CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1956/11/13
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03178384
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U
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
October 25, 2019
Document Release Date:
October 31, 2019
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Publication Date:
November 13, 1956
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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c) 13 November 1956 �1
Copy No. 11Z
4 9
/
r/
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
El DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE VIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
W/07113, TPeT'3/1/7,317,7za,
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4111%
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Ur
CONTENTS
-
CONTENTS
1. THE SITUATION IN HUNGARY
(page 3).
2. SOVIET MOVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
(page 4).
3. NASR MAY BE LOSING PRESTIGE WITH EGYPTIAN
MILITARY (page 5).
ki/
4. NEHRU'S REACTION TO EVENTS IN HUNGARY
(page 6).-
5. SOUTH KOREAN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF OPPOSES
UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION
(page 7).
6. ITALIAN DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST HEAD SAYS SOCIALIST
REUNIFICATION HINGES ON ITALIAN SOCIALIST CONGRESS
IN JANUARY (page 8).
13 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
TOP SECRET
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Noe
1. THE SITUATION IN HUNGARY
The inability of the Kadar regime to
demonstrate authority or influence
has become increasingly apparent in
Hungary. Scattered rebel groups con-
tinue to resist Soviet forces and Hun-
garian security police. The popula-
tion in Budapest had not yet returned
to work on 10 November. Food is
scarce, and the Soviet forces continue
to keep Budapest isolated in an appar-
ent attempt to end all resistance by
starvation.
The US legation reports that the pres-
ent mood of the crowds in Budapest is sullen, and that they
may eventually turn against the US representatives.
Khrushchev told the Swedish ambassador
on 7 November that the Soviet government had originally a-
greed to support Nagy and had decided to use troops in Hun-
gary only when it became apparent that Nagy had lost control
and was in the hands of a "fascist" counterrevolutionary group.
Khrushchev denied that the entire Hungarian people was a-
gainst the USSR and insisted that it would not have used troops
if this were so. He stated that in addition "fascist bands" were
murdering "our people" and it was quite impossible for the
Soviet army to withdraw in the face of hostile fire.
Khrushchev asserted that if the present
government of Hungary asked for the withdrawal of Soviet
troops and the acceptance of neutrality, the Soviet government
would favorably consider both requests. He added emphati-
cally that Soviet policy was still based on the decisions of the
20th party congress and the principles of the 30 October reso-
lution concerning relations with Socialist states.
13 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
SEeRET
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.11
'*11110#1
2, SOVIET MOVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
Pravda on 12 November reiterated the
government's earlier declaration that
if Great Britain, France and Israel did
not withdraw their troops in accordance
with UN decisions, "the appropriate
authorities of the USSR will not hinder
the departure of citizen volunteers who
wish to take part in the struggle of the
Egyptian people for their independence!'
The Swedish ambassador in Moscow has
told Ambassador Bohlen that Ithrushc:hev's
attitude toward Israel at the 7 November
reception in Moscow was one of "anger and contempt!' Khru-
shchev said the USSR could have handled Israeli action with
no trouble; without using airplanes but merely rockets, and
not even atomic rockets. Ambassador Bohlen believes that
any Soviet assistance during the cease-fire will be given to
Syria and possibly Jordan and Iraq, with Israel as the prin-
cipal target. He believes such assistance might include arms
and volunteers.
Secretary General Hammarskj old re-
marked to Ambassador Lodge on 11 November that he is sure
Egypt's reservations concerning the composition of the police
force were the direct result of Soviet influence since, in his
conversations during the past week, the Egyptians had never
hinted at it. Khrushchev told the Finnish ambassador on'?
November that the Soviet government had certain indications
that its notes to Britain and France had contributed to bring-
ing about a cease-fire.
13 Nov 56
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�41,�
3. NASR MAY BE LOSING PRESTIGE WITH
EGYPTIAN MILITARY
ne of the major problems Nasr may
ace in the immediate future is a de-
line of his prestige with the armed
orces,
The regime is making an all-out propaganda ef-
fort to claim credit for Egypt's "heroic" military resistance,
but this effort is unlikely to counteract entirely the effects
of resentment in the Sinai army and among canal zone refu-
gees who are saying that Nasr let them down. Moreover,
the Egyptian military services are reported blaming each
other for the debacle in Sinai. The air force, which is the
most discredited, is believed the most anry at the regime,
because of the order given it not to fight.
Comment Internal prestige problems, as well as
his improved international position,
probably account for Nases increasing concern that UN
troops not appear to be violating Egypt's "sovereignty."
