CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/05/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03192930
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: May 10, 1955

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10 May 1955
Copy No. 94
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO 2.9
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I:1 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE.
AUTH: HR 70-2
DAT E: 3///cRO REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. Bao Dai may be planning to return to Vietnam (page 3).
2. Faure raises possibility of military withdrawal from Indochina
(page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Comment on Menderes-Tito conversations in Belgrade (page 4).
WESTERN EUROPE
4. Comment on current British attitude on East-West talks (page 5).
* * * *
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SOU'rlIEAST ASIA
1. Bao Dai may be planning to return to Vietnam:
Comment: As of 7 May, elements of the
four battalions of the Imperial Guard at Dalat were apparently un-
der the control of General Nguyen Van Vy, who has sided with Bao
Dai. Dalat would be the most likely point from which Bao Dai
might attempt a "counterrevolution." Diem is attempting to as-
sert his control of the Imperial Guard b.y appointing a commander
loyal to Chief of Staff Ty.
During the late April events in Saigon,
Vy attempted to occupy certain public buildings in Saigon, using
elements of the Imperial Guard. These troops refused to open
fire when units of the national army later came to occupy the
buildings.
Bao Dal's return to Vietnam has fre-
quently been rumored,
2. Faure raises possibility of military withdrawal from Indochina:
n preliminary talks on Indochina with
ecretary Dulles on 8 May, Premier
Faure raised the possibility of a com-
lete withdrawal of French forces from
oc na unless Vietnamese premier Diem is replaced. Faure
insisted that Diem is leading to catastrophe apd that France will
not continue with him.
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Comment A French withdrawal prior
to the planned all-Vietnam elections of 1956 would constitute
a disavowal of France's responsibilities under the Geneva ac-
cords and thus open the way for Communist charges that France
had capitulated to the American policy of "turning South Vietnam
into a base for military aggression." The French have consist-
ently urged a rigorous application of the Geneva accords.
The French government is determined
to avoid the onus for any further disaster in Indochina, and
Faure's relatively strong parliamentary situation may encourage
him not to temporize.. Mendes-France's recent success in win-
ning control of the party machinery of the premier's Radical
Socialist Party will incite Faure to prove himself a man of "move-
ment," possibly by a bold decision to quit Indochina.
Under current,French repatriation plans,
all but 75,000 of the French troops in Indochina will have been with-
drawn by July.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Comment on Menderes-Tito conversations in Belgrade:
Turkish prime minister Menderes' con-
versations with Marshal Tito in Belgrade
apparently failed to resolve the funda-
mental question of Balkan pact-NATO
co-ordination. The Turkish ambassador in Belgrade told Ambas-
sador Riddleberger on 8 May that Menderes was dissatisfied with
the course of the conversations and that he regarded Tito's atti-
tude as frequently contradictory and obscure. While Tito re-
emphasized that continued development of good relations with the
West is fundamental in Yugoslav policy, he apparently believes
that a workable equilibrium has been established between the
East and West.
The Turkish ambassador said that, while
Tito denied wanting NATO dissolved, he deplored ideological
trends within. NATO. When Menderes broached the question
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of Balkan pact-NATO co-ordination, Tito said this step should
take place only "in an emergency' Menderes replied that it
would then be too late.
Riddleberger believes that Menderes'
disappointment was caused by Tito's reluctance to agree to some
modus operandi for military co-ordination, a reluctance which
Menderes regards as running out on a commitment.
WESTERN EUROPE
4. Comment on current British attitude on East-West talks:
Prime Minister Eden's public insistence
on East-West talks "at the summit" is
primarily an election maneuver, but
nevertheless a commitment which cannot
be disregarded. British officials at the tripartite meetings in
London on East-West talks have argued that no British govern-
ment could propose anything less during an election campaign.
Primarily for the same reason, they want the agenda for such
talks to be general enough to cover all outstanding East-West is-
sues except Far Eastern questions.
The new British government to be formed
after the 26 May elections will probably not be prepared to enter
talks with the USSR before mid-July, and British officials are un-
willing at present to discuss substantive proposals. They insist
that East-West talks should aim at concrete results, however, and
state that the West must be ready to offer something more than it
did at the Berlin conference in 1954.
British officials have stated
a foreign ministers' meeting before a conference of heads of gov-
ernment may be neither necessary nor proper. On disarmament,
they state that they would be satisfied with urging greater progress
within the United Nations framework.
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