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
; DECt AFnrEIED
NEXT REVIEW DATE: ..
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS 21_516
IEVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3.5(c)
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CONTENTS
7,HITKOV REPLACED AS SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER
(page 3).
2. POSSIBLE EARLY LAUNCHING OF SOVIET ICBM TEST
VEHICLE OR EARTH SATELLITE (page 5
3. USSR REPORTEDLY SENDS ARABS "DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE" OF TURKISH PLANS
(page 6).
4.
5.
EGYPTIAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF TO VISIT USSR
page 7).
AGGRESSIVE EAST GERMAN ACTIONS CHALLENGE
STATUS OF WEST BERLIN :pa0
o
6.
EAST GERMANY
REDUCES ECONOMIC GOALS
(page 9).
OK-
7.
MAO TSE-TUNG'S
VISIT TO MOSCOW
(page 10).
l)o
8. BURMA SET
FOR LONG DELAY IN REACHING
BORDER
ACCORD WITH
PEIPING (page
11).
9. SITUATION IN LAOS
10.
(page 12).
INDONESIAN COMMUNISTS REPORTEDLY DEMAND
MILITARY CONQUEST OF NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA
(page 13).
11. MANAHAN'S CHANCES FOR WI HILIPPINE
PRESIDENCY SEEN GROWIN (page 14).
12. HEALTH MAY FORCE OUSTER OF TOP SOUTH 70REAN
LIBERAL PARTY LEADER (page 15)
13, EARLY WEST GERMAN-POLISH INFORMAL TRADE
TALKS REPORTED (page 16).
14. THE SITUATION IN GUATEMALA
27 Oct 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
(page 17).
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1. ZHUKOV REPLACED AS SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER
There has been no official statement from
the Soviet Union on the replacement of
Marshal Georgy Zhukov by .MarshalRodion
Malinovsky as USSR minister of defense
other than the 26 October' radio announce-
ment of the shift late Saturday evening, Mos-
cow time,, followed by a brief item pub-
lished on the back page of Pravda on Sunday
morning. Whether Zhukov has been demoted
or whether he relinquished the defense post
in order to assume broader political responsi-
bilities is not yet clear. The longer the delay
in clarifying Zhukov's position, the greater
is the tendency to speculate that the change
'amounts to a demotion for him.
Western Communist correspondents in Mos-
cow state that a central committee meeting will convene within
the next few days, possibly on 28 October, to discuss Zhukov's
status.
Zhukov reportedly hurried to a meeting
with party leaders immediately after he arrived back in Mos-
cow from his state visit to Yugoslavia and Albania. Khrushchev,
Bulganin, and Mikoyan, :who are normally very punctual, ar-
rived nearly an hour late at the Iranian embassy, after having
had the Iranian ambassador twice change the hour of his recep-
tion. It may have been at this party meeting that Zhukov first
learned of the decision to replace him as defense minister.
American correspondents, whose attempts
to report speculation concerning Zhukov's status were cut off
by Soviet censors on the 26th, are now permitted to hint at
a possible demotion.
27 Oct 57
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American service attaches noted an extra-
ordinary number of security and militia personnel and one
armed MVD patrol at the Iranian reception on the 26th, and
report that a large number of military officers entered and
left the Kremlin on the nights of 22, 23, and 24 October.
Policy differences may have figured prom-
inently in the decision to relieve Zhukov of the defense post.
General military policy-=for example, the question of economic
priorities as they affect the Soviet military establishment, and
perhaps particularly Khrushchev's policy with regard to the
Middle East situation--may have been an area of serious dis-
agreement. There have been confirmed reports of recent
differences over long-range economic planning in high echelons
of the party and government.
Ambassador Thompson points out that in re-
cent weeks the military press has been carrying a conspicuous
number of references to the leading role of the party in military
affairs, and he considers it possible that Zhukov has overreached
himself in .attempting to establish the independence of the mili-
tary.
The above evidence, while suggestive of
Zhukov's demotion, is still not conclusive, and must be weighed
against the evidence cited in the CIA intelligence memorandum
of 26 October supporting the view -That the Kremlin would be
hesitant to demote Zhukov on the eve of the 40th anniversary
celebration.
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2. POSSIBLE EARLY LAUNCHENG OF SOVIET ICBM TEST
VEHICLE OR EARTH SATELLITE
Operational activity of an as yet unde-
termined nature resumed on 25 October
on the Tyura Tam-Klyuchi guided-mis-
sile test range. This activity marks the
first date since the 3-4 October period, when the Soviet satel-
lite was launched, that activities have been noted involving the
local Tyura Tam network, the Klyuchi complex, �
Evidence does not allow assessment as
to whether the activity on 25 October was a valid countdown
or only practice;
October is not available.
