CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1956/10/04

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03015181
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RIPPUB
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U
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12
Document Creation Date: 
October 25, 2019
Document Release Date: 
October 31, 2019
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Publication Date: 
October 4, 1956
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Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 CO3015181, 1 C1.1- ' CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 0 4 October 1956 Copy No, fc% DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0 DECLASSED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVON DATE: AUTH: H 70- ATE REVIEWER. OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OM% ' (10:14 Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 CO3015181 r .20 Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 I �tsar CONTENTS 1. KE1RUSHCHEV REPORTED CONSIDERING 7.E-ESTABLISH- ING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST LINKS (page 3). 2. BRITAIN FAVORS STATIONING IRAQI TROOPS IN JORDAN (page 4). 3. NEWS OFFER OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO IRAN (page 5). 4, THREAT OF VIOLENCE INCREASES IN HONDURAS (page 6). 5. INDONESIAN ARMY OFFICERS ALLEGEDLY PLAN COUP (page 7). 4 Oct 56 THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (Top Secret Eider) (page 8) * * * * THE TAIWAN STRAIT (page 10) Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2 rop-sEeRET Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181- Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 Nixie 1. KHRUSHCHEV REPORTED CONSIDERING RE- ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST LINKS Comment on: Soviet leaders had under study proposals to "re-establish links" be- tween Moscow and foreign Communist parties to exchange views and informa- tion. They discussed the possibility of having representatives of Communist parties meet at regu- lar intervals and forming a telegraphic news agency to transmit information to Communist parties. Khrushchev agreed that something of the sort was necessary. Moscow believes it neces- sary to establish some new form of international control prevent serious deviations in Communist parties0 speculation that this is the subject of current talks has probably inspired press reports that Khrushchev has al- ready proposed such a plan to Tito. Tito would fear the inevitable domination of an arrangement of this sort by Moscow and would prefer to exert Yugoslavia's influence through bilateral relations. Any loose organization along Cominform lines would be inadequate to deal with Moscow's problem of maintaining, and where necessary re-establishing, discipline over Satellite Communist parties. An overt organization reminiscent of the old Comintern or Cominform would damage Communist efforts to establish unity of action with West European Socialists. 4 Oct 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3 sE.GRE_T__ Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 2, BRITAIN FAVORS STATIONING IRAQI TROOPS IN JORDAN The British Foreign Office is convinced it would be desirable from the stand- point of Western interests to have Iraq station troops in Jordan, as requested by Jordan's King Hussain. In particular, London believes such a move would greatly enhance Iraq's prestige at the expense of Nasres in the entire region. According to the American embassy in London, the Foreign Office appears confident that it could allay any of IsraePs fears which might result from Iraq's movement into Jordan. Comment Britain is probably assisting Iraq to strengthen its influence in Jordan in order to be in a position to profit from an eventual parti- tion of Jordan and to strengthen Iraq as a counterweight to Egypt. In addition to recent diplomatic moves aimed at promoting the proposed Iraqi troop movement, the British are evidently active in Jordan itself on Iraq's behalf. Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion has said Israel would not attack Jordan as a result of move- ment of Iraqi troops into Jordan as long as the troops re- main east of the Jordan River. 