CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/03/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03162014
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: March 27, 1955

Approved for Release: 2019/09/17 C03162014
TOP
3.3(h)(2)
27 March 1955
Copy No,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS at
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2 t9
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: S Z;34. VO REVIEWER _
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3.5(c)
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. Khrushchev defines reasons for Malenkov's downfall (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Allison anticipates weak, irresponsible government in Japan
(page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Egypt rushes arms procurement following Gaza attack (page 4).
LATE ITEMS
4. Comment on declaration of state of emergency in Pakistan (page 5).
5. Comment on withdrawal of Vietnamese sects from Diem govern-
ment (page 6).
THE FORMOSA STRAITS
(pages 8, 9)
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SOVIET UNION
1. Khrushchev defines reasons for Malenkov's downfall:
Indonesian ambassador Subandrio, who
recently had an interview with N. S.
Khrushchev, told the British ambassar
dor in Moscow that Khrushchev outspok-
enly criticized Malenkov's policies and direction.
Khrushchev highlighted (a) Malenkov's
maladministration of economic matters, (b) his attempt to run
the government through bureaucrats rather than through the
party, and (c) his lack of firmness in foreign policy on China.
Khrushchev allegedly stated that if China were "attacked," the
Soviet Union would honor its 1950 treaty, but did not specify ex-
actly what he meant by "attacked."
Ambassador Bohlen comments that
Khrushchev's reference to a lack of firmness on China may re,-
late to Malenkov's general foreign policy and in particular to hip
statement concerning the "destruction of civilization" in a future
war which has been the subject of special criticism recently in
the Soviet press.
Khrushchev's unprecedented expression
of criticism to a foreigner, together with the recent publication
of Tito's personal attack on Molotov, in Bohlen's view, would ap-
pear to indicate that the present leadership is operating on a dif-
ferent basis than in the past and with considerably less precision.
Bohlen believes this is in part due to the nature of group rule,
which, despite the fall of Malenkov, still appears to characterize
the Soviet dictatorship.
FAR EAST
2. Allison anticipates weak, irresponsible government in Japan:
Recent political developments in Japan
lead Ambassador Allison to believe that
a responsible and capable conservative
government in Japan is still a long way
off, He thinks that within the two conservative parties--the Lib-
erals and Democrats--there will be a continuing struggle for
positions and power, to the advantage of the Socialists.
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He notes that the Yoshida-Ogata Liberal
Party has apparently decided to cause maximum trouble and em-
barrassment to the Hatoyama government, partly out of simple
revenge, and partly because it believes this strategy is best for
the party.
Although the Liberals probably will not
carry their opposition so far as to join with the Socialists in a
no-confidence motion against the government as a whole, they
may do so with respect to individual cabinet members. They are
expected to focus on the government's foreign policy mistakes,
especially on Japan's negotiations with the Orbit, and on the "dete-
rioration" in relations with the United States,
Comment: Since Hatoyama is quick
to keep on the same side of issues as public opinion, it will be
difficult for the Liberals to capitalize on their position of hold-
ing the balance of power between the Socialists and the govern-
ment.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Egypt rushes arms procurement following Gaza attack:
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Comment: Cairo's urgent efforts to ob-
tain additional arms suggest tharffie Nasr regime is concerned
over its ability to repulse a major Israeli attack. Internal polit-
ical pressures are likely to require the regime to retaliate in
force in the event of another raid on the scale of the Gaza inci-
dent. An unsuccessful engagement with Israel would have seri-
ous repercussions and threaten the stability of the regime.
It is unlikely that Egypt can obtain heavy
equipment such as tanks and artillery at this time from the above
sources; it can, however, increase its current procurement of
small arms and ammunition.
LATE ITEMS
4. Comment on declaration of state of emergency in Pakistan:
Governor General Ghulam Mohammad's
declaration on 27 March of a state of
emergency in Pakistan and his assump-
tion of "supreme powers" were probably
inspired by his decision to speed up pas-
sage of a national constitution and not by
fear that his government was in immi-
nent danger of being overthrown.
Despite the Pakistani ruling group's de-
sire to establish constitutional government as soon as possible, a
recent effort by,Prime Minister Mohammad Ali and Interior Min-
ister Mirza to end governor's rule and restore responsible parlia-
mentary government in East Pakistan failed because of political
factionalism and instability there. In addition the province of Sind
In West Pakistan is also in the midst of a political crisis caused
by opposition to land reform measures and to provincial reorgani-
zation plans.
