CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1956/12/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 2018 Sanitization
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03161781
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2019
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2019
• Publication Date: December 29, 1956

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29 December 1956
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DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I ; P'.:CLAC.CTED
GLASD. CHANCED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
42rC
AUUKiflEi 4PREVIEWER
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
/Mr" / T
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CONTENTS
JORDAN FEDAYEEN
WARNS OF COUNTERACTION AGAINST
(page 3).
2. PLANS FOR FURTHER EGYPTIAN SABOTAGE IN PERSIAN
GULF OIL AREA INDICATED (page 4).
3. SITUATION IN INDONESIA
(page 5).
4. YUGOSLAV DEFENSE POLICIES FOR 1957
5. ZHUKOV'S
TION IN POLAND
(page 6).
THREAT OF MILITARY INTERVEN-
(page 7).
6. POLES TO ELIMINATE DUPLICATIONJN PARTY AND GOV-
ERNMENT FUNCTIONS
7. CHINES
VIE VS
(page 8).
T PARTY LEADERS DISCUSS TITO'S
(page 9).
AL CRISIS MAY BE IMMINENT IN BURMA
(page 11).
ANNEX -- Conclusions of the Watch Re
gence Advisory Committee
29 Dec 56
ntelli-
(page 12),
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
TOP SECRET
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JORDAN FEDAYEEN
gains
WARNS OF COUNTERACTION AGAINST
there is a good possibility
Israel will in the near future take action a-
rab tedayeen terrorist centers in Jordan.
French premier Mollet also had been informed of this pos-
sibility by the Israeli ambassador.
Comment
Israel has recently placed increased em-
phasis on continuing Arab fedayeen activity,
which intercepted messages have revealed is being directed
from Cairo. Such emphasis by Israeli spokesmen has often
in the past been the prelude to a retaliatory raid--the last such
raid against Jordan was on 10 October, prior to the attack on
Egypt However, the Israelis may at this time be using the
threat of retaliation to spur Western diplomatic moves in their
behalf. Should such moves not be forthcoming and fedayeen ac-
tivity continue, the Israelis probably will launch at least a raid
into Jordanian territory.
29 Dec 56
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producing sheikdom
2. PLANS FOR FURTHER EGYPTIAN SABOTAGE IN
PERSIAN GULF OIL AREA INDICATED
Comment on:
Egypt is
planning further clandestine operations
against the British-protected oil-
s in the Persian Gulf.
, Cairo was informed
that one of its agents had contacted the emir of Qatar and
would dispatch explosives to him for sabotage of oil installa-
tions. Oil operations in Qatar are conducted by the Qatar
Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum
Company, which is owned by British, French, Dutch and
American interests. Qatar's present reduced output of about
100,000 barrels a day is carried by pipeline to a tanker-load-
ing terminal, from which it is shipped to the nearby refinery
at Bahrein.
Although the emir of Qatar enjoys special
treaty relations with Britain, he has been somewhat less
friendly to Britain than the other rulers of Persian Gulf pro-
tectorates.
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3. SITUATION IN INDONESIA
Tension remains high in North Sumatra,
where Col. Simbolon, leader of the local
revolt against the central government, has
escaped into the interior. Army elements
in North Sumatra appear to be evenly divided
between those supporting Simbolon and those backing Lt. Col.
Ginting, the government's territorial commander who took over
in a countercoup on 27 December. The Djakarta government
has sent fighter and bomber aircraft to Medan, the North Suma-
tran capital, to bolster Ginting's efforts to stay in control.
Spokesmen for the Central Sumatran gov-
ernment, still under army control, repeatedly pointed out in
a special broadcast of 27 December that it had no connection
with events in North Sumatra. In South Sumatra the governor,
with army support, has cut off revenues normally going to
Djakarta, but has made no effort to join forces with disaffected
elements in the other two Sumatran provinces.
Meanwhile, the government's success in
splitting rebel elements in North Sumatra has increased the
present prospect for survival of the All cabinet. President
Sukarno, furthermore, is strongly supporting Ali, and the
Nandlatul mama, Indonesia's second largest Moslem party,
has decided to stand with the National Party in an effort to
keep the government in office. Should the Masjumi, the larg-
est Moslem party, resign with its small-party allies, the gov-
ernment would still have a parliamentary majority and could
perhaps remain in office.
29 Dec 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin
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4. YUGOSLAV DEFENSE POLICIES FOR 1957
The Yugoslav defense policies as out-
lined in the speech of Defense Secretary
Gosnjak and the defense budget approved
by the Yugoslav parliament on 27 Decem-
ber indicate that the Tito regime does not
expect hostile Soviet bloc action as a re-
sult of the Hungarian crisis and the ideo-
logical rift between Belgrade and Moscow.
Defense expenditures--$529,000,000 at
the official exchange rate--are to remain about the same
as last year, and are now just short of 10 percent of the
national income. A slight reduction in military personnel
is under way, resulting in part from the pensioning of old
officers as well as a cutback in length of service for certain
draftees.
Gosnjak stated that the Yugoslays were
no longer counting on Western military aid and are still
very intent upon building their own jet aircraft. The im-
plied termination of future US military aid may be intended
to forestall Soviet criticism if Belgrade decides to accept
the remaining jet aircraft already scheduled under the ex-
isting US military aid program.
In the opinion of Ambassador Riddleberger,
the equivocal attitude exhibited recently by Yugoslav officials
toward continued military aid deliveries may arise from Bel-
grade's feeling that in return for a possible Soviet accommoda-
tion to Yugoslav views on the Hungarian problem, it must be
prepared to make a gesture toward the USSR, which undoubt-
edly has been pressing for a loosening of military ties with
the West.