13 Nov 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 5
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Lufrulut,IN/IAL
No,
4 NEHRU'S REACTION TO EVENTS IN HUNGARY
Indian prime minister Nehru's refusal
to co-operate in UN action on Soviet
intervention in Hungary and to support
UN supervision of elections in Hungary
probably stems from his earlier refusal
to allow the same thing in Kashmir. He
is also probably reluctant to admit that
his picture of a liberalized Soviet Union
as a force for peace in the world has
been proven erroneous.
Nehru's negative approach to the Hun-
garian problem has probably also been influenced in part
by his satisfaction at Soviet premier Bulganin's prompt and
lengthy explanation to him of events in Hungary. While Nehru
has described both Hungary and Egypt as "small countries...
made to suffer because of the rivalries of great powers," he
sees British-French action in Egypt as "naked aggression"
while the fighting in Hungary appears to him to have been
merely "civil conflict."
India's official policy on Hungary has been
criticized by all of the country's leading newspapers. Re-
spected Socialist leader J. P. Narain described it on 12 No-
vember as the result of "a double standard...unworthy of
this country!' Even India's Vice President Radhakrishnan
told the American charg�n New Delhi on 11 November that
he was much disturbed by Krishna Menon's vote in the UN
against the resolution calling for withdrawal of troops and
free elections in Hungary.
13 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
Trecr-HDENT-IAL
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ilar-Zretet-
Noe
5. SOUTH KOREAN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF OPPOSES
UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION
Army
Chief of Staff Yi Hyong-kun reportedly
stated that South Korea was unable to
take the initiative against North Korea because of the lack
of air and logistic support. Yi expressed the opinion, how-
ever, that unification could be achieved if North Korea took
the initiative since UN support would then be assured.
Yi reported a considerable logistics
build-up by the North Koreans in areas adjacent to the
Demilitarized Zone, but indicated he believed this activity
derived from fear of an invasion from the South.
President Rhee reportedly said that he
had been holding back on unification since he did not want
to jeopardize the position of the free world, but that South
Korea now had waited long enough. He instructed the min-
isters and generals present to mobilize all resources to
reinforce South Korean combat readiness and to draw up all
national policies in accordance with the unification goal.
Comment
Yi's statement, if true, represents a
ehancrta in his attitude as expressed pub--
licly where he supported
Rhee's demand for a "march North." These earlier state-
ments were probably designed to ingratiate himself with
Rhee at a time when he had no command responsibilities.
Rhee's immediate plans probably are to
seek to foment unrest in North Korea. In pursuing this ob-
jective, he may try to stage incidents along the Demilitar-
ized Zone, capture North Korean troops and infiltrate agi-
tators into the North.
13 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 7
TOP-SEeRET
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11AL4
6.. ITALIAN DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST HEAD SAYS
SOCIALIST REUNIFICATION HINGES ON ITALIAN
SOCIALIST 'CONGRESS IN JANUARY
iuseppe Saragat told Ambassador Luce
n 9 November that he is less optimistic
ver Socialist reunification than he was
everal weeks ago. Saragat feels that
Nenni's speech in parliament on 6 November was as ambigu-
ous as ever and that Nenni still cherishes Communist ideol-
ogy and is opposed to NATO. After expressing his confidence
in US forces Saragat said Italian president Gronchi is badly
frightened by Soviet moves and had spoken urgently to him
about the need for strengthening NATO..
According to Saragat, most leaders of
Nenni's party still favor co-operation with the Italian Com-
munists, and the whole matter of reunification now depends
on the national congress of the Italian Socialist Party,
scheduled for 30 January. With regard to his own party,
Saragat admitted he was having a hard time with the left
wing and was often obliged to take a more pro-unification
stand than he desired.
Comment In his speech to the Italian parliament on
6 November, Nenni attacked Soviet inter-
vention in Hungary, but agreed that "reactionary elements
and white terror had infiltrated the uprising of workers,
students and intellectuals:' He also stressed that his party
should be vigilant against any "reactionary attempt" to ex-
ploit the disagreement with the Communist Party over
Hungary. While insisting on a withdrawal of Soviet troops
from Eastern Europe, he called for a withdrawal of Amer-
ican and other NATO troops stationed in foreign countries.
His own press Avantil pointed out on 30 October, as it has
in the past, that Nenni's position is the same as that of many
local Communist leaders.
13 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
CONFIDENTIAL
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