Complete data as to activity on 26
The first firing at Tyura Tam on 21
August was preceded by prarticA fltraci r
an extended period of time
Assuming that the reported activity is
valid, however, from the pattern of the cur-
rent operation, that the activity on 25 October probably was
practice and could Indicate preparation for the early launching
of either an ICBM test vehicle or an earth satellite.
27 Oct 57
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3. USSR REPORTEDLY SENDS ARABS "DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE" OF TURKISH PLANS
Comment on:
The Soviet embassy in Washington
is reportedly sending Arab embassies
and UN delegations "documentary photo-
stats" purportedl showin the Turkish
e same me, an
1.%ypt.14.11 news 4.1101JuLLA.,11 trom New York asserted the USSR
told Arab delegations that it had received accurate informa-
tion that the United States on 21 October sent 300 saboteurs
to join the Turkish forces on the Syrian border.
Since mid-October, Soviet spokesmen
have claimed to possess documentary proof of a US-Turkish
plan for an attack. Khrushchev told the Syrian ambassador
in Moscow on 16 October that he had "irrefutable documentary
evidence" and the TASS statement of 18 October declared that
"not only the existence of such a plan, but even its concrete
content has been learned authentically." In his letter to the
president of the UN General Assembly on 16 October, Gromyko
referred to "verified data in hand" and strongly reiterated his
charges to a private meeting of selected Asian UN delegations
on 20 October.
Moscow may believe that a dramatic
move such as publication of _alleged "documeiltary evidence"
is now necessary to maintain the momentum of its campaign
against the United States and Turkey in view of widespread
suspicion of Soviet motives in the General Assembly, the
Saudi mediation offer, and Ambassador -Lodge's challenge
Qn22Otber that Gromyko cannot prove his charges.
27 Oct 57
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4, EGYPTIAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF TO VISIT USSR
Comment on:
General Abd�al-Hakim Amir, minister
of defense and commander in chief of
the Egyptian army, will visit the USSR
from 1-19 November
Amir's recently announced trip, delayed since last summer
when the Soviet invitation was first received, will include 12
days devoted to military "visits" and 5 days for "general con-
versations."
Amir will
� submit requests for an as yet undetermined quantity of military
items, including night fighters, radar, and possibly artillery.
discussions will also be held on the training of
high-ranking staff officers and pilots.
Amies projected absence from his post
as head of the Egyptian-Syrian joint command during the present
Syrian crisis suggests that Egypt does not expect hostilities on
the Syrian-Turkish border.
27 Oct 57
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5,. AGGRESSIVE EAST GERMAN ACTIONS CHALLENGE
STATUS OF WEST BERLIN
Comment on:
A new, harder East German policy is de-
veloping which appears designed to strength-
en East Germany's claim to sovereignty and
to erode away the quadripartite status of Ber-
lin. The regime, apparently with Soviet backing, has taken a
number of steps in recent weeks aimed at forcing Bonn and the
Western powers to recognize East German rather than Soviet
authority over the territory of the German Democratic Republic.
Probably as a consequence of Khrushchev's strong endorsement
of the Ulbricht regime last August, the government has recently
shown markedly greater assurance, both in its tougher domestic
policies and its more aggressive attitude toward West Germany
and West Berlin.
Strong actions affecting access to Berlin taken
by the regime include: increased controls over interzonal road
and rail traffic, including confiscation of parcel post and freight
shipments; generally more stringent controls on Berlin intersec-
tor traffic in violation of four power agreements; the disruption
of plans for a church coriference scheduled for both parts of Ber-
lin on 26 and 27 October; and threats to assume control over the
Berlin air corridors used by allied aircraft.
The East German government reportedly de-
cided not to go through with a plan to seal the Berlin sector
borders for two weeks beginning at dawn on 26 October, because
of the disruption of interzonal trade, which is very important
to the East German economy.
While most measures to date have affected
primarily German interests, the US mission in Berlin con-
siders it likely thatiAlliedinterests will be increasingly affected
if the trend continues, whether or not the Russians add direct
harassmentS, of their own to those of the East German regime.
27 Oct 57
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6, EAST GERMANY REDUCES ECONOMIC GOALS
Comment on:
oals of the East German Five-Year
Economic Plan (1956-60) for industrial
production have been reduced from a
planned increase of 55 percent in output
by 1960 to 34 percent, according to a 17
October speech by Party Secretary Walter Ulbricht which
has just been released.
