CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/04/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03181199
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: April 27, 1955

VO, /31/2400/APr"ed;2rORPW9M17 ";7 /77107/
7/117/13#1,
27 April 1955
Copy No. 94
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUNIENT NO /8
NO CHANGE IN CLASS,
El DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2O1 ()
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: apid,a_ REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. TASS correspondent stresses Soviet desire for negotiations on
East-West issues (page 4).
2. Britain proposes disarmament for four-power talks agenda
(page 5).
FAR EAST
3. Chinese Communist spokesman hints at early release of American
airmen (page 5).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
. Bao Dai's plan seen influenced by US views (page 6).
. Viet Minh economic requirements exceed Soviet aid allotment
(page 7).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia fail to agree on new defense pact
(page 7).
EASTERN EUROPE
7., Tito promises continued co-operation with West, but is evasive
on military planning (page 8).
47/7/v /94peoeico'
8. Guatemala (page 9).
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'Nee
* * * *
9. Fighting between Vietnam National Army and Binh Xuyen may
break out near Saigon (page 10).
THE FORMOSA STRAITS
(page 11)
* * * *
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GENERAL
1. TASS correspondent stresses Soviet desire for negotiations on
East-West issues:
A TASS representative stated on 12 April
that the United States should enter direct
negotiations with Communist China on
the Formosa question along the lines of
e recent meetings in Bern on the question of the Chinese students
in the United States. I
The TASS correspondent asserted that American negotiations witn
the Chinese would produce "some concrete results," but warned that
they would be "very slow" as "new revolutionaries are very difficult
and so proud."
He declared that the conclusion of an
Austrian treaty would be a start toward discussions on Germany. A
working arrangement to deal with Germany, he said, could be "slowly"
established.
The TASS representative asked why Presi-
dent Eisenhower did not invite Marshal Zhukov to visit Washington.
He thought such an invitation would be accepted with alacrity and
would pravide "two old comrades-in-arms,' with an opportunity for an
exchange of views, and might serve as a basis for further negotiations.
Comment: These remarks indicating the
Soviet government's belief in the possibility of new negotiations serve
the same purpose as Premier Bulganin's answer on 23 April to a
deliberately encouraged question in which he expressed willingness
to meet with Western leaders. Soviet diplomats have several times
privately commented on the favorable opportunities presented by
Zhukov's former association with President Eisenhower.
The correspondent's remarks about the
need for patience in dealing with the Chinese revive a Soviet theme
circulated at the Geneva conference. As at that time it again serves
Moscow's interest to pose as the reasonable mediator disclaiming
responsibility for the actions of its ally.
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2. Britain proposes disarmament for four-power talks agenda:
Britain would like to include the question
of disarmament on the agenda of a four-
power meeting, according to Anthony
Nutting, British representative to the
tOdisarmament subcommittee talks in London. The British gov-
ernment wants to avoid a break in the present discussions in London
in order to retain the "proper climate" for extending an invitation to
the USSR in May for four-power talks.
Comment: Announcement in Britain be-
fore the general election on 26 May that disarmament would be a
subject of four-power talks would enable the Conservatives to coun-
ter left-wing Labor charges that the government is not sufficiently
concerned with the threat of nuclear warfare.
The British believe that four-power talks
should not be merely a propaganda exercise, but that the agenda
should include a study of ways and means of dealing with all out-
standing East-West issues.
FiQte
3. Chinese Communist spokesman hints at early release of American
airmen:
The Chinese Communist ambassador in
Stockholm asked UN secretary general
Hammarskjold, in a 23 April interview
held at the latter's request, how Hammar-
an e release" of American airmen if he were in
Chou En-lai's position. Hammarskjold interpreted this question as
evidence that Peiping has moved from the question of "whether to
release" to the question of "how to release" the Americans.
Hammarskjold recommended that Peiping
release the 11 airmen of the "spy" case and the four jet pilots not
yet charged with anything except "intrusion" by commuting their
sentences.
Comment: The Chinese Communists have
been expected, for propag�iii-Hjiiiiaoses, to release during 1955 some
of the 56 Americans they admit holding.
