CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/04/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03179876
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: April 13, 1955

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TOP SECRET
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
13 April 1955
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 6 oz'
NO CHANGE IN CLASS,
LI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE- 20/
AUTHi HR 70-2
DATE: FIEVIEVVER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
-720-P-S-EG-R-ET
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. Bohlen comments on Molotov congratulatory telegram to Eden
(page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Comment on Senator Recto's demand for revision of Philippine
foreign policy (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Iraq to give "final" warning to Syria to abstain from new Arab
pact (page 4).
THE FORMOSA STRAITS
(page 6)
* * * *
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SOVIET UNION
1. Bohlen comments on Molotov congratulatory telegram to Eden:
Ambassador Bohlen believes Molotov's
telegram of congratulations to Sir
Anthony Eden may have been a hint that
Moscow would not rebuff an approach
ks such as Churchill made last summer.
He believes that there has been no comparable Soviet message to
a Western statesman since the war.
Bohlen suggests that Foreign Minister
Molotov rather than Premier Bulganin signed the message because
of the former's personal association with Eden during and since
the war.
The ambassador emphasizes the contrast
between the telegram and the "mean-spirited and cheap attack"
Soviet propaganda made on Churchill when he resigned. He notes
that while press treatment of Churchill has varied since Stalin's
death, there have recently been savage personal attacks on him in
the press as well as in Molotov's Supreme Soviet speech on
8 February. On the other hand, criticism of Eden's speeches has
not extended to him personally.
Comment: Molotov may hope to revive
the close working relationship achieved with Eden during the
Geneva conference with a view to further negotiations on the
Formosa question. He has already privately encouraged the
British to keeu up their efforts to devise a solution to that problem.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Comment on Senator Recto's demand for revision of Philippine
foreign policy:
13 Apr 55
Senator Recto is taking advantage of the
tense situation in the Far East to challenge
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
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the wisdom of close Philippine support
for America's Formosa policy. The
senator, who has frequently attacked
American foreign policy, sought support
in the Philippine Senate on 12 April for a proposal to place Formosa
and the Pescadores under UN trusteeship, while in a press inter-
view last week he said he personally was "not opposed" to Communist
China's admission to the UN. The senator also urged a "realistic
revision" of Philippine foreign policy.
Although President Magsaysay and the
Philippine government still firmly oppose accommodation to
Communist China, Recto and his followers may embarrass the
government on the eve of the Afro-Asian conference�
While Recto, a member of Magsaysay's
Nacionalista Party, is now more or less isolated in his demand for
a revision of Philippine foreign policy, he has succeeded in creating
considerable uncertainty in the Philippines regardi7 the wisdom of
going along with American policies in the Far East.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Iraq to give "final" warning to Syria to abstain from new Arab pact:
Baghdad instructed its minister in Damascus
on 10 April to warn the Syrian government
that if Syria signs a new pact with Egypt and
Saudi Arabia, it must hold itself responsible
he minister was to add that this warning was
final and that Iraq would not be prepared to reopen the subject.
The under secretary of foreign affairs, who
gave this information to the American embassy in Baghdad, stated
that his government was taking this action because of an intimation
from Damascus that Syrian foreign minister Azm intends to sign such
an agreement at the end of April.
The official defined "consequences" as
economic pressures� withholding assistance against Israel, and
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"other measures deemed advisable." He excluded the movement
of Iraqi troops. He believes that the best these forms of pressure
can now achieve is to keep Syria inactive in the face of Egyptian
blandishments.
Comment: This warning may lead pro-
Iraqi Syrians to assert themselves against Azm's policy. It will
almost certainly increase doubts within the Syrian cabinet as to
the wisdom of going ahead with even a watered-down version of
a new Arab pact.
Iraq's action appears to be well timed,
since the Egyptian leaders who in the past have sought personally
to counter Iraqi pressure are now en route to the Afro-Asian �
conference in Indonesia.
13 Apr 55
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THE FORMOSA STRAITS
Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Formosa Straits Problem
This report is based on information received in Washington
up to 1100 hours 12 April 1955.
1. The Chinese Nationalists on Quemoy fired over 200 155mm
artillery rounds at Communist positions and radar sites on Amoy.
This was the first use of the recently arrived battery of four US
155mm guns. The shelling provoked 40 rounds of Chinese Communist
152mm artillery counter battery, which damaged one of the Nation-
alist guns and again demonstrated very effective Communist employ-
ment of artillery.
2. On the night of 11 April, the Chinese Nationalists stationed
three naval patrols of two ships each in the sea area north of the
Matsus in order to interdict the Chinese Communist coastal logistic
effort. If this operation continues and the proper type ships are
aggressively employed, these patrols could be a significant naval
contribution to the defense of these islands.
13 Apr 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
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CHINA �FORMOSA SITUATION
Nautical miles
Statute miles
50 1?0 150
50 100 150
Selected road
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+ + Proposed railroad
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COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND
USEABILITY DESIGNATIONS
PRIMARY: considered most important in area with prepared runway
MIS-IS, MIG-17, TU-4, 1L228 generally 5000 feet or longer.
TU-2, IL-b, LA-9/ I I, LI-2, etc. SECONDARY: auxiliary or emergency bases, or fields of lesser
unknown importance-runways generally less than 5000 feet.
Fields not considered capable of OPERATIONAL: consistently used by military S civilian aircraft.
sclaPort ng sustained operations
at present.
lir NATIONALIST AIRFIELO
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SERVICEABLE: capable of use by ai rc rft.
UNKNOWN: current status undetermined.
OTHER: under construction, abandoned,
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PRESENTATIONS DIVISION
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