CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1956/10/03
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Publication Date:
October 3, 1956
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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
3 October 1956
copy Non
DOCUMENT NO. 4.7
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: T$ S -
NEXT REViEW DAT
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0:4;1
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3.3(h)(2)
3. 5(c4
74//4/74
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CONTENTS
1. YUGOSLAVS ADMIT SERIOUS DIFFERENCES WITH THE
USSO (page 3).
2. NASR ADVISER SAYS EGYPT IS READY FOR NEGOTIATIONS
ON SUEZ (page 4).
3. EGYPT CLAIMS IT WILL SEEK TO LIMIT TRADE WITH BLOC
(page 5).
4. BRITISH LABOR PARTY CONFERENCE
5. CIVILIAN UPRISING MAY BE ATTEMPTED IN CUBA
(page 7).
6. NEW BRITISH DRAFT CONSTITUTION FOR CYPRUS
(page 8).
(page 6).
7. INDONESIANS AND CZECHS Fit7., TO AGREE ON JOINT
STATEMENT (page 9).
8. LAOS REPORTEDLY TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELA-
TIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION (page 10).
3 Oct 56
* * * *
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(page 11)
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
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1.. YUGOSLAVS ADMIT SERIOUS DIFFERENCES WITH
THE USSR
High Yugoslav officials now admit that
the Soviets have been undermining Yugo-
slav relations with the Satellites, ac-
cording to Ambassador Riddleberger.
Yugoslav foreign under secretary Prica
on 29 September that the atti-
tuae oI boviet party boss ithrushchev in his talks in Brioni
had been an uncompromising reversal of the 20th Commu-
nist Party congress doctrine on the "many roads to social-
ism!' When Tito threatened to publish their respective
positions, Ithrushchev invited him to the USSR to discuss
their differences with the Soviet leaders. Prica added that
the Soviet leaders apparently had expected that Yugoslavia
would return to the Soviet fold and were now worried about
the effect of their policy of liberalization in the Satellites.
Molotov and others had always opposed the policy and the
great majority of the Soviet presidium and central committee,
including Ithrushchev, now support Molotov's views. Prica
stated this had created such a wide gap between Soviet and
Yugoslav ideas on socialism that it could never be bridged.
Riddleberger concludes that this devel-
opment, if as described, must be a bitter blow to Tito, who
has predicted fundamental changes in the USSR in justifying
his foreign policy.
Comment Because of the extent of the ideological
differences, any durable Yugoslav-Soviet
compromise is unlikely, although both sides will try to avoid
another open split.
Tito's visit to the USSR, despite the un-
favorable Western reaction he feared would result, indicates
that he feels he must make every effort to protect Yugoslavia's
growing prestige in Eastern Europe.
3 Oct 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
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2. NASR ADVISER SAYS EGYPT IS READY FOR
NEGOTIATIONS ON SUEZ
Ali Sabri, Egyptian president Nasr's
principal political adviser, stated on
29 September prior to his departure
for New York that he believes the mo-
ment hag come when the parties to the Suez dispute can
accept negotiations and reach a mutually satisfactory set-
tlement without loss of face. Sabri said this applies, how-
ever, only if the West's objective is a settlement and not
just to "get" Nasr.
Sabri said Egypt hopes the UN Security
Council will designate a negotiating body. He added that
his government had no set requirements for the composition
of such a body and would accept negotiations with the Western-
sponsored users' association, although such negotiations
would not satisfy "the world"--i. e., the USSR. Sabri re-
peated assurances given earlier by other Egyptian spokesmen
that Egypt would be willing to enter detailed agreements on
such questions as tolls and administrative regulations, pro-
vided Egypt remained the actual operator of the canal.
Comment
Apart from the emphasis on Egypt's read-
iness to negotiate now, Sabri's statements
indicate that Cairo has not lowered its terms for a settlement
in any significant respect.
