CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/05/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169488
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: May 27, 1955

.; .Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03169488
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27 May 1955
Copy No. 94
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 44-
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
Li DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE- .20/0
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: .91/4160 REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Japan sets policy for talks with USSR (page 3).
2. South Korean foreign minister fears Soviet proposal to neu-
tralize Korea (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Viet Minh presses French on Geneva responsibilities (page 4).
4. Plans for popular revolt against Pathet Lao in doubt (page 5).
SOUTH ASIA
5, Afghans qualify acceptance of "mediation" proposals (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
6, West German neutralists sobered by fears of US withdrawal
(page 6).
7.
* * * *
8. Comment on Khrushchev's apology to Tito (page 8).
* * * *
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FAR EAST
1. Japan sets policy for talks with USSR:
The Japanese government has decided
to seek the settlement of specific prob-
lems between Japan and the USSR in the
forthcoming talks before consenting to
establish diplomatic relations. Foreign Ministry adviser Tani,
however, told Ambassador Allison on 25 May that domestic polit-
ical considerations might make it impossible strictly to follow
this policy.
Tani said that Tokyo believes the forth-
coming Japan-Soviet negotiations will be affected by the proposed
four-power meeting "at the summit," and will defer any final ac-
tion pending the results of the latter conference. He said the
Japanese would resist Soviet attempts to introduce Communist
China into the discussions, and would co-ordinate with the United
States any response to Soviet proposals for Japanese neutrality.
Comment: Moscow may seek a quick
agreement to resume diplomatic relations with Japan, leaving the
more troublesoiiie issues for future deliberation.
Matsumoto, Japan's chief delegate to the
talks, which are scheduled for early June, told the upper house
on 17 May that he would refuse a hasty agreement for diplomatic
relations, and that he would work out a compromise "suitable to
Japanese public opinion" on the issues of repatriation, territory,
admission to the UN, and fishing rights.
2. South Korean foreign minister fears Soviet proposal to neutralize
Korea:
Foreign Minister Pyun told Ambassador
Lacy in Seoul on 25 May he hoped the
coming Big Four conference would not
concentrate on European problems to the
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he L.4 %,11 I. OW
*iiej NOV
exclusion of those of the Far East. He urged that the United
States reject any Soviet proposal to neutralize Korea.
Pointing to Korea's strategic importance
to the USSR, Pyun said the Soviet Union remains the master of
North Korea and has removed most Chinese Communist sympa-
thizers from the Pyongyang regime. He added that of the 55 top-
level North Korean government officials, 30 are Russian-trained
and would presumably support Moscow's ambitions, while only
five have Chinese backgrounds.
Comment: While the Soviet representa-
tives at the four-power co-iiirei�Vn7e- may repeat their standard call
for Korean reunification as part of a package proposal for reduc-
ing international tensions, it is unlikely that they will advance
any specific plan to neutralize Korea. Recent North Korean prop-
aganda raises the possibility that the USSR will suggest a disarma-
ment scheme for the two Korean regimes and a withdrawal of for-
eign troops as part of a broader East-West arms limitation system.
Pyun's views on relative Soviet and Chinese
influence in Pyongyang are realistic. South Korean propaganda,
however, still asserts that Communist China controls North Korea.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Viet Minh presses French on Geneva responsibilities:
According to a French official in Saigon,
Viet Minh commander in chief Giap re-
cently told General de Beaufort,. French
liaison officer with the International
Control Commission:
a. The Wet Minh cannot stand by
and see chaos continue in the south..
b. The French are responsible for see-
ing that the Geneva accords are carried out and for maintaining
order in the south.
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c. Vietnamese politicians being sup-
pressed by Diem are putting out feelers to the Viet Minh.
Comment: The first point has been fea-
tured recently in Viet Minh propaganda broadcasts. The second
is essentially a restatement of responsibilities France accepted
at Geneva. The Viet Minh presumably believe that the elections
envisaged at Geneva provide the best opportunity for realizing a
Communist take-over of South Vietnam.
The third point, if actually made by
Viet :Minh officials, would appear to be designed to convince the
French that their best chance of avoiding difficulties in connec-
tion with their Geneva responsibilities is to support anti-Diem
elements in the south.
