CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/03/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 2018 Sanitization
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03162003
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: March 1, 1957

Approved.14;07/07:04/7/00,0( fo'.51eale�.2.9,2/12.!.�4
3.3(h)(2)
re/7/ffrz7:74'
TELLI
LL TI
T)OC:01,11.Lt,4 i _
CLA
NEXT TlE`..111.7.-1,:,./ DAI L.
H
DATE
1 March 1957
Copy No. 131
ReVtENNER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04
..,,,Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
CONTENTS
1. KING SAUD SAYS GULF
NATIONAL WATERWAY
A CANNOT BE INTER-
2. USSR URGED ARAB CONFERENCE TO "BAR DOORS" TO
THE 'WEST (page 4).
3. JORDANIAN ARMY INTELLIGENCE DISCOUNTS REPORTS
OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION PLANS (page 5).
(;�` 4. EFFORTS CONTINUING TO LINE UP INDONESIAN ARMY
BEHIND SUKARNO (page 6).
LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT REPORTEDLY REJECTS PATHET
PROPOSAL ON CHINESE COMMUNIST AID (page 7).
6. THAI GOVERNMENT PARTY PILING UP BIG ELECTORAL
LEAD (page 8).
\ 7. YUGOSLAVIA REMAINS ADAMANT IN DISPUTE WITH
MOSCOW (page 9).
.\)
\ 8. MOROCCAN-FRENCH RELATIONS MAY BE DETERIORATING
(page 10),
\ 9. COMMUNIST DEFEATS IN ICELANDIC TRADE UNION ELEC-
TIONS (page 11).
`. 10. AFGHANISTAN SEEKS US PETROLEUM AID
(page 12).
ANNEX--Conclusions of the Watch Report of the
Advisory Committee
1 Mar 57
(page 13).
Current Intelligence Bulletin
TOP V7C.T2FT FITWP
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
Page 2
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
low
1. KING SAUD SAYS GULF OF AQABA CANNOT BE
INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY
King Saud told Ambassador Hare in Cairo
on 26 February that the Tiran Straits at
the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba cannot be
regarded as an international waterway,
since to do so would constitute a threat to Saudi Arabia and
the Moslem holy places there. Saud said this would be one
of the points in a memorandum to be sent the American gov-
ernment following the conference of Arab chiefs of state.
Saudi royal councilor Yusuf Yasin suggested to Hare that
the United States "reconsider" this issue "before going too
far and taking a firm position."
Comment Assumption of this position by Saud will
support Nasr in his desire to avoid a
settlement of the Gulf of Aqaba question on any ground other
than the reassertion of full Arab control over the straits.
Press speculation associating the French with US-Israeli un-
derstandings may arouse new Arab suspicions, enabling Nasr
to exert stronger influence over Saud.
1 Mar 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
1-**� 4i) 1."1
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
� � ,ry rie r11.
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
%sof
2. USSR URGED ARAB CONFERENCE TO "BAR DOORS"
TO THE WEST
Comment on:
G. T. Zaitsev, chief of the Middle East
Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry,
told the Egyptian ambassador on 25 Feb-
ruary that the Arab four-power conference
which was about to open in Cairo could
"easily" find a formula which would be acceptable to all par-
ticipants and which would "bar all doors to imperialism and
foreign forces:'
"particular individual interests should be dis-
carded for the general vital interests of all Arabs' This sug-
gests that Moscow feared Saud might either inject anti-Com-
munist professions into the final joint communique or break
openly with Egypt and Syria.
1 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 4
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
Ast,
3. JORDANIAN ARMY INTELLIGENCE DISCOUNTS REPORTS
OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION PLANS
Comment on:
The Jordanians consider that limited
call-ups of reserves and troop movements have taken place
in Israel for the purpose of conducting deferred annual
training maneuvers for reserve units which were not ac-
tively engaged in operations against Egypt. The evaluation
adds that because of the international situation, the Israeli
command has ordered the maneuvers at this particular time
"in order to meet any sudden military operation either by
the adjacent Arab states or from outside."
