CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/03/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003284
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: March 4, 1955

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4 March 1955 3.5(c)
Copy No. 88
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 'A
NO CHANGE IN CLASS 4A
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2-0 to
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: g t9 REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. Comments from London on stability of Soviet leadership (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Comment on North Korean measures to deceive armistice inspec-
tion teams (page 3).
3. Withdrawal of two Chinese Communist armies from North Korea
indicated (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Availability of tanks to Viet Minh confirmed (page 5)
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Comment on Iranian attitude toward Middle East defense arrange-
ments (page 5).
* * * *
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SOVIET UNION
1. Comments from London on stability of Soviet leadership:
The American embassy in London re-
ports that observers there, including
Foreign Office officials, regard the
latest shifts in the Soviet government
as further evidence of instability within the top leadership and as
having the effect of isolating Malenkov. They believe that there
is probably an uneasy balance between the "party machine,"
presently led by Khrushchev, certain "government forces" and
some regular army generals.
The consensus is that the power factor
became decisive in the Malenkov-Khrushchev dispute once the
issue had been joined over economic policy. Given the ambitious
domestic and foreign goals established by the Bolsheviks) the
very small ruling group is permanently faced with "deep issues
demanding appalling decisions" When there is no all-powerful
arbiter and vital issues are involved, these decisions become
more difficult to reach. Throughout the history of the Commu-
nist Party, stability and unity have been sought mainly through
struggle and purge, and there has been an almost inevitable
tendency for one man to feel obliged to become the final court
of appeal
Comment: These observations are con-
sistent with a British view expressed in January that a "struggle
for power" is inherent in the nature of the Soviet regime The
British expect further instability in the Soviet leadership.
FAR EAST
2. Comment on North Korean measures to deceive armistice inspec-
tion teams:
4 Mar 55
the aircraft may have been
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withdrawn from their bases to escape detection by inspection teams
of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC).
An inspection of six North Korean air-
fields was to begin on 1 March following a UN Command charge
that North Korea has violated the armistice by introducing jet
fighters, which were not operationally based within the country
at the time of the cease-fire.
North Korean army
preparation of measures to conceal mili-
tary activities in anticipation of impending visits by teams of the
Such precautions have previously been
unnecessary because of rigid controls over movements of inspec-
tion teams in North Korea � A relaxation of these controls,
initiated to counteract the UN Command's efforts to disband the
NSSC, is forcing increased attention to deception and concealment.
3. Withdrawal of two Chinese Communist armies from North Korea
Indicated:
Over 55,000 Chinese Communist troops
left North Korea between 19 and 27 Feb-
ruary,
If the present rate of redeployment is
maintained through 5 March, as is expected, the equivalent of about
two Chinese Communist armies will have withdrawn from North
Korea in the current movement.
Comment: The withdrawal of two Chinese
armies would leave only seven in North Korea, where 19 were sta-
tioned at the time of the armistice.
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As yet there is no information to indicate
the ultimate destination of the departing troops, or whether they
will be replaced.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Availability of tanks to Viet Minh confirmed:
Comment:
The date on which the Viet Minh received
this materiel from Communist China is not made clear. If the
tanks crossed the border after mid-October, they would constitute
the first significant shipment of prohibited military materiel noted
since that time.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Comment 9n Iranian attitude toward Middle East defense arrange-
ments:
4 Mar 55
Iranian officials are extremely cautious
about associating Iran with any Middle
East defense arrangements,
and adherence to any regional bloc is not
likely in the near future.
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The Shah has long insisted that Iran would
be interested in Joining an area defense pact only when its military
power has been sufficiently built up. He can be expected to con-
tinue to press for greatly expanded American military aid and de-
lay any decision until he obtains its
4 Mar 55
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