CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/10/30

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03155155
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: October 30, 1957

;0472,1;or 2N.91,1,21j.2,0315F",
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
30 October 1957
copy IVO. 138
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANCE IN CLASS.
LA-CI
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NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1
AUTH: HR ;0,02 zon
DATE. 111,--- nEVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
-T-09P-SEC-RE /74
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1. ZHUKOV'S� STATUS
CONTENTS
(page 3).
2. GROMYKO MAY BE PREPARING RETREAT ON TURKISH-
SYRIAN ISSUE IN UN (page 5).
3. TITO WILLJiO ATTEND 40TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRA-
TIONS (page 7).
40SIIiOJAPANSE TRADE DISCUSSIONS SUSPENDED
Li (page 8).
5. THAI
MAN"
S CHIEF SARIT CALLED "DYING
(page 10).
o
6. INDONESIANS DEMONSTRATE
"
N" OF
NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA
(page 11).
o
7. NEW PAKISTANI GOVERNM
LIKELY
TO CHECK
ECONOMIC DECLINE (page 12).
8. GAILLARD CONCEDED LITTLE CHANCE FOR FRENCH
PREMIERSHIP age 13).
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I. ZHUKOIPS STATUS
Comment on:
rushchev's remarks to Western news-
en at a Turkish embassy reception on
9 October seem to indicate that central
ommittee discussion of the Zhukov case
s ended or nearing conclusion. Khru-
shchev said that no further word could be
expected during the evening, but an offi-
cial announcement, probably in the form
f a central committee resolution, is
likely soon. It now seems clear that
Zhukov has been deprived of any signif-
icant role in the highest party councils.
II
Soviet officials stationed abroad have ap-
parently received little or no information
on what has been transpiring in Moscow.
The American embassy in Moscow reports
what appears to be concerted and mounting stress in the Soviet
press on the theme of party supremacy within the armed forces.
There have also been references to "immodesty" and insufficient
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NIS yore
respect for party guidance which are evidently directed at
Zhukov. These articles probably anticipate the sense of
the definitive party statement.
While these appear to be the issues on
which Zhukov was called to account before the central com-
mittee, more complex questions of political friction probably
were also involved. Evidence does not yet indicate whether
�Zhukov will be dropped from the party presidium or what new
assignment will be given him. Khrushchev stated that he would
be given a job "commensurate with his experience and qualifi-
cations." One Soviet official is reported to have stated that
Zhukov does not desire a foreign post.
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2. GROMYKO MAY BE PREPARING RETREAT ON
TURKISH-SYRIAN ISSUE IN UN
Despite Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's
reiteration in the General Assembly on 29
October of Soviet support for Syria's reso-
lution calling for the creation of an investi-
gating commission to examine the situa-
tion on the Syrian-Turkish frontier, there
are indications that he realizes that Soviet
tactics in the United Nations have backfired.
Secretary General Hammarskjold stated he was con-
vince a the Soviet foreign minister realized that the "Rus-
sian play had not worked and that he was looking for the softest
way to land." Hammarskjold noted that Gromyko had completely
changed his line on the secretary general's role in the Turkish-
Syrian situation from last week, when he reportedly had de-
nounced Hammarskjold for interfering and said this would cre-
ate a "liability" in his future relations with the USSR. Hammar-
skjold reported that Gromyko had indicated that the situation
was calming down and that he was no longer opposed to the sec-
retary general's playing a mediatory role if both Syria and Turkey
agreed. Another sign of a possible Soviet shift on this issue was
Klirushchev's unexpected appearance at the Turkish National Day
celebrations in Moscow on 29 October and his statement that he
thought the Middle East situation was improving slightly.
These soundings by Gromyko may presage
the abandonment of the USSR's original tactics, which were to
force a vote on the Syrian resolution on the assumption that,
even though it was doomed to defeat, other Arab states would
be compelled to vote with Syria and the Soviet bloc against the
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Western powers. As recently as 25 October, the USSR was
putting heavy pressure on Syria to introduce its resolution
and Soviet bloc delegates were insisting that no alternative
should be proposed for the investigating commission.
