CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/10/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03181974
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: October 13, 1957

-Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03181974
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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
13 October 1957
Copy No.
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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CONTENTS
A.0 1. APPARENT DELAY IN ATTEMPT TO LAUNCH A
SOVIET EARTH SATELLITE OR ICtiM TEST VEHICLE
(page 3).
2. NEW EGYPTIAN MILITARY FORCES ARRIVE
IN SYRIA (page 4).
L9-11--- 3. EGYPTIAN ARMS OFFER TO GHANA REPORTED
(page 6).
4. MALIK SAYS LEBANON'S P 0-WESTERN
POSITION CRUMBLING (page 7)
5. TRIBAL REVOLT IN YEMEN
(page 8).
642.� 6. FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS
(page 9).
"A-0 7. PRE-ELECTI0 )II1LTENSION INCREASING IN
GUATEMALA (page 10).
'-kt--6 8. PHIBUN APPRAISES THAT SITUATION
(page 11).
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I. APPARENT DELAY IN ATTEMPT TO LAUNCH A
SOVIET EARTH SATELLITE OR ICBM TEST VEHICLE
Comment on:
a
delay in the anticipated attempt
to launch a second earth satel-
lite or a third ICBM test ve-
hicle.
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2. NEW EGYPTIAN MILITARY FORCES ARRIVE IN SYRIA
Comment on:
The arrival of a contingent of Egyp-
tian military forces at the Syrian
port of Latakia on 13 October has
meaning only as a political gesture
and probably does not materially
augment the capability of Syria's 50,000:=man army.
Even with the new contingent, organized Egyptian mili-
tary forces in Syria probably will not exceed a rein-
forced battalion in size, possibly 500-1,000 men.
Damascus radio stated on 13 October that Egypt had
begun in mid-Septe'mber to send "major elements" to
strengthen Syria's defenses. The Egyptian troops,
according to the announcement, were escorted by
Egyptian naval units and aircraft Of both countries.
Egyptian military cooperation
with Syria has become closer since the establishment
of the Arab Joint Command under Egyptian leadership
in late 1955. Egypt has periodically furnished small
numbers of military specialists to assist the Syrian
forces. In early 1957,
Egypt even furnished six pilots to fly newly
arrived MIG-17 jet fighters which the Syrialls were
then unable to operate.
e presence of an un-
bpeeiiieu 11U1111Jer oi JgypLIcLiL military personnel in
Syria.
Following the increase in tension
between Syria and Turkey in early September, the
Egyptians reportedly sent military specialists,
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including air force officers, to Syria by air. These
specialists, however, may have been destined for Syria
in connection with previously planned September maneu-
vers there.
a 500-man contingent of Egyptian
"volunteers" had been preparing to depart for Syria
in mid=September and another group of unspecified
size left about that time.
The American acting army attache
in Damascus reported on 9 October; following a recon-
naissance of northern Syria, that Syrian army maneu-
vers appeared to have ended and that most units had
returned to their home stations. No Syrian build-up
was noted in northern Syria, nor were there indica-
tions of a large-scale mobilization. Reports of re-
cent call-ups were believed to apply only to special-
ists.
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3. EGYPTIAN ARMS OFFER TO GHANA REPORTED
Comment on:
Egypt is reported to have offered arms
to Ghana in a further move to increase
its"influence in Africa below the Sahara.
Egyptian military authori-
ties maae tne otter to tormer Ghana Interior Minister Adjei
during his visit to Cairo in August. The offer reportedly in-
cluded light weapons and munitions produced in Egypt. Should
such an offer become widely known, it would serve notice to
the emerging African nations that Egypt stands ready and will-
ing to furnish arms.
Ghana has not evinced any desire to se-
cure additional material for or expand its largely British-
officered and wholly British equipped army of approximately
3,000 men. The country faces no external threat, and the
supplies of light arms now at hand are believed adequate
for the army's primary mission of supporting the 6,000-
man police force.
Egypt's mounting interest in tropical
Africa is further shown by the recent increase in the coun-
try's Swahili-language broadcasts to east Africa. These
broadcasts, which are heard daily for 40 minutes, have
been vitriolic in condemning colonialism and the white
man's dominant role in the economic and social pattern of
Africa.
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4. MALIK SAYS LEBANON'S PRO-WESTERN
POSITION CRUMBLING
Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik told
Ambassador Lodge on 11 October that
Lebanon's pro-Western policy is rapidly
being undermined. Malik expects par-
liament may order the Foreign Ministry
to declare that Syria constitutes no threat to Lebanon. He
fears present attitudes could ultimately lead to the abroga-
tion of agreements with the United States, including those
negotiated by the Richards mission.
