CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/06/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03194475
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: June 19, 1955

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3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
19 June 1955
Copy No.
99
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. [
I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 20/0
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: -9/445.0 REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. French consider passing full responsibilities to Vietnamese
(page 3).
2, Cambodia would keep US aid agreement despite any ICC objections
(page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Turkish failure to make petroleum payments may affect whole
economy (page 4).
4. Nasr discounts consequences of accepting Soviet arms aid (page 5).
5. USSR reportedly suggests to Greece exchange of visits by heads
of governments (page 6).
6. Greek government debating its attitude toward Soviet overtures
(page 7).
Special Annex Attached: THE ARGENTINE REVOLUTION
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SOUTHEAST
1. French consider passing full respon:i irties to Vietnamese:
French representative in Saigon hinted
o American officials on 15 June that, if
he Diem government is willing to take
ver the responsibility for implementing
eac Geneva last July, France will relinquish
the army high command, reach agreement on the status of the
French Expeditionary Corps, and inform the Geneva powers and
the International Control Commission of the Change.
The Indian chairman of the ICC in Saigon,
who complained to an American official that the French position
on implementation is increasingly difficult and ambiguous, believes
that France should take the above steps before 20 July,
Comment: Diem's special representative
in Paris has the impression that Premier Faure is undecided be-
tween Foreign Minister Pinay's attitude, which is favorable to the
Vietnamese point of view with regard to transfer of the high com-
mand, and the less conciliatory position of Secretary for Associated
States Laforest. Faure is under increasing pressure to cut France's
Indochina commitments, however, because of the growing difficut,
ties in North Africa. Moreover, since the Big Four conference will
be in session on 20 July when talks may begin in Vietnam on reunifi-
cation, Faure can be expected to make a decision soon in an effort
to keep the issue from arising at the summit meeting.
Although Diem has indicated he is willing
to enter discussions with the Viet Minh on elections, he apparently
still takes the position that only a national assembly-. which will
not exist before fall-- can commit his regime to actual participation
in all-Vietnam elections.
2. Cambodia would keep US aid agreement despite any ICC objections:
Cambodian officials assured Ambassador
McClintock on 17 June that their govern-
ment had no thought of going back on its
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military aid agreement with the United States. In the event that
the International Control Commission found the accord in violation
of the Geneva agreement, the government would hold a referendum
on the issue. The Cambodian officials asserted the result would
be an overwhelming popular demand that Cambodia receive US
aid; "the will of the people" would then be considered to be "over-
riding."
Comment. Prince Sihanouk called on the
ICC on 16 June to make a public statement of its position, probably
to prevent his political opposition from making an issue of the agree-
ment.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Turkish failure to make petroleum payments may affect whole
economy:
Turkey is approaching a crisis in petroleum
supplies because of the inability of the major
oil companies and Turkey to work out a pay-
ment plan for oil deliveries, according to
the American consul general at Istanbul.
The local manager for the Socony- Vacuum Oil Company, who sup,-
plied this information, told the consul general that the foreign oil
companies have started informal rationing of petroleum deliveries
to Turkish consumers.
The manager added that Turkish officials
are apparently incapable of understanding the serious effect this
situation will have on the wheat harvest and production of coal and
electricity.
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Comment: An oil shortage will directly
affect Turkey's foreign exchange earnings from the export of wheat
and will intensify the country's severe economic crisis.
The oil companies apparently havedecided
to withhold further credit until Ankara is able to guarantee payment.
The recent American grant of $30,000,000
in economic aid has not been made applicable to the petroleum debt.
4. Nasr discounts consequences of accepting Soviet arms aid:
In conversation with Ambassador Byroade
on 16 June, Egyptian prime minister Nasr
tended to discount the effect acceptance of
Soviet arms aid would have within Egypt
itself.
Nasr insisted he could make a deal with
the USSR whereby no Russians would be allowed inside Egypt and
no signed agreement would be necessary. Nasr stated he was aware
of the long-range disadvantage of accepting Soviet arms aid, but
cited his recent jailing of Communist leaders as proof that Commu-
nism in Egypt could be controlled.