In view of efforts by the Egyptian and
other, Arab-Asian delegates to dissuade Syria from pressing
for a vote and clear indications that a vote would divide the
Arab-Asian bloc, Moscow may have decided to go along with
a compromise which would endorse mediatory efforts by the
secretary general. MoscoVs awareness that its campaign
against the United States and Turkey was in trouble was re-
flected in the disappointment expressed by a Soviet official to
the Syrian ambassador in Moscow on 21 October that the Arab-
Asian states had failed to provide stronger support for "so
important a case as this!'
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TITO WILL NOT ATTEND 40TH
ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS
Comment on:
ito apparently has decided not to go
o Moscow for the 40th anniversary
elebration of the Soviet revolution on
November. This is indicated in the
ugoslav government's announcement
on 29 October that President Tito is suffering from a
"sudden attack of lumbago" which will "prevent his travel
abroad for the next few months." His absence will prevent
any Communist summit meeting even though Mao Tse-tung
and Gomulka have announced their intention to attend.
Tito's decision not to attend probably re-
flects his concern over the unsettled situation in Moscow
and his desire not to be associated with it until he has some
clearer idea of its outcome. Tito may have been influenced
in this decision by the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, with
whom Khrushchev reportedly spent more than half his time
in earnest conversation at an Iranian embassy reception on
26 October, immediately following the announcement of
Marshal Zhukov's removal from office.
Tito may also hope by this decision to
allay Western suspicions that Yugoslavia is steadily moving
toward the USSR.
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4. SINO-JAPANESE TRADE DISCUSSIONS SUSPENDED
Comment on:
The breakdown in Sino-Japanese trade
talks in Peiping is a result of political
differences over the size and nature of
the trade missions to be exchanged and
the question of the Japanese govern-
ment's sanction for a new trade agreement. The Japanese
delegation is returning to Tokyo for the five-day special
session of the Diet beginning 1 November, which the Social-
ists have forced in order to harass the Kishi government.
During this session, the SocialiSts, some conservatives,
and trade and business interests probably, will exert pres-
sure for concessions to Peiping's demands.
The negotiations which began in mid-
September between Chinese Communist officials and rep-
resentatives of private Japanese trade organizations have
failed to agree on any significant point. Three previous
Sino-Japanese trade agreements have been private in na-
ture, but Peiping, in an obvious attempt to pave the way for
official relations with Tokyo, has reportedly made a new
demand that the Japanese government enforce any new trade
agreement.
The Japanese have proposed an exchange
of permanent trade missions limited to ten members each,
only five of whom would be extended quasi-diplomatic privi-
leges such as exemption from fingerprinting and freedom of
travel. Peiping has insisted on a staff of 30 members in
Japan plus dependents, all of whom would enjoy such privi-
leges.
While some commercial circles are be-
coming less sanguine about the China trade potential, they
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are reluctant to lose the mainland market to Western nations--
as Peiping claims will happen unless its terms are met--or
to lose 1,000,000 tons of iron ore reportedly offered by Peiping
for 1958. Lack of Sino-Japanese trade accord, however, is
unlikely to affect the present volume of trade.
The first private Sino-Japanese trade agree-
ment was signed in 1952. Total trade between the countries
increased from $15,500,000 in 1952 to $151,000,000 in 1956.
iThe balance rem' rly ha's favored Communist China.
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5, THAI ARMED FORCES CHIEF SARIT CALLED
"DYING MAN"
Comment on:
Marshal Sarit,
the power betuna Tnalind's provisional
government, is a "dying man."
Sarit's physical incapacity has affected his mental powers to
such an extent that Sarit is now unable to make decisions.