1 Mar 57
CUrrent Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
rl r'
Approved for Release: C03162003
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
virmo Yiw
4. EFFORTS CONTINUING TO LINE UP INDONESIAN ARMY
BEHIND SUKARNO
Indonesian army headquarters announced
on 26 February that it is prepared to re-
ceive and discuss views of the armed
forces concerning President Sukarno's
"concept." The announcement stated that
the armed forces are loyal to Sukarno as supreme commander
and will "give his concept full consideration." The joint chiefs
of staff are scheduled to hold a special session during the com-
ing weeks to discuss the president's plans.
The American ambassador in Djakarta has
reiterated that the implementation of President Sukarno's
"concept" depends on the attitude of the armed forces. In this
connection, he reports that it is significant that the Non-Corns'
and Privates' Association has announced its undivided silpport
for Sukarno's proposal. Sukarno
will, depend on noncommissioned officers r ther than the officer
corps to provide army support for his plan. The association
was organized in 1956 and is reportedly heavily infiltrated by
Communists.
Comment The officer corps, although loyal to Sukarno,
is believed to be sharply divided on the ex-
tent to which it should endorse his demands for Communist par-
ticipation in the government. Sukarno and the Communists,
however, have already used a campaign of intimidation against
political leaders without interference from the army.
1 Mar 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT REPORTEDLY REJECTS PATH:ET
PROPOSAL ON CHINESE COMMUNIST AID
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has re-
jected the Pathet Lao demand that Laos
accept aid from Communist China, ac-
cording to the French Foreign Ministry.
On 25 February, Souvanna reportedly gave the Pathet Lao an
ultimatum that they must signify within five days whether or
not they are willing to place the two northern provinces and
Pathet forces under the command of the royal government in
return for participation in a coalition government. Laotian
officials are reportedly thinking of presenting the problem
to the United Nations if negotiations break down.
Comment The Pathets would be reluctant to sacri-
fice the gains they have already won in
negotiations and they may reason that they could induce Laos
to accept Communist bloc aid once a coalition government has
been set up. They might, therefore, accept the government's
terms if a formula can be negotiated which would allow them
to retain real control of their troops after their integration
into the Laotian army.
1 Mar 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
6. THAI GOVERNMENT PARTY PILING UP BIG
ELECTORAL LE A n
Comment on:
The Thai government's Seri Manangkhasila
Party (SMP) is far out in front in early
returns from the elections for the 160 elec-
tive seats in Thailand's unicameral legis-
lature. Leftist candidates, whose campaign
features attacks on the United States and
Thailand's pro-Western foreign policy, are
trailing far behind, although they may pick
up a few seats in northeastern Thailand,
where antigovernment sentiment is the
strongest.
Unofficial tabulations from 53 out of 71
provinces show the SMP has captured 55 seats to 17 for the
conservative Democrat Party, the only opposition party of any
importance. Twenty-one other seats went to candidates who
are likely to support the Phibun regime.
The SMP's lead is likely to become even
more impressive as the rest of the rural vote comes in. Vil-
lage headmen are expected to deliver large blocs of votes to
the government party.
The closest contests were for Bangkok's
nine seats. The SMP won seven and the Democrats two. Prime
Minister Phibun and Democrat leader Khuang, whose party is
also committed to a policy of close ties with the West, were the
most prominent winners.
1 Mar 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
en NFTlir NTT A T
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
%,�04.4,%L. AL A&'-Ii
7. YUGOSLAVIA REMAINS ADAMANT IN DISPUTE
WITH MOSCOW
Comment on:
In his speech to the Yugoslav parliament
on 26 February, Foreign Minister Popovic
clearly affirmed his country's refusal to
back down in its dispute with the USSR,
but professed a strong desire to carry on
good state relations with the Soviet bloc
countries. Popovic characterized Stalin-
ism in the period since World War II as
inflicting "incomparably greater damage
to the cause of socialism than all imperial-
ist conspiracies put together." Implying that Belgrade might
now step up its ideological attacks, he pointed out that its re-
cent silence had been misinterpreted by Moscow as weakness.