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The Bandung conference seemed to
strengthen the possibility of some early releases, as several
of the delegates reportedly found occasion to speak to Chou
about the detained Americans. Moreover, it would appear in
Peiping's interest, in its current bid for direct negotiations on
Formosa, to offer evidence of "good intentions" on one of the
points suggested in the Department of State's statement of
23 April.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Bao Dal's plan seen influenced by US views
Bao Dal's plan for the replacement of
Premier Diem is French-influenced
but not French-inspired, in the judg-
ment of the American embassy in Paris.
The plan is, moreover, clearly influenced by American views,
since both Bao Dai and the French would probably have chosen
candidates other than Phan Huy Quat, but for their belief that
Quat is the man most acceptable to the United States.
The embassy believes that American
views now carry more weight with Bao Dai than do French views,
owing to the importance of American aid. Bao Dai is the "last
person to overlook his own interests," and is therefore determined
not to antagonize the United States. He hopes to persuade the
United States to share responsibility for a change of government
in Vietnam, but to refrain from taking an active role in the "every-
day" operations of the government.
The embassy recognizes that it will be
extremely difficult to avoid the impression, if Diem is replaced,
that he has lost and the sects have to some extent won.
Comment: The dominance of American
over French advice in Bao Dai 's actions regarding Diem would
probably no longer obtain once American assent to his removal had
been granted. Furthermore the French exert a more direct and
substantial influence in the "everyday" affairs of the government
than the United States. Despite Bao Dal's choice of Quat to head
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the next government, the government which emerges from the pro-
posed reorganization might be far from representing the sort of
nationalism Quat stands for.
5. Viet Minh economic requirements exceed Soviet aid allotment:
Comment: Chinese Communist support
of the Viet Minh has been carria�out under both aid and barter
trade agreements, and Moscow can be expected to follow the same
pattern. The Viet Minh, however, will have only a limited ex-
port capability throughout 19550
negotiations for large quantities of fuels, cloth, vehicles and
other equipment that would be in excess of Viet Minh ability to
finance through trade. (Concurred in by ORR)
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia fail to agree on new defense pact:
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Comment: Leaders of the three coun-
tries may continue to discuss the subject of a new pact after
they return home. There is still an outside chance that they may
come up with some sort of pact as a face-saving gesture.
EASTERN EUROPE
7. Tito promises continued co-operation with West, but is evasive on
military planning:
In his 25 April talk with Ambassador
Riddleberger, Tito repeatedly stated
that a fundamental postulate of Yugoslav
policy continues to be improving rela-
ions with Uniteda es, He admitted, however, that Yugo-
slavia's appraisal of the international situation differs from that
of the United States and said he thinks a multilateral discussion
should be held this summer.
Tito emphasized that the West should
not consider. European defense solely in terms of a "line of
bunkers." He suggested that negotiations between East and West�
Germany might prevent a revival of German militarism.
Tito denied that Yugoslavia had lost
interest in the American military aid program, but avoided a
direct reply when the ambassador insisted on over-all Yugoslav
military co-ordination with the West. Tito's response was that
the Yugoslav general staff would put forth proposals for a "tech-
nical conference" in a few days.
He promised, however, to discuss at
once with the general staff the difficulties which the United States
has encountered in implementing its military aid program, and
thought many of these could be resolved.
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" F.% .ry Ira re ore
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Comment:
- they reaffirm Belgrade's view that world tensions
have lessened to such a degree that negotiations for the solution of
East-West problems, particularly that of Germany, are of greater
priority than development of a cohesive Western military force.
The Yugoslays undoubtedly believe more than ever that they are
justified in pursuing their policy of independence of any bloc.
LATIN AMERICA
Guatemala:
Comment: The rightist faction in the
Guatemalan government, to whia-Cordova Cerna and Barrios
Solares are believed to belong, has long criticized Castillo's
moderate policies. Castillo's position has improved considera-
bly since January, however, and it is unlikely that this group
could force him out at this time.
Though enjoying wide popular support,
the government is still plagued with serious economic problems
which, if not solved quickly, could seriously weaken the regime.
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9. Fighting between Vietnam National Army and Binh Xuyen may
break out near Saigon:
Three battalions of the Vietnamese
National Army at a town 15 miles south-
west of Saigon are preparing to prevent
a contemplated linking of Binh Xuyen
and Hoa Hao forces in that area,
Growing anti-French feeling among both
army and civilian elements was also noted
the present struggle is one between Diem ana
French colonialists, who are manipulating the opposition.