Since the inception of the Five-Year Plan
in 1956, East German industrial production has fallen behind
plan, largely because the goals for investment, labor pro-
ductivity, and raw materials output were set too high. The
revised production goals appear to be feasible, but the in-
ternal resources of the East German economy are not ade-
quate for the planned investments, which have been only
slightly reduced. The Soviet Union will continue to assist
East Germany, which has received a total of $785, 000, 000
in credits since 1953.
27 Oct 57
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7. MAO TSE-TUNG'S VISIT TO MOSCOW
Comment on:
Peiping's announcement that Mao Tse-
tung will visit Moscow early next month
in connection with the Soviet anniversary
celebrations on 7 November paves the
way for a Communist "summit" confer-
ence among Khrushchev, Mao, Tito, and Gomulka, who rep-
resent the four principal points of view on relations among
"socialist" states.
Now that Mao's presence is assured, Tito
and Gomulka are almost certain to be there. Both Tito and
Gomulka regard Mao as sympathetic to certain features of
their individual positions on "different roads to socialism,"
and will look to Mao for some support in their contentions
with Khrushchev. On the other hand, Khrushchev can count
on Mao's support for the central issue of "socialist" solidari-
ty against the West.
Last January and February, Chou En-lai
visited Moscow and Warsaw with the aim of preventing fur-
ther deterioration in Soviet-Polish relations. Since then,
Moscow's relations with both Warsaw and Belgrade have im-
proved considerably, in line with Peiping's advice to avoid
invective and work out problems quietly and gradually. Mao
will encourage the Communist leaders to continue this course,
Mao may follow his visit to Moscow with a
tour of the East European satellites, and there have been re-
ports he will also go to Belgrade.
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8. BURMA SET FOR LONG DELAY IN REACHING BORDER
ACCORD WITH PEIPING
Comment on:
Burmese officials appear resigned, in the
light of Chief Justice Myint Theints recent
unsuccessful mission to Peiping, to a pro-
tracted period of negotiations before a de-
finitive border settlement with Communist China can be achieved.
The Burmese are deeply disappointed over
their failure to nail down a definitive border settlement, In
the absence of new Chinese incursions into territory claimed
by Burma, however, Rangoon is in a poor position to take
drastic steps, such as a renewed press campaign, in an ef-
fort to incline China toward early settlement.
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9. SITUATION IN LAOS
Comment on:
Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma's efforts toward a quick set-
tlement with the Pathet Lao hit a snag
on 25 October when the council of
ministers--the cabinet plus Crown Prince Savang�de-
cided the communique proposed by Souvanna and Pallet
chief Souphannouvong required major revision to safe-
guard the government's interests. The council also dis-
avowed the political agreement signed on 22 October by
government and Pathet Lao negotiators which had been
described by the American ambassador as a "sell-out"
to the Communists.
The councils revision of the communi-
qu�ightens loop-holes the Pathets would probably have
exploited to evade their commitments regarding restora-
tion of the government's authority in the disputed prov-
inces. It also serves to reduce the effectiveness of the
communiqu�s a propaganda vehicle in the Pathetgl
neutrality campaign.
The crown prince believes the revised
communiqu�ill be unacceptable to the Pathets. They
may, however, consider that the original draft was so
favorable that they have latitude in which to negotiate
further. It seems unlikely that they will react to this set-
back by breaking off negotiations.
In any event, the Pathets can be expected
to launch an intense propaganda campaign portraying the
United States as the only obstacle to the unification of Laos.
In addition, Souvanna may react by threatening to resign,
charging that America has frustrated his efforts, and thus
raise the prospect of another prolonged government crisis
if a settlement is not quickly achieved.
27 Oct 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
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10. INDONESIAN COMMUNISTS REPORTEDLY DEMAND
MILITARY CONQUEST OF NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA
Comment on:
Indonesian Communist Party leaders
are urging their followers to demand
the conquest of Netherlands New Guinea
by force of arms if the UN d
the question in Indonesiatsa favnr
stallations.
:ne tone ot speeches
akiD�fch residents and in-
This report fits into a pattern of official
government policy aimed at stimulating a powerful popular
reaction if Indonesia's demands are not approved by the UN.
Foreign Minister Subandrio, who has just returned from
New York, has stated publicly that if Indonesia's claim to
West Irian fails at the UN, "other ways and means must be
found." In addition the government has proclaimed a "West
Irian week" and has delegated its preparation to the Youth-
Military Cooperative Body, a quasi-official organization
which has branches all over Java and includes Communists
at every level.
The official program to emphasize the
West Irian issue has probably been adopted largely at the
direction of President Sukarno with the full support of the
Communists. The emphasis on armed force is unlikely
to result in an invasion of New Guinea, but it may stimu-
late attacks against the Dutch and pnihh st other
Westerners on the island of Java.
