CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/11/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03178398
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: November 9, 1957

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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9 November 1957
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DOCUMENT NO
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NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
. RENEWED MOB ACTION EXPECTED IN INDONESIA
(page 3).
2. LARGE-SCALE GOVERNMENT PARTY COERCION SEEN
POSSIBLE IN PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS (page 5).
t le- 3. MALAYAN COMMUNIST TERRORISTS OFFER TO SUR-
RENDER (page 6).
c
4. YEMENI CROWN PRINCE BADRiS VISIT TO LONDON
(page 7).
5. DIFFICULTIES IN IRANIAN-BRITISH RELATIONS
(page 8).
6. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN JORDAN
(page 9).
7. SPAIN REINFORCES IFNI
9 Nov 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
(page 10).
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1. RENEWED MOB ACTION EXPECTED IN INDONESIA
Comment on:
The second phase of Indonesia's drive
to "regain" Netherlands New Guinea
(West Irian) is scheduled to start 10
November, a national holiday commem-
orating the beginning of Indonesia's mil-
itary struggle for independence.
Inflammatory demonstrations and de-
structive mob action which may involve
Westerners are likely. The minister of
information announced some days ago
that this phase will be "executed more
fiercely." Although moderate forces in Indonesia have spoken
against excesses and have warned that care should be taken
to prevent mob action, the police and army are reported not
to be taking any extraordinary precautions. The campaign is
apparently building toward the General Assembly debate on
the subject, which will take place sometime after 18 Novem-
ber when the third phase of the drive will be activated.
The Communist party is trying to cap-
italize on the West Irian drive and is being aided in its efforts
by its influence in the government and by President Sukarnots
own emotional preoccupation with the issue. The party's sec-
retary general recently proposed either armed action against
New Guinea or seizure of Dutch interests in Indonesia if Indo-
nesia fails to get the area through UN action. He emphasized
expropriation as allowing not only the army but all elements of
Indonesian society to participate in the effort.
Sukarno has in general tried to link the
West Irian issue with the need for nationwide economic devel-
opment and national unity, apparently believing he can use the
9 Nov 57
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emotionalism generated by the West Irian drive to develop
loyalty to Djakarta. Although he has left the more inflam-
matory statements to his subordinates, he stated on 7 No-
vember that if UN results are unfavorable, Indonesia will
take action "which will startle the world."
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2. LARGE-SCALE GOVERNMENT PARTY COERCION SEEN
POSSIBLE IN PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS
Comment on:
The final days of the Philippine election
campaign have been marked by bitter
countercharges and sporadic outbursts
of terrorism. Although Nacionalista
candidate President Garcia is still widely believed to have
an edge over his opponents, an upset is possible if the elec-
tions on 12 November are free. Despite current indications
that the Commission on Elections and the constabulary are
making efforts to ensure clean elections, traditional patterns
of political coercion and fraud are expected to develop.
A source close to President Garcia has
told the American embassy in Manila that victory for Garcia,
and possibly also for his running mate Laurel, Jr., will be
virtually assured through last-minute bribery and intimida-
tion. The US embassy fears that blatant illegal efforts could
well provoke bloodshed of serious proportions.
9 Nov 57
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3. MALAYAN COMMUNIST TERRORISTS OFFER
TO SURRENDER
Comment on:
Malayan Prime Minister Abdul Rahman
reported on 8 November that the Commu-
nist terrorists have agreed in principle
to surrender and thus end the nearly ten
years of "emergency" in Malaya. Accord-
ing to press reports, Rahman received a letter on 12 October
from Communist Secretary General Chen Ping calling for a
preliminary meeting aimed at obtaining a "just and fair agree-
ment" and stating he expected that "agreement can be reached."
Although it has long been evident that the
Communists wish to abandon guerrilla warfare and concentrate
their resources on subversion, they have demanded recogni-
tion of their party and guarantees against detention or investi-
gation of terrorists who lay down their arms. Now, however,
since Malayan independence has further isolated the Commu-
nists from the masses by removing the party2s main propaganda
weapon, Chen Ping may feel that he must retreat from these de-
mands.
Despite the government% apparent optimism
that this will bring an end to the "emergency," there is still
likely to be a wide initial divergence between the positions of
the two sides. The Communists, however, probably believe
that settlement at this time, even if it involved considerable
sacrifice, might provide a considerable boost to their goals of
promoting neutralism in Malaya, achieving recognition of Red
China, and undermining the UK-Malaya Defense Treaty by ap-
pearing to remove any need for Commonwealth troops in the
Federation.
9 Nov 57
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4. YEMENI CROWN PRINCE BADRS VISIT TO LONDON
Comment on:
Britain's plan to give Yemeni Crown
Prince Badr the "red-carpet treatment"
during his 10-day visit to London begin-
ning on 9 November is presumably intended
to facilitate future relations with him in the event he is chosen
as the present Imam's successor. A Foreign Office official's
statement on 7 November that Britain's underlying purpose in
the talks is to detach Yemen from its pro-Soviet orientation
sugests'that London now feels the long-standing Anglo-Yemeni
animosity may actually be reduced, with consequent advan-
tages for British interests elsewhere in the Arabian peninsula.