4 Oct 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4 SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 NW, 3. USSR RENEWS OFFER OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO IRAN The Shah informed Ambassador Chapin on 30 September that N. M. Pegov, the new Soviet ambassador to Iran, told him that the USSR is ready to give Iran eco- nomic assistance of any kind and in almost any amount Iran wishes to name. Specifically, Pegov proposed joint con- struction of a million-kilowatt hydroelectric project on the Araks River on Iran's northwest border with the USSR. The USSR offered to submit plans shortly for Iranian concurrence. Comment When the Shah visited the Soviet Union in July, he was assured by Soviet leaders that the USSR was prepared to give Iran unconditional large- scale assistance for its economic development, but no spe- cific offers were made. The Shah indicated interest at the time in common development of water resources along the border. The present offer comes at a time when Iran faces serious economic problems and is uncertain of the extent of aid from the West, and will be difficult for Tehran to reject. In its negotiations with Afghanistan, Burma and Indonesia, the USSR quickly followed up acceptance of ini- tial general offers of economic assistance with specific pro- posals on terms and projects. 4 Oct 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5 Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 4. THREAT OF VIOLENCE INCREASES IN HONDURAS The political struggle in Honduras is approaching a crisis, and the election 3f a constituent assembly scheduled for 7 October seems likely to provoke disorders and, possibly, an attempted revolt. The election will be rigged against the Nationalist and Liberal Parties on behalf of a government-supported National Union slate dominated by the small Reformist Party. The Nationalists, angered at illegal government actions against them, announced on 1 October that they would boycott the election. The Liberals, whose hatred for the government surpasses their traditional en- mity for the Nationalists, have considered co-operation on common political action with the Nationalists. Together, the two parties polled 79 percent of the votes in the rela- tively free 1954 national elections. There are indications that Nationalist Party chief Carias may now be preparing for armed action against the government. The ailing Julio Lozano, whose strenu- ous efforts to create a stable coalition government have led merely to an increase in tension, temporarily turned the government over to popular ex-president Galvez last month. Lozano's return as chief of state, which may occur before the election, would probably spark serious disorders. Most top army leaders are loyal to Galvez and Lozano and could probably suppress a revolt at this time. 4 Oct 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6 SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 Approved for Release: 201 gifoTH-60a6-15181 government, They expected to implement their plans sometime after 2 Oc- tober and anticipated no resistance from within the army ex- cept in East Java. As of mid-September, three high-ranking Indonesian army officers--one of them former deputy chief of staff Colonel Lubis-- were still planning action to take over the Comment Reports of an impending army coup have appeared regularly since mid-summer, and it is quite likely that Colonel Lubis is eager to take some form of action against the government. In such an action, he would be supported by a number of young officers, chiefly at the brigade command level, in West Java. Army dissatisfaction derives from a feel- ing that the army is not receiving adequate material support from the government, a belief that the government has inter- fered unnecessarily in strictly military affairs, and disillu- sionment over corruption in the government. Army leaders may also be disturbed by President Sukarno's strong show of friendship toward Communist countries during his current tour of the Sino-Soviet Orbit, 4 Oct 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7 Approved for for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 TrID Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (Information as of 1700, 3 October) Israel plans to restrict its future partici- pation in the proceedings of the Israeli-Jordanian Mixed Armi- stice Commission, according to an unconfirmed report from the israeli sector of Jerusalem. It plans not to request meet- ings to discuss armistice violations by Jordan, and will not attend meetings called by Jordan to consider alleged armistice violations by Israel. Israel, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesman, "sees no useful purpose in continued routine ex- aminations of border incidents...in view of steady attempts by the UN Truce Supervision Organization to equalize Jordanian acts of aggression with justified Israeli measures in self- defense." The spokesman denied that the new policy amounted to a complete boycott of the commission, and stated that Israel would continue