CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1954/04/16

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02870937
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: April 16, 1954

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
LI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: FaC7_9
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: R/7.9_ REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1 1.; I
4lar.
SUMMARY
GENERAL
I. Cease-fire in Indochina seen first French objective at Geneva
(page 3).
2. French officials see no treaty with Vietnam before Geneva (page 3).
FAR EAST
3. Party revolt may force Yoshida's early retirement (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Enemy "smothering" tactics noted at Dien Bien Phu (page 5).
5. Infiltration of Vietnam army held steadily increasing (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Egyptian leader considers adopting anti-Western demagoguery
(page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
8. French cabinet agrees on 25 May for EDC debate (page 8).
* * * *
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INE,
GENERAL
1. Cease-fire in Indochina seen first French objective at Geneva:
Ambassador Dillon believes that the
French government's first objective
at Geneva will be to find a basis for
a cease-fire in Indochina.
In conversation with American repre-
sentatives on 13 April, French officials indicated that they do not
favor negotiations with the Viet Minh or evacuation from Indochina,
but emphasized that there is strong public pressure in France for
a cessation of hostilities.
They maintained that in Indochina, as
in Korea, it is possible to have a cease-fire without a political
settlement. As favorable factors they cited their belief that the
Soviet Union is reluctant to have Indochina fall into Chinese hands
or to risk a general war, that China fears American intervention,
and that both the Vietnamese and the Viet Minh desire to limit
Chinese influence in the area.
Comment: The Communists are be-
lieved to desire cease-fire talks--particularly if proposed by the
French--which could be prolonged to the advantage of the Viet
Minh, The Vietnamese are opposed to a cease-fire.
2. French officials see no treaty with Vietnam before Geneva:
Commissioner General Dejean told
Ambassador Heath's deputy on 13 April
that in his opinion France will not sign
the treaty of independence with Vietnam
before the Geneva conference. Although
both he and Vietnamese prime minister
Buu Loc, who was also present, expressed
hope that agreement could be reached,
Dejean pointed out that the French cabinet is divided on the question
of Vietnam's role in the French Union.
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1.
"VOW
French foreign minister Bidault, in
discussing Vietnamese independence with Secretary Dulles on
14 April, referred to French statements of 1949 and 1953. He
said that if some powers still remain to be transferred, this is
because the Associated States have given little in return, especially
in the military field.
Comment: Previous official comment in
France and Indochina has been optimistic about the early signing of
the treaties. Bidault has long held to the position that the Associated
States should be given independence gradually and within the framework
of the French Union.
French reluctance to sign the agreement
before Geneva will strengthen the Communist charge that the Asso-
ciated States have no justification for being considered sovereign.
FAR EAST
Party revolt may force Yoshida's early retirement:
Japanese prime minister Yoshida may be
forced to retire soon because of a "revolt"
of substantial elements in his Liberal Party
who are now openly opposing his leadership
of the proposed new conservative party, according to Ambassador
Allison. He notes that even if the Progressive Party accepts the merger
proposals of the Liberals for simultaneous dissolution of both parties and
a secret ballot, Yoshida's election as head of the new party is no longer,
certain.
Comment: So long as Yoshida retains
control of the government, his power to dissolve the Diet and call
for new elections remains a strong weapon in his hands. He is not
likely to accept responsibility for the scandals by voluntarily resign-
ing, as the Progressives would like, since he is not personally in-
volved and many of the potential leaders of the new party are implicated.
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LI I.
'ter'
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Enemy "smothering" tactics noted at Dien Bien Phu:
A French clearing operation on 14 April
north of Huguette positions five and two
and Epervier four was stopped by Viet
Minh mine fields and heavy artillery fire,
according to the American army attach�
ombat patrols must now aggressively reopen the
approaches to Huguette one and six in order to resupply these positions,
which are virtually surrounded by enemy entrenchments (see map, p. 6).
The attach�omments that the enemy
encirclement of Huguette's northern positions is part of an anticipated
"smothering" tactic to isolate or pinch off each French position indi-
vidually.
Comment Enemy entrenchments near
French positions serve the double purpose of facilitating further large
assaults and restricting the garrison's defense perimeter. The enemy
is expected to concentrate on the latter tactic during a protracted siege
should future large-scale attacks fail.
5. Infiltration of Vietnam army held steadily increasing
Viet Minh infiltration of lower and middle
echelons of the Vietnam army is steadily
increasing,
at the army is also becoming more effective.
between 4 and 11 April a Vietnamese battalion in Annam went over to
the Viet Minh, taking its arms and equipment.
Enemy propaganda aimed
Comment An intercepted French message,
previously reported, reveals that two Vietnam army battalions in Annam
mutinied in mid-March. The above report apparently refers to a third
unit.
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Nee
X(
308
HUGUETTE
LILY
DIEN BIEN PHU
CLAUDINE"
incl�French CP
15 APRIL 1954,
0
Kilometrs
1 : 25,000 Scale
Former French
positions
Viet Minh,entrench-
ment attempts
Reported Viet
NL4-4-4- Minh mine
fields
,TUNON
X
, Ban Loi
B. Ten
Nong Nhai
B. Khu Lai
Air Strip
ISAWLLE
I I
57 1.-->SJ304
312
)42
ELIANE
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1 L.3 LA IN. L., J.
OP
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Egyptian leader considers adopting anti-Western demagoguery:
Ambassador Caffery believes that Colonel
Nasr� strong Man of the Egyptian military
regime, may be on the verge of concluding
that anti-Western demagoguery is the only
weapon e im n esent difficult political situation. Caffery
notes that Nasr is being widely criticized as "an American tool."
He feels that Nasr is seriously questioning
the political feasibility of a policy of cooperation with the West, par-
ticularly since Nasr sees no indication of early progress in settling
the Anglo-Egyptian dispute or in obtaining American economic assist-
ance.
Comment: Other recent reports from Egypt
have emphasized the possibility that if there is no progress on a Suez
settlement, the Nasr regime might drift into an anti-Western position
and feel forced to condone or support terrorist activity against the
British. There have, however, been no estimates as to how imminent
such developments might be.
7. Egyptian regime expected to dismiss civilian ministers:
the civilian cabinet
ministers who were "influential in the adoption
of the resolution of 25 March" were expected
to resign. The resolution announced the resto-
ration of parliamentary government in Egypt
and the dissolution of the Revolutionary Com-
mand Council.
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Comment: These reports, linked to
indications that Colonel Nasr is strengthening his position, suggest
that further cabinet shuffles may be imminent and that more of the
few competent civilians now in the government may be on the way out.
The 15 April decree debarring virtually
all experienced civilian leaders from political activity will aggravate
the regime's difficulties in obtaining competent high-level advisers.
WESTERN EUROPE
8. French cabinet agrees on 25 May for EDC debate:
According to French NATO representative
Alphand, the French cabinet has unanimously
agreed that National Assembly debate on EDC
will begin on 25 May, without preliminary
debate of the assembly's preconditions.
Alphand also told Ambassador Dillon on
15 April that the Socialists' demand for "democratic control" will
be met by a government statement of willingness to negotiate the
question with the other EDC countries. Alphand said that this was
satisfactory to Socialist leader Guy Mollet,
Comment: The government's decision
should facilitate a French-German agreement on the Saar and on the
manner in which the treaty protocols will be signed by West Germany.
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%...) Ls 14.--d 1N. Ls 1
Nur,
The time lag between the government's
communique and the time for the debate�while necessary to satisfy
Socialist demand for time to call a special congress--gives the oppo-
sition a chance to marshal its forces for a concentrated effort to
bring down the government.
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