Nasr retreated somewhat from his pre-
vious categorical statement that he intended to obtain arms from
the USSR. Nevertheless, he said he felt a desperate need for reasons
of army morale and the security of Egypt to obtain additional sup-
plies of military equipment in the event of more trouble with Israel.
Comment: The USSR has reportedly offered
to supply Egypt with some arms in return for cotton, but Nasr will
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probably not take advantage of this offer unless he loses all hope
of obtaining arms elsewhere.
5. USSR reportedly suggests to Greece exchange of visits by heads of
governments:
Comment: Following the Soviet-Yugoslav
talks in Belgrade,
a "new spirit" had emanated from the talks and suggested
that the time had come to place Soviet-Greek relations on a more
friendly basis.
Increased Soviet attention to these t;wo mem-
bers of the Balkan Pact and NATO may mark the beginning of a cam-
paign aimed at ultimately "neutralizing" the two countries. Moscow
may plan to offer a proposal for creating a Balkan bloc including Yugo-
slavia, Greece, Turkey and at least one Satellite state with the hope
of weakening Greek and Turkish ties with the West. It is not likbly,
however, that either Athens or Ankara will alter its present defense
arrangements.
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6. Greek government debating its attitude toward Soviet overtures:
Greek defense minister Kanellopoulos is
currently urging his government to adopt
an attitude of distrust toward any Soviet
diplomatic overture,
Foreign minister
Stephanopoulos, on the other hand, advocates that any opportunities
for Greek gain be explored, on the assumption that Greek Soviet
relations might be improved without imperiling Greek ties with the
West and that the threat of a Greek-Soviet rapprochement might
gain more American aid for Greece.
there is increased support in Greek government circles for a
stronger position toward the United States on the aid question.
Stephanopoulos is arging Prime Minister Papagos
to request more American aid in the "bluntest terms" and to threaten
to resign if not satisfied with the results.
Comment: Greece is not likely to effect a
rapprophement with Moscow, although it might threaten to' do so as
a bargaining device on the aid question.
0
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MEMORANDUM
Subject: The Argentine Revolution.
I. 13ackground
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Current Intelligence
19 June 1955
Three distinct elements are present in the revolt against
President Peron of Argentina which broke out in Buenos Aires
at noon on 16 June:
A. A past history of repeated plotting by military leaders
against Peron:
1, In September 1951 the Peron government suppressed
an. "army revolt," which according to the American
embassy, "seems to have been not phony, but an
attempt by a small group which misfired." This group
may have been part of a larger group which "jumped
the gun." The 1951 attempt did not involve the coun-
try b most powerful generals.
2. Plans were reported in 1952 for a. revolt which would
Introduce a new government to be temporarily headed
by an army-navy-air triumvirate. These plans did
not materialize, but a large number of garrison com-
mands throughout the country were reported at that
time to be anti-Peron
3. 1953 was marked by the explosion of two bombs during
the course of a speech by President Peron. The origi-
nators of this incident are still unknown,
B. Continuing opposition by certain political parties (see
appendix), pkini:Apally,
1. The Radical Civic Union�Peron's only parliamentary
opposition
2. The Communists
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C. The recent church-state conflict
1. This seems to spring largely from Peron 's conviction
that clerical elements were working with his political
opponents to organize a Christian Democratic party
aimed at overthrowing the regime. He has steadfastly
Insisted he has no quarrel with the church as such.
Conflict has been intensifying over the past eight months.
a. It opened with a major speech by Peron on 10
November 1954 attacking "treasonable" activi-
ties of certain clerical elements.
b. In December, new laws legalizing divorce and
prostitution stimulated various Catholic groups
to protest demonstrations, pamphlet campaigns
and even inflammatory sermons.