A French Foreign Ministry official has
emphasized to the American embassy in Paris the danger of
permitting the Security Council, or any group delegated by it,
to assume the role of negotiator in international disputes,
since this would create a precedent for further Soviet inter-
vention in affairs in which the USSR has no direct concern.
3 Oct 56
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3. EGYPT CLAIMS IT WILL SEEK TO LIMIT TRADE
WITH RLOC
Ali Salm, Nasr's chief nniiti-
cal adviser, stated that
in order to prevent Soviet domination, the
Egyptian government has decided that no
more than 35 percent of Egypt's total foreign trade would be
with the Soviet bloc. He pointed out, however, that if cotton
could not be sold elsewhere, Egypt would be forced to sell
it to the Soviet bloc, without regard to this limitation.
Comment
In 1955 less than 20 percent of Egypt's
trade was with the Soviet bloc. Egypt has
turned to the bloc increasingly since the Suez nationalization,
and total trade for 1956 may actually exceed the 35-percent
ceiling. The USSR on 1 October agreed to send another
200,000 tons of wheat which, with its previous 250,000 com-
mitment, will furnish Egypt with two thirds of its wheat im-
port requirements for the current consumption year.
3 Oct 56
�Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
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4, BRITISH LABOR PARTY CONFERENCE
Aneurin Bevan's election on 1 October as
party treasurer at the British Labor Party
conference, only a year and a half after
he was almost expelled from the party,
shows the degree to which party unity has been restored un-
der Hugh Gaitskell's leadership. Despite his past conten-
tiousness, Bevan's moderation during the last six months
made him acceptable even to Gaitskell, who preferred his
right-wing opponent. The party treasurer automatically
sits on the National Executive Committee, the top policy
board of the party.
Probably more significant for future party
policy is the growing militancy of the trade union movement,
previously a major moderating influence. Under stimulus of
the new head of the influential Transport and General Workers
Union, the unions have reversed their position by demanding
further nationalization of industry and by rejecting the gov-
ernment's plea for restraint in wage demands. The party will
vote on these and other issues before concluding its confer-
ence on 5 October.
3 Oct 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
CONEIDIL
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5. CIVILIAN UPRISING MAY BE ATTEMPTED IN CUBA
A civilian organization may attempt an
uprising in Cuba by 10 October,
igh Cuban military officials, lacking detailed information
concerning the extent of participation of military personnel
in the conspiracy, are planning a counteraction including a
purge of army officers they consider suspect.
Comment
revolutionary activity is
planned for Cuba in the near future, and it seems likely
that disturbances are in the offing.
it has information indicating the
existence of a well advanced civilian conspiracy which is
operating with a considerable degree of confidence,
however, that a movement re-
lying principally on civilian support would appear to have
little chance of success.
The threatened uprising may be related
to reported coup plans of the group headed by Colonel
Ramon Barquin, imprisoned after leading a military con-
spiracy thwarted in April.
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Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7
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6. NEW BRITISH DRAFT CONSTITUTION FOR CYPRUS
the proposed new
constitution for Cyprus now being drafted
is "very liberal," and would give the
Greek Cypriots 24 elective seats and the Turkish Cypriots
six seats in the unicameral legislative counciL The pro-
posed council would exercise extensive authority over al-
most all phases of government under the leadership of a
chief minister it would choose. Turkish minority interests
would be safeguarded by specific constitutional provisions
and a Turkish Cypriot minister for their affairs aided by
an intercommunal arbitration authority with both nominated
and elective members.
the British
are also considering including a statement promising a self-
determination plebiscite after a 10- or 15-year period of
successful self-government.
Comment Britain's formal position continues to be
that it can consider no substantial polit-
ical moves regarding Cyprus, including promulgation of a
new constitution for the colony, until terrorism is stamped
out. London apparently intends the proposed constitution,
which as reported appears to satisfy several of the Greek
Cypriots' earlier demands, as evidence that it is not rely-
ing wholly on force to bring about an ultimate solution. The
British presumably plan to publish the draft constitution
just before the opening of the UN General Assembly next
month.