to register complaints against Jordan if border violations were reported. (Press) the movement of Iraqi troops into Jordan is immi- nent, Other reports however, suggest that if any Iraqi troops are sent into Jordan the force will probably not exceed a battalion0 many people questioned whether Jordan was a viable state, and that even the British doubted whether it could survive. The Israeli government, recognizes that retaliation is not a solution to the border problem, 4 Oct 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8 IMP E e RE-T Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 but considers it an effective deterrent and believes that con- ditioris w�iild h nuch worse along the border without retalia- tion. Rapid Egyptian response to Jordan's appeal for military aid following the Israeli raid suited in delivery of 21 tons of arms by air and 60 tons on the following day, the arrival of five Egyptian transport aircraft, described in the press as IL-14's, on the 28th, and an additional eight aircraft were expected later, three planeloads of Egyptian arms were delivered to Amman, and a shipload of un- disclosed size was dispatched to Jordan via the Syrian port of Latakia. In addition, Syria is attempting to expedite delivery of $1,300,000 worth of arms to Jordan from Czechoslovakia. 4 Oct 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9 TOP-StEr-e-REz Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181� --of � 10, AoNi T", Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 BIWEEKLY SUMMARY (20 September-3 October 1956) THE TAIWAN STRAIT Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Grotty) for the Taiwan Strait Problem 1. The only noteworthy combat activity during the period occurred when four Chinese Nationalist F-84's on a reconnais- sance mission along the South China coast on 1 October were engaged by four. Chinese Communist jet fighters near Swatow. In the ensuing engagement two Communist aircraft were damaged, according to Chinese Nationalist claims, and one F-84 received minor damage. The incident appears to have been a chance en- counter between the Nationalist aircraft and a Communist jet fighter patrol on a routine mission. 2. The eighth congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which concluded on 27 September, and statements made on National Day (1 October) reiterated Peiping's intention to "lib- erate" Taiwan by either peaceful or other means, but this theme received little stress. 3. In a statement on 21 September on the Johnson-Wang talks at Geneva, the Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry indi- cated that it regards further discussion of the question of renun- ciation of force as fruitless and proposed that the talks move on to the question of trade controls. The tone of the statement was moderate and gave no in off the talks at this time. 4 Oct 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10 SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03015181 SECRET TAIWAN STRAIT SITUATION CHINESE COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND DESIGNATIONS SECONDARY AIRFIELD PRIMARY AIRFIELD AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN OR FIELDS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE. AREA WITH PREPARED RUNWAY RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER 5000 FEET. ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIR- CRAFT. SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES MAY BE USABLE BY JETS INACTIVE BASES CAPABLE OF USE BY AIRCRAFT CURRENT STATUS UNDETERMINED � OPERATIONAL A � SERVICEABLE UNKNOWN HO N.( A ? ; H U E H �T-IDHANKOW (IA Ai Tr" -$ HUAINING0 (. .... - � -� V / s_ ,..- / - --.. )--- ''' 1 -- -,- _r ..,,,z i 1.,.-- c---� - ,...., -- ) ,,-- -, c < r'-' - i_ HIU N6-'" .., - -...,/ .... ,_./ � CHUHSIEN 0.1,----"- 4HINHUA - 1111 :4 NANCHAN � TACHEN ,--k O. "i LZ1 LUCHIAO � SHANGJAO / 7 '�Yingtan � / ( .: ,,, r \ wENcHow 0 , �Juian 7 �,, - ">�,- NANKING" t WU H-U114" 120 USABILITY v10-17 I-4 ., 28 TU-2, IL-10 LA-9/11 LI 2 I ETC. _ FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CA^ PABLE UT SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPER- A [IONS AT PRESENT. KIANt.-7�W Ff "CHIA-)ING7i; r � 28 fiCHANGSHA r HXNGYANG '44k 26 L11" 24 KWAN lil*CANTON � � 6I4,000 TROOPS \ TROOPS 122 32- SHANGHAI A HANGCHOW611171 30 CLIflUSHAN IS N I N'Gra n. � , / i - \ t.- , �4 - I i ./ 0 CHIENOU / \. vNanping ' 53,000 .NIngte 7 ) 1 z .sL- / FoOctiop -6,,, M :A2 0TS(V0S0 f ./0464) ',�Yungan NANTAI IP t CHANGTING* LIENhCHENG a LUNGTIEN i / \ .. . WUCHIU ..,) 4F k 5--. ) MAO-ft-HANG � --- H U IAN F-'- � , / ---- x ALIIP-.������ . v , ---_,_ ,�� -,.. - LUNGCHI.s., -74,14A