MEMO TO HENRY KISSINGER FROM THEODORE L. ELIOT, JR.

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Fall of the Libyan Monarchy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05140120
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: September 9, 1969

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, 0,C. 20520
September 9, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Enclosed, in response to Colonel Haig's
request, is a memorandum on the background of
the recent coup in Libya. This memorandum has
been cleared with the working level of CIA, and
its transmittal to you has been approved by
Under Secretary Richardson.
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Enclosure:
Paper re Libya
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Wash !neon, D.C. 20520
September 9, 1969
The Fall of the Libyan Monarchy
SUMMARY
The military coup which overthrew 79-year-old King
Idris on September I was a surprise in terms of timing
and the secrecy enveloping the identity of its leader-
ship. We have been aware for some time, however, that
threats were developing to Libya's eighteen-year tradi-
tion of constitutional rule. We have also gone to
unusual extremes for a foreign embassy in admonishing
the Libyan Government about its points of weakness.
In recent years there has been apparent in Libya a
breakdown of political forces that have been kept in
delicate balance since Libya obtained independence in
1951. In the last six months these weaknesses, coupled
with mounting army capabilities and discontent, were
seen to be reaching a dangerous level. Specifically,
they resulted largely from criticism of Libya's passive
and defensive foreign policy, disgust of widespread
corruption, and the increasing weakness and capricious-
ness of the system by which Libya was ruled. They were
heightened by the brief, progressive prime ministership
of Abdul Hamid Bakkush, whom the King dismissed one year
ago.
TRADITIONAL LIBYA
For the first fifteen years of Libyan independence,
the country lived in isolated poverty at the edge of
the Eastern Arab World. King Idris ruled through
personal fiat; government departments were mere empty
vessels for his authority. Other potential sources of
power were either negligible or carefully balanced off
against each other. There was no national figure apart
from the King; there want no political parties; labor
unions were government-controlled and efforts to organize
Libya's students were repeatedly frustrated. The armed
forces were kept weak and balanced by a more numerous
gendarmerie.
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THE MID-1960'S -- A TURNING POINT
The Mid-1960's saw the beginnings of fundamental
change which ultimately created propitious conditions
for the conspirators and finally made possible their
success. Three areas in particular should be noted.
1. The Radicalization of Arab Public Opinion:
The tripartite aggression of 1956 provoked no serious
internal problem for the pro-British Libyan Government.
By contrast, however, when the Arab-Israeli War broke
out in 1967, a number of Libyan military units defected
to the UAR, anti-American and anti-regime mob violence
took the government by surprise, and for almost a week
anarchy reigned. The country at that time was saved
primarily by the rapid collapse and humiliation of the
Arab armies. Soon afterwards, the Crown Prince remarked
that "if the war had lasted another ten or fifteen days,
Libya would have been done for." After 1967 radical
popular opinion in Libya stabilized at a new high level,
and it became more difficult than ever for Americans
to maintain rapport at most levels of Libyan society.
The increased radicalization of the area in general,
moreover, placed Libya's moderate pro-Western regime
under considerable internal and foreign pressure. It
is significant that the new regime's platform calls for
more effective participation in treating the problems
of the Arabs in the Arab World" and for "eliminating
the sterile negativism of the past regarding our
participation in affairs of the world as a whole."
2. Oil Revenues and the Problem of Corruption:
Libya's oil exports and revenues, which had begun at a
small level in 1961, soared spectacularly after the
closure of the Suez Canal in 1967. In 1961 the GOL oil
revenues were only $6 million; in 1968 Libya recorded
its first billion-dollar budget. The expenditure of
these sums, 70 percent of which were spent in development,
produced a natural degree of social dislocation. More
disturbing, however, as an -immediate cause of social
strain was the corruption--in which some American and
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other foreign firms were involved--that inevitably
followed the spending of such large sums. The first
statement by a member of the RCC to our Charge claimed
that the coup was "a reaction against the corruption
and great gap that exists between the Libyan people
and those on the top."
We have been worried over corruption as an emerging
threat to the Libyan Government. Ambassador Newsom on
several occasions warned Libyan leaders of the danger
of this problem. During a call on the King and Queen,
he expressed concern that excessive influence peddling
could have serious political side effects. He remarked,
"Libya should guard against persons gaining great amounts
of money through special influence as this was the sort
of action most likely to alienate public opinion." To
the Crown Prince the Ambassador 'remarked "that commercial
corruption had very serious political effects because
it alienates public opinion. In fact, public disgust
over corruption has been a major cause of public upheavals
against various conservative regimes in Iraq, Sudan, and
Nigeria." Finally, in a call onone of the King's favorites
and chief beneficiaries of the spoils system, he observed
that, while some profit might be the natural result of
influence, he was concerned because "extensive activities
of this kind can have serious political side effects."
