NID: CZECHOSLOVAKIA: TEETERING BETWEEN OLD AND NEW

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe: A 30-Year Legacy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06826748
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2019
• Publication Date: July 25, 1989

Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826748
'Thr�letwet.
Special Analysis
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Teetering Between Old and Nov
Pressures far change are building slowly. although dissident actirity
could become more focused and widespread as a resu t of change in the
USSR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
Dissidents. former Dubcck-cra politicians. and religious leaders
seem inure willing titan ever to cooperate for political and religious
freedoms. Emboldened by the political liberalization elsewhere in
the Bloc, they are increasingly vocal in calling for such reforms as
freedom of speech and political pluralism. Several times in the past
year. thousands of demonstrators have marched in Prague to press
their demands. actions that are unprecedented since the 1968 Soviet
invasion. Although open defiance of the regime's policies is spreading
to a broader spectrum of intellectuals as well as some younger lrtv
members, the public for the most part remains apathetic
The regime is still dominated by hardliners who, seeing the erosion of
Communist authority in Poland and Hungary. oppose liberalization
because they fear it will lead to social instabithy and their losing
power. Jan Fojtik. Prague's chief ideologue. has underscored regime
concerns by publicly warning of counterrevolution in Hungary.
Pragmatists in the lower ranks, spurred by Soviet calls to reform.
seem more willing to advocate change. but their strength appears
limited.
Polish Solidarity activists arc
increasing their contacts with Czechoslovak dissidents and arc ready
to give them advice and material support. This connection might
spark a broader challenge, and the leadership's instinct will be to
crack down. Pragmatists in the party seem to be increasingly
uncomfortable with su ijciesJiower. and the result may
be more vacillation.
In the absence of strong pressure front the populace or front within
the party. President Gorbachev's reforms in the USSR arc the major
catalyst for change in Czechoslovakia. and against that Soviet
backdrop the party rank and file in Czechoslovakia increasingly see
their leaders as out of step. The growing gulf between Czechoslovak
practice and the Soviet model means that the hardliners' position is -
likely to erode as opportunists and fence-sitters in the party shift with
the winds from Moscow. Preparations for the next party congress in
May 1990 are likely to sharpen debate and trigger new tressure front
cl
within and outsi e the party on the Jakcs leadership.
14
TM.---irSti)
'rC8 2871189
25 July 1989
Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826748
Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826748
Polish Solidarity Increases its Support to Opponents of
Czechoslovak Regime
Representatives of Solidarity's parliamentary faction met openly
over the weekend in Czechoslovakia with Vaclay Havel: Cardinal
Tomasek, head of the Czechoslovak Catholic Church: former party
leader Alexander Dubcck: and other independent activists. The Poles
and the Czechoslovaks issued a joint communique calling for release
of Czechoslovak political prisoners and citing the Polish roundtable
negotiations as an example for Czechoslovakia.
In addition. Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity, a group founded in 1978
to exchange information and coordinate dissident activities in the
two countries, has smuggled four 60-watt radio transmitters into
Czechoslovakia. Radio
Solidarity provided the equipment, and its experts plan to begin
clandestine Czech language broadcasts next month, possibly keyed
to the anniversary of the Soviet occupation.
The Solidarity visit and technical support probably will spur
Czechoslovak dissidents to form a united opposition. The Prague
regime surely recognizes the risks of inaction but probably was
reluctant to intervene because the Poles represent a legal party that
Moscow has shown it is willing to deal with. Failure to react will
probably increase the perception that the regime is not in control
and may encourage more people to actively defy its policies.
To ret
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25 July 1989
Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826748