Comment The weakening of the Lebanese pro=
Western attitude is the prime objec-
tive of Lebanese opposition forces which favor the "neu-
tralist" Arab policy of Egypt and Syria. This group plays
on Lebanese fears that the Chamoun government is forsak-
ing Lebanon's traditionally neutral position in the Arab
world, and that its close association with American Mid-
dle Eastern policy will upset the delicate political balance
among Lebanese, Moslem and Christian elements.
The Lebanese government has already
felt it necessary to issue a statement declaring that "Leba-
non will consider any aggression against Syria as aggres-
sion against herself." The Lebanese have thereby aligned
themselves with the pro-Syrian professions of other Arab
states.
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5� TRIBAL REVOLT IN YEMEN
Comment ,on:
Additional fragmentary information on
the tribal revolt in eastern Yemen,
strengthens the impres-
sion that the rebellion has been under-
f the ailing Imam's brother, Prince Has-
san, in an effort to depose the Imam and block succession by
the Imam's son, Crown Prince Badr.
The Saudi governor of Najran, key post
on the Yemeni border, informed King Saud that large quantities
of arms and money were being distributed to Prince Hassan's
supporters via the Western Aden Protectorate. King Saud was told
that informants in Yemen had reported that the conspiracy was
supported by the British and the AMericans.
Saud was also advised of the emergence
of a new political group, the "Liberation party, which is calling
for the creation of a people's government"--possible evidence
that an Egyptian-supported antimonarchical group may enter
the struggle which began between two royalist factions.
King Saud was advised that the Imam had
sent one force from the capital to enzaae the rebellious tribes.
the Imam's
attempts to raise armed forces from northern tribes may be
encountering difficulties. One district decided to assemble
only 1,000 armed men instead of the 4,000 initially ordered by
the Imam. many of the northern
tribes as well as those in the south and east are partial to
Prince Hassan. Troop movements throughout Yemen are con-
tinuing, but the development of the action and extent of the up-
rising are not yet clear.
one trib-
al leader who received instructions from the Imam to raise an
army for action against the rebellious tribes sent a message to
King Saud denouncing the Imam and asking King Saud to extend
his "protection" tO "Yemen. Saud responded in noncommittal
terms.
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6. FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS
The invitation to former premier and
Independent leader Antoine Pinay to
form a new French government was
obably intended primarily to kill
ime un ocia is ex-premier Guy Mollet feels the crisis
has ripened sufficiently to make a second try. President
Coty, concerned by the political implications of the con-
tinuing crisis and by the gravity of the financial situation,
reportedly favors Monet, who would probably muster a
majority on most key issues but whose economic and
welfare Views remain anathema to the Independents.
each day's delay in ending the
crisis increases the prospect for a "De Gaulle solution."
They consider that De Gaulle's return to power is a "seri-
ous possibility" if a new government is not invested during
the next two or three weeks, and that he could be recalled
sooner if the present situation suddenly deteriorates--for
example, through incidents arising from Communist dem-
onstrations set for 17 October to protest the Algerian war.
This Communist "day of action" is ex-
pected to be a very extensive
nationwide propaganda effort, the demonstra-
tions will not be violent. Nevertneiess, widespread violence
might easily result if Poujadist toughs also turn out and suc-
ceed in provoking incidents which crystallize the widespread
non-Communist sentiment against giving up Algeria.
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7. PRE-ELECTION TENSION INCREASING IN GUATEMALA
Comment on:
an antigovernment
demonstration is planned for 14 October
by the Communist-infiltrated Revolutionary party, which was
recently barred from the 20 October presidential elections.
the demonstration is in-
tended to help prepare sentiment for a revolution after the
expected victory of the moderate administration party presi-
dential candidate, Miguel Ortiz Passarelli.
The chief danger of leftist-inspired dis-
orders is that they might provide a pretext for a rightist
coup. Defense Minister Juan Francisco Oliva insists that
constitutional procedures will be observed and that he is in
full control of the army.
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8. PHIBUN APPRAISES THAI SITUATION
Former Thai premier Phibun
stated in-a conversation
that the pro-
. Visional government under Pote Sarasin
should be relatively stable in that its members will be uni-
fied by fears of possible countercoup attempts. Phibun ex-
pects opposition to the government from moderates and
royalists to be slight because the moderates are pleased
with the dismissal of Phao as police director general and
the royalists are satisfied with Pote as premier.
Phibun believes the leftists have been
disappointed by Marshal Sarit's actions to date because
they had e]q)eeted him to switch -Thai toviard neu-
tralism. Phibun expec ts Sarit to take harsh measures
against the left-wing press and leftist spokesmen if they
become too objectionable.
Phibun doubts that Sarit has any long-term
political ambitions and believes Thailand's new ruler will con-
centrate on elimin -level support of Phao in gov-
ernment circles.
Comment Phibun's ostensibly dispassionate, but
probably overoptimistic, appraisal of
the situation and the equanimity with which he seems to be
accepting his ouster suggest he hopes Sarit will in time in-
vite him to return tO Thailand, perhaps as premier.
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