CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/07/29
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
03448337
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
September 20, 2019
Document Release Date:
September 26, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 29, 1955
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15721993].pdf | 249.07 KB |
Body:
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29 July 1955
Copy No. 99
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. evz
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
Li DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: __e0/
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: /LAW__ REVIEWER: _
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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AIIlk
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-NOV
SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2. Egypt requests Saudis to open liaison office in Sudan to support its
position (page 3).
3. Grandval expects solution to Moroccan dynastic issue within three
weeks (page 4).
EASTERN EUROPE
4. Comment on Tito 's 27 July speech (page 5).
* * * *
Newlaidanesian cabinet may be formed before Sukarno b return
(page 7).
29 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
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SOVIET UNION
1.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2. Egypt requests Saudis to open liaison office in Sudan to support
its position:
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Comment: Authorization for Saudi
Arabia to open an office in the Sudan requires concurrence from
Britain as well as Egypt. Establishment of a Saudi office in
Khartoum would provide Egypt with an ally in its efforts to in-
fluence Sudanese opinion during the coming session of the Suda-
nese parliament, which will consider methods by which the Sudan
will exercise self-determination.
Cairo has recently doubled its broadcasts
to the Sudan and is engaged in an intensive campaign to undermine
Prime Minister Azhari's government because of its stand in fa-
vor of full independence for the Sudan.
3. Grandval expects solution to Moroccan dynastic issue within three
weeks:
Resident General Grandval told American
diplomatic agent Holmes on 27 July in
Ra,bat that he expected to produce a solu-
tion to the Moroccan dynastic issue with-
in 4 ree wee . Grandval envisages the departure of Sultan Ben
Arafa and his replacement with a regency council. These steps
would be publicly approved by former sultan Ben Youssef and would
be immediately followed by negotiations for the formation of a
Moroccan government and the drafting of a constitution for a limited
monarchy.
Grandval admitted that pressure against
his liberal program was growing in Paris and Morocco and named
Marshal Juin as one of the opponents. He pointed out, however, that
the real stumbling block was El Glaoui, who, though not strong with-
out French support, could not be easily dropped and was capable of
causing real trouble.
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Comment:
Juin, backed by
French industrialists in Morocco, is influencing El Glaoui to
keep Arafa on the throne. Juin resigned early this month from
the Faure government's top-level co-ordinating committee on
North Africa, apparently because he could get no assurance
that Arafa would be retained.
The Moroccans are unlikely to accept
a regency council without a guarantee of autonomy.
EASTERN EUROPE
4. Comment on Tito's 27 July speech:
Yugoslav president Tito in a speech
at Karlovac on 27 July restated Yugo-
slavia's policy of aloofness from power
blocs and pointed up Belgrade's determination to pursue an in-
dependent course, in co-operation with countries like India,
Burma, and Egypt. His tone toward the West was sharper than
that taken by any Yugoslav leader in recent months, while he
demonstrated increasing confidence in his country's relations
with the USSR.
He made the strongest disclaimer to
date of any fear of attack from the Soviet Union, citing this as
the reason for his disinclination to emphasize the military aspects
of the Balkan pact.
Although he characterized President
Eisenhower's 'blueprint" proposal as "unrealistic" and only an
"ideal" at this stage, Tito made enthusiastic references to the
President.
Relations with the USSR and the West
In his discussion of every subject,
whether internal or international, Tito revealed a preoccupation
with economic problems, particularly the worsening Yugoslav
balance of payments position. He expressed more interest in
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continuance of economic than of military aid from the West, but
said that either kind must be given without strings, emphasizing
that Yugoslavia will not alter its stand in the controversy over
American inspection and supervision of the utilization of aid.
Tito spoke with considerable gratitude
of the Soviet cancellation of Yugoslavia's prewar debt of
$90,000,000. All past claims, even Yugoslav ones for a far
higher total for damages accruing from the post-1948 Soviet
blockade, have apparently been wiped out. He contrasted Soviet
generosity with West German unwillingness to reach an agree-
ment on wartime debts and with Western insistence on large in-
terest payments on past loans. Tito appeared to be trying to
use what was in fact a rather academic concession by Moscow
to show the West that he can bargain with both sides success-
fully.
Relations with the Satellites
Tito charged that "certain men in the
neighboring Satellites, . especially in Hungary" are not pleased
with the improvement in Soviet-Yugoslav relations and are "in-
triguing under cover" against Yugoslavia. He said they are tell-
ing their followers that the Soviet gestures toward Yugoslavia are
only a maneuver, and are still arresting men who favor friend-
ship and co-operation with Yugoslavia.
Tito charged that "these men," who ar-
ranged false trials in the past and sentenced innocent men such
as Lazio Rajk in Hungary to death, are afraid to admit their mis-
takes and to follow a new path. "These men," Tito concluded,
"will inevitably fall into their own political traps" and will not
succeed in causing relations between the Soviet bloc countries
and Yugoslavia to deteriorate again.
Titob charges seem designed to test
the intentions of Soviet leaders, in view of the promises they re-
portedly made in Belgrade to bring about changes in the Satellites.
This portion of the speech may have been prompted by his dis-
satisfaction with the Satellites' caution in endorsing the Solviet-
Yugoslav rapprochement, and particularly with the indications of
renewed campaigns in Poland, Hungary, and Albania against
"nationalist" deviationists within the parties.
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A TOP SECRET TA
Tito appears to be aiming particularly at
Hungarian party boss Rakosi, who played a leading role in the Corn-
inform 's ouster of Tito in 1948. The Hungarian regime, in an ap-
parent effort to cover Rakosi's position, after the visit of the Soviet
leaders to Belgrade publicly blamed the imprisoned former security
chief Gabor Peter for the deterioration in Hungarian-Yugoslav rela-
tions.
* * * *
. New Indonesian cabinet may be formed before Sukarno's return:
Indonesia's Vice President Hatta is try-
ing to select a cabinet formateur and get
a new cabinet accepted before President
Sukarno returns from Mecca,
Hatta has not indicated his reaction to a
reported proposal by the army that it have a seat in the new govern-
ment, but it is clear that no cabinet would succeed without army
approval. (NOFORN)
Comment: The possibility of a "business"
or caretaker cabinet rather than the usual parliamentary cabinet
has been frequently advanced by the former opposition parties. It
would have a limited program--presumably holding elections on
schedule and trying to settle the army crisis, and would have the
additional advantage of not requiring Sukarno's personal participa-
tion.
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