CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/10/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03000972
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: October 14, 1955

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14 October 1955
Copy No. 100
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
NO -CHANGE IN CLASS. rie7/
DOCUMENT NO, -5
C) DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE; 2r.) 1(7
AUTH: HR
DATE: REVIEWER.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
1. COMMENT ON SOVIET PROTEST TO IRAN (page 3).
2. ISRAEL ASKS WEST'S INTENTIONS ON EGYPTIAN
ARMS DEAL (page 4).
3. MUTINY OF MOROCCAN TROOPS REPORTED PLANNED
(page 5).
4. COMMENT ON CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT IN LAOS
(page 6).
5. COMMENT ON PROSPECTS FOR MILITARY COUP IN
BRAZIL (page 7).
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1. COMMENT ON SOVIET PROTEST TO IRAN
The Soviet protest of 12 October
against Iranian adherence to the
Turkish-Iraqi pact reiterates
Moscow's position as stated previously by Soviet dip-
lomats in both Moscow and Tehran. The USSR has
frequently emphasized Article III of the 1927 Soviet-
Iranian treaty in which each country agrees not to
take part in political alliances or agreements directed
against the security of the other. It has also often
stressed the fact that the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty
of Friendship prohibits Iran from furnishing bases to
potential enemies of the USSR.
The strictly conventional phrasing
of the protest suggests that the USSR is at present not
planning any aggressive moves such as military demon-
strations on the Iranian border or abrogation of the
Soviet-Iranian treaties. The Soviet Union may, how-
ever, obstruct the work of the bilateral commission now
demarcating disputed sections of the border and hold up
delivery of commodities due under agreements reached
last spring.
The USSR may also respond by in-
creasing its efforts with the states south of the "north-
ern tier." In addition it may also make new overtures
to Afghanistan, where there is a favorable climate for
Soviet penetration resulting from bad feeling toward
Pakistan and dissatisfaction with the level of American
economic aid.
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2. ISRAEL ASKS WEST'S INTENTIONS ON EGYPTIAN
ARMS DEAL
The Soviet bloc arms deal with
Egypt places Israel in a "very
serious situation," according to
Israeli prime minister Sharett,
He told Ambassador Lawson on 11 October that it is
difficult for Israel to plan its policy or discuss for-
eign policy in parliament without knowing Western
plans regarding Egypt's arms deal with Czechoslo-
vakia and Egypt's orientation toward the USSR. Sharett
believes there is a need for a "pooling of ideas."
The USSR has "dropped hints"
through Poland, Sharett said, that Moscow might per-
mit emigration of Jews to Israel and offer arms if
Israel abandons the idea of a security treaty with the
United States.
Comment Israel continues to hope that the
Soviet-Egyptian arms deal will in-
duce the United States to supply additional arms and
to give a security guarantee. Sharett's reference to
possible approaches by the Soviet bloc may be aimed
at promoting favorable American consideration of
Israeli arms requests. At present Moscow would
probably not risk alienating the Arab states by sup-
plying arms to Israel.
Israel's dedication to the return of
Jews to the "homeland" might induce it to consider a
Soviet offer, but not one which would require it to aban-
don the idea of a security treaty with the United States.
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3. MUTINY OF MOROCCAN TROOPS REPORTED PLANNED
A mutiny of Moroccan officers and men
within the French army in Morocco is
planned for November
This mutiny
will be synchronized with an extension of rebel operations.
Meanwhile, the so-called rebel "army
of liberation" is to continue its hit-and-run attacks against
French military outposts. primarily to capture more arms
and equipment.
Comment There have been reports of a few iso-
lated incidents of mass insubordina-
tion and native desertions from the French army in North
Africa. The nationalists are also known to have infiltrated
many Moroccan units. Nevertheless, this is the first re-
port of plans for a country-wide mutiny.
Approximately one fourth of the 70,000
French troops now in Morocco are Moroccans. Si Bekkai
Is himself a reserve lieutenant colonel in the French army
and an adviser of deposed sultan Mohamed ben Youssef.
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4. COMMENT COMMENT ON CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT IN LAOS
The cease-fire agreement reached
at Rangoon on 11 October by Lao-
tian government and Pathet Lao
representatives provides for a ces-
sation-of hostilities in ten days and the establishment
of a neutral zone between opposing forces. According
to the government negotiators, however, it is contin-
gent on the settlement of other basic issues, including
the question of re-establishing royal government admin-
istration in the two northern provinces of Laos. The
talks in Rangoon have broken down, and these unresolved
problems have been referred back to the negotiating teams
in Vientiane.
Most of the truce agreement's terms
are merely a reiteration of the terms of the 9 March
cease-fire agreement, which was short-lived. A major
difference is the clause prohibiting any military rein-
forcements in the two disputed provinces. A Laotian
official has explained this provision by stating that the
government has no intention of increasing its strength
in the Pathet Lao areas, and that in any case the entire
agreement is provisional.
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5. COMMENT ON PROSPECTS FOR MILITARY COUP
IN BRAZIL
According to the press, anti-Kubitschek forces are
planning a move to disqualify Kubitschek and Goulart
by court action on the charge that their margin of vic-
tory was accounted for by Communist votes. Since
the Communist Party is illegal and a federal law pro-
hibits candidates from financial dealings with illegal
parties, they presumably hope that Kubitschekrs elec-
tion would be invalidated,
there were
too many variables in the situation to predict with cer-
tainty the likelihood of a coup but that if one is attempted
the most favorable time would be within the next three
weeks.
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