NID: GERMANYS: EARLY ELECTION FORCING PACE OF UNITY DEBATE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe: A 30-Year Legacy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06826861
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2019
• Publication Date: January 30, 1990

Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826861
I I�I
LI 3 C.
GERMANYS: Early Election Forcing Pace of Unity Debate
The advancement of the East German election is already forcing the
pace of decisionmaking in Bonn and East Berlin as the unity question
increasingly dominates both Germanys' agendas.
East German Communist leader Gysi canceled today's scheduled trip
to Washington. citing the nccd to prepare his collapsing party for
the March election. Gysi has called unification "unstoppable" but
cautioned against hasty movemcnt.I
he will fly to Moscow soon. following Premier Modrow
o caves today to meet with President Gorbachev and Premier
Ryzhkov. Meanwhile�barely a day after a non-Communist caretaker
government was announced�some 100,000 demonstrators in
Leipzig called for German unity and an end to Communist rule.
Also citing the new East German election date, West German
Chancellor Kohl has canceled a t �
March.
Bonn IS stowing efforts toward a "treaty community" het wren the
Germanys
Comment: The continuing rounific
Isuggest a widespread German belief that the
unification is being telescoped.
Inew German initiatives,
such as a proposal for a demilitarized Eas Germany. may be
announced soon.
Modrow and Gysi may try to use their Soviet visits to show their
influence with Moscow: they probably will coordinate policy on
managing the unification process, including responses to popular
demands for reducing the Soviet troop presence in East Germany.
Modrow may urge Moscow not to cut oil. shipments or Soviet orders
for East German goods during the election campaign even though
Moscow will be hard pressed to avoid temporary cutbacks. Gysi
probably hopes Gorbachev's popularity in East Germany will help
slow the Communists' eroding electoral prospects.
2
-TeirrberrigL
TCS 2724/90
30 January 1990
6.2(d)
6.2(d)
3.3(b)(1)
6.2(d)
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
6.2(d)
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
6.2(d;
6.2(d
Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826861
� Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826861
I,
'U]
U
-Tra-Seczet
The East German Election and Soviet Troop Withdranals
A freely elected East German government is likely to call for Soviet troop reductions,
although Bonn and East Berlin would prefer that any withdrawals occur at a measured pace
and be accompanied by some US withdrawals from %Vest Germany. The presence of about
380,000 Soviet troops and their extensive training needs have been a constant burden on
East Germans. A sharp reduction in Soviet troops would give a strong impetus toward
German unification, which most political parties in East Germany endorse in some form.
East German officials are signaling they have no desire to be the sole East European country
retaining large Soviet forces.
West German officials will try to facilitate Soviet reductions and may even be forced by
domestic political pressures to echo East German calls for a partial withdrawal of Allied
forces from West Germany. In a matter of weeks, Foreign Minister Genscher is likely to flesh
out his ideas of how Germany fits into collective European security arrangements in order to
provide the basis for agreed steps toward unity.
In talks with Moscow, Bonn will reject any formula that legitimizes a continued Soviet
presence in East Germany. Bonn would be angered by any indication the US and the Soviets
were trying to strike a bilateral deal that indefinitely perpetuated the presence of foreign
forces in either German state and will try to block moves in this direction. Kohl government
officials nonetheless are sensitive to Soviet security concerns and probably would lobby the
US for early reductions in US forces below the 275,000 ceiling in NATO's current CFE
proposal. Bonn might also try to reassure the Soviets by suggesting that NATO forces not be
deployed in what is now East Germany once unification occurs. Kohl's chief foreign policy
adviser stated publicly that East Germany could be "demilitarized."
The NATO Allies would be in a weak position to block a request by Bonn to remove
stationed forces from West Germany. London and Paris, in particular, probably would
caution against US troop reductions and would link the withdrawal of their own forces
in Germany to a formal peace treaty. Stronger resistance, however, probably would be
interpreted in Bonn as a threat to its sovereignty and to the spirit of the NATO Alliance.
-TO-SOW&
TCS 2724/90
30 January 1990
Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826861