NID: THE GERMANYS: REUNIFICATION - WHAT WOULD HAVE TO HAPPEN

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe: A 30-Year Legacy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06826777
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2019
• Publication Date: October 27, 1989

Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826777
Special Analysis
TILE GERNIANIS; Reunification�What Would Have To Happen
Chancellor Kohl and other West German leaders hare asserted that
German reunification is "on the international agenda" but are well
awtire that it would require fundamental changes in both East and West
Germany. The most difficult obstacles are East Germany's adherence
to Communism and Moscow's firm rejection of reunification as a
practical, near-term issue. A Soviet shift, in particular, might precipitate
rapid change in other areas.
Born has used reunification rhetoric in part to undercut the far-right
Republican Party but the debate is also stimulated by the East
Gelman crisis. Soviet encouragement of reform and diversity in
Eastern Europe. and an ebbing East-West conflict. Although many
West Germans still see reunification as a thing that depends heavily
on external events. these trends arc making the phrase less an empty
incintation.
East German Liberalization
Win.t Germany's Basic Law calls for freedom and unity for all
Germans through self-determination. and reunification would be
impossible without democratization in East Germany. West German
leaders probably believe the chances for this have not improved
app..eciably with the appointment of the orthodox Egon Krenz to
head the East German party. Nevertheless, they probably think East
Berlin will have to begin liberalizing to revive the slowing economy.
cope with dissidents, and hedge against a massive protest that could.
in the worst case, force Moscow to choose between intervention and
a collapse of the East German regime.
Soviet Acquiescence
Bona is keenly aware that Soviet memories of Nazi Germany
and geostrategic interests make the USSR a major obstacle to
reunification. Some Soviet officials have indicated that reunification
might come about eventually but most have listed such preconditions
as i placement of NATO and the Warsaw Pact by a new European
security order, limits on German forces. and the denuclearization
of Elrope. West German officials probably wonder nonetheless if
President Gorbachev's encouragement of reform in East Berlin might
eventually stimulate changes that would make it harder for East
Germany to sustain its identity
COMintled
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Foreign Minister Genscher. meanwhile. ma). be optimistic that his
urgings to other Allies to "help Gorbachev." his favorable references
to Gorbachev's concept of a "common European home." and his
opposition to "raising tensions" through new weapons programs will
calm Soviet fears. Some officials in Bonn probably believe Soviet
objections to German unity, like so many orher assumptions about
Moscow, might eventually change or become unenforceable.
Western Acceptance
West German leaders note that reunification could not occur without
the consent of their Allies and EC partners, but green lights in East
Berlin and Moscow would heighten their expectations for cooperation
from the West. While conceding that legally the victorious powers in
World War 11 hold a veto over changes in Germany's status, the West
Germans probably would press for acquiesc,:nce if they thought their
goal was in sight, citing the Western Allies' longstanding treaty
commitment to work for reunification. Bonn probably would
calculate that its partners would try to enhance Germany's ties to the
West by lending support rather than risk a titter quarrel.
Despite the reservations of some West Gerirans, the broad consensus
in favor of a unified Germany is certain to prevail domestically.
Some West Germans probably have qualms about a unified Germany
because it would be more Protestant and, probably. more Social
Democratic. There would also be the imposing task of integrating
East Germany's relatively backward economy and 17 million citizens
who look to the state for their needs. But the additional skilled labor
and enlarged domestic market would have the potential to increase
German economic power. probably to more than 30 percent of the
EC's GDP.
Implications for the US and the West
If reunification became a serious possibility. Bonn would push to
retain its role in the EC'. but�if perceptions of the Soviet threat
continued to diminish�might accept a Sovi.zt precondition to
attenuate, or even drop, its NATO tics. In tte near term. most West
German leaders will want the US to support reunification in general
terms, but they probably would see an activist US posture as
counterproductive. Bonn will also encourage more Western economic
and political help to Eastern Europe. but it will want to remain the
primary Western link to East Germany.
�11:115-SersieL.
TCS 2950/89
27 October 1939
Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826777