CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1956/10/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03178382
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2019
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2019
• Publication Date: October 28, 1956

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
28 October 1956
Copy No, 1I 2,
Doo'VENT No.
No Ci4At\tGE IN CLASS.
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: S ..0
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
1. THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION
2. ISRAEL APPROACHING COMPLETE MOBILIZATION
(page 5)
(page 3).
3. AMBASSADOR BOHLEN DESCRIBES BEHAVIOR OF SOVIET
LEADERS (page 8).
4. GOMULKA REPORTEDLY PLANS TO REQUEST SOVIET
BEFORE TURNING TO WEST (page :10).
1AID
5. ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER COMMENTS ON POLISH
HUNGARIAN DEVELOPMENTS (page 11).
6. FRENCH TROOP MOVEMENTS IN NORTH AFRICA
(page 12).
72 SINGAPORE RIOTS (page 14).
8. FURTHER REVISIONS IN WEST GERMAN DEFENSE TARGETS
PLANNED (page 15).
9. PATHET LAO OBJECTIVES CLARIFIED
(page 16).
10. CYPRUS PARTITION PLAN
28 Oct 56
(page 17).
THE ARAB- IS RAE LI SITUATION
(page -18)
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1. THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION (information as of 2330)
The complete failure of Soviet troops
and Hungarian forces still loyal to the
government to prevent the spread of
the Hungarian rebellion has apparently
--forced the central regime of Imre Nagy
to revise drastically its over-all pol-
icies and to abandon attempts to force
the insurgents to surrender. Instead
Nagy, calling for a cease-fire on the
basis of the status quo, has ordered
both Soviet and Hungarian forces not
to fire unless fired upon by the rebels,
and has been increasingly concessionary
toward insurgent demands. The Nagy regime has also as-
sured the insurgents that it is already negotiating with the
USSR for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the coun-
try. By so doing, Nagy has, in effect, shifted the basis for
whatever authority he now possesses from reliance on Soviet
support to hoped-for insurgent support.
The Soviet attitude toward this shift re-
mains completely unclear. The USSR may now have only two
choices: full-scale war against a Hungarian rebellion which
would be supported by virtually all Hungarians, including Nagy,
or withdrawal within the near future of all Soviet military
forces in the country. The first alternative would necessitate
massive reinforcement of the Soviet troops which are now in
Hungary.
three Soviet armies totaling 27 divisions are converging
on Hungary from Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and the Ukraine.
There is no confirmation of this or Soviet
and Czech forces moving toward the Czech-Hungarian border.
Major elements of at least four Soviet divisions are now within
the borders of Hungary. In addition to the two mechanized
divisions normally stationed in Hungary, major elements of the
28 Oct 56
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Soviet division at Timisoara, Rumania, arrived in the
lltirlanPqt vicinity hr mid day nn 9 (11-.1 nh or
The rebel forces, acting independently
with no central leadership, appear to be in control of most
of Hungary outside of Budapest. The independent provi-
sional committee of Miskolc on the evening of the 28th called
for a unification of the activities of the numerous provisional
committees which have been established throughout Hungary.
Attacking the Nagy government appointed 27 October as one
"relying on a foreign power," the Miskolc committee is de-
manding the immediate formation of a new provisional
coalition government under Nagy which would exclude all
ministers who served under Rakosi. This government
would be pledged to establish "a truly democratic free and
socialist Hungary," and to hold general elections within two
months in which several parties would participate. The
Miskolc committee stated the provisional government's first
act must be the immediate removal of Soviet troops from
Hungary.
A few hours earlier Premier Nagy, in
a desperate effort to meet rebel demands, announced that
Soviet forces were now observing a cease-fire in Budapest
and that after a Hungarian militia was formed to maintain
public order, the Soviet units would move out of the Budapest
area. Nagy also acceded to basic economic demands of the
workers' councils, but he made no reference to freedom of
religion or elections. In a subsequent Budapest radio broad-
cast, results of a cabinet meeting were announced in which
the government body called for a revision of collectivization
policies, a revision in the status of small craftsmen, changes
in the system of produce collection, and basic changes in
educational processes.