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Consequently, Ghulam Mohammad has
probably decided not to wait until all provincial legislatures are
ready to elect responsible delegates to a national constituent as-
sembly. Instead, the governor general is probably going to
nominate the delegates himself; as Mirza is reported to have sug-
gested,and to call a constitutional convention within the next month.
By this means, Ghulam Mohammad can
presumably assure the selection of men loyal to him who will
nevertheless command the greatest possible popular respect.
5. Comment on withdrawal of Vietnamese sects from Diem govern-
ment:
The withdrawal of the Cao Dai and Hoa
Hao representatives from the Vietnamese
government indicates that Premier Diem
has gained the upper hand, at least in the
political phase, in his struggle with the
sects. The possibility remains, however,
that the sects will resort to guerrilla war-
fare against the government.
Previously the sects had failed to make
good their threats to "take action" against
Diem unless he agreed to form a cabinet
approved by them, although the ultimatum deadline expired on
25 March. Moreover, "popular" demonstrations against the gov-
ernment scheduled for the week end did not materialize and sect
troops were reported withdrawing from the environs of Saigon.
Meanwhile, Diem is moving boldly to re-
tain the initiative. He has publicly castigated the sects for "pro-
voking disunion fatal to the higher interests of Vietnam" and has
indicated an intention to form a government "comprised of men
determined to serve only the interests of the state and of the peo-
ple--outside of partisan spirit." Diem has also launched a cam-
paign to recapture control of the Saigon- Cholon police from the
Binh Xuyen.
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Although some disorders are likely to
occur, Saigon has remained calm and the only preparations for
an emergency have been small-scale movements of national army
troops and activity by a few French motor patrols. Although of-
ficials of the American embassy in Paris have suggested that
French intervention in local hostilities should not be taken for
granted, General Jacquot, acting commander in chief of French
Union forces, said on 26 March he would back up the Vietnamese
army in the event of disturbances.
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,440
THE FORMOSA STRAITS
Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Formosa Straits Problem
This report is based on information received in Washington
up to 1100 hours 26 March 1955.
1. No significant military activity was reported. Bad
weather hampered aerial reconnaissance.
2. A regimental combat team from the Nationalist 57th
Division was scheduled to sail from Formosa on the night of
25 March to replace the infantry regiment on the Paichuan (White
Dog) islands, which will return to its parent unit on Quemoy. The
movement of the RCT will further increase the strength of the
Matsu Island Group to approximately 15,000 regular troops. Com-
bat readiness tests, similar to the recent tests concluded on Que-
moy under IVIAAG supervision, will be conducted in the Matsu
Island Group beginning 1 April.
30 the Chinese Nation-
alists now have the weapons and crews to make a decisive attack
against Nantai airfield near Foochow. The Nationalists have not
yet, however, formulated concrete plans or carried out the neces-
sary preparations required for such an attack.
4. an attempt by Chinese
Communist jet fighters from Canton to intercept Nationalist recon-
naissance planes west of Swatow just before noon on 17 March.
The lack of positive results in this day-time intercept attempt is
another indication that there has been no appreciable improvetnent
in Chinese Communist capability to intercept intruder aircraft in
this area.
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THE FORMOSA STRAITS
Report of the IAC Current Ititelligence Group
for the Formosa Straits Problem
This report is based on information received in Washington
up to 1100 hours 27 March 1955.
1� Military activity in the area has remained negligible
2. TU-2 piston light bombers of the 1st Naval Air Division
and of two unidentified bomber units have been noted since 1 March
in rather heavy training activity in the Shanghai area This activity
has included night training by the 1st Naval Air Division.
Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders, both publicly and
privately, have previously suggested that the Sino-Soviet treaty
would be applicable in the event of hostilities between the United
States and Communist China. The treaty is so worded, however, as
to permit the USSR to decide for itself the degree of support which
it would provide, and Soviet statements have been evasive on the
question� Khrushchev probably expected his remarks to be trans-
mitted to the United States and to other governments which might try
to bring pressure on the US. The remarks appear to represent a
psychological warfare measure.
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Available Airfield (jet)
Available Airfield (conventional)
Airfield Site
Nationalist-held Islands
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Statute Miles
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Kilometers
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KEELUNG
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