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5. ZHUKOV'S THREAT OF MILITARY
INTERVENTION IN POLAND
Marshal Zhukov,,Varned Polish party
first secretary Gomulka in Moscow
that if Poland left the
Warsaw pact, or threatened to do do,
soviet troops would move in regardless of the consequences,
during the Polish-Soviet negotiations, there was much
talk about Hungary. "had reason to believe" the
Poles had suggested "some kind of transition" whereby
Polish troops would try to guarantee order in Hungary but
that Moscow did not respond.
Comment Hungary's repudiation of the Warsaw pact
two weeks earlier would have been fresh
in Zhukov's mind and probably prompted the stern warning to
the Poles. It cannot fail to have impressed Gomulka as evi-
dence that the Kremlin sees in the pact a means to justify the
stationing of troops in the Satellites to assure adherence to
the bloc, by force if necessary,
The Poles appear unwilling to consider the
Warsaw pact as justification for the stationing of Soviet troops
in Poland under the auspices of the Warsaw pact, Although
Soviet leaders have said their troops are in Poland by virtue
of both the pact and the Potsdam agreement, Warsaw contended
in the official government organ on 19 December that the troops
are there in consequence only "of the occupation of Germany
and the Potsdam agreement, not the Warsaw pact." The Polish-
Soviet troop accord of 17 December did not mention the pact.
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6. POLES TO ELIMINATE DUPLICATION IN PARTY AND
ri /IX TV trATWNWT�Tril T Mir TWIMQ
overlapping
of government and party functions will
be removed in Poland by cutting the party apparatus.
the party is being reshaped as quickly as possible,
at least 100,000 persons will be
cut from the party bureaucracy.
Comment The Poles will probably abolish the cen-
tral committee departments that are
concerned with policy making in the functions handled by
the ministries of the government. In addition they may
severely cut back the control apparatus in regional and lo-
cal party organizations. Such changes would result in a
party-government relationship similar to that in Yugoslavia.
In addition to streamlining the party,
which has about 1,2002000 members, Gomulka is eliminat-
ing dissident elements and strengthening his position by
replacing them with people who are in sympathy with his
ideas. The shake-up in the party has apparently resulted
in at least a temporary weakening of discipline on the inter-
mediate and lower levels.
29 Dec 56
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7� CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS DISCUSS
TITO'S VIEWS
The Chinese Communist Party's official
newspaper has issued a summary of a
"discussion" by party leaders on the
questions raised by Tito in his speech
at Pula on 11 November. Generally fol-
lowing Pravda's 23 November reply to Tito, this first com-
ment by Peiping supports the Kremlin on the main points in
the dispute, but observes that "some part" of the Yugoslav
"criticism of brother parties is reasonable."
The summary reaffirms the Chinese Com-
munist view that the "road to socialism"--for Peiping or any
other Communist regime--necessitates essential fidelity to
the Soviet model in constructing a new society, and a close
alliance with the Soviet party and state. It thus rejects key
features of Yugoslav domestic and foreign policies.
The statement supports previous indica-
tions that Peiping, regarding its own relationship with the
Soviet Union as ideal, favors this type of relationship in East-
ern Europe wherever practicable. The Chinese reiterate
that the Soviet Union has been guilty of "great-nation chauvin-
ism" in the past, that there are "many helpful lessons" to
be learned from recent "setbacks" in the international Com-
munist movement, and that certain mistakes have not yet
been corrected.
Peiping's statement, like Soviet and other
Chinese comment in recent weeks, emphasizes the need for
bloc unity, under Soviet guidance, above other considerations
at this time. The Chinese apparently see their own role as
one of helping to keep quarrels in the family, while exercis-
ing a moderating influence on all parties.
This latest Chinese pronouncement should
make clear to the Yugoslays that there is no Titoist tendency
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in the Chinese Communist leadership, and to the Poles that
the Chinese--while supporting Polish freedom within the
bloc--do not approve all features of Gomulkais program.
At the same time, the statement advises Moscow once more
that the Chinese regard the Kremlin as fallible, and that
Peiping s not fully content vith Soviet policies in Eastern
Europe.
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8, POLITICAL CRISIS MAY BE IMMINENT IN BURMA
Prime Minister Ba Swe
joined other Socialist
leaders in opposition to the return of
U Nu to the prime ministership. His
Socia ist colleagues consider Ba Swe's performance as
prime minister acceptable and are said to fear the return
to power of Nu.
There have been numerous recent re-
ports that Nu planned to reassume the prime ministership
early in 1957 and that Ba Swe, who allegedly finds the of-
fice somewhat burdensome, was disposed to defer to him.
Ba Swe's apparent decision to throw his weight behind the
strong anti-Nu faction led by Deputy Prime Minister U Kyaw
Nyein virtually precludes the possibility of Nu's return to
office under present political alignments in the ruling party,
the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL).
Nu himself is reported to have conceded
loss of control of the league's executive committee, which
meets on 29 December, when he learned of Ba Swe's deci-
sion to oppose him. He is said to be prepared, however;
if rebuffed in his bid for the prime ministership, to bring
down the government when parliament convenes in late
February or early March. In such an effort Nu would prob-
ably muster considerable voting strength from representa-
tives of the Communist-dominated Nationa United Front
racial minorities, and the AFPFL itself.
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Niter
ANNEX
Watch Report 334, 28 December 1956
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the
Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:
A. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostili-
ties against the continental US or its possessions in the
immediate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostili-
ties against US forces albroad, US allies or areas periph-
eral to the Orbit in the immediate future.
C. A deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Middle East
is improbable in the immediate future.
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