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2. ISRAEL APPROACHING COMPLETE MOBILIZATION
Israeli mobilization on an unprecedented
scale, which reached an estimated
strength of 1702000 on 28 October, and
is now approaching 100 percent, indi-
ates preparation for possible major
rnilitary action against the adjoining
Arab states in the near future. The ma-
or concentration of Israeli forces re-
mains south and southeast of Tel Aviv
and south of Beersheba. Heavy move-
ments of troops and materiel toward
the Jordan border and Jerusalem have
been reported, and reinforcements have
been dispatched to other fronts. Civilian
vehicular traffic has declined sharply,
the Israeli military headquarters in Tel
Aviv has moved to a field location, and
civilian hospitals have been alerted. The
Israeli air force is not reported to have mobilized reserves
in noticeable numbers, but is on alert status.
On the evening of 28 October, the Israeli
cabinet announced "partial mobilization. . . . as a precaution-
ary measure to safeguard the security of Israel's border:'
Causes for the mobilization cited by the cabinet were; renewed
incursions by Egyptian-directed terrorists from Egypt, Lebanon
and Jordan; establishment of a military alliance directed against
Israel by Egypt, Jordan, and Syria; declaration by the govern-
ment of Jordan that its principal concern is a war of destruc-
tion against Israel; and mobilization of Iraqi forces on the Jor-
danian border.
Deep Israeli concern over possible devel-
opments in Jordan and Syria, which might result in the inter-
vention of Iraqi forces and change the status quo on Israel's
most vulnerable flank, has been stressed in press and official
comment from Tel Aviv. Israeli suspicions have probably
been strongly aroused by recent large-scale Iraqi troop move-
ments toward the Jordanian border. During the last week
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Iraqi forces near the Jordanian border have approximately
tripled, and now include about 6,000 troops at the border
and 3,000 one day's march away.
Iraqi interest in supporting a rightist
coup in Syria is probably also known in Tel Aviv, where it
is viewed with strong suspicion. Israel's strong attitude on
this point may have caused postponement of an Iraqi-backed
antileftist collo in Syria. revortedlv originally scheduled for
28 October. I on 28 October
that the coup had been postponed for at least 24 hours.
Israel has as yet taken no action against
Egypt in reprisal for the mining of two military vehicles on
21 October which killed three and wounded 27. Israeli ac-
tion against Egypt, accordingly, may occur at any time. The
35,000 Egyptian forces remaining on the Israeli frontier dur-
ing the Suez crisis are reported to have been placed on alert.
Most of Egypt's forces were concentrated in the Nile delta area
following Nasr's nationalization of the Suez Canal.
* * * * * * *
The IAC Watch Committee met at 1200.� .
holts 28 .0�Aober tOeohoider available information bearing
on the.Israeli mobilizatim The summarizing pa,ragr4,h of
the committee'J report is as follows:
"The scale of the Israeli mobilization
and its damaging effects on the economy, together with
Egyptian preoccupation in the Suez, Soviet preoccupation in
Europe, French material support to Israel and the compli-
cated inter-Arab rivalries in and over Jordan, particularly
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the growth in Egyptian influence in Jordan, all provide a
favorable opportunity for a major attack. Past Egyptian
provocations, the key role of Egypt in the Arab threat and
UK involvement with Jordan indicate the attack will be
launched against Egypt in the very near future, under the
pretext of retaliation and exceeding past raids in strength.
The scale of the mobilization indicates that Israel is pre-
pared to meet or exploit such situations as mar arise dur-
ing such an attack:'
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3. AMBASSADOR BOHLEN DESCRIBES BEHAVIOR
OF SOVIET LEADERS
Ambassador Bohlen reports that Khru-
shchev, Bulganin, Molotov and Kaganovich
were the only full members of the party
presidium present in Moscow at a recep-
ion or a vi Belgian delegation on 25 October. Five of
the six alternate members--Zhukov, Shepilov, Furtseva,
Shvernik and Brezhnev- also attended.