3 Oct 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
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7. INDONESIANS AND CZECHS FAIL TO AGREE ON
JOINT STATEMENT
Comment The joint Soviet-Indonesian statement
of 11 September aroused considerable
political opposition in Djakarta because of the omission of
any reference to West Irian and because it was widely re-
garded as a violation of Indonesia's independent foreign
policy. Abdulgani reportedly was instructed not to sign
a joint statement with any other Communist nation without
first consulting the cabinet. His lack of success in Prague
may be attributable to his desire for references to colonial-
ism and military pacts which could be construed to apply to
either East or West.
3 Oct 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
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8. LAOS REPORTEDLY TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
The Laotian cabinet has approved the
establishment of diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union
Meanwhile,
Pathet Lao representatives on the
mixed commissions negotiating a final settlement with the
royal government have insisted, but without success, that
diplomatic relations also be established with Communist
China and North Vietnam.
Comment The Laotian prime minister has ex-
pressed a willingness to open relations
with both countries if they will treat Laos as a fully inde-
pendent and sovereign state.
3 Oct 56
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the Iraqi government Eas informed
te in arming the Jor-
� THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 2 October)
When questioned by American ambassador
Lawson on 1 October concerning the Israeli response to the
movement of token Iraqi troops into Jordan, Israeli prime min-
ister Ben-Gurion declared, "If Iraq sends troops to the other
side of the Jordan River, we will do nothing. If they send them
to our borders that is different They should not cross the
Jordan:'
Meanwhile, however, Iraqi chief of staff
Rafiq has stated that Iraqi troops will not be sent into Jordan
at least until the joint planning now under way in Amman has
been completed. Concentration of a reinforced brigade at H-3
pumping station in western Iraq forty miles from the Jordan
border will also depend on the results of the Amman talks. Ac-
cording to Rafiq, the force at H-3 still includes only two infantry
battalions with supporting antiaircraft, artillery and headquar-
ters troops. A major problem for the Amman discussions is
to formulate a joint concept of defense and to define the Israeli
military action which would set the agreed joint defense meas-
ures in motion. Iraq, like Egypt, has apparently told Jordan
that it does not consider border raids to constitute invasion and
believes Jordan should be capable of handling such incursions it-
self. Rafiq reaffirmed, however, that Iraq would assist Jordan
in the event of all-out Israeli aggression and was making plans
for this contingency.
Further evidence of Iraqi hesitation to corn-
mit itself in Jordan
Jordan that it aoes not
danian National Guard.
� Egypt appears to have gained an advantage
over Iraq as a result of its immediate response with shipments
of arms for the Jordan National Guard, following the recent
3 Oct 56
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Israeli raids.
It
In requesting aid for the Jordan National
Guard, the Jordan government advised Lebanon's President
Chamoun that the Guard consisted of 100,000 men,
RIT
Of this force, Jordan claimed that "25,000
were fully-armed with good weapons, 25, 000 were poorly armed,
and 50, 000 were without any weapons at a11:' These figures sug-
gest not only that Jordan's King Hussain may have ambitions to
expand his military forces, but also that he has exaggerated the
size of the Guard in hobe of assuring receipt of maximum aid.
The possibility that Egypt continues to con-
duct terrorist operations against Israel from Jordanian terri-
tory, without the knowledge of Jordan government authorities,
Jordanian authorities arrested three men armed with Czech
submachine guns in the Hebron area of West Jordan south of
Jerusalem. The men were reported to have claimed that they
were working with Egyptian military intelligence.
15 tanks (probably
mm nowitzers, eiglit 1Zmm
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field guns, 10,000 anti-personnel mines and 5,500 rocket shells
arrived on a Soviet ship in Latakia on 24 September. This ship-
ment, presumably made under terms of the third Syrian-Soviet
bloc arms contract just concluded, represents fulfillment of at
least 20 percent of that contract.
3 Oct 56
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