MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD FROM L. K. WHITE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Fall of the Libyan Monarchy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03397852
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: September 16, 1969

Approved for Release: 2019/08/15 C03397852
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16 September 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Morning Meeting of 16 September 1969
3.3(h)(2)
*DD/I highlighted a recently completed study by OBGI which
demonstrates that the Soviets have deliberately distorted their maps.
DDCI underlined Soviet military dependence upon maps and
questioned regarding the problems this distortion would create for the
Soviet military. The Director asked Goodwin and the DD/I to get
together and to provide recommendations on how to surface this material.
DD/I provided Goodwin with D/BGI's summary memorandum.
Godfrey noted completion of a memorandum on what areas of the
world are apt to imitate the kidnaping of the U. S. Ambassador to
Brazil. He went on to doubt the value of the memorandum in that it
concludes such incidents could happen almost anywhere and consequently
is not too helpful. He suggested that the memorandum therefore not
be distributed externally.
Godfrey noted the completion of a memorandum summarizing
data on the fifteen terrorists released by Brazil.
Godfrey noted that Eldridge Cleaver has appeared in Panmunjom,
where he is agitating for a number of things including a free Palestine.
He noted General Bonesteel's concern.
The Director asked how he should respond to the observation that
we had no advance information with respect to the coup in Libya.
D/ONE seconded the DD/P's judgment that within the
intelligence community the coup was generally totally unanticipated.
In response to the Director's question D/ONE reported that
NIE 11-8 will be distributed today.
TO?
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Mil 11
DD/S reported that commencing on 6 October influenza shots
will be available, although no epidemic is anticipated.
Carver observed that the President will be making a public
statement on Vietnam this morning and briefly noted that he was con-
sulted on howbest to describe GVN troop strength not on active duty.
Maury reported that DIA is testifying this morning before the full
House Armed Services Committee just prior to the Director's scheduled
appearance before our Subcommittee.
Houston briefed on a visit here by Lloyd Cutler, representing
CBS. Cutler related that CBS is being criticized by the House Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce Committee for not having consulted CIA
on a story they did on Rolando Masferrer's attack against Haiti. Houston
noted his advice that this matter is completely out of our jurisdiction
and his suggestion to recommend that the Committee staff be referred
to the FBI and customs officials. The Director concurred.
DD/P reported
on the likelihood
and consequences of a Soviet pre-emptive strike on China.
DD/P noted that he sent Secretary Rogers a brief report in con-
nection with the possibility that Willy Brandt may visit Washington.
Citing our inability to anticipate the Libyan coup, DD/P noted
that the impact of OPRED will greatly curtail our capability to cover
internal political situations throughout many areas. The Director sug-
gested that the DD/P press this point, and the DD/P commented that
he will be asking the Director to underline this diminution of our capa-
bilities before the 2 October OPRED meeting of the Under Secretaries
Committee.
DDCI reported that the 303 Committee will meet this afternoon
rather than this morning, and the Director asked him to take the meeting.
*The Director asked the DD/P to draft a reply to IN 44956.
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(b)(1)
*The Director complimented the drafter of the
text of his remarks before the Air war Uollege. He added that this
speech will probably be good for his scheduled appearance before the
National War College. DD/I noted that some mention of NSC matters
should probably be introduced into the text, and the Director concurred.
The Director asked that an appropriate rewrite be furnished shortly
before the 10 October date and asked particularly that
extended his appreciation for a job well done.
be
The Director asked Goodwin to assemble any press coverage of
Senator Mansfield's favorable statement with respect to our noninvolve-
ment in the Green Beret case.
Goodwin called attention to Stewart Alsop's piece in the 22 Septem-
ber issue of Newsweek, "Why Are the Russians Scared?" He noted that
he has received no inquiries from the press on this matter but added
that to his knowledge this is the first mention in the media of beehive-
shaped installations in North China. The Director suggested that, if
Goodwin is questioned by the press on the reported CIA/KGB cocktail
party conversation, he should simply laugh it off and note that CIA and
KGB officers simply do not converse at diplomatic receptions. DD/P
added that he is in receipt of some report that identifies these SWARFs
as guarded food storage facilities.
*The Director mentioned that he sent the DD/I a newspaper report
that the ChiCorns are moving nuclear facilities to Tibet. The Director
added that he may be questioned on this matter and asked the DD/I to
provide a report.
DDCI noted receipt of a telephone call from Scotty Reston of the
New York Times asking for information on the Chou/Kosygin meeting.
He added that he gave Reston a negative report and noted that the call
was intended for the Director.
*Extracted and sent to action officer
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BY STEWART ALSOP,
WHY ARE THE RUSSIANS SCARED?
WASHINGTON�A few days before Pres-
ident Nixon returned to Washington
last week, a major state paper was de-
livered to him in California. The paper
gave the answer of the Board of Na-
tional Estimates to this question: is
there a serious danger of war between
the Soviet Union and Communist Chi-
na? The board's answer, in non-gov-
ernmentese: indeed there is.
The paper was prepared, of course,
before Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin's
surprise trip to Peking to talk with Chi-
nese Communist Premier Chou En-lai.'
The Kosygin trip may�or may not�
have reduced the danger, but it is
evidence that the danger is taken very
seriously indeed in Moscow.