The Soviet leaders were quiet and sub-
dued and kept more to themselves than usual. Bulganin, in
particular, looked tired and depressed, and Khrushchev was
not his usual exuberant self. Kaganovich and especially
Molotov seemed considerably more at ease. Later, at a
ballet performance, Molotov occupied a prominent position
in the front row along with Khrushchev and Bulganin.
The ambassador comments that, while
it is dangerous to draw conclusions from the public be-
havior of these men, all foreign observers noted the dif-
ference in bearing between Khrushchev and Bulganin, on
the one hand, and Kaganovich and Molotov on the other.
Comment Khrushchev and Bulganin, who initiated
the rapprochement with Tito in 1955,
would be more subject to psychological tension from recent
events in Eastern Europe than Molotov, who opposed that
policy, or Kaganovich, who has not been closely associated
with Soviet policy toward the Satellites. Mikoyan and Suslov,
who have been closely associated with developments in
Hungary, were not present at the reception. There is no
confirmation of press reports that they were in Budapest
on the morning of 25 October.
The threat to Soviet control of Eastern
Europe has probably weakened Khrushchev's position and
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5. ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER COMMENTS ON POLISH-
HUNGARIAN DEVELOPMENTS
Italian foreign minister Martino told
Ambassador Luce on 26 October that
Soviet use of troops in Hungary and the
threat of such use in Poland could give
Ita Ian ocia is eader Pietro Nenni a solid reason for
breaking with his Communist allies. He said that Nenni's
failure to avail himself of the opportunity would give Social-
ist reunification in Italy a "stunning setback" and discredit
it in the eyes of many Socialists.
Martino also expressed the opinion that
"Nehru can no longer believe," as he had insisted to Martino
in India, that the Kremlin could be trusted to abide by the
"five principles," and therefore would never intervene by
force in the internal affairs of the Satellites or of friendly
states.
Comment There has been an increasing divergence
in Nenni Socialist and Italian Communist
views on the developments in Poland and Hungary. On 22
October, Nenni stated publicly that it would be erroneous to
believe the movement for democratization in Poland could
be blocked or hampered. His party press declared on 26
October that responsibility for the Hungarian uprisings
rested in part with the Communist "people's democracies:'
According to a semi-official French news
agency, the youth groups of the Nenni Socialist and Demo-
cratic Socialist Parties, which are considering reunification,
jointly declared their enthusiasm for Polish developments.
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may bring another shift in power in the party presidium,
despite Khrushchev's apparent successes in Soviet internal
policy, particularly agriculture. The attitude of Mikoyan,
and possibly Suslov, could be decisive in determining
Khrushcheves future.
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4. GOMULKA REPORTEDLY PLANS TO REQUEST SOVIET
AID BEFORE TURNING TO WEST
Wladys law Gomulka reportedly will ask
the USSR for a large-scale, long-term
loan before turning to the West,
USSR refuses, Gomuiica win make the
same request to the West through the
International Bank or some similar
agency. He will not accept any loan
with strings attached, but will guarantee
that the loan will not be used for military purposes.
Gomulka reportedly is fully aware that
although the Polish people are supporting him, it will be
several months before he can bring about enough increased
production to improve living standards and that he cannot
wait this long. He firmly intends to reduce military ex-
penditures to what he considers more reasonable amounts.
The American embassy in Warsaw on
23 October reported that Western press representatives
stated that the government was pressing the USSR for a
one billion ruble ($25020009000) loan, and that it was leak-
ing word that Poland wanted $300,000,000 from any source
with no strings attached.
Comment Poland is already over $600,000,000 in
debt to the USSR. In September the
regime asked for, and received, a moratorium on repay-
ment of these debts and a new loan of $25,000,000 was
granted. Any loan capable of halting Poland's deteriorat-
ing economic position and significantly improving the
standard of living would have fo be several times the size
of the September loan.
