CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/07/17
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
03185637
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2019
Document Release Date:
December 20, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 17, 1957
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15757407].pdf | 265.53 KB |
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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
17 July 1957
opy No. 13c
DOCUM:.
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
h 1,441. 44114tee, 4i6 txtV701e441,014
1% USSR MAY HAVE SUBMARINE WITH UNCONVENTIONAL
PROPULSION SYSTEM (page 3).
o 6. DEVALUATION OF FRENCH FRANC HINTED
(page 4).
463. JAPANESE MINIMUM POSITION ON STRATEGIC SHIP-
MENTS TO COMMUNIST CHINA
(page 5).
0 )21)). LAOTIAN CABINET CRISIS
(page 6).
PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER APPARENTLY CO-
OPERATING ON WEST PAKISTAN (page 7).
/9 /5
- 6. NASR REPORTEDLY TRYING TO ARRANGE KHRUSHCHEV-
BULGANIN VISIT (page 8).
A/42
7. NASR CON
DOLLARS
TO FORCE RELEASE OF BLOCKED
page 9).
(54/8. STALINISTS CONSOLIDATE CONTROL OF BULGARIAN PARTY
(page 10).
17 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
TOP SECRET
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T1 Pi' Ni.:1-3-1ET
1. USSR MAY HAVE SUBMARINE WITH UNCONVENTIONAL
PROPULSION SYSTEM
The United States navy has reported that
"a probable submarine, not US or known
friendly," detected 110 miles off the Vir-
ginia coast during April frequently ma-
neuvered while submerged at speeds in excess of 18 knots.
The high speeds were maintained over a considerable period
of time,with little or no oDDortunity to charge batteries for at
least 20 hours.
Comment The high speeds frequently used by the
above boat appear to preclude the use of
the conventional combination of battery and electric motor
propulsion. A hydrogen peroxide or nuclear propulsion sys-
tem would have enabled the submarine to perform as described.
No Soviet submarine equipped with either of these systems has
yet been identified. According to a National Intelligence Estimate
(SNIE No. 11-6-57),a Soviet atomic submarine "could be in op-
eration well before 1960."
The most modern Soviet long-range sub-
marines known to exist are the 7W-" and "Z-class" units,
which are believed to be conventionally powered, having max-
imum submerged speeds of about 13 and 14 knots respectively
for periods of no longer than one hour.
17 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
'It()P SECRET
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2. DEVALUATION OF FRENCH FRANC HINTED
Comment The French government's new economy
program would tend to put France in a
better position than heretofore to reap the maximum benefit
from devaluation.
There have been recurring rumors of
devaluation during the financial crisis this year, and, ac-
cording to a press report of 14 July, investors in all Euro-
pean countries have been uneasy over such a possibility.
One leading French financial publication has declared that
this is the time for devaluation. There have also been re-
ports that devaluation might be one of the conditions Bonn
would require for a West German loan to France.
17 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
�SittieLRET�
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3. JAPANESE MINIMUM POSITION ON STRATEGIC SHIP-
MENTS TO COMMUNIST CHINA
Japan on 1 July formally presented
to the China Committee in Paris its
proposals for the export of certain
strategic items to Communist China
during the remainder of 1957. These
proposals represent Japan's maximum
position.
The items under study by the China Com-
mittee appear on International List II and are not connected
with the China Special List, which Japan abolished on 16 July.
The Japanese have insisted that they will honor quotas on
List II items, but will not accept other restrictions which do
not apply equally to trade with the European Communist bloc.
17 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
TOP SECRET
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LICALArtE,
vor
4. LAOTIAN CABINET CRISIS
Comment on:
Prime Minister-designate Katay's
chance of success in his second at-
tempt to form a government appears
slim. He is again opposed by the
left-wing National Union Party and
the small Democratic Party. It now
appears that, at best, he can hope for
a favorable margin of one or two votes.