Comment: Diem's order of 26 April re-
moving the national policj-n7Oril Binh Xuyen control may considerably
heighten tension in� Saigon.
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THE FORMOSA STRAITS
Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Formosa Straits Problem
This report is based on information received in Washington
up to 1100 hours 26 April 1955.
1. A Peiping broadcast of 25 April, quoting the Chinese
Communist Party's,official People's Daily, declares that the US
State Department's statement of 23 April calling for evidence of
good intentions put forth "unreasonable prerequisites."
Despite Chou En-lai's much-publicized "mildness" in
dealing with the problem of Formosa at Bandung and the extensive
publicity given his offer to negotiate with the US on "elimination of
tension" in the area, Chinese Communist statements at Bandung
and Peiping do not indicate any shift in the Chinese Communist
position on substantive matters.
Chou En-Jai publicly emphasized at Bandung that his
offer of negotiations "should not in the slightest degree affect the
just demand of the Chinese people to exercise their sovereign rights
in liberating Formosa." This point was made even more clearly at
the luncheon meeting prior to the issuance of Chou's invitation to
the US, when Chou is reliably reported to have emphasized that
Formosa is a purely internal question, that the only international
issue is that of US intervention in the Formosa area, and that
"compromise" solutions, including those involving evacuation of
the offshore islands or a plebiscite, are out of the question.
On 24 April, subsequent to the luncheon meeting, the
Peiping radio reaffirmed the long-standing Peiping position that a
"prerequisite" for the solution of the Formosa problem is the
"withdrawal of US armed forces," Chou's view of a "peaceful,' solu-
tion of the Formosa question does not appear to differ from that ex-
pressed by Chinese Communist spokesman Kuo Mo-jo at the pre-
Bandung Communist-front conference in New Delhi. On that occa-
sion, Kuo stated that the Formosa question should be settled
peacefully, just as the "liberation" of Peiping was settled peace-
fully in 1949 (when the commander of the Nationalist garrison
surrendered to the Communists and was given a high sinecure posi-
tion in the Peiping regime).
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2. Australian prime minister Menzies in the Australian
House of Representatives recently defended US policy by stress-
ing the difficulty and complexity of the situation and implying that
there were reasons for US policy being "somewhat guarded and
even ambiguous." He stressed that unconditional abandonment
of the islands would intensify Communist truculence and impair
the morale of the non-Communist Chinese in Formosa and in
Southeast Asia. However, Menzies adhered to his previous pol-
icy by being careful not to commit his government to any action
on the offshore islands.
3. US photo interpreters evaluating 4 April photography
counted 23 jet fighters, three piston fighters and 12 transports
at Tatopu airfield, located 10 NM south of Changsha and about
460 NM from Formosa. This is the first photography received
on this airfield,
icin storage buildings and a probable underground POL storage
A 6450 x 200 ft. concrete runway, 20 revetments, 19 ammu-
area were also observed.
Jet fighters based at Tatopu would be important to the
air defense of central China. Effective employment in air opera-
tions over the Formosa Straits, however, would require staging
through a forward base.
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CHINA -RAMOS& AI5TUAT ION
Nautical miles
Statute miles 0
510
-- Selected road
100 150
1 1 1 1 1 1
100 1S0 + +4. + 4_ Proposed railroad
tail road
45
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SERVICEABLE
COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND
U SEABILITY
MIC-15, MIG-17, TU-4, IL-28
I TU-2, IL-l0, LA-9/ I I, LI-2, etc.
� unknown
* Fields not considered capable of
sub:porting sustained operations
at present.
* NATIONAL 1ST AIRFIELD
DESIGNATIONS
PRIMARY: considered most important in area, with prepared runway
generally 5000 feet or longer.
SECONDARY: aux' I iary or emergency bases, or fields of lesser
importance- runways generally less than 5000 feet.
OPERATIONAL: consistently used by military & civi I lam aircraft.
SERVICEABLE: capable of use by aircraft.
UNKNOWN: current status undetermined.
OTHER: under construction, abandoned, or unserviceable.
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