London is also developing contacts with Prince Hassan, the
other principal contender to the throne.
The British appear somewhat more opti-
mistic than formerly that the talks will have beneficial results.
They are especially anxious to set up a procedure for investi-
gating incidents along the Yemen - Aden Protectorate frontier.
Hoping that implementation of the 1951 agreement providing for
border demarcation can now be agreed upon, London is pre-
pared to accept the present border despite recent Yemeni en-
croachments. London is also willing to carry out technical
assistance provisions of the 1951 agreement by sending a few
technicians to Yemen and training some Yemenis in Britain.
Britain's capacity for maneuver is limited, however, by com-
mitments to sheiks in the Aden Protectorate.
The Imam has actively promoted the visit
for the purpose of enhancing the prestige of the crown prince.
There is reason to believe, however, that the Imam might
maneuver his way out of any commitments undertaken by Badr.
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5. DIFFICULTIES IN IRANIAN-BRITISH RELATIONS
Comment on:
Britain has rebuffed the Shah in his
efforts to discuss cooperation in the
Persian Gulf, and will turn down
Iran's long-standing request for de-
stroyers. This will block the Shah's
plan to expand Iran's influence in the
Persian Gulf through cooperation
with Britain and increased naval pres-
tige.
Although an agreement was reached
in principle with the British in late September to discuss
Persian Gulf questions, the later British restrictions on
the talks would make them meaningless from the Iranian
point of view. The Shah reacted angrily to these limita-
tions. Britain said the discussions could not include sov-
ereignty over Bahrein, the establishment of an Iranian
consulate in Kuwait, or the designations "Persian Gulf"
versus "Arabian Gulf." Furthermore, Britain insists
that Iran acknowledge Kuwait sovereignty over Farsi Is-
land, occupied by Iran since 1956.
The London Foreign Office has in-
structed the British ambassador to Iran to explain to the
Shah that the costs of an initial destroyer would have to be
met from Iranian funds and that its crew would have to be
trained by the British navy. The American ambassador in
London has been informed that Britain hopes this will end
its discussions with Iran concerning the supplying or sell-
ing of a destroyer.
9 Nov 57
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6. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN JORDAN
Comment on:
The stepped-up Egyptian and Syrian
propaganda campaign against King
Hussayn appears, in the judgment of
the American embassy in Amman, to
mark the beginning of an all-out effort
to create chaos in Jordan. Cairo's
thinly veiled exhortations to Jordanians
to assassinate the King have already
made a deep impression in Amman, where the Egyptian at-
tacks are recognized as incitement to Jordan's half million
Palestinian refugees to act against the monarchy and the
government.
Among other charges, Cairo has ac-,
cused Hussayn of negotiating secretly with Israel to solve
the Palestine refugee problem in exchange for $30,000,000
in American aid. The similarity of the current Egyptian
campaign to that which preceded the assassination of Hus-
sayn's father, King Abdullah, in1951, is regarded as particu-
larly ominous in Amman.
Despite the inability of King Hussayn
and the Hashim-Ftifai government to attract support from
the majority of the population, Hussayn appears to be confi-
dent that he will be able to continue ruling as long as he has
a loyal army. The basis of Hussayn's control in the army is
the loyalty of the Bedouin elements, who occupy the most
sensitive posts although they comprise only 35 to 40 per-
cent of army strength. A revival of activity by antimonarch-
ical "free officers" in the Jordanian forces, however, could
eventually threaten Bedouin control.
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70 SPAIN REINFORCES IFNI
Comment on:
Spain is rushing reinforcements to
its enclave of Ifni on the Moroccan
coast, presumably in an attempt to
resist a challenge to its position in
West Africa by the irregular Moroc-
can Army of Liberation. On 5 and 6
November, 200 soldiers were flown
to Ifni from Madrid, and five Spanish
warships, one of which carried 800
men, left Ceuta for Ifni on the night
of 5 November. The Spanish govern-
ment is further reported to have req-
uisitioned a private vessel, which will
leave Spain about 10 November, to
ferry troops and equipment from the
Canary Islands to Ifni.
Although the situation in Ifni has been
quiet since last July.
the Spanish authorities were
upset over the reappearance of the
SPAIN
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Army of Liberation around Ifni and believed that Rabat's
deployment of royal army troops there indicated conniv-
ance between the two.
Reinforcement of the Spanish forces
may also be designed to strengthen Spain's position in nearby
Spanish Sahara. /
Spain has denied a Rabat announcement
that it had agreed to cede the northern portion of Spanish
Sahara to Morocco. /
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