CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/06/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03189002
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: June 9, 1955

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9 June 1955
Copy No. 94
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMEN NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
Li DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: ?Via_
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: _.9./a_d_C2__ REVIEWER: _
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Comment on Soviet invitation to Adenauer (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. Yugoslav government believes USSR would compromise with West
(page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Comment on Vietnamese army's campaign against Hoa Hab rebels
(page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4.
EASTERN EUROPE
5. Comment on Yugoslav attitude toward the Balkan pact (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Spain actively seeking support for UN membership (page 6).
THE FORMOSA STRAITS
(page 6)
* * *
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GENERAL
1. Comment on Soviet invitation to Adenauer:
West German chancellor Adenauer
will probably visit Moscow in response
to the Soviet invitation of 7 June. Some
preliminary exchanges may be necessary to arrange details.
Adenauer realizes the political necessity
of appearing to do everything possible for German unification, and
considers it equally essential for Bonn to avoid losing the confi-
dence of the Western powers. German leaders agree that diplo-
matic and trade relations with the Soviet Union should be estab-
lished, as proposed in Moscow's note. The Western Allies have
already expressed confidence in Adenauer's ability to handle the
matter.
Moscow may hope to fan West German
interest in neutrality by presenting prior to the planned four-power
conference a new unification plan more attractive than past ones.
Adenauer would face heavy criticism from the opposition Social
Democrats if he turned dOwn a neutrality plan which also provided
for free all-German elections.
Even if the USSR made no new unification
offer now, it would hope the West Germans would view a normaliza-
tion of relations as an indication that fruitful negotiations on the
unity subject are possible.
SOVIET UNION
2. Yugoslav government believes USSR would compromise with West:
Yugoslav leaders believe that with any
encouragement from the West, the USSR
would soon compromise in order to reach
an understanding, according to the Yugo-
slav foreign under secretary. The Yugoslav government believes
that more contact with the West will eventually lead to greater real-
ism on the part of the Soviet leaders and hence that negotiations are
more necessary than ever.
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The Yugoslav government thinks that
great changes have occurred in the USSR and that more are com-
ing, even though not overnight. It feels that the Soviet trip rep-
resented efforts to inaugurate a new policy, and that the Soviet
leaders recognize that the Stalin policy was often "stupid." Dur-
ing the Belgrade meetings, the Russians freely criticized Stalin-
ist policies, including the proposal for one-third all-around re-
duction of armaments.
Comment Yugoslav officials, when
talking with Western representatives, have continued to back up
the oft-repeated Belgrade thesis that real changes for the better
are going on inside the USSR. There has been one report, �however,
from good sources of the American embassy in Belgrade that Tito
is in fact disillusioned about the real Soviet attitude and not nearly
so convinced as formerly of the USSR's peaceful intentions.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Comment on Vietnamese army's campaign against Hoa Hao rebels:
The Vietnamese army's campaign against
Hoa Hao leader General Soai appears to be
thus far mainly a show of force. No major
fighting has yet developed. Soars forces,
estimated at not more than 7,500, are said by Premier Diem to be
encircled southwest of Saigon. Some 24,000 national army troops
are deployed in the general area. American observers estimate
the combat effectiveness of the national army troops at more than
twice that of the rebels.
The premier, still hopeful that an all-out
campaign can be averted, states he has instructed his army com-
mander in the area to explore any possibility that Soai may yet be
brought to terms by peaceful means. Meanwhile, government troops
are moving cautiously against Soars forces, and Soai himself Is
said to be in hiding and out of contact with his troops. Thus far he
has received no aid from the 3,300 troops of Ba Cut, the only ocher
Hoa Hao commander still opposing the government.
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4.
The campaign might end quickly as the
result of large-scale rebel defections or a decision by their com-
manders to come to terms. On the other hand, it could drag on
for weeks as a mopping-up operation, but the army's superiority
is such as to leave little doubt of the eventual outcome.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
EASTERN EUROPE
5. Comment on Yugoslav attitude toward the Balkan pact:
9 June 55
Yugoslav foreign under secretary Prica,
in his 6 June briefing of the American,
British and French ambassadors, claimed
that the Yugoslav leaders went out of their
way to stress to the Soviet chiefs the sig-
nificance of the Balkan alliance as an in-
strument for long-term collaboration with
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Balkan states. When the Soviet delegation raised the question of
Bulgaria's admission to the alliance, the Yugoslays rejected the
proposal as highly unrealistic.
some Yugoslav Communist Party members do not take the Balkan
pact seriously, especially in view of the current improvement in
Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The regime as a whole, however, can
hardly consider the pact insignificant. The current value of the
alliance to Yugoslavia arises from the prestige and international
support it furnishes as well as its proof of Belgrade's contention
that nations of differing social systems can co-operate in all fields.