Popovic decried Moscow's withholding of
investments promised to Yugoslavia. He observed that the
Soviet attitude toward Belgrade was engendered in large part
by Moscow's disappointment in its expectations that Yugo-
slavia would join the "so-called Socialist camp:' In contrast
Popovic observed that in spite of differing political systems,
Yugoslav co-operation with the West was becoming stronger,
and he praised "precious" American economic aid.
The foreign minister's statements on gen-
eral world problems reflected a more even balance between
East and West than did the Yugoslav view in 1956. Ambassa-
dor Riddleberger has suggested that this, along with Popovic's
failure to endorse the Soviet position on German policy in a
recent press interview, may represent a threat to Moscow of
withdrawal of support on international issues and also a hint
to the West that Yugoslav positions may be revised in its
favor.
1 Mar 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
I/ I tI1%Tr1,T A T
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04C03162003
V,
8. MOROCCAN-FRENCH RELATIONS MAY BE DETERIORATING
Comment on:
The American embassy in Rabat consid-
ers that recent diplomatic exchanges of
the French and Moroccan governments
characterize the dangerous tensions in
their relations which could eventually lead to another open
clash between the French army and the Moroccan govern-
ment and people.
Moroccan assistance to the Algerian rebels
remains the basic friction in Moroccan-French relations. The
French hope by economic pressures on Rabat to limit this aid,
while the Moroccan government acutely fears that France might
use its 80,000 troops in Morocco to overpower the Moroccan
army and attempt to resume control over the administration.
The Moroccan government rejected a double protest delivered
by the French charge on 23 February objecting to Spain's
representation of Moroccan interests in Latin America and
Moroccan guerrilla activity in Mauritania.
1 Mar 5'7
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10
1-1 ArINTLIrrtir,IxTryr 4 r
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
4.4 .1.1-P1Irt I' I AY:11J
9. COMMUNIST DEFEATS IN ICELANDIC TRADE
UNION ELECTIONS
Comment on:
The recent defeats of Icelandic Commu-
nists in the Reykjavik carpenters' and
factory workers' union elections by So-
cial Democratic-Conservative coalitions
will increase the instability of Iceland's
coalition cabinet made up of the Progressive, Social Demo-
cratic, and Labor Alliance (Communist) parties.
The Communists, however, still retain
a strong position in labor. They control the Icelandic Fed-
eration of Labor and several important unions�among them
the largest in the country, the Unskilled Workers/ Union in
Reykjavik, which includes dock workers, truck drivers and
petroleum distribution employees. The Social Democratic
gains are chiefly the result of Conservative support and re-
flect anti-Communist sentiment more than confidence in the
Social Democratic Party. The Communists retain the capa-
bility to bring about damaging strikes at a time when the
economy is impaired by serious inflation.
1 Mar 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 11
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
.ko...a.A. �
10. AFGHANISTAN SEEKS US PETROLEUM AID
Afghan Foreign Ministry adviser Aziz
and transport director Yaftali told an
American official on 26 February that
Prime Minister Daud is very anxious to
have a Western oil company establish without delay a system
for the supply and distribution of petroleum products in
Afghanistan. Aziz and Yaftali had previously spoken of the
American CALTEX and STANVAC companies. At this meet-
ing they also indicated an interest in Burmah Shell, a British
concern, saying it was important for Afghanistan to become
involved with allies of the United States,
Comment The use of petroleum products- particu7
larly gasoline--may have reached a
volume greater than the Afghan distribution system, a gov-
ernment monopoly, can handle. The Afghan leaders appear
to hope to obtain Western assistance in solving this problem.
Soviet deliveries of gasoline have in-
creased sharply in recent years, while Western deliveries
have remained constant at about 3,000,000 imperial gallons
a year. The granting by Afghanistan of an important petro-
leum distribution role to a Western company might prevent
the USSR from further expanding its activities in this field.
1 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 12
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003
6.-IJILJ '1_./111 11-1-/
ANNEX
Watch Report 343, 27 February
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the Intel-
ligence Advisory Committee concludes that:
A. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the continental US or its possessions in the imme-
diate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral
to the Orbit in'the immediate future.
C. A deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Middle East is
improbable in the immediate future. Unsettled issues and
continuing tensions in the area constitute possibilities for
violence.
1 Mar 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 13
r11/-171 Cf
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03162003