3. The Growing Crisis of Leadership: From the mid-
1960's on, King Idris increasingly withdrew from the
practical supervision of affairs and his ability to
concentrate diminished. He once fell asleep during a
meeting with the American Ambassador. These were perhaps
natural failings in a man approaching 80, but they
weakened the monarchy as the keystone of the Libyan
political system. Their effects were the more pronounced
because the King had not allowed any political institu-
tions to develop that could mediate political opinion.
American and British Ambassadors made repeated but
fruitless efforts to persuade him to strengthen the
institutional basis of the state. He also in recent
years became more arbitrary and capricious. In 1964 he
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threatened to abdicate over a suspected challenie to
royal authority. In 1966 he proposed to transform Libya
into a republic by royal fiat. He was dissuaded from
such drastic action, but knowledge of his intent unsettled
Libyan politics. Four Prime Ministers came in and out
of favor between 1966 and 1968. One year before the
coup, younger elements were deeply disappointed by the
King's abrupt dismissal--against strong American and
British advice--of brilliant reformist Prime Minister
Al-Bakkush. The Embassy observed this "was a disturbing
reminder that Libya is ruled by an absolute monarch whose
unpredictable exercise of power may have little relevance
to the real needs of the country." Finally, on the eve
of the coup, consternation spread over the Libyan
political scene at news that the King was again consider-
ing abdication because of clandestine criticism of his
corrupt palace favorites.
THE BALANCE IS UPSET
The strains under which Libya's political structure
found itself as a result of wealth, a radicalized area
and local population, and the increasingly erratic style
of its ruler created a climate for change. The agency
for change however lay elsewhere. In the mid-1960's
the balance between the gendarmerie (CYDEF) and the army
began to be upset by declining police efficiency,
esprit, and training. A report of January 1969 points
out that while throughout the 1950's CYDEF was "a
competent and formidable organization.., the general
level of morale, discipline, and training throughout
CYDEF is now low." U.S. attempts to improve this situation--
brought about by politics and poor leadership--by dis-
patching a top-flight police adviser met with no response.
An offer in 1968 to apply several million dollars due the
GOL to police training was ignored.
The Libyan army, meanwhile, in the words of a report
of April 1969, was being transformed through "rapid
growth in both manpower and personnel, together with the
emergence of a younger, more able officer corps, into a
force to reckon with in Libyan politics." (No security
was afforded the regime by its Minister of Defense,
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a drunk, or the Chief of Staff, who was noted for cronyism
and inefficiency.) A massive build-up of military equip-
ment was projected for the Libyan armed forces, and in
the words of the same report, "leadership of the army
(began) to pass from veterans of World War II to a genera-
tion of younger activists." Clandestine indications of
discontent were also emerging. In April 1969 a dissident
group known as "the Black Boots" was rumored to be
reorganizing. Composed of company grade officers reported-
ly dissatisfied with the corrupt state of the Libyan
Government, the organization believed that the time was
rapidly approaching when the army should assume control
of Libya. An Embassy report of July stated that "younger
army elements have been chafing under a lack of sense of
mission as well as from old guard leadership." Thus by
the summer of 1969, the strains of the GOL and its
weaknesses were apparent, as was the likely source of any
revolutionary effort. No specific information as to
personalities or timing was available, however, prior to
the outbreak of the coup on September 1.
UNIgUENESS OF COUP AND OF LIBYAN SETTING
In the Arab World there is probably no more reserved
or xenophobic population than that of Libya. Libyan
society, one of the most traditional in the Arab World,
was severely disoriented in the twentieth century by the
brutal Italian conquest of the 19201s, the North Africa
campaigns of World War II, and the impact of great wealth
in the 1960's. Libyans, moreover, have always lacked a
sense of national identity. They have had a sense of
inferiority toward their more developed neighbors--
Egypt and the countries of the Maghreb. The impenetra-
bility of Libyan society is highlighted by the surprise
the coup was to us and also to the British--who since
World War II have been primarily responsible for training
and developing the Libyan army. It was, of course, also
a complete surprise to everyone in Libya's far-flung
ruling class, and apparently also to the USSR, Egypt, and
the other Arab states. Libya does not accept military
attaches, and until recently we had only ACSI coverage
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from Wheelus on a restricted level. Our contacts over
the years with Libyan officers have been through the -
NAAG, which by its terms of reference does not have
an intelligence function.
Reportage on the coup's planning was made difficult
also because of the level at which the planning was
carried on. With the exception of its putative leader,
a lieutenant colonel, most of the RCC representatives
with whom we have been in touch rank no higher than first
lieutenant or captain. Very little was known about the
attitudes of Libya's junior officers--their contacts
with foreigners were strictly limited--and their movement
short-circuited the generation of command from which we
expected the challenge to the regime would come. We
know, however, that through the years a large number of
Libyan military officers have received some training in
the U.S. They have almost uniformly been deeply and
favorably impressed by their experience in America. For
this reason there is some basis for considering that the
new Libyan junta's strong expressions of friendship for
the U.S. are sincere and not simply a tactical maneuver.
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