He is also reported to be under pressure from elements with-
ing his own Nationalist Party to withdraw in favor of former
prime minister Souvanna Phouma.
In the event that Katay withdraws or is
defeated a second time, Souvanna would probably be desig-
nated to form a government. His prospects appear favora-
ble. Should Souvanna head a new government, he would be
in a position to press for a coalition government with the Pa-
thet Lao in view of the assembly's ratification of his 28 Decem-
ber agreement with Pathet chief Souphannouvong.
17 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
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SECRET
5. PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER APPARENTLY
CO-OPERATING ON WEST PAKISTAN
Comment on:
President Mirza's action on 15 July re-
storing the provincial government in
West Pakistan reportedly was taken in
consultation with Prime Minister Suhra-
wardv who is now touring the United States.
There had been some indication recently
that Mirza was taking advantage of Suhrawardy's absence to
strengthen the position in West Pakistan of his own Republican
Party and thereby check the prime minister's growing political
power in the province. Suhrawardy's reported concurrence in
the lifting of President's Rule appears to reduce the possibility
of a split between the two leaders in the immediate future.
However, the return of the Republican Party
to power in West Pakistan, while assuring the support Suhrawardy
needs in the national coalition, will also impede the prime minis-
ter's effort to build a strong branch of his own Awami League in
the western province. This could result eventually in renewed
friction between Suhrawardy and Mirza.
17 July 57
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3E/Liitiz4 I
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6. .NASR REPORTEDLY TRYING TO ARRANGE KHRUSHCHEV-
BULGANIN VISIT
Egyptian rresment iNasr is trying to ar-
range a visit to Egypt and Syria by Soviet
leaders Khrushchev and Bulganin,
eir
trip would be made in August or September and would take the
place of the visit to the USSR Nasr had planned for 15 August.
Nasr reportedly fears that his absence from Egypt would be the
signal for an attempted coup or popular uprising, but does not
wish to show his uneasiness by an outright cancellation.
Comment Since Nasr first announced in 1955 that he
intended to visit the USSR, the trip has
been repeatedly postponed. It is unlikely that his latest change
of plans is caused by fear of a coup or uprising. The recent
parliamentary elections revealed sources of dissatisfaction and
opposition, but no serious threat to his regime. In addition, a
visit to Egypt by the top Soviet representatives would probably
have greater prestige value for Nasr than would a trip by him to
the USSR.
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Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
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SECRET
7. NASR CONSIDERING MOVE TO FORCE RELEASE
OF BLOCKED DOLLARS
Reference:
Nasr reportedly intends to request
that the International Monetary Fund
seek payment of the $30,000,000 Egyp-
tian debt out of the approximately
$42,000,000 of Egyptian funds blocked by the United States
following nationalization of the Suez Canal last July0
he is not planning any surprise move in the
near future, such as blockading the Straits of Tiran or oust-
ing the United Nations Expeditionary Forces from the Sinai
Peninsula. He intends to wait until September to make his
play for securing release of the blocked dollars.
17 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
7V-PeRLF-T
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olutAit.E., 1
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8., STALINISTS CONSOLIDATE CONTROL OF
BULGARIAN PARTY
Comment on:
The Stalinist leadership in Bulgaria--
the triumvirate of Chervenkov, Zhivkov,
and Yugov--apparently has used the occa-
sion of the party house-cleaning in Moscow
to consolidate its control of the Bulgarian party. During the
past several months, however, it has been applying some of
IChrushchev's economic policies to Bulgaria, hoping thereby
to counter party and popular dissidence.
Georgi Chankov, politburo member and
first vice premier, and two members of the central committee
generally believed to have been opposed to Chervenkov were re-
moved from their party positions at a 11-12 July plenary ses- �
sion of the central committee,
The three men have been in partial eclipse for some
time and were charged with factionalism, but have not yet been
removed from their government posts. Twelve men simultane-
ously promoted to higher party posts are believed to be linked to
Chervenkov.
17 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10
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