C. Even stronger Catholic agitation was produced
by legislation in May abolishing compulsory re-
ligious instruction and calling for a specially
elected assembly to meet within 180 days to con-
sider a constitutional revision formally separat-
ing church and state.
d. On 11 June there were large-scale Catholic dem-
onstrations in downtown Buenos Aires, followed
by minor clashes on 12 and 13 June.
e.
f. On 15 June Argentina summarily expelled Auxiliary
Bishop Tato and Monsignor Novoa on the ground that
they were responsible for the disorders of 11, 12,
and 13 June.
g. On 16 June the Vatican announced the excommunica-
tion of all persons connected with this expulsion.
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3. The traditionally anticlerical Radical Party�Peron's
principal opposition�and also the Communists have
used the church= state dispute for fomenting anti-Peron
sentiment. The Communists offered to make common
cause with their "Catholic comrades."
4. Certain top leaders of the army--a principal prop
of Peron's regime--are known to disapprove of his
attacks on the church..
U. The revolt
A. Its development
1. At noon on 16 June�shortly after the Vatican's ex-
communication decree was announced.- a group of
military planes dropped bombs on the presidential
palace (Casa Rosada). Press reports stated that
"soldiers" armed with machine guns were attempt-
ing to attack the palace.
2. At 13.11 (EDT) the official government radio an-
nounced that the revolution had been quashed.
3. At 14.26 (EDT), according to press reports, "waves
of bombers" of the navy and air force again started
dropping bombs around the government buildings with
numerous casualties resulting.
4. Early in the evening Peron, in a radio address to
the nation, charged the navy�chiefly the naval air
corps--with directing the rebellion, stated that the
revolt had now been suppressed except for a few
Isolated spots, and praised the army highly for its
loyalty. He declared a state of siege and affirmed
that the traitors would be punished.
5. Also on the evening of 16 June, Montevideo press
reports described the flight to Uruguay of about
40 rebel planes and some 200 refugees.
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6. On 17 and 18 June Peron spoke on the radio again,
reiterating that the revolt was suppressed and at-
tributing to Communists the burning of church build-
ings. An AP dispatch from Buenos Aires quoted
church authorities as stating that all previously im-
prisoned priests had now been released.
7. Relative quiet was reported by the government to
have returned to Buenos Aires, but unconfirmed
reports out of Montevideo up to early 18 June stated
that the garrisons in Cordoba, Santa Fe and Entre
Rios, and the naval forces at the major naval base
of Puerto Belgrano9 had joined the revolt. These
reports also gave Rosario. Argentina's second lam-
est city, to the rebels:
8. At noon on 18 June an unconfirmed AFP report from
Montevideo stated that an Argentine war fleet, includ-
ing five cruisers and 22 destroyers, was outside
Argentine territorial waters under the command of
Rear Admiral Anibal Olivieri, who was navy minister
until the revolt began. (According to available official
data, Argentina does not have a fleet of this size in
operational condition.) A Brazilian radio broadcast
late on 18 June said that "massed Argentine naval ves-
sels are threatening to bombard Buenos Aires unless
Peron resigns."
9. Additional AFP reports out of Montevideo on 18 June,
also unconfirmed, state that the Argentine government
is now under the control of General Franklin.Lucergo
minister of the army. Other such reports state that
"by order of General Peron" the army has assumed
control of the federal police. (Before the revolt the
federal police was under the control of Interior Minis-
ter Borlenghi, a powerful labor leader and an enemy
of Lucero. )
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10. In an 18 June speech to the general secretaries of
unions affiliated with the Argentine General Con-
federation of Labor, reported by INS, Peron indi-
cated he might submit his government and the church-
state question to the test of a general election.
B. Peron's situation
1. From the commencement of hostilities on 16 June
until late 18 June the Peron government imposed
strict censorship including cipher messages.
2.
3. The leader of the revolt is identified by rebel asylees
in Montevideo as General Leon Bengoa�earlier re-
ported by rebel broadcasts to control Rosario. Gen-
eral Bengoa was appointed by Peron in April 1953 to
investigate corruption in the government, and before
the revolt was commander of the Third Infantry Divi-
sion: He is known as a man of high integrity and is
widely respected in the army.