Plans for popular revolt against Pathet Lad in doubt:
rown Prince Savang is discouraged
ver prospects bra popular uprising
gainst the Pathet Lao in the northern
rovinces of Laos, according to the
merican legation in Vie�tane. The government is reluctant
to give a final green light to the project.
The crown prince also recognizes the
possibility of Viet Minh intervention to liquidate all government
forces in the north.
Comment: Premier Katay has been
unenthusiastic about plans to foiTei an uprising from their in-
ception. His coolness sterns both from his realistic view that
a revolt would have little chance of success and his ill-founded
hope that a favorable political settlement can be reached by nego-
tiation with the Pathet Lao.
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In view of the hesitance now reported on
the part of the project's chief backers, there appears little likeli-
hood that official backing will be forthcoming.
SOUTH ASIA
5. Afghans qualify acceptance of "mediation" proposals:
According to the American army attach�
in Kabul, Afghan foreign minister Naim
has been informed by the head of a "medi-
ation commission" comprising Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, that it
unMm�itr agrees that Afghanistan should accept in full the Paid-
stani demands regarding the Kabul incident of 30 March. The com-
mission will next investigate the Peshawar incident, and Pakistan
has agreed to accept its recommendations.
The Afghan government is said to have
agreed to the above terms, provided Syria is added to the group
of five nations investigating the Peshawar incident, or that the
group is reduced to three members--Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
Iraq.
Comment: The reported Afghan sugges-
tions on the number of mediators of the Peshawar incident would
be unacceptable to Pakistan and would provide no basis for settle-
ment. By adding Syria to a mediating commission, Afghanistan
would probably deadlock the situation by producing a 3-3 vote,
since Syria would be likely to join Saudi Arabia and Egypt in sid-
ing with Afghanistan. By reducing the commission to the three
suggested nations, Afghanistan would have a 2-1 vote in its favor.
WESTERN EUROPE
6. West German neutralists sobered by fears of US withdrawal:
est German misinterpretation of Presi-
dent Eisenhower's remarks on 18 May on
cordon sanitaire in Europe had a salutary
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Naive
effect on local discussion of German neutralism, according to
American officials in Bonn. That the United States seemed even
to consider withdrawing from Europe shocked and dismayed those
who have espoused various neutrality arrangements for Germany.
From parliamentary leaders of various
parties, American officials have gained the impression that most
Germans will not agree to unification at the cost of their security.
The American officials believe that the extent of neutrality senti-
ment in the Federal Republic has been highly exaggerated by the
German press and that Austrian developments and other Soviet
maneuvers have failed to sway West German opinion.
Comment: At present all parties in the
West German Bundesta,g reject neutrality in name, but the opposi-
tion Social Democrats continue to advocate foreign policies similar
to Sweden's.
A bona fide Soviet offer for free all-German
elections and neutrality would put Chancellor Adenauer in a critical
position.
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* * * *
8. Comment on Khrushchev's apology to Tito:
Khrushchev's admission in Belgrade on 26
May that the Soviet Union was "misled" by
Beria and was to blame for the 1948 split
with Yugoslavia indicates the unprecedented lengths to which Moscow
is now willing to go to re-establish close relations.
This concession to Tito indicates that the
USSR probably expects to gain Yugoslav support for its positions on
international issues, Tito may go as far as signing a nonaggression
pact. First, however, he is likely to demand some further proofs
of� Soviet good intentions, such as a settlement of Yugoslav economic
claims against the USSR.
Khrutahchev's call for "mutual truat"between
the Communist parties of the two countries indicates that Moscow
is also seeking a close party working relationship. Before con-
senting to this, Tito would probably insist upon concrete evidence
that the USSR has radically revised its policies and is now willing
to treat the European Satellites as sovereign and independent states,
Khrushchev's ideological about-face probably
will encourage factionalism on the part of nationalist elements within
the Satellite Communist parties. Hungarian party leader Rakosi in
particular may find himself in an awkward position, since he was
one of the most outspoken leaders of the anti-Tito movement in the
Cominform and only last month succeeded in ousting Premier Nagy
from the party and government for nationalism and chauvinism,
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