CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/05/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03160456
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: May 19, 1957

4Approved for Release: 2019/12/04
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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CO3,
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
19 May 1957
Copy No. 134
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OFFICE OF OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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CONTENTS
, ),10 KING SAUD MAY CALL MOSLEM CONFERENCE
(page 3).
/4,10 2. DJAKARTA DI ES EAST INDONESIAN MILITARY
COMMANDER (page 4).
()", 3. NASR RE14SSERTS INTENT TO SEIZE
ISRAELI "TEST" SHIP (page 5).
4. MOLLET USING SUEZ ISSUE TO RETAIN PREMIERSHIP
(page 6).
.0K 5. POLISH PARTY PLENUM
page 7).
6. SOUTH VIETNAM ALTERS TACTICS ON OVERSEAS
CHINESE (page 8).
19 May 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin
7013-St-CR
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Uti'l TIT ift3rEd 11th)
%SP' Nair
1. KING SAUD MAY CALL MOSLEM CONFERENCE
at the
recent Baghdad talks King Sauct indicated
that he was giving consideration to call-
ing an all Moslem conference,
The conference would
have the purpose of developing a general position on relations
with the West, and would be attended by Moslem leaders not
only of Baghdad pact nations but of North African countries
and Indonesia as well as all Arab countries.
Saud's idea is that if Nasr fails to attend, he
will be isolated, whereas if he does, he would find himself
greatly in the minority.
Saud
not only stated that he could live with the Baghdad pact, but
declared it a good thing.
19 May 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
CONFIDENTIAL
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144019
2. DJAKARTA DISMISSES EAST INDONESIAN
MILITARY COMMANDER
Comment on:
On 18 May the Indonesian army announced
the relief of dissident Lt. Col. Samual as
commander of East Indonesia. This ac-
tion is the latest in a series of steps indi-
cating the hardening attitude of President Sukarno toward the
rebellious provinces.
It is quite likely that Sukarno, who has .
frequently called for vigorous action to solve Indonesia's press-
ing problems, overruled the recommendation of Prime Minister
Djuanda. The latter, who has just returned from a visit to the
East Indonesian command, reportedly warned only three days
ago that SamuaPs dismissal would not solve the crisis there.
Samual can be expected to ignore the order.
Should Sukarno attempt to enforce it, he would call on the spe-
cial task force of Col. Sudirman in southern Celebes. Reports
suggest, however, that Sudirman, although loyal to Djakarta,
might not be entirely reliable in this situation.
Sudirman would not follow Djakarta's directives ii tney watt
have "dangerous results."
19 May 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin
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3. NASR REASSERTS INTENT TO SEIZE
ISRAELI "TEST" SHIP
Egyp Jan president Nasr has told
\that if an Israeli ship
enters Egyptian territorial waters to
transit the Suez Canal, the ship, crew
/and cargo will be seized, \
Comment Because of Nasr's past vehemence on this
subject, there is little reason to doubt
that a ship bearing the Israeli flag would be seized. Any con-
cession by Nasr on this point would result in a serious loss
of face in the Arab world. The attempt made in 1954 to send
an Israeli ship through the canal ended in the confiscation of
the vessel and its cargo.
Nases position with regard to a non-Israeli
vessel transiting the canal to an Israeli port is uncertain. Be-
fore the hostilities last fall, most such vessels passed unim-
peded, but some seizures of cargo were effected on the ground
that they were contraband war materials.
19 May 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
L31 I
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4. MOLLET USING SUEZ ISSUE TO RETAIN PREMIERSHIP
Comment on:
France and the United States "are drift-
ing apart" over the Suez issue. In an
apparent effort to elicit US support in the UN Security Coun-
cil, he said a serious outburst of anti-American feeling would
arise in France if �Mollet's appeal to the council were fruitless.
He denied that Mollet's recent moves were
dictated by domestic political considerations, but admitted that
the premier's appeal to th,..) council on Suez and his dramatic
attempt to resign would have "domestic repercussions." The
immediate favorable popular response to Mollet's latest move
on Suez indicates the continued value of this issue as a rallying
point for French nationalist sentiment,
the government expects to survive the vote of confidence,
on the tax issue, now scheduled for 21 May. Despite increasing
speculation on a new premier, Mollet is apparently confident
that the assembly will prefer to leave the Socialists saddled with
the problems of Algeria and France's shaky financial situation.
His advisers expect that in the event Monet falls, the rise of
his prestige during the crisis that follows will permit his return
to power.
19 May 57
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�ettiNtit,Ert1r21
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5. POLISH PARTY PLENUM
Comment on:
Polish sources have told representatives
of the Western press that First Secretary
Gornulka's speech to the ninth plenum of
the Polish Communist Party on 15 May
was followed on 16 May by attacks on his
policies by his Stalinist opponents. These
attacks, reportedly directed against his
entire policy rather than parts of it, sug-
gest a concerted move against Gomulka
and a high degree of cohesion within the
Stalinist Natolin wing.
Press observers believe that the Natolin
attacks have served to reduce criticism of Gomulka by the
party's liberal wing, which was singled out for criticism in
his keynote speech. Gomulka may now give up his attempts
to appease the Natolins and strongly insist on acceptance of
his moderate program in the hope that a show of firmness
will bring him enough support from uncommitted sectors to
offset Natolin hostility.
The terse communiqu�ssued by the cen-
tral committee on 18 May stated that Minister of Agriculture
Ochab had been released from his post as a central committee
secretary, though he remains on the politburo. Zenon Kliszko,
an old associate of Gomulka, and politburo member Jerzy
Morawski, a liberal, were added to the secretariat. Ochab,
a former first secretary, was probably released from his
duties as secretary to enable him to devote full time to imple-
menting Gomulka's important agricultural reforms. Appar-
ently no one from the Stalinist group was added to either the
politburo or secretariat.
19 May 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin
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"two
6. SOUTH VIETNAM ALTERS TACTICS ON
OVERSEAS CHINESE
outh Vietnam is planning a long-range
olicy of harassment, rather than large-
cale immediate direct action, to force
ocally born Chinese to accept natural-
\--qx_rests,_small-scale expulsion and economic pressures.
The policy will be based primarily on scattered
Vietnamese foreign secretary Mau agreed
recently to permit voluntary expatriation
to Taiwan of those Chinese who refuse naturalization, but
this may have been only a temporary expedient to prevent fur-
ther rioting in Saigon while President Diem is abroad. In the
face of a hardening resistance among the Chinese community
of nearly 1,000,000, Vietnamese leaders remain confident
the Chinese will comply eventually in order to protect their
wide commercial interests, and the government appears will-
ing to suffer any economic losses in the process. Compli-
ance thus far has been negligible despite intimidation by the
government.
While Chinese reaction to a coercive policy
would depend on its pace and severity, further rioting, rupture
of Saigon-Taipei relations, and growing pro- Peiping sentiment
among the Chinese in Vietnam are possible consequences.
19 May 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
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