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11, MANAHAN'S CHANCES FOR WINNING PHILIPPINE
PRESIDENCY SEEN GROWING
The American embassy's latest survey
of the Philippine political campaign in-
dicates that although President Garcia
may hold a lead in the race for the presi-
dency, his lead is small and appears to be diminishing. The
presidential candidates of the Liberal and Progressive par-
ties, Jose Yulo and Manuel Manahan, are, in the embassy's
judgment, running neck-and-neck. Manahan's popularity,
in particular, continues to rise and should this popularity
be converted into votes on 12 November, he may run ahead
of Yulo and conceivably could win the necessary plurality.
Although Garcia and Yulo are supported
by long-established party machines--traditionally the decid-
ing factor in Philippine elections--the embassy believes that
voters will exercise morejinctependence.of judgment this year
than ever before. The increased price of rice and other basic
commodities as well as chronic socio-economic pressures are
probably playing a major role in electing a "new order" to power.
Manahan may also be able to play on the continuing popular de-
sire for a "clean new force" which manifested itself in the 1953
election of the late Ramon Magsaysay.
Liberal party candidate Yulo reportedly has
the support of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the Philippines.
Unless this support involves instructions to parish priests, how-
ever, the embassy believes the parish-level clergy and popular
Catholic action groups will back Manahan.
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120 HEALTH MAY FORCE OUSTER OF TOP SOUTH KOREAN
LIBERAL PARTY LEADER
Yi Ki-pung, the leader of the ruling
Liberal party in South Korea, may
soon be forced to retire from active
politics because of his rapidly failing
health. Yi has been observed to have great difficulty in
walking or even in standing for more than ten minutes at
a time. Many of his associates reportedly are urging
him to relinquish leadership of the party.
Yi's retirement would almost certainly
lead to the fragmentation and possibly the disintegration
of the large but poorly disciplined Liberal party. Many
party members were recruited by Yi from the opposition
Democratic party of Vice President Chang Myon and from
independent circles. Subsequent maneuvering by the var-
ious factions for political advantage could precipitate po-
litical instability which even President Rhee may have
difficulty in containing.
27 Oct 57
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13, EARLY WEST GERMAN-POLISH INFORMAL TRADE
TALKS REPORTED
Comment on:
Informal trade talks between West Ger-
man and Polish officials will begin on
29 October in West Berlin
Bonn has indicated many times that a
"first step" in improving relations with Poland would be
the establishment of a West German trade mission in War-
saw. The government has been strongly criticized by both
the political opposition and the independent press on the
groundsthat its diplomatic, break with Yugoslavia creates ob-
stacles to a rapprochement with Poland. An official gov-
ernment periodical recently stated that the break with
Belgrade did not mean that Bonn would never establish rela-
tions with countries which had recognized East Germany
"under different circumstances."
Members of the Polish delegation are
emphasizing the nonofficial status of the meeting. In re-
cent weeks, the Polish leaders have insisted that the re-
sumption of full diplomatic relations must accompany any
exchange of trade missions.
0
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14� THE SITUATION IN GUATEMALA
Comment on:
Constitutional government was tenuously
restored to Guatemala late on 26 October,
but Communists may benefit from the bitter
divisions among anti-Communist political
and military forces which were revealed in
the violent disturbances last week.
The military junta resigned on 26 October
and the congress installed Guillermo Flores
Avendano as interim president until a perma-
nent president can be elected and inaugurated. Flores is the
constitutional successor to Luis Arturo Gonzalez, the president
ousted by the junta on 24 October after two days of rioting over
the disputed, and now annulled, presidential election of 20 Octo-
ber. His installation was the result of an agreement between
the beleaguered junta and Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, whose fol-
lowers had nearly succeeded by mob action in forcing the junta
to relinquish power directly to him. A new presidential election
is promised for the "near future" and Ydigoras seems confident
of winning it. He has been assured that, this time, the election
will be really free.
The army, formerly a decisive power in
Guatemala, is now weakened by internal factionalism. The 26
October "solution" to the political dilemma probably does not
have the support of more than a bare majority of officers,
Guatemalan Communists are "delighted"
with last week's events. They exercise influence in the leftist
Revolutionary party (PR) and in various labor and student
groups which were active in the mob action. The PR, which
has been promised the right to participate in the new election,
is confident. Many observers believe it might win, especially
if given time to organize.
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CORRECTION
Current Intelligence Bulletin 26 October 1957, Item 3, p.5.
EGYPTIAN REINFORCEMENT OF SINAI REPORTED
The last sentence in the second paragraph
should real: "Egypt had about 35 000 troops in Sinai at the
time of the Israeli attack in late October 1956."
27 Oct 57
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