CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/08/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03185373
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: August 13, 1957

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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3.5(c)
13 August
1957
Copy No,
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AUTH: I.-10 70-2
DATE riEViEWER: _
136
3.3(h)(2)
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
Tor SECRET
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C03185373
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AJ
v
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CONTENTS
COMMENT ON RETURN ?F SOVIET OFFICIALS TO
MOSCOW (page 3)0
o SOVIET PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORTEDLY
WILL MEET SOON (page 4).
-)5
rk\6.
KHRUSHCHEV REPORTEDLY ASSURES ULBRICHT OF
CONTINUED SUPPORT (page 5).
YUGOSLAV OFFICIA., COMMENTS ON TITO-KHRUSHCHEV
TALKS (page 6).
NEW RUMANIAN SHAKE-UP RUMORED
(page 7).
GROWING PRESSURE ON 7EHRU TO RETIRE AS PRIME
MINISTER (page 8).
INDONESIAN ELECTIONS
(page 9).
VENEZUELA TO BOYCOTT INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC
CONFERENCE IN BUENOS AIRES
(page 10).
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1. COMMENT ON RETURN OF SOVIET OFFICIALS
TO MOSCOW
As of 12 August at least 362 Soviet offi-
cials have returned to Moscow since early June from 42 of
the 53 nations with which the Soviet Union maintains diplo-
matic relations. This number does not include dependents
of foreign service officers.
In addition to some 25 ambassadors, of
whom five have now returned to their foreign posts, and large
numbers of lesser diplomatic officials, at least 60 officers of
the Committee of State Security (KGB) and military intelligence
service (GRU) have also been called home. There has as yet
been no unusual movement of military or naval attaches, despite
unconfirmed reports that a conference of all attaches from the
Middle East has been called by Marshal Zhukov,
foreign correspondents who worked
with Shepilov and Molotov are also slated for recall and removal,
and at least one Pravda correspondent in Rome has suddenly
left for the USSR.
It seems likely that both the diplomatic and
intelligence personnel returned to the USSR for briefings and
consultations. In the case of the intelligence officers, these
briefings might deal with a change in the future conduct of for-
eign intelligence operations or in the priority of Soviet intelli-
gence targets. The large number of returnees also raises the
possibility that some may be removed or reassigned.
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2. SOVIET PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORTEDLY
WILL MEET SOON
The Soviet Communist Party's central
committee is scheduled to meet during
the latter part of August or early Sep-
tember to deal with the activity of Soviet
trade unions, according to a dispatch by
the Moscow correspondent of the Italian Communist Party
paper L' Unit.
Comment
L' Unitas Moscow correspondent, Giuseppe
Boffa, has recently been a fairly reliable
source for this kind of information, and the party central com-
mittee would presumably be called upon to approve measures
worked out by the trade unions to define their role in the Soviet
Union's new system of industrial management and improve their
organizational structure. The All-Union Central Council of
Trade Unions met 11-12 June to deal with these problems, and
turned over responsibility for the details to its presidium, which
by now should be ready to report to the party central committee.
The plenum may well also have been called
to hear Khrushchev review the international situation and report
on the results of his recent talks with Tito and the trips to Czecho-
slovakia and East Germany. Other problems which might be dis-
cussed are the Sixth Five-Year Plan, not yet approved in final
form, and top-level personnel assignments in the party and the
government, possibly including the question of Bulganin's status.
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3. KHRUSHCHEV REPORTEDLY ASSURES ULBRICHT OF
CONTINUED SUPPORT
Comment on:
Khrushchev, shortly after his arrival
in East Berlin on 7 August, honored
Party Secretary Ulbricht as the "most
faithful of all the faithful," and gave the
SED leadership his blessing,
During his visit Khrushchev
repeatedly assured the East Germans of Soviet support for the
SED position that German reunification can only be brought about
through confederation of the two existing German states.
Khrushchev's endorsement, which reportedly
has given SED leaders new optimism and confidence, is prob-
ably intended not only to assure that no East German Commu-
nists will dare oppose Ulbricht, but also to warn revisionists
throughout the Soviet bloc that "the unity of the socialist camp"
must be maintained.
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4. YUGOSLAV OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON TITO-
KHRUSHCHEV TALKS
Acting Foreign Secretary Prica on
8 August, in a conversation with Am-
bassador Riddleberger on the recent
Tito-Khrushchev talks in Rumania, re-
iterated that the Yugoslav viewpoint was unchanged on major
issues. Prica said that Yugoslavia had not expected the meet-
ing to resolve outstanding problems between Moscow and Bel-
grade, but that Tito was encouraged by Khrushchev's "open-
minded and receptive attitude" toward Yugoslav policy.
