NID: USSR: GORBACHEV FACES TOUGH TEST IN LITHUANIA

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe: A 30-Year Legacy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06826843
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2019
• Publication Date: January 4, 1990

Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826843
Special Analysis
USSR: Gorbachev Faces Tough Test in Lithuania
Gentral Secretary Gorbachev will lead a group of senior party officials
to Lithuania�reportedly in the next few days�to try to persuade the
Lithuanian Communists to reconsider their split with the national party.
In agreeing to lead the delegation, Gorbachev temporarily staved off
calls by hardliners at last week's Central Committee meeting in Moscow
for a forceful response to the Lithuanian party's declaration. Even
Gorbachev and other reform-minded national party leaders, such as
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, however, are worried that the
Lithkanian party's decision would, if allowed to stand, trigger a chain
react:on in other republics, endangering the stability of the union.
The maverick party has set the achievement of Lithuanian
independence as its ultimate goal. And Communist parties in
neighboring Latvia and Estonia are already preparing to discuss
their own future relationship with the national party. The Latvian
Supreme Soviet, moreover, took a first step last week toward
estabishing a multiparty system in the republic by abolishin the
Communist Party's constitutionally guaranteed supremacy
Gorbachev will try once again to persuade Lithuanian party leaders
that their current course makes it increasingly difficult for him to
keep aardliners at bay. He will argue that, unless they soften their
stand on independence, any prospect of substantial autonomy for
their .-epublie is doomed.
The Lithuanian party will not be easily moved. Its members are
convinced that they \yin be overwhelmed in Lithuania's legislative
election next month if they do not end their subordination to Moscow
and c nbrace a nationalist agenda. Support for an independent state.
fuelec by events in Eastern Europe. is widespread among ethnic
Lithuanians�roughly 80 percent of the republic's population. Last
week, the maverick party officially registered as a political party
with the Lithuanian government.
Compromise
The last Gorbachev can probably expect from his Lithuanian trip is
a compromise that allows each side to save face and eases tensions
temporarily. He might promise to use the Central Committee meeting
scheduled for later this month to advance the next Soviet party
conga ss from October to this spring and to structure the congress to
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cominued
"Tilo-Seese.L.
TCS 2701/90
4 January 1990
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6.2(d)
6.2(d)
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discuss a significant expansion in the autonomy of republic parties. In
return, the Lithuanians might pledge to reconsider their position after
the February election, possibly through a referendum among the
republic's 220,000 Communists to gauge support for the split from
the national party.
No Compromise, No Clash
It is more likely that the two sides will fail to reach an agreement. In
that case. Gorbachev will probably still be able to fend 3ff calls for a
harsh response while holding out the prospect of Lithuania's return to
the fold after the Soviet party congress. 1 he central leadership might
intensify threats of economic sanctions against the Lithuanians but
would be unlikely to follow through because such measures would
carry a high potential for escalating tensions.
No Compromise, Subsequent Clash
Fear of instability arising out of the Lithuanian party's secession
and pressure from his right flank might force Gorbachev to choose
a tougher response. In that case, Moscow probably would expel
Lithuanian mavericks from the national party and order them to turn
over all party assets, including buildings, mass news media, and
printing facilities, to those Lithuanian party members who rcziain
loyal to the center. If the independent part:/ members refused,
Moscow would be prepared to arrest them and deal with public
reaction. It probably would not take more drastic actions, such as
imposing martial law, unless there were a major outbreak of violence.
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TCS 2703/90
4 January 1990
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