CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/03/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 2018 Sanitization
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03162004
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: March 2, 1957

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2 March 1957
Copy No,
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANCE IN CLASS.
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NEXT REVIEW DATE:
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1EVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TO SECRET
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CONTENTS
. HATTA FORESEES CONTINUED STRIFE IN INDONESIA
(page 3).
2. INDONESIAN MOSLEMS ALERT NON-JAVANESE AREAS
FOR ACTION IN EARLY MARCH (page 4).
t )3. SOVIET MISSION TO REORGANIZE SYRIAN ARMY
(page 5).
1140 EGYPTIAN ASSISTANCE TO OMANI EXILES MAY PRESAGE
NEW DRIVE AGAINST BRITISH IN PERSIAN GULF
(page 6).
5. CESSATION OF KREMLIN'S ANTI-POLISH CAMPAIGN
(page 8) .
ti) 6. BRITAIN DISTURBED OVER INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGI page 9)0
7.
U NU REAPPOINTED
BURMESE P I
E MINISTER
,(page 10).
8.
RESIGNATION
OF FINNISH GOVE
ENT
(page 11).
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1. HATTA FORESEES CONTINUED STRIFE IN
1 I
ONESIA
Former vice president Hatta expects
turmoil in Indonesia to continue for
approximately two months, by which
time he believes President Sukarno
will become aware of the sizable oppo-
sition to rus plan for a "guided democracy" and of the ex-
tent to which the Communists are using his proposal for
their own purposes. When Sukarno becomes aware that
his plan is moving the country toward civil war, Hatta told
the American ambassador, a formula will have to be devised
to save face for him and "compel the Communists into ac-
quiescence." Hatta said, however, he had "absolutely no
idea" what such a formula could be.
Hatta believes that unless events take
this turn, civil war will come sooner or later. Meanwhile,
he plans to work with the Moslem parties, certain army
circles, the civil service, and various organizations at
the village level to encourage unity among all these ele-
ments and keep alive resistance to Communism. He will
also work "as effectively as political discretion permits" to
improve conditions in strongly anti-Communist Sumatra.
Comment Hatta resigned as vice president on
1 December largely as the result of in-
creasing disagreement with Sukarno over Communist ac-
tivity in Indonesia. Sumatra-born, he has widespread sup-
port in all non-Javanese areas, and, as the foremost revolu-
tionary leader next to Sukarno, is known and respected
throughout Indonesia. As such he is potentially the most
effective antagonist to Sukarno among Indonesian leaders.
Hatta has long been a primary target of
the Communists, whose present mass campaign to support
Sukarno's concept specifically demands that Hatta not be in-
cluded in the reorganized government.
2 Mar 57
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2. IN oNESIAN MOSLEMS ALERT NON-JAVANESE AREAS
FOR ACTION IN EARLY MARCH
Top Indonegian Moslem leaders have in-
formed Moslems in the Atjeh area of
North Sumatra and in Celebes, as well as
Colonels Hussein and Simbolon, the anti-
government army leaders in Central Sumatra, that Communist
participation in the government under Sukarno's new concept
will not be tolerated,
These groups were told that they should be "pre-
pared for action" between 1 and 10 March if Sukarno insists
on including Communists in the government.
Comment The Moslem leaders referred to in this re-
port may be connected with the Darul Islam,
a fanatical Moslem organization centered in Java which seeks to
establish a theocratic state by force throughout Indonesia and
maintains liaison with Moslem dissident groups in Atjeh and
Celebes. It would be natural for them to contact Colonels Hus-
sein and Simbolon who are anti-Communist and are already ac-
tively opposing the government.
2 Mar 57
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3. SOVIET MISSION TO REORGANIZE SYRIAN ARMY
Comment on:
The Syrian arms negotiator in Moscow
informed Damascus on 20 February
that "the committee of experts to
organize the army will leave soon for
Damascus,"
This group,
composed of "six high-ranking Soviet
officers expert in organizing and
training," was requested by Damascus
on 4 February.
The USSR has also agreed to furnish
160 military technicians to train
Syrians in the assembly, maintenance
and use of military equipment which the Soviet Union is pro-
viding under the arms agreement of November 1956. More
than half of these technicians are believed to have arrived
in Syria.
Syria appears to be attempting to
standardize its equipment on Soviet models, and the quanti-
ties of Soviet arms entering Syria do not appear to exceed
re-equipment needs. The varied types of old Western equip-
ment thus replaced, including medium tanks and artillery,
are being transferred to the Jordanian army and to the
Saudis. Syria is reported, meanwhile, to have reduced its
army strength from about 65,000 to about 57,000 and released
more than half of the reserve officers called up during the
emergency last fall.
On 25 February two and possibly three
Soviet-type jet fighters were observed at Hama airfield _
indicating that some of the crated
MIG-17's delivered from the USSR in December are now
assembled. The Syrians are not qualified to operate these
d have been forced to borrow six Egyptian pilots.