The Board of National Estimates
represents Washington's "intelligence
community"�the CIA, plus the Penta-�
gon's DIA, the State Department's in-
telligence branch, and the other bu-
reaucracies in the immense Washington
paraphernalia of intelligence. Most of
the board's "national estimates" are fes-
tooned with dissents. Significantly, to
this paper there were no dissents at all.
Only a few months ago, the consen-
sus of the intelligence community was
that the chances of� a; Sino-Soviet war,
despite the bitter rhetoric on both
sides, were near zero. The intermittent
fighting this summer along the frontier
�the Russians charge that no fewer
than 488 Chinese border violations.
have been repulsed by the Soviet Army
since June�has of course influenced
the changed assessment of the danger.
So has the mounting evidence, rein-
forced by Kosygin's trip to Peking, that
the Russians themselves take the dan-
ger with deadly seriousness.
GENUINE DANGER
In recent months, to cite one ex-
ample, Russian Ambassador Anatoly
Dobrynin has gone out of his way, not
once but several times, to warn Secre-
tary of State William Rogers that the
danger of war is very real. In terms of
nuclear power, air power, fire power�
all forms of power except man power�
the Russians are almost as superior to
the Chinese as this country is to, say,
the Mexicans. This raises an obvious
question: why, in heaven's name, are
the Russians scared of the Chinese?
According to the experts in such mat-
ters, the answer falls into four parts:
First, history. The Tartars held Rus-
sia in thrall for 240 years. Ever since,
the Russian people have had a sort of
folk fear of attack from the cast.
Second, geography. The Trans-Sibe-
rian Railway runs in sonic places less
than 10 miles from the Chinese bor-
der. It is the only land link between
European Russia and Asiatic Russia.
To cut it would be to cut Russia in two.
Third, mystery, always a component
of fear. The Russians really do not
know what the Chinese are up to. In
the open Western countries, the KGB,
the Soviet equivalent of the CIA, has
an easy assignment, but in China it has
more than met its match. The Soviet
diplomatic mission in Peking is so iso-
lated that it might just as well be locked
up in Moscow's Lubianka prison.
WHAT ARE THEY?
The Soviet Union, of course, like the
U.S. stages reconnaissance and spy-
satellite flights over China. But these
flights do not really dispel the mystery,
as a recent, rather amusing exchange
between a CIA man and a KGB man in
Washington suggests.
The two met at a diplomatic recep-
tion. The CIA man, a China specialist,
knew that the KGB man specialized in
the same field (the identity of the
KGB men under diplomatic cover is, of
course, known to the CIA). After a bit
of chit-chat, the CIA man brought up a
subject that has mystified the -CIA�
the large numbers of big, beehive-
shaped installations that appear in re-
connaissance pictures of North China.
The CIA knows they are not missile in-
stallations, but has no clue to what
they really are.
The CIA man asked casually wheth-
er the KGB man had noticed these cu-
rious objects. But of course, the KGB
man replied, somewhat nettled�and
proved it by displaying detailed knowl-
edge of what the beehives looked like,
and where they were. And what, the
CIA man asked even more casually, did
his colleague think the purpose of the
installations might be?
"But we have no idea�no idea at
all," said the KGB man, with a mixture
of indignation and chagrin. By the same
token, Soviet intelligence has "no idea
at all" of what Chinese intentions really
are. This makes the Russians deeply
uneasy and is an important element in
the Russian fear of China.
The fourth and most important reason
for the Russian fear of China is that, al-
though they are more polite about it,
Nikita Khruslichev's successors un-
doubtedly share Khrushchev's view
that the Chinese Communist leaders
are irrational�Khrushchcv called them
madmen" and "maniacs."
There is, indeed, a lunatic quality
about the Chinese Communists' ideo-
logical assault on the "Russian revision-
ists." Tass, the Russian news agency,
collects examples of anti-Russian propa-
ganda. One recent item concerned a 4-
year-old girl who had been performing
. her "anti-revisionist dance" poorly, until
inspired by the thoughts of Mao Tse-
tung, when she became the best anti-
-revisionist dancer in her age group. The
Russians would not worry very much
about anti-revisionist dances if they
were not aware that the Chinese Com-
munists are acquiring more lethal.
Means of expressing their hatred.
The Chinese, as the Russians know
all too well, have acquired a respecta-
ble nuclear arsenal, have already de-
ployed medium-range missiles, and are
'working hard on the second stage of a
missile with the range to devastate
European Russia. The Russians also
know that the sacred Maoist doctrine
holds that a thermonuclear war�a war
. which, in Khrushchey's phrase, would
"leave the living envying the dead"�is
not only inevitable but desirable, to
assure the final triumph of Mao-style
Communism.
SHARED FEAR
The Russians' fear of a nuclear-armed
China was shared by President Ken-
nedy even before the Chinese acquired
nuclear weapons. In 1963, he mused
- aloud about "a government that has
called for war, international war, in or-
der to advance the final success of the
Communist cause ... you introduce into
this mix nuclear weapons and [you
have] a more dangerous situation than
we've faced since the end of the sec-
ond world war."
Before he died, President Kennedy
bad secretly ordered a study of the
feasibility of a "surgical operation" to
accomplish the "nuclear sterilization" of
Communist China. Since the nuclear
weapons have been introduced "into
this mix," it is not very surprising that
the Russians should have considered
the same thing. Moreover, they are not
the only people with reason to fear a
nuclear-armed China. Fear of nuclear
weapons in irrational hands is not an
irrational fear.
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