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5. ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER COMMENTS ON POLISH-
HUNGARIAN DEVELOPMENTS
Italian foreign minister Martino told
Ambassador Luce on 26 October that
Soviet use of troops in Hungary and the
threat of such use in Poland could give
Iansciastieader Pietro Nenni a solid reason for
breaking with his Communist allies. He said that Nenni's
failure to avail himself of the opportunity would give Social-
ist reunification in Italy a "stunning setback" and discredit
it in the eyes of many Socialists.
Martino also expressed the opinion that
"Nehru can no longer believe," as he had insisted to Martino
in India, that the Kremlin could be trusted to abide by the
"five principles," and therefore would never intervene by
force in the internal affairs of the Satellites or of friendly
states.
Comment There has been an increasing divergence
in Nenni Socialist and Italian Communist
views on the developments in Poland and Hungary. On 22
October, Nenni stated publicly that it would be erroneous to
believe the movement for democratization in Poland could
be blocked or hampered. His party press declared on 26,
October that responsibility for the Hungarian uprisings
rested in part with the Communist "people's democracies:'
According to a semi-official French news
agency, the youth groups of the Nenni Socialist and Demo-
cratic Socialist Parties, which are considering reunification,
jointly declared their enthusiasm for Polish developments.
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6. FRENCH TROOP MOVEMENTS IN NORTH AFRICA
rench troops in Morocco and Tunisia
ppear to be maneuvering into position
o resume protection of French settlers'
ives and property. Any such French
ction would probably prompt Rabat and
unis to break completely with Paris
nd might lead to an early resumption
f guerrilla warfare against the French
n both countries.
oroccan foreign minister Balafrej in-
ormed the American embassy in Rabat
n 26 October that French troops have
crossed into Morocco from the Oran
region of Algeria, while at Safi--a port
city south of Casablanca--they have
seized all Moroccan arms, distributed
hem to French residents and taken up positions behind
reshly constructed entrenchments. He also said that the
French army had taken over police headquarters in Meknes,
scene of bloody anti-French reprisals last week, ejected
Moroccan policemen and officers and seized a quantity of
Moroccan arms. In Tunisia, similar French military move-
ments led to clashes on 27 October in which 14 were killed.
Balafrej stated that Moroccan authori-
ties are entirely capable of maintaining law and order and
indicated that Prime Minister Bekkai's new government
would lodge a strong protest both with the French govern-
ment and the UN.
In Paris, a high Foreign Ministry
spokesman denied the French intended to use troops in
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Morocco or Tunisia unless requested by the respective gov-
ernments. He stated that French officials in both countries
have been instructed to observe caution and avoid any pro-
vocative action. The American military attach�n Rabat,
however, believes that the French army is prepared to inter-
vene militarily.
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SINGAPORE RIOTS
Rioting continues in Singapore, but on a
greatly reduced scale, and business is
almost normal. Army reinforcements
from Malaya have been deployed through-
out the city to help deal with any resur7
gence of violence.
On the night of 26-27 October, the police
arrested some 500 persons, including the hard-core elements
of the pro-Communist People's Action� Party and its labor af-
filiates. This action by the government is aimed at the heart
of the pro-Communist organization in Singapore. The Amer-
ican consulate general reports that the arrests may lead to
fresh trouble in the form of widespread strikes, although
there is presently no evidence that such a development is
imminent.
There is no reason to doubt that the gov-
ernment will vigorously press its advantage. Under the cir-
cumstances, the prospects are that PAP will have a difficult
time regrouping its forces and regaining lost prestige and
influence.
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8. FURTHER REVISIONS IN WEST GERMAN DEFENSE
TARGETS PLANNED
The American embassy in Bonn fears
that unless NATO makes it clear to the
West Germans that their force targets
still stand, the Germans may change
their targets and claim NATO approval for the action. The
Foreign Ministry in Bonn told the embassy that Defense
Minister Strauss will announce at the NATO annual review
examination on 29 October that the armed strength target
for 1957 will be considerably below the planned 270,000, and
that manpower at the end of 1956 will total only 752000 in-
stead of the 95.,000 planned. Defense expenditures for the
current year are also far behind schedule.