Prica revealed that there had been con-
siderable argument over the substance and form of the com-
muniqu�with the Yugoslays rejecting a long Soviet draft.
The result was a short, unsigned press "communiqu�
Prica firmly rejected any idea of Yugo-
slav participation in a revived Cominform, and emphasized
the Yugoslav doctrine that the "international workers' move-
ment" includes "all socialist parties."
While admitting that Zhukov had been in-
fluential in gaining support for Khrushchev during the Moscow
crisis, Prica tended to play down his importance, and re-
marked that his power may have been overestimated. In the
Yugoslav view, the situation in the USSR could not be ex-
plained merely in terms of personalities: the USSR was in a
state of ferment resulting both from de-Stalinization and pres-
sure from below for reforms.
Although he would not specify how liberal-
ization of Soviet policies toward the satellites would be mani-
fested, Prica expects that such developments will occur, per-
haps sooner than anticipated in the West.
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5. NEW RUMANIAN SHAKE-UP RUMORED
Rumors are current in Bucharest that
new changes in Rumania's political
leadership are likely in the near future,
according to the American legation.
Certain members of First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej's im-
mediate circle of advisers have been attacked on grounds
of economic incompetence by leading party intellectuals, and
some stories assert that Gheorghiu-Dej may be in danger of
losing his pre-eminent position. One legation source reports
that Rumanian journalists have received no regime-approved
line since the July shake-up in Rumania.
Comment Recent signs of lack of direction by the
regime probably are more a reflection of
uncertainty and confusion, both within the party and among the
populace, than of any real threat to Gheorghiu-Dej's position.
Until now Gheorghiu-Dej has shown skill in adjusting to changes
in the Kremlin; the recent demotion of politburo members Con-
stantinescu and Chisinevschi was reportedly a personal victory.
The regime has kept pace with the other satellites in carrying
out such measures as decentralization, which are generally asso-
ciated with Khrushchev, although the country's economy remains
in poor shape.
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6. GROWING PRESSURE ON NEHRU TO RETIRE
AS PRIME MINISTER
Criticism of Prime Minister Nehru and
talk of his retirement as government
leader reportedly are growing in the
Indian cabinet and in the Congress Party
rngli command. Concurrent reports picture Nehru as in-
creasingly despondent and ineffectual.
The question of Nehru's continuance in
office apparently has been discussed more seriously during
the last three months than at any time in the past, as con-
cern has grown over the economic crisis and the Congress
Party's loss of vitality.
in May Nehru was considering resigning and his top
a.is felt he was no longer able to deal effectively with the
country's problems.
Cabinet sentiment in favor of Nehru's
resignation now reportedly is broadening to the extent that
only a few of his closest associates, such as Defense Minis-
ter Krishna Menon, have not been identified with groups seek-
ing his retirement.
Nehru's colleagues probably cannot force
his retirement. Any decision by the 67-year-old Nehru is
likely to be his alone. While in his present depressed frame
of mind he might feel inclined toward relinquishing his re-
sponsibilities, his final decision probably would depend on
whether he felt the alternative to his personal leadership would
be more beneficial for the country.
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7. INDONESIAN ELECTIONS
Comment on:
Preliminary returns from the 10 August
elections in West Java show the Commu-
nists well in the lead of their principal
rival there, the Masjumi party. They
reportedly have won a major victory in Bandung, the provin-
cial capital. If this early trend continues, the Communists
will repeat their considerable gains in the recent Central and
East Java elections, where they made substantial inroads into
the Nationalist Party vote of 1955 and, on the basis of still un-
official counts, polled a plurality.
Some leaders of the three major non-Com-
munist parties, alarmed by these gains in Java, have announced
a desire to cooperate with each other against the Communists,
but their plans appear highly indefinite.
13 Aug 57
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res*
80 VENEZUELA TO BOYCOTT INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC
CONFERENCE IN BUENOS AIRES
Comment on:
Venezuela will probably boycott the Inter-
American economic conference in Buenos
Aires beginning 15 August because of the
break in Argentine-Venezuelan relations
in early July. The Venezuelan ambassador
nequivocally advised the Brazilian foreign
ministe that Caracas would not enter negotiations
to re-establish relations with Argentina on condition that former
Argentine president Peron be ousted from Venezuela.
Venezuelan security chief Estrada had
stated in early August that Venezuela would attend the Buenos
Aires conference and would arrange for Peron's departure pro-
vided Argentina gave assurances of courteous treatment of the
Venezuelan delegation. In a subsequent conversation with a
high US government official, however, Estrada implied that
Venezuela had no intention of attending.
The Argentine foreign minister has indi-
cated that Peron's ouster from Venezuela would be a condition
to Argentina's expressing "no objection" to Venezuelan attend-
ance at the conference.
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