While the Yugoslays have been subordinating the military to the
economic and cultural aspects of the pact. they continue detailed
military planning with the Greeks.
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Spain actively seeking support for UN membership:
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Comment: It is likely that the question
of admission of new members will be discussed at San Francisco
in anticipation of the Big Four "summit" talks.
Spain is a member of seven of the 10
specialized agencies of the UN. It has an observer at the UN,
but a 1946 condemnatory resolution of the General Assembly still
precludes Spanish UN membership.
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WEEkLY SUMMARY
(2-8 June 1955)
THE FORMOSA STRAITS
Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Formosa Straits Problem
1. There have been no significant combat operations in
the area during the past week.
2. An apparently intensive training exercise has just
been concluded by Communist air units in East China. An ex-
ceptionally high level of fighter and bomber training was noted
between 21 May and 3 June. The activity declined on 4 June
and reverted to a virtual sta,nddown the next day. Joint fighter-
bomber operations were stressed, and both jet and piston bomb-
ers as well as fighter units in the Shanghai-Luchiao area were
employed.
3. Runways at two of the five coastal airfields�Chenghai
and Lungtien�are now considered serviceable and ready for use.
The Communists have apparently surfaced the runways with large
concrete blocks. This procedure avoids the delay involved in lay-
ing new concrete, which takes considerably longer to harden suf-
ficiently to permit flight operations.
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If these fields are activated as quickly as was Luchiao
this spring, aircraft can be expected to arrive in the near future,
possibly within a week.
The great emphasis placed on construction of the coastal
airfields indicates the importance attached by Peiping, for both
military and diplomatic reasons, to the achievement of air superior-
ity in the Formosa Straits.
4. A reliable sighting of a small Chinese Communist tanker
in Foochow in early May and the reported sighting of a similar
tanker near Swatow this week indicate that the Communists may
have extended the seaborne logistic support of their coastal air-
fields to include POL products. Tankers are not known to have
called at Swatow or Foochow previously, although the Communists
do possess a number of small tankers which could be used to sup-
ply the coastal airfields nearing completion.
5. The transfer of another railway engineer division to
East China in May suggests an intensification of the railway con-
struction program in Fukien Province, opposite the Nationalist-
held offshore islands and Formosa. Three railway engineer divi-
sions are now accepted as engaged in the construction of the Kueichi-
Foochow rail line and the possible branch line to Amoy. A fourth
division may have moved to the Fukien area in May and be working
on the same lines. It is estimated that the Kueichi-Foochow rail
line will be completed in early 1956. Completion of these lines
will materially increase the Chinese Communist capability to sup-
port logistically any type of operation that may occur in the area.
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7. Chinese Communist propaganda on the subject of
Formosa remained at a very low level during the past week.
On 7 June Peiping made its first reference to efforts by India,
Great Britain, and Indonesia to explore the possibility of nego-
tiations between Communist China and the US. One Peiping
commentary noted that President Eisenhower, while describing
Peiping's action in releasing the fliers as a "token" toward re-
ducing tension, had failed to say "what measures the US would
take to ease tension. . ."
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CHINA -FORMOSA SITUATION
9 JUNE 1955
50 100
Nautical miles
Statute miles 0
150
100 150.
Selected road
Railroad
+ +, Proposed railroad
or
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� A OPERATIONAL
� A SERVICEABLE
� A UNKNOWN
�
UNDER .
CONSTRUCT I ON
COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND
USABILITY
MIG-15, MIG.17,TU.4, IL-28
TU.2, IL-10, LA.9/11, LI-2, ETC.
UNKNOWN
FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF
SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS
AT PRESENT.
* NATIONALIST AIRFIELD
DESIGNATIONS
PRIMARY: CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN AREA, WITH PREPARED
RUNWAY GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER.
SECONDARY: AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES. OR FIELDS OF LESSER
IMPORTANCE'. RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN 5000 FEET.
CPERATIONAL: ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT.
SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES MAY BE USABLE BY.IETS.
SERVICEABLE: INACTIVE BASES CAPABLE OF USE BY AIRCRAFT
UNKNOWN: CURRENT STATUS UNDETERMINED
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