Strauss will not discuss West German
defense goals beyond 1958 on the grounds that NATO is now
considering a revision in strategy and force goals.
Comment A reappraisal of Bonn's present military
commitments appears essential to over-
come public reluctance to meet the financial and military
goals. The desirability of a "go-slow" pace was reflected
early this month when the defense committee of the Bundestag
planned the defense procurement program only to 1958 to al-
low for periodic reappraisal and procurement of the most
modern equipment.
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9. PATHET LAO OBJECTIVES CLARIFIED
With regard
to a coalition government,
the
Pathet Lao will demand a deputy premiership and at least
the post of deputy minister in Defense,Interior, and Foreign
Affairs,
The Communists proposed to accept a
government offer "leaving our forces complete and organ-
izin them into battalions."
it was essential to retain the original units, under Com-
munist command. In addition, the Communists will demand
that a "number of units be stationed in the two provinces,"
with others advantageously stationed in the ten provinces
now controlled by the government.
Comment There is strong sentiment in Laos for
a settlement of the Pathet problem, and
Premier Souvanna Phouma has indicated a desire to complete
negotiations by the end of the month. The Communists, how-
ever, have almost certainly overestimated the strength of
their position, as the government is unlikely to settle on a
basis of peace at any price. The government has indicated,
for instance, some reservations on acceptance of Pathet Lao
units intact. the Commu-
nists are anxious to avoid a deadlock, and therefore the will
probably settle for less than the concessions demanded
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NurNS.
10. CYPRUS PARTITION PLAN
The plan for partitioning Cyprus be-
tween Greece and Turkey, which has
been pressed for several months by
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick--until recently
permanent under secretary of the Brit-
ish Foreign Office--and which has
recently received press discussion,
has aroused little enthusiasm outside
London. The Turkish ambassador to
Athens told Ambassador Allen on
26 October that he and Greek foreign
minister Averoff had briefly discussed
the matter. Although the Turkish ambassador quoted
Averoff as saying partition might "turn out to be the only
feasible solution," the ambassador concluded that Turkey
could not accept partition if proposed by Greece, and
Greece could not accept it if either Britain or Turkey pro-
posed it. If put forward, it would have to be done by a
supranational organization such as NATO.
Partition of Cyprus would tend to per-
petuate Greek-Turkish antagonisms and would be bitterly
resisted by the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the Greek-
Cypriot population. It would be difficult for any Greek
government to accept the plan and survive. Ankara has
apparently given the plan no serious consideration.
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 28 October)
The signing on 24 October of a military
agreement linking Jordan, Egypt and Syria, which establishes
a combined staff in Jordan to function under the command of
Egyptian general Amer, places Jordan solidly in the Egyptian-
Syrian military camp, according to the American embassy in
Amman. The agreement also jeopardizes the Anglo-Jordanian
treaty since it raises the possibility that British forces would
be required to operate under Egyptian command. The agreement
completely excludes Iraq.
Now that unity of command under General
Amer has been openly asserted in Jordan, Egypt will send con-
siderably more arms of all types, according to comment by a
Syrian staff officer to the American army attache in pamascus.
Syria would also continue arms shipments to Jordan,
The position of Jordan's anti-Western and
opportunistic army chief of staff, General Nuwar, has been
strengthened as a result of his success in placing Brigadier
Hiyari, his principal remaining army rival, on extended leave
pending forced retirement. (Press)
Following his designation as prime minister
of Jordan, the anti-Western Suleiman Nablusi has started to
choose a leftist coalition cabinet which includes thus far, in ad-
dition to members of his own National Socialist Party, one
representative each from the pro-Communist National Front
and Resurrection Parties, and two independents. (Press)
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