2 Mar 57
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4, EGYPTIAN ASSISTANCE TO OMANI EXILES MAY PRESAGE
NEW DRIVE AGAINST BRITISH IN PERSIAN GULF
All Sabri, Nasr's chief of cabinet, has
authorized Saleh ibn Isa, an Amir of
Oman to send groups of refugee Omani
tribesmen to Egypt from Saudi Arabia,
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The Omanis were to assemble in Cairo
under the care of an Egyptian intelligence officer.
the Amir maintain constant contact with
the Saudi government after the return of King Saud to Saudi
Arabia, and assured the Amir that the question of Oman was
being discussed at the conference of the Arab chiefs of state,
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Comment Egyptian assistance to the Omani tribes-
men may include arms and fedayeen-
type training.
Cairo radio charged recently that Britain's
ally, the Sultan of Muscat, had illegally annexed the terri-
tory of Oman. Since this charge is not new, its coincidence
with the above evidence of Egyptian interest suggests that
Cairo has decided to step up agitation and subversion against
the Sultan. The Sultan's forces, led and supported by the
British, in late 1955 asserted control over Buraimi Oasis
and the Imamate of Inner Oman--a region in southeast
Arabia whose ruler did not recognize the Sultan's authority
and had become a protege of Saudi Arabia.
Egyptian support of dissidents in Muscat
and Oman would not only increase unrest in the Persian
Gulf area, but encourage the Saudis to greater anti-British
efforts as well. By such maneuvers, Nasr probably hopes
to limit an inclination Saud may have to draw closer to
the West.
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5� CESSATION OF MLIN'S ANTI-POLISH C PAIGN
Comment on:
Reports that the Kremlin had assured
Warsaw "prior to 21 February" that the
anti-Polish press campaign in the Soviet
Union and the Satellites would cease im-
be supported by the lack of such polemics
since that date. There has been no rebuttal of the 9 February
articles of the principal government and party papers in Poland
which defended the Polish concept of "democratization" and
committed the Gomulka regime itself to the debate.
the Kremlin
also promised that Soviet propagandists will stop attacking
Polish leaders at closed meetings in the USSR. These assur-
ances followed a Polish protest against the anti-
Gomulka campaign in the Soviet, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian
and East German press.
The recently reported replacement of the
liberal editor of the principal party organ Trybuna Ludu by
Leon Kasman, who had edited the paper during the Stalinist
Bierut regime, suggests a reciprocal Polish promise to curb
the outspoken journalism in Poland that has been the basis of
much of the Kremlin's irritation.
2 Mar 57
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6. BRITAIN DISTURBED OVER INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
Comment on:
Recent statements from several high
British officials show concern over the
possible emergence of an independent
French-German nuclear weapons pro-
gram. The most recent indication of this concern is a
statement made on 27 February by a member of the Atomic
Energy Authority that the British government regrets that
the EURATOM treaty allows members to develop their own
nuclear weapons programs. Present moves for closer col-
laboration between Paris and Bonn in research, develop-
ment, and production of new weapons--particularly mis-
siles--might allow West Germany eventually to get around
treaty limitations on its own nuclear program, the official
said.
Apart from general concern about other
nations developing nuclear weapons capability, British mis-
givings seem to stem from two causes. There are widespread
doubts both inside and outside the government of the future po-
litical reliability of France and Germany. Secondly, any nu-
clear weapons production on the continent would end Britain's
own present unique position among Western European nations
and impede its campaign to extend its influence among them.
In an effort to deal with the-problem of
French-German collaboration, Britain in mid-February set
up with France a "steering group" on weapons production,
and has been urging a more active role in this regard for the
Western European Union's Standing Armaments Committee.
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7. U NU REAPPOINTED BURMESE P
Comment on:
I I
MINISTER
The Burmese Chamber of Deputies on
28 February unanimously reappointed
U Nu as Burmese prime minister. Nu
had turned over his office to Socialist
Ba Swe last June, citing a desire to devote his full atten-
tion to the reorganization and "purification" of the Anti-
Fascist People's Freedom League, the government coali-
tion. For the past three months, however, Nu has been
maneuvering intensively, against the opposition of the strong
Socialist Party faction of the League, to regain the prime
ministership.
While Nu's return probably foreshadows
no basic foreign policy changes, he is apt to be more easily
manipulated by Communist leaders such as Chou En-lai than
the more calculating Ba Swe. Recent reports have indicated
that in domestic policy, Nu may be amenable to a new effort
to reach a settlement with the insurgent Communists.
The outgoing prime minister will still be
a powerful figure. He is to become one of four de su prime
ministers, and retain the portfolio for defense.
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8. RESIGNATION OF FINNISH GOVERNMENT
Social Democratic prime minister Fager-
holm's coalition cabinet resigned on
1 March following the withdrawal of the
six Agrarian Party members. This cli-
maxes a prolonged dispute over means of combating Finland's
growing inflation. Socialist insistence on a proposal to re-
duce the prices of some farm products in order to keep or-
ganized labor's demands for wage hikes within bounds brought
on the Agrarian resignations.
It seems unlikely that any effective govern-
ment can be formed without Agrarian participation, although
many Socialists feel that labor has more in common with the
parties representing business interests than with the farmers.
The Communist-front Finnish People's Democratic League,
which controls about one fifth of the seats in parliament, is
unlikely to secure representation in any new government.
Social Democratic finance minister
Simonen, a strong party leader, is regarded as a possible
successor to Fagerholm, who had previously announced his
willingness to retire. Failing a new parliamentary coali-
tion, however, a "nonpolitical" cabinet of civil servants
might be formed to deal with the country's pressing economic
problems on an emergency basis.
2 Mar 57
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