/ "the
press reports that General Bengoa has declared his
loyalty to Peron and that previous reports of his par-
ticipation /in the rebe111on7 . were erroneous.")
4. Another rebel leader, Admiral Olivieri, minister of
the navy until the commencement of the revolt, is
reported to control Puerto Belgrano, Argentina's
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principal naval establishment. Reports from
Uruguay intimate that the Argentine fleet is fully
stocked with fuel, ammunition and provisions, and
will probably attack Buenos Aires in the near future,
(A UP report from Buenos Aires late on 18 June,
however, quotes a progovernment newspaper as claim-
ing that the police have arrested Admiral Olivieri.)
5.
"Peron has gained a complete victory over the revolu-
tionary forces with the exception of naval vessels and
Puerto Belgrano. The greatest crisis facing Peron
will be his ability to negotiate peace with the naval
forces. Argentine stability will not be possible until
a truce or compromise is reached with this group."
III. Evaluation
The revolt is believed to have assumed major proportions.
The ability of the Peron regime to weather the present crisis
depends on the continued loyalty of a substantial majority of the
army. The reported establishment of relative order in Buenos
Aires, if true, is largely attributable to the support of the re-
gime by the local military and police forces.
Peron's placing of the secret police, the gendarmerie and
all law-enforcing agencies under the army and declaring the
state under full martial law, makes the position of the army
practically invulnerable in the present political setup.
� The suggestion made by Peron in his speech to the union
labor leaders on the evening of 18 June to submit his govern-
ment to the test of a general election would appear to offer no
threat to army control. Should the results of the election be
adverse to Peron the army could still keep the reins and name
a substitute to Peron. The army could also probably depose
Peron without awaiting the election results.
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APPENDIX
I. Strength of the political parties
The Peronista Party controls all seats in the 36-member
Senate, and 139 of 157 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Of
the remaining seats in the Chamber of Deputies, the Radical
Civic Union holds 12 and some are vacant. Poor leadership
and deepening factionalism over party doctrine and tactics have
reduced the Radicals' effectiveness. Their congressional pro-
gram has been negative and has concentrated on bitter opposi-
tion to any Peronista proposal, regardless of its merits. The
Radical Party claims to be anti-Communist; but various lead-
ers have consulted with the Communists on possible joint ac-
tivities to oppose Peron, and one Radical leader has recently
expressed concern over Communist infiltration of his party.
In the April 1954 elections for vice president and members
of congress, the Peronistas polled 68 percent of the total vote
and the Radicals about 30 percent. The remainder was split
among the Democrats (conservatives), Communists and two
other very small parties. The Communist vote was unofficially
estimated at 65,000 to 100,000.
IL Strength of the armed forces
A. Ground forces
1. Strength: 102,000 as of 1 Sept 54.
2. Disposition: The bulk of the army is disposed
roughly in an arc around the upper half of
Argentina. About 22,000 troops are in the Buenos
Aires area.
B. Navy
1. Strength'. 25,860 as of 31 July 54.
2. Disposition: Most vessels, except river gunboats,
are based at Puerto Belgrano (3 light cruisers,
6 destroyers, and some 60 amdliary ships). Two
submarines are based at Mar del Plata.
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Naval Air Arm
1. Strength: 2,700, including 219 pilots, as of 1 Sept 54.
2. Equipment: Transport 19, patrol 12, liaison 25, train-
ing 74, miscellaneous 8.
3. Disposition: Puerto Belgrano, Punt� del Indio.
C. Air Force
1. Strength" 15,800 including 497 pilots, as of 1 Dec 54.
2. Equipment: Jet fighters 84, piston fighters 56, at-
tack 69, medium bombers 34, transports 110, recon-
naissance 30, trainers 317.
3. Disposition: Buenos Aires, two fighter and two trans-
port groups; Mercedes, one bomber group; Mendoza,
one fighter group and one attack group; Parana, one
observation group.
D. Security forces
1. Federal police 47,000
2. National gendarmerie 15,000
3. Maritime police 3,500
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