Sarit is known to be suffering from some
chronic ailment, most commonly reported to be cirrhosis of
the liver. While his poor health may have caused his leader-
ship since the coup d'etat to be somewhat sporadic, his peri-
odic interviews with the press, the latest of which was on 19
October, do not suggest that his mental powers or his author-
ity have been affected.
Sarit's death, or incapacitation to the point
where he would be forced to withdraw from active participa-
tion in official affairs, would set off a bitter power struggle.
The chief contenders would be Defense Minister Thanom and
Interior Minister Prapat, both army generals under Sarit
who already have been reported to be at odds with one another.
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6. INDONESIANS DEMONSTRATE FOR "RETURN" OF
NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA
Comment on:
The anti-Dutch demonstrations in
Djakarta, touched off by a mass rally
on 28 October to demand the "return"
of Netherlands New Guinea, were or-
ganized by the Indonesian government
for the purpose of stimulating popular support prior to the
UN debate on New Guinea as well as to divert attention from
the serious problem of national disunity. The rally, was ad-
dressed by government officials, including Foreign Minister
�Subandrio and President Sukarno, and was followed by a pro-
cession of youth groups, police units, and all branches of
�the armed forces.
All speakers except Sukarno delivered
highly inflammatory speeches on the New Guinea issue, de-
manding resort to military conquest if necessary and call-
ing on the crowd to make "the supreme sacrifice!' Presi-
dent Sukarno did not mention New Guinea but stressed in-
stead the need for "national unity." His object apparently
was to direct the aroused emotions against those elements
opposed to his concept of "guided democracy" as well as
against the Dutch.
Despite official assurances that the situa-
tion-will not get out of hand, there is a continuing danger that
the public may take the government's campaign literally and
that anti-Dutch and anti-Western disturbances on Java will
result. The Communists, who back the current government
program, probably were responsible for the burning in effigy
of a Netherlander in front of the Netherlands ambassador's
residence and for the defacement of Dutch property in the city.
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7. NEW PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT UNLIKELY TO
CHECK ECONOMIC DECLINE
The new government in Pakistan shows
little sign that it will take the action which Will be needed to
check deterioration in Pakistan's economic situation. While
the former government under Suhrawardy gave some indica-
tion of successfully attacking the country's economic problems,
the new leadership of Prime Minister Chundrigar seems likely
to allow matters to drift to the point where they will probably
be beyond control.
The present coalition represents the big
landowners of West Pakistan who are not likely to take de-
cisive action on such essential programs as land reform and
rural development, since they feel that this would undermine
their control of political and economic power.
The result probably will be to accentuate
Pakistan's most pressing economic problems--lagging food
production, which has caused the government to rely increas-
ingly on American surplus food stocks, growing inflation, a
serious foreign exchange squeeze, and slowdowns in industrial
production. Pakistan's financial de endence oiUiieilnited States
can then be expected to increase.
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8. GAILLARD CONCEDED LITTLE CHANCE FOR
FRENCH PREMIERSHIP
Comment on:
Radical Socialist Felix Gaillard, finance
minister in the BourgesMaunoury cab-
inet who is now attempting to form a gov-
ernment, is given little chance of resolving
the 29-day-Old government crisis. Right-wing hostility to
Gaillard's austerity program was instrumental in Bourges-
Maunoury's overthrow, and even if Gaillard now succeeds in
placating the conservatives on his economic program, he may
face Socialist opposition. Socialist leader Mollet has hinted
that his party may now oppose any government participated in
or even supported by the right-wing Independents.
)Chances for a candidate from the Popular
Republicans are increasing, but they would probably be reluc-
tant to take on the job if the Socialists stay aloof. Other cen-
ter candidates such as Radical Socialist Rene Billeres and
Resistance Union leader Rene Pleven have been mentioned, and
the deputies may accept a dark horse as a temporary solution.
Meanwhile, there is renewed speculation of
an "outside solution," such as a call to General de Gaulle, who
had reportedly been in contact with Coty earlier in the crisis.
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