CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/01/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02989042
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: January 11, 1955

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ILCIP--191?CRET
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
11 January 1955
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
Cl DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 20 Jo
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 6///e0 REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. American embassy comments on Soviet leadership situation
(page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Japanese conservatives see election as "last chance" (page 4).
3. Comment on latest Chinese Communist air attack on Tachens
(page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4, Wet Minh continuing arms supply to Laotian Communist forces
(page 5).
SOUTH ASIA
5. Comment on cabinet changes in India (page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Moroccan situation alleged "near breaking point" (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Comment on Benelux reaction to French arms pool plan (page 8).
8. Comment on Italian Communist Party's current national confer-
ence (page 8).
LATIN AMERICA
9. Somoza, expects "internal uprising" in Costa Rica before
15 January (page 9).
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SOVIET UNION
L American embassy comments on Soviet leadership situation:
The American embassy in Moscow
observes that the Soviet press reports
of the 7 January Moscow meeting of
Komsomols is another example of the
preferential publicity accorded Khrushchev during the past nine
months. The embassy feels that Khrushchev in his speech as
well as in a recently publicized interview made somewhat patron-
izing references to Malenkov.
The embassy, while cautioning against
"premature hypotheses;' notes that Khrushchev b activities in the
past nine months have identified him with an increasing number
of important aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign policies and
have made him the most publicized member of the Soviet leader-
ship group.
In contrast, Malenkov has not made a
single major speech since the Supreme Soviet session of April
1954. The only occasion since April on which he has received
individual publicity was his New Year's Day response to questions
posed by a foreign correspondent, and this received noticeably
less propaganda treatment than it did last year. Moreover, Malen-
kov's name has been omitted during the past nine months from press
items listing Lenin's "closest associates" and leading members of
the central committee prominent in war work during World War II,
while Khrushchev has been included on all these lists, sometimes
in defiance of the facts.
Comment: Despite the suggestion of
weakness in Malenkovb. position, he has impressed virtually all
foreigners who have observed the presidium members at social
gatherings during the past year as poised, self-confident, and
clearly the dominant figure present.
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FAR EAST
2. Japanese conservatives see election as "last chance":
Japanese conservative leaders see the
coming election as their "last chance"
to consolidate their control, provide
economic and social stability, and thereby
nullify the growing leftist threat. They assert, according to Am-
bassador Allison, that the conservatives must win a decisive vic-
tory to be able, by democratic means, to correct unsuitable occu-
pation reforms and restore some prewar authoritarianism, disci-
pline and order. Otherwise, they believe, conservative strength
will be eroded in a series of elections.
Allison feels this view is exaggerated
but that the coming election may be the best fore-seeable chance
for achieving conservative unity without extremism.
Comment: The desire for personal power
among the rivals for the leadership of Japan's dominant conserva-
tive forces is the major reason for the present disunity and weak-
ness. The leftist parties appear certain to attain the 156 seats
required to block constitutional amendments, in particular, the
one on rearmament.
Hatoyama's Japan Democratic Party is
probably hoping that an expression of American support will
enable it to make sufficient election gains to assure its hegemony
over any postelection movement for conservative unification.
3. Comment on latest Chinese Communist air attack on Tachens:
11. Jan 55
The air assault on the Chinese Nationalist-
held Tachen Islands on 10 January, the
third major air raid on the islands since
1 November, seems to have been aimed
chiefly at disrupting the second phase in
a Nationalist plan for replacing the Tachen
garrison with troops from Formosa. The
Tachen Defense Command was "caught
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flatfooted" by ttie bombing,
There was no air alert, and Nationalist antiaircraft
fire was sporadic and ineffective.
The 66 Chinese Communist fighters and
bombers which struck at the Tachens on 10 January concentrated
their attacks on Tachen harbor, in which there was a destroyer
escort, three LST's, a niinesweeper, and several other small
vessels. All three of the LST's were hit, two of them seriously.
The destroyer escort, the only one remaining on station in the
Tachens since the CommuniSt sinking of a similar ship there in
November, was also reported as hit Details on the damage to
these ships and on other Nationalist losses are not yet available.
When the first phase of the troop rota-
tion program was undertaken on 21 December, Chinese Commu-
nist planes unsuccessfully bombed Nationalist shipping in the
Tachens. The second phase, originally scheduled for the period
between 4 and 6 January, was delayed by poor weather, and most
of the ships involved did not arrive at the Tachens until 8 and
9 January. The third and last phase is scheduled on or about 22
January. Further Communist air attacks are expected at that time.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Viet Minh continuing arms supply to Laotian Communist forces:
The Viet Minh continues to send weapons
and other materiel from Dien Bien Phu
into Phong Saly Province in northern
Laos in an obvious attemnt to strengthen
:Pathet Lao forces,
each platoon-size Pathet Lao unit is directed by Viet
Minh military-political officers. Open clashes between govern-
ment forces and the Communists are frequent.
continuing armed action on the part of the Pathet Lao possibly is
designed to put pressure on the Laotian government to accept
Pathet Lao terms in the present conversations.
Comment: Viet Minh tactics relative
to the truce agreement for Laos have obviously been designed to
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Now
stall for time to permit the strengthening of the relatively weak
Pathet Lao forces.
Pathet Lao and
representatives relate to establishment of a "mixed commission,"
which eventually would supervise the planned general elections,
and the submission of Pathet Lao troops to the Laotian government
authority without integration into its forces. Laotian acceplance
of these terms would give the Communist an early entree into
governmental affairs without a significant concession on their part.
SOUTH ASIA
5. Comment on cabinet changes in India:
Prime Minister Nehru's resignation from
the Defense Ministry on 10 January, his
shift of K. N. Katju from the Home Minis.
try to Defense, and his appointment of G. V.
Pant as home minister will strengthen the Indian cabinet. Pant, one
of the ablest administrators in the country, may be expected to be
loyal to Nehru and to take the place of the late Rafi Ahmed Kidwai as
Nehru's top adviser and domestic policy expediter.
Katju, a relatively strong conservative, will
be able to 'give the Defense Ministry the direct leadership it has lacked
under Nehru, who is primarily interested in foreign affairs. Prime
Minister Nehru, who now holds only one additional portfolio, that of
External Affairs, will be more free than before to supervise his new
program of increasing India's economic strength.
Essentially the new moves represent a loss
for Congress Party conservatives, since Katju's removal from the
important Home Ministry will weaken his influence in the -cabinet
by removing him from the main stream of Indian politics.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Moroccan situation alleged "near breaking point":
The tense situation in Casablanca is
"near the breaking point,"
The American consul general
comments that French indecision or inability to deal with the
Moroccan problem, except for police reorganization, is gradu-
ally turning the area into a political jungle.
The consul general adds that the situa-
tion provides fertile ground for the Communist propaganda which
on 1 January assured Morpccans that independence could only, be
acquired by fighting the French and that "unconditional assistance"
would be provided by the "partisans of peace and liberty" headed
by the USSR.
Comment: Recent reports have indicated
that tension in Morocco is rising and that the number of armed at-
tacks has increased in the past few weeks.
Premier Mendes- France considers the
conclusion of French-Tunisian negotiations, which he does not
expect before February, essential before commencing a study of
Moroccan problems. There is no indication, however, that he
envisages for Morocco substantial changes in France's policy in
the area.
The small, covert Moroccan Communist
Party is capable mainly of illicitly distributing propaganda leaf-
lets and starting whispering campaigns. Heretofore, nationalist
leaders have spurned Communist leadership or assista,nce. Local
Communist allegations that the USSR would provide assistance
might convince some nationalist extremists, however, to turn to
the Communists for support.
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WESTERN EUROPE
7. Comment on Benelux reaction to French arms pool plan:
A spokesman for the Belgian Foreign
Ministry, in criticizing the French
proposal for an arms pool as "compli-
cated" and contradictory, stated, how-
ever, that it is more satisfactory than
had been anticipated. A high-level
Dutch Foreign Ministry official told
Ambassador Matthews on 7 January that
.the French proposal is unsatisfactory
and does not provide adequate national
safeguards. He revealed that his gov-
ernment is sounding out industrialists
on the possibility of the Netherlands staying out of the pool even
if all other WEU countries join.
The Benelux countries will probably be
greatly antagonized because Mendes-France has not included them
in the itinerary of his current trips to Italy and West Germany to
discuss the Paris proposal for an arms pool.
Representatives of the Western European
Union countries are scheduled to meet on 17 January to discuss
the French plan, and the success of this meeting may be jeopard-
ized if the Benelux countries are convinced that France, Italy
and Germany intend to impose their vies.
8. Comment on Italian Communist Party's current national conference:
Togliatli's position as chief of the Italian
Communist Party (PCI) does not appear
in jeopardy, despite the critical attitude
of other party leaders at the opening
session of the PCI national conference
in Rome on 9 January.
Rumors of a party crisis have circulated
periodically for the past six years, but Togliatti has always managed
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to reassert his leadership. The party has shown continuing
electoral strength as a result of his "soft" tactics, the main tar-
get of his enemies in the party. As far as is known, Moscow has
not taken a position in the present dispute.
Although a majority of PCI leaders appear
to support Togliatti, a report prepared by the party's central com-
mittee for submission to the current conference notes several party
weaknesses. The report admits that the party is having difficulty
in recruiting young men, cites the lack of enthusiasm for recent
party undertakings, and complains that there are too few "who
dedicate all their activities to the party."
PCI reaction to the Scelba government's
anti-Communist campaign has thus far been confused and uncertain.
A continuing dispute over policy within the party would probably
lead to the further success of Scelba's program.
LATIN AMERICA
9. Somoza expects "internal uprising" in Costa Rica before
15 January:
Nicaraguan president Somoza advised
Ambassador Whelan early on 10 January
that he believes a Costa Rican revolt
made up "100 percent of 'Costa Ricans"
will occur prior to 15 January.
It is believed that the Nicaraguan and
Venezuelan governments have been providing clandestine assist-
ance to exiled Costa Rican revolutionaries and that every attempt
will be made to have any move against Figueres appear a purely